Bhagwati, J.

1. The Appellant No. 1 was the Minister of Industries and the Appellant No. 2 was the Secretary to the Government in the Commerce and Industries Department of the State of Vindhya Pradesh. The Appellant No. 1 was charged with having committed offences under Ss. 120-B, 161, 465 and 466 of the Indian Penal Code and the Appellant No. 2 under Ss. 120-B and 161 of the Indian Penal Code as adopted by the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance No. 48 of 1949. They were tried in the Court of the Special Judge at Rewa under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Ordinance No. I.VI of 1949 and the special Judge acquitted both of them.The State of Vindhya Pradesh took an appeal to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Rewa. The Judicial Commissioner reversed the order of acquittal passed by the Special Judge and convicted both the Appellants of the several offences with which they were charged. The Judicial Commissioner awarded to the Appellant No. 1 a sentence of 3 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2000/- in default rigorous imprisonment of 9 months under S. 120-B, Penal Code and a sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment under S. 161, Penal Code, both the sentences to run concurrently. He imposed no sentence upon the Appellant No. 1 under Ss. 465 and 466, Penal Code.He awarded to the Appellant No. 2 a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default rigorous imprisonment for nine months under Section 120-B, Penal Code. He did not award any separate sentence to Appellant No. 2 under S. 161, Penal Code. On an application made to the Judicial Commissioner, Rewa for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court the Judicial Commissioner granted the Appellants leave to appeal under Art. 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution in regard to the four points of law raised in the case before him.

2. The constitutional points involved in the appeal came up for hearing before the Constitution Bench of this Court and were dealt with by the judgment of this Court delivered on22-5-1953. The Constitution Bench held that the appeal to the Judicial Commissioner from the acquittal by the Special Judge was competent and that there was no infringement of the fundamental rights of the Appellants under Arts. 14 and 20 of the Constitution Vide - Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V. P., AIR 1953 SC 394 [LQ/SC/1953/67] (A).The appeal was accordingly directed to be posted for consideration whether it was to be heard on the merits. An application was thereafter made by the Appellants to this Court for leave to urge additional grounds and this Court on 2-10-1953 made an order that the appeal should be heard on merits. The appeal has accordingly come up for hearing and final disposal before us.

3. The case for the prosecution was as follows. By an agreement executed on 1-8-1936 between the Panna Darbar of the one part and the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate represented by Sir Chinubhai Madholal and Hiralala Motilal Shah of the other part, the Panna Durbar granted to the Syndicate a lease to carry on diamond mining operations for a period of 15 years. The period of the lease was to expire on 30-10-1951 but there was an option reserved to the lesee to have a renewal of the lease for a further period of 15 years from the date of such expiration. There were disputes between the Syndicate on the one hand and the Panna Durbar on the other and by his order dated 31-10-1946 the Political Minister of Panna stopped the mining operations of the Syndicate.The State of Panna became integrated in the Unit of Vindhya Pradesh in July 1948 and the administration of Panna came under the control and superintendence of the Government of Vindhya Pradesh with its seat at Rewa under his Highness the Maharaja of Rewa as Rajpramukh and the Appellant No. 1 became the Minister in charge of the Industries Department in the Cabinet which was formed by the Rajpramukh. The Appellant No. 2 held the post of Secretary, Commerce and Industries Department and was working under the Appellant No. 1. On 1-9-1948 the Syndicate appointed one Pannalal as Field Manager to get the said order of the Panna Durbar stopping the working of the mines rescinded.Pannalal made several applications for procuring the cancellation of the said order and on 13-1-1949 and 26-1-1949 Pannalal made two application and handed them over personally to the Appellant No. 1 requesting for the resumption of the mining operations and was asked to come in February for the purpose. The Appellant No. 1 consulted the legal advisers of the State of a questionnaire was framed which was to be addressed to the Syndicate for its answers. When Pannalal went to Rewa the questionnaire was handed over to him on 9-2-1949 for being sent of Sir Chinubhai.Sir Chinubhai sent the replies to the said questionnaire along with a covering letter dated 18-2-1949 wherein he expressed a desire to meet the Appellant No. 1 for personal discussion in regard to the settlement of the matter of the resumption of the mining operations etc. In reply to the telegrams sent by Sir Chinubhai on 19-2-1949, the P. A. to Appellant No. 1 intimated to Sir Chinubhai that he could go to Rewa and see the Appellant No. 1 on 7-3-1949. As Sir Chinubhai was ill he deputed his Personal Assistant, Nagindas Mehta to go to Rewa and see the Appellant No. 1 on his behalf. Nagindas arrived at Rewa on the evening of 6-3-1949.

The Appellant No. 1 had gone out of Rewa and Nagindas had to wait. He saw the Appellant No. 1 on the morning of 8-3-1949 but was asked to see the Appellant No. 2. The Appellant No. 2 saw Nagindas at the Guest House where he had put up and informed Nagindas that a third party was offering Rs. 50,000/- for the mining rights Nagindas told the Appellant No. 2 that the Syndicate was a limited concern and could not afford to pay so much money but if the amount was reduced they would make an effort to pay the sum. The Appellant No. 2 then told Nagindas that he would talk over the matter with the Appellant No. 1 and let him know.

The same day in the afternoon the Appellant No. 2 saw Nagindas at the Guest House and informed him that as the syndicate was working for the last so many years the Appellant No. 1 was prepared to reduce the amount to about Rs. 25,000/-. Nagindas told the Appellant No. 2 that he would talk over the matter with Sir Chinubhai in Bombay and would let him know about it. Nagindas then left for Bombay but he reached Bombay on 29-3-1949 having been detained on the way for some other business of his. He saw Sir Chinubhai in Bombay and reported to him what had happened at Rewa and gave him to understand that resumption orders would not be passed unless a bribe of Rs. 25,000/- was paid.

Sir Chinubhai did not approve of the idea of giving a bribe and suggested that Nagindas should lay a trap for catching the Appellant No. 1 Nagindas sent a telegram 29-3-1949 agreeing to go to Rewa in the week thereafter for completion. On receipt of that telegram, the Appellant No. 2 in the absence of Appellant No. 1 who was on tour sent a telegram on 1-4-1949 to Sir Chinubhai pressing him to come the same week as his presence was essential to complete the matter which had been already delayed.

On 4-4-1949 Pannalal was informed by the Appellant No. 2 that the Appellant No. 1 was leaving for Delhi that day and that he should go to Bombay and send Sir Chinubhai to Delhi to meet the Appellant No. 1 in the Constitution House where he would be staying. He also gave a letter to Pannalal to the same effect. Appellant No. 1 left for Delhi on 4-4-1949 with the files of the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate and reached Delhi on 5-4-1949. On 6-4-1949 the Appellant No. 1 sent a telegram through his P. A. Mukherji to Sir Chinubhai at Bombay asking him to meet the Appellant No. 1 on 7th, 8th or 9th April 1949 at 31 Constitution House for final talks regarding the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate.

On receipt of the said telegram, Sir Chinubhai sent a telegram in reply stating that his Personal Assistant, Nagindas and Pannalal were reaching Delhi on 9-4-1949. Nagindas reached Delhi on 8-4-1949 and put up at the Maidens Hotel and Pannalal reached Delhi on 10-4-1949 and put up at the Regal Hotel. On 9-4-1949 Nagindas informed the Appellant No. 1 on the telephone about his arrival at Delhi and an appointment was fixed for 10-30 A. M. on 10-4-1949. Nagindas contacted Shri Bambawala, the Inspector-General of Police, of the Special Police Establishment on the morning of 10-4-1949 before coming to meet the Appellant No. 1 and told him how the Appellant No. 1 was coercing him to pay a bribe.

Shri Bambarwala referred Nagindas to Pandit Dhanraj, Super-intendent, Special Police Establishment and Nagindas told him the whole story of his harassment by the Appellant No. 1 and it was then decided to lay a trap for Appellant No. 1. Nagindas informed Pandit Dhanraj that he would meet the Appellant No. 1 at about 11 A. M. and then report their talk to him in the afternoon. Nagindas then saw the Appellant No. 1 at the Constitution House at the appointed time and at this meeting the Appellant No. 1 demanded from Nagindas a sum of Rs. 25,000 as a bribe for allowing the resumption of the mining operations and made it quite clear that he would not accept anything less than Rs. 25,000.

As Nagindas had not received the moneys from Bombay, the following day, i.e. 11-4-1949 at 3 P. M. was fixed for the next meeting. Nagindas thereafter informed Pandit Dhanraj as to what had taken place at the aforesaid meeting between him and the Appellant No. 1. Nagindas went to the Constitution House and saw the Appellant No. 1 at about 3 P. M. on 11-4-949. Pannalal was already there. Nagindas and the Appellant No. 1 went into the bedroom where Nagindas requested the Appellant No. 1 to extend the period of the lease for 10 years so that the Syndicate might be compensated for the loss sustained by the stoppage of the mining operations.

The Appellant No. 1 thereupon asked Nagindas to submit a written application in Hindi and as Nagindas did not know it he called Pannalal into the bedroom and asked him to write out an application to that effect. The Appellant No. 1 after making sure from Pannalal that Pannalal was present at Rewa on the 1st April 1949 asked Pannalal to put the date on the said application as 1-4-1949. The Appellant No. 1 made an endorsement at the foot of the said application and dated it as of 1-4-1949. It was arranged that Nagindas should see the Appellant No. 1 at 9 P. M. that day, that Nagindas should pay Rs. 25,000 to the Appellant No. 1 at that time and the Appellant No. 1 would deliver the resumption order to Nagindas on payment of the said sum of Rs. 25000.

Nagindas then left the Constitution House and reported to Pandit Dhanraj what had transpired between him and the Appellant No. 1. He further told Pandit Dhanraj that he had not received any moneys upto that time. Pannalal was asked to proceed to the Constitution House in advance and inform the Appellant No. 1 that Nagindas would be coming along at P. M. that night. Nagindas and Pandit Dhanraj then proceeded to the house of Shri Shanti Lal Ahuja, Additional District Magistrate. Pandit Dhanraj made arrangements for a raiding party. Nagindass statement was recorded on oath and a search of his person was made and he was then given three bundles containing 250 Government Currency Notes of Rs. 100 and a memorandum of the same also prepared.

After these formalities were gone through Pundit Dhanraj, Nagindas and the Additional District Magistrate along with the police party left for the Constitution House. It was arranged that Pannalal should be sent out by Nagindas after the completion of the transaction, on some pretext or other to the taxi waiting outside and that this would serve at a signal for the raiding party which would rush into the room No. 31 Constitution House which was occupied by the Appellant No. 1. Nagindas then went inside the suite of rooms occupied by the Appellant No. 1 and the Appellant No. 1 took him to his bedroom and closed the door which connected the bedroom with the sitting room where Pannalal was already waiting.

After this the Appellant No. 1 handed over the resumption order to Nagindas and on reading the same Nagindas found that the extention given was only for 4 years and he asked the Appellant No. 1 why this was so when the Appellant No. 1 had promised before to give an extension for 10 years. On this the Appellant No. 1 told Nagindas that he should put up another application after a few months and then the Appellant No. 1 would extend the period. Appellant No. I then signed the resumption order and put down the date thereunder as 2-4-1949.

As soon as the signed order was handed over to him, Nagindas handed over to the Appellant No. 1 the Government currency notes of the value of Rs. 25,000 which had been given to him previously by the Additional District Magistrate. Nagindas then asked or an extra copy of the said order and the same was accordingly given to him after being dated and initialled by the Appellant No. 1. The Appellant No. 1 took the government currency notes and put them in the upper drawer of the dressing table in the bedroom. After the transaction was thus completed Nagindas shouted to Pannalal to go to the taxi and bring his cigarette case.

Pannalal went out to the taxi and on receipt of this signal, the Additional District Magistrate and Pandit Dhanraj rushed into the sitting room along with the other members of the raiding party. The Appellant No. 1 met the raiding party at the communicating door between the two rooms. After the Additional District Magistrate and Pandit Dhanraj had disclosed their identity Appellant No. 1 was asked by Pandit Dhanraj whether he had received any money as a bribe to which the Appellant No. 1 replied in the negative. Pandit Dhanraj then told Appellant No. 1 that he should produce the money which he had received, otherwise he would be forced to search the room.

On this Appellant No. 1 went to the said dressing table, opened the top drawer and brought out the three bundles of Government currency notes given to him by Nagindas and handed them over to Pandit Dhanraj. On inquiry by the Additional District Magistrate as to how he had come into possession of the said notes, the Appellant No. 1 stated that he had brought Rs. 40,000 from his home out of which Rs. 15,000 had been sent by him in the purchase of a motor car and the remaining sum was with him which was required by him to purchase some ornaments in connection with the marriage of his daughter.

In this meanwhile two respectable witnesses, Shri Gadkari, who was a member of the Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, Government of India and Shri Perulakar, who was the Minister for Agriculture and Labour, Madhya Bharat, were brought to the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 by the police. The Appellant No. 1 repeated the said statement and gave the same explanation before these two witnesses which he had given and made before the Additional District Magistrate and Pandit Dhanraj a little while before. Nagindas was then searched in the presence of these two witnesses and the two copies of the order which had been given to him by Appellant No. 1 were recovered from his person.

Two other copies of the said order and the application and the file of the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate were recovered from the search of the upper drawer of the dressing table in the bedroom of Appellant No. 1. Appellant No. I also produced a receipt in support of his story of the purchase of the car. The relevant memos of the search were prepared and also a list of the numbers of the Government currency notes of Rs. 25,000 which had been produced by the Appellant No. 1. This list was compared and checked by the said witness Gadkari and Perulakar with the numbers of notes and also with those appearing in the list which was in the possession of the additional District Magistrate and which was shown to the said witnesses.

They found that the numbers in said two lists tallied in all respects. After the completion of the list the Additional District Magistrate confronted Appellant No. 1 with the documents which were produced before him by Nagindas and also the list of notes and asked Appellant No. 1 if he had any explanation to offer. The Appellant No. I was confused and could give no explanation. On further enquiry whether the Appellant No. I had any other money with him, he opened an iron confidential box a key of which was in his possession and brought out a sum of Rs. 132/- which was not taken charge of as the same had no concern with the case. Thereafter Appellant No. I was put under arrest and was subsequently released on bail.

4. Further investigation was carried on by the police and on the 6th December 1949 the Appellant No. 1 and2 were placed on trial before the Court of the Special Judge and charged with having committed the several offences mentioned above.

5. The defence taken up by both the Appellant consisted in the main of a denial of the prosecution case. The defence version briefly was that the affairs of the Panna Mining lease were hanging fire for long thereby causing loss to the State revenues. The Appellant No. I on the representation of Pannalal got the files examined officially in the Secretariat and after consulting the Judicial Department of the Vindhya Pradesh framed a questionnaire to clarify certain issues before passing final orders. One of such issues was whether the lessee, i.e., the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate had incurred a liability of Rs. 25,000/- as liquidated damages for breach of the terms of the mining agreement.

A reply to the questionnaire was received in due course and Sir Chinubhai, the Managing Director of the Syndicate himself expressed keeness to meet the Appellant No. 1 and personally discuss the matters. On the 1st April 1949 Pannalal the local representative of the Syndicate made an application for the extension of the period of lease and resumption of the mining operations.

As the matter had already received the attention of the Appellant No. I having been kept pending since February 1940 and further delay would have caused loss to the revenues of the State the Appellant No. I passed an order on the 2nd April 1949 granting the resumption of the mining operation for a period of four years but reserved orders as to extension of the lease and also the rights of the State on certain outstanding points of the dispute; in other words excepting for the order as to resumption and extension for a small period all other questions as to the disputes between the parties and financial claims were kept pending.

That since a fresh area containing a diamond plug was discovered and it had to be exploited and since all matters regarding the affairs of the Syndicate had not been settled the Appellant No. I when proceeding to Delhi asked Sir Chinubhai to come there believing that he having not come to Rewa, Delhi might suit his convenience better as a venue of meeting. That on the 11th April 1949 at about 9 P. M. the Appellant learnt that Nagindas Mehta and Pannalal had come to meet him. When the Appellant No. I came out to the sitting room he found Nagindas talking to Pannalal and taking certain papers from him and placing them in a porfiolio.

Nagindas told the Appellant No. I that he wanted to talk to him. Thereupon the Appellant No. 1 and Nagindas came inside the other room and Nagindas took his seat on a chair lying near the chest of drawers. After a few minutes talk when it appeared to the Appellant No. 1 that the matter would take some time and it was getting rather later for dinner in the Constitution House he asked Nagindas to accompany him to dinner but since Nagindas wanted to be excused and preferred to wait, he started for the Dining Hall. As he entered the siting room he heard Nagindas calling out to Pannalal to fetch his cigaratee case. Pannalal got up and went out.

When the Appellant No. 1 walked up to the door opening in the Varandah connecting the corridor leading to the Dining Hall he met two gentlemen who had come to make enquiries about his son-in-law, and while the Appellant No. 1 was talking to these persons the raiding party came up. One of the persons introduced himself as a Magistrate and the other as a Superintendent of Police and told the Appellant No. 1 that it had been reported to them that the Appellant No. had accepted a bribe. The Appellant No. 1 denied it. Thereupon the persons who had introduced themselves as Police Superintendent and the Magistrate entered his room. The Superintendent of Police told Nagindas that the Appellant No. 1 was denying having taken any bribe and asked him where the bribe money was.

Nagindas pointed out towards the top drawer of the dressing table, the Superintendent of Police proceeded towards it and brought out the bundles of notes from it. The Appellant No. 1 on being asked if he had any money of his own in the room replied that he had brought Rs. 25,000 from his home, out of which he had spent Rs. 15,000/- in purchase of car, about Rs. 10,000/- in purchase of ornaments for the marriage of his daughter and a small balance was left with him. A cash box of steel belonging to Appellant No. 1 was opened, and a receipt for the purchase of a car and hundred rupees and odd were found therein.

6. The Appellant No. 2 in his defence denied that he ever conspired with the Appellant No. 1 to obtain illegal gratification from Sir Chinubhai or that he made any suggestions whatever in relations to the obtaining of the alleged illegal gratification.

His case also was that all the files relating to the affairs of the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate were examined officially in the Secretariat, that the questionnaire was drafted consultation with the Judicial Department and several authorities were of the opinion that under the terms of the agreement the State was entitled to a claim of Rs. 25,000/- as liquidate damages from the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate. Sir Chinubhai himself was anxious to meet the Appellant No. 1 and he had written to him that he would himself like to come and discuss the matter. In March 1949 when Nagindas came he never talked to him anything about any payment being made to the Appellant No. 1.

7. These were the rival versions which were sought to be supported by the prosecution as well as the defence before the Special Judge. The Appellant No. 1 led evidence in defence. The Special Judge held that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges which had been framed against the Appellants. He commented adversely upon the evidence of Nagindas and Sir Chinubhai and refused to accept the same. He came to the conclusion that Nagindas had decided to entrap the Appellant No. 1 and inveigled the police into lending him their help to achieve his nefarious object and planted the Government currency notes of the value of Rs. 25,000 in the top drawer of the dressing table in the bedroom when the back of the Appellant No. 1 was turned against him.

He characterised the evidence of Pandit Dhanraj and Gurudas Mal, the police witnesses and also of Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate as that of Partisan witnesses who were out to entrap the Appellant No. 1 at the instance of Nagindas. He disbelieved the evidence of Gadkari and Perulakar, characterising their version of the statement alleged to have been made by the Appellant No. 1 to them as fantastic and unworthy of credence. He found that the whole affair was got up between Nagindas and the police with a view to entrap an importance person like the Appellant No. 1 and acquitted both the Appellants.

8. The Judicial Commissioner on the other hand was emphatic in his condemnation of the judgment of the Special Judge which he characterised as a perverse judgment.

The Judicial Commissioner was of the opinion that Nagindas and Sir Chinuhbai were actuated with the best of motives, that the Appellant No. 1 and Appellant No. 2 had conspired to get illegal gratification in the sum of Rs. 25,000 for the Appellant No. 1, that the evidence of Nagindas which did not require any corroboration was nevertheless corroborated in material particulars by the evidences, on the record, that the application for extension bearing date the 1st April 1949 and the resumption order bearing date the 2nd April 1949 were in fact brought into existence at the Constitution. House on the 11th April 1940 and dated with a view to make it appear as if the application had been handed over on the 1st April 1949 and the resumption order was signed on the 2nd April 1949 at Rewa and were therefore forged, that the Appellant No. 1 had accepted the bribe of Rs. 25,000 against the delivery of the resumption order by him to Nagindas, that the statement made by the Appellant No. 1 to Shanti Lal Ahuja the Additional District Magistrate was admissible in evidence, that the evidence of Gadkari and Perulakar was worthy of credence in spite of whatever criticism had been levelled against it by the Special Judge and that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused.

He therefore reserved the order of acquittal passed by the Special Judge in favour of the appellants and convicted the Appellants of the several offences with which they were charged and sentenced them as above.

9. The appeal before us was very elaborately argued on behalf of the Appellants and we were taken through the evidence of the several witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution in great detail. We heard the appeal as an appeal on questions of fact with a view to see whether the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner reversing the acquittal of the Appellants by the Special Judge was justified. It was impressed upon us that when the Special Judge had acquitted the Appellants the presumption of innocence was redoubled and the Judicial Commissioner would not be justified in reversing the order of acquittal unless three were substantial and compelling reasons for doing so.

The position in regard to interference with orders of acquittal by the Trial Court has been thus summarised in the latest judgment of this Court in - C. M. Narayan v. State of Trav. Co., in AIR 1953 SC 478 [LQ/SC/1952/70] (B). The Appellant Court has full powers to review the entire evidence but proper weight and consideration should be given to the following matters:

(1)The views of the Trial Court as to the credibility of witnesses,

(2)The presumption of innocence which is strengthened by the acquittal,

(3)The right of the accused to the benefit of the doubt, and

(4)The reluctance of the Appeal Court to disturb a finding arrived at by the Trial Judge after seeing the witnesses.

10. It may be observed at the outset that so far as the events that happened at Rewa were concerned the only evidence on behalf of the prosecution consisted of the evidence of Nagindas corroborated as it may be by that of Pannalal. After Nagindas left Rewa he saw Sir Chinubhai in Bombay on the 29th March 1949 and he gave his report to Sir Chinubhai of what had transpired at Rewa. The evidence of Sir Chinubhai also there-fore had corroborative value. These events had a direct bearing on the complicity of the Appellant No. 2 with the whole affair.

The Appellant No. 2 and nothing to do with the events that happened after the 4th April 1949 when the Appellant No. 1 went to Delhi and he dropped out altogether. The events that happened in Delhi concerned only the Appellant No. 1. The evidence led by the prosecution in regard to these later events consisted of that of Nagindas and Pannalal, that of the police officers, Pandit Dhanraj and Gurudas Mal as also the Additional District Magistrate, Shanti Lal Ahuja and that of Gadkari and Perulakar, who were called to the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 in the Constitution House after the raid was effected.

11. It was urged that the evidence of Nagindas was that of an accomplice both in regard to the forgery of the documents and the giving of the bribe to the Appellant No. 1, Pannalal was also a co-conspirator of his particularly in the matter of the forgery of the documents and the evidence of these two witnesses therefore could not be said to be untainted and could not be accepted without the closest scrutiny and independent corroboration.

It must be said however that neither Nagindas nor Pannalal nor as a matter of fact Sir Chinubhai, their principal was a willing party to the giving of the bribe to the Appellant No. 1 and were only actuated with the motive of trapping the Appellant No. 1 Their evidence therefore could not be treated as the evidence of accomplices. Their evidence was nevertheless the evidence of partisan witnesses who were out to entrap the Appellant No. 1. A perusal of the evidence of Nagindas and Sir Chinubhai leaves in the mind the impression that they were not witnesses whose evidence could be taken at its face value.

When Nagindas was cornered in regard to the non-mention of the specific sum of Rs. 25,000 as bribe at Rewa he had resort to a slip of memory or forgetfulness as an excuse for not having mentioned the specific sum in his evidence. When Sir Chinubhai also was confronted with a similar situation he trotted out the excuse that the statements which he had made on the earlier occasions were incomplete and that was so not because he made an incomplete statement but the recording thereof was incomplete. This excuse also could not avail him because in the next breath he stated that his typist had typed the statements as he was making the same and therefore there could be no question at all of the recording of the statement having been in any manner incomplete.

The evidence of these two witnesses was not satisfactory and could not be relied upon for implicating the Appellants without independent corroboration. The Judicial Commissioner sought corroboration so far as the testimony of Nagindas is concerned from his conduct and his reports from time to time to persons in authority and from what he found to be the events of the 11th April 1949 and the conduct and the statements of the Appellant No. 1 himself. This corroboration in his opinion was sufficient to rehabilitate the evidence of Nagindas.

12. The part played by Nagindas in the whole affair was not at all commendable. After Sir Chinubhai refused to fall in with the suggestion of giving a bribe to the Appellant No. 1 Sir Chinubhai suggested to him that he should try and trap the Appellant No. 1.Nagindas entertained the notion of trapping Appellant No. 1 at Rewa and the idea of trapping the Appellant No. 1 at Delhi entered his mind only after the Appellant No. 1 went to Delhi on the 4th April 1949. Nagindas was sent to Delhi by Sir Chinubhai and after he reached Delhi he consulted some friends of his and approached Shri Bambawala, the Inspector-General of Police of the Special Police Establishment.

He had not got with him the sum of Rs. 25,000 which was to be given as a bribe to the Appellant No. 1 nor was he in a position to procure the same. He went on communicating with Sir Chinubhai for obtaining these moneys and it is clear on the evidence that Sir Chinubhai was not in a position to and in fact declined to sent the necessary moneys. Nagindas however kept on promising the police authorities that he was getting the moneys in a short time and had several interviews with Pandit Dhanraj in the course of which he promised Pandit Dhanraj that the moneys would be forthcoming.

He also saw the Appellant No. 1 and fixed up an appointment with him for the afternoon of the 11th April 1949 and when the matters came to the pass when the details of the raid had to be fixed up Pandit Dhanraj found that Nagindas was not in a position to obtain the moneys from Bombay and himself offered to produce the sum so that the Appellant No. 1 could be trapped. It appears that Nagindas was at no time in a position to procure these moneys from Bombay and he all the time procure these moneys from Bombay and he all the time played with Pandit Dhanraj and inveigled him into the belief that the moneys would be forthcoming.

Pandit Dhanraj and the Special Police Establishment were also willing tools in the hands of Nagindas. They thought that there was a great opportunity of trapping Appellant No. 1 who was an important person occupying the position of the Minister of Industries in Vindhya Pradesh and they did not want to miss the opportunity and therefore procured the moneys even though Nagindas was not in a position to do so. It almost appears as if they were out to oblige Nagindas and brought about a situation whereby through the instrumentality of Nagindas they got at the Appellant No. 1.

Not only was the police force requistioned in the organising of the raid but they also enlisted the aid of Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate who took down the statement of Nagindas searched his person, prepared a memorandum of the notes which were handed over to him and actually accompanied the raiding party to the Constitution House. The Additional District Magistrate was thus made a member of the raiding party itself and was reduced to the position of a witness. The evidence of the police witnesses as also of the Additional District Magistrate thus was tainted as that of partisan witnesses and no corroboration could be derived by Nagindas from the evidence of these witnesses.

No such criticism could however be levelled against the evidence of Gadkari and Perulakar, who were absolutely independent witnesses brought into the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 after the raid was over. They had nothing to do with the affairs of the Syndicate nor with the intention of Nagindas or the police authorities to trap the Appellant No. 1.

They came on the scene after the whole affair was practically over and the stage had been reached when it was necessary to compare the numbers of the notes which had been recovered from the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 with the numbers of the notes which had been handed over to Nagindas when the raid was being organised. It was at that stage that they figured in the transaction. Their evidence could certainly not be impeached as that of partisan witnesses.

13. It is with this background that we have to scrutinise the evidence which has been led on behalf of the prosecution and come to a conclusion whether the prosecution has established its case against the Appellants. So far as the Appellant No. 2 is concerned, his connection with the affair as already stated ceased with the 4th April 1949. There is no doubt that the Panna Durbar had stopped the mining operations which were conducted by the Syndicate under the terms of the lease which it had obtained from them and that the departmental working of the mines by the State and not been quite satisfactory. There were disputes between the Syndicate on the one hand and the Panna Durbar on the other as regards the liability of the respective parties for the stoppage of the work.

The Panna Durbar had been claiming liquidated damages from the Syndicate and the Syndicate was claiming compensation for wrongful stoppage of the mining operations. It was at this stage that the State of Panna merged into the Unit of Vindhya Pradesh and the Appellant No. 1 was appointed the Minister of Industries in the newly organised State. He took up the threads of the dispute. Pannalal who was appointed the representative of the syndicate in Rewa made the applications of the 13th January 1949 and the 26th January 1949 for the Syndicate being allowed to resume the mining operations and a questionnaire was issued by the Appellant No. 1 for being answered by the Syndicate before any final conclusion could be arrived at by him in regard to these applications.

This questionnaire was framed after consulting the legal advisers of the State and the bone of contention between the parties was the claim for liquidated damages made by the State against the Syndicate and the compensation which was claimed by the Syndicate from the State for the wrongful stoppage of the work. When the questionnaire was answered Sir Chinubhai expressed a desire to see the Appellant No. 1 with a view to discuss the whole situation and it was in response to that desire on the part of Sir Chinubhai that the appellant No. 1 gave an appointment to him at Rewa for the 7th March 1949. The whole march of events thus up to the 7th March 1949 was normal and was not at all suggestive of any mental reservation on the part of the Appellant No. 1.

Whatever part the Appellant No. 2 took in the affair up to the 7th March 1949 was in his capacity as the Secretary, Commerce and Industries Department working under the Appellant No. 1 and there is nothing which can be suggested against the Appellant No. 2 so far as his participation in the affair till that date was concerned.

It was only on the 8th March 1949 that the prove caution alleged the Appellant No.1 entered into a conspiracy with the Appellant No. 2 to set an illegal gratification for the Appellant No. 1 and the manner in which it was done was that the Appellant No. 2 told Nagindas at the Guest House where he saw him after having seen the Appellant No. 1 that a third party was offering Rs. 50,000 as illegal gratification to the Appellant No. 1 for having the right of working the mines but that the Appellant No. 1 would prefer to give the mining rights to the Syndicate having regard to the fact that they had been working the mines previously.

It was alleged that thereupon Nagindas wanted the Appellant No. 2 to have the amount reduced at far as possible and when the Appellant No. 2 saw Nagindas later in the afternoon of that day he told Nagindas that the Appellant No. 1 was prepared to accept Rs. 25,000. This was the part alleged to have been taken by the Appellant No. 2 in the affair at Rewa and from this was sought to be spelt out a conspiracy on his part with the Appellant No. 1 to get that illegal gratification for the Appellant No. 1.

A further piece of evidence which was sought to be relied upon in this connection was the telegram which was despatched by Nagindas from Bombay on the 29th March 1949 wherein he stated : "Agreed coming by next week for completion. Details posted", which according to the prosecution showed that Sir Chinubhai was agreeable to the proposal which had been made by the Appellant No. 2 in regard to the giving of the bribe of Rs. 25,000 to the Appellant No. 1.

14. The evidence of Nagindas in regard to the participation of the Appellant No. 2 in the affair consisted of his version of the conversation which took place between him and the Appellant No. 2 at the Guest House. It is significant however to observe that the word bribe or illegal gratification was never used by Nagindas in this connection. He no doubt talked about the third party offering Rs. 50,000 for obtaining the lease from the State. But that could as well have been a premium for obtaining the lease and was not necessarily illegal gratification to the offered to be Appellant No. 1.

Even in regard to the sum of Rs. 25,000 if at all it was ever mentioned in the conversation between Nagindas and the Appellant No. 2 it could as well refer to the sum of Rs. 25,000 which was demanded by the State as liquidated damages from the Syndicate and which could also be a premium of a fine for the resumption of the mining operations. If therefore the Appellant No. 2 did not mention all this as a bribe or illegal gratification they very foundation for the suggestion that he was a party to a conspiracy with the Appellant No. 1 for obtaining bribe or illegal gratification in the manner alleged by the prosecution disappears.

When Nagindas made his statement before Pandit Dhanraj when the raid was organised and also after the recovery of the sum of Rs. 25,000 from the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 he did not mention to the police that the sum of Rs. 25,000 was fixed at Rewa. The only thing which he states was that Rs. 50,000 was mentioned in the first instance but that he asked the Appellant No. 2 to see if the amount could be reduced and the matter was left at that. The first mention of the sum of Rs. 25,000 was in the conversation which Nagindas ultimately had with the Appellant No. 1 at the Constitution House on the 10th April 1949 when it was alleged that the Appellant No. I told him that nothing less than Rs. 25,000 would be acceptable to him.

The evidence of Sir Chinubhai also could not corroborate Nagindas in this behalf. Sir Chinubhai prevaricated in the matter of the figure of Rs. 25,000 and the statement which he had made to the police when he was examined in the course of the investigation was incomplete. He never mentioned the figure of Rs. 25,000 as having been fixed by Nagindas with the Appellant No.2 at Rewa.

If thus the evidence of these two witnesses Nagindas and Sir Chinubhai was not sufficient to fix up the sum of Rs. 25,000 as having been demanded by the Appellant No. 2 for being given as a bribe or illegal gratification to the Appellant No. 1 at Rewa-and be it noted that Pannalal in his behalf-there was a conspiracy hatched between the Appellant No. 2 and the Appellant No. 1 at Rewa for obtaining illegal gratification for the Appellant No. 1.

As a matter of fact the name of the Appellant No. 2 was not at all mentioned in the first information report which was given at Delhi on the night of the 11th April 1949 and it was only when the Statement came to be made by Nagindas that for the first time there was a mention of the Appellant No. 2 as having been concerned in any manner whatever with the affair at Rewa. The telegram which was despatched by Nagindas from Bombay on the 1st April 1949 also was never understood to refer to an agreement by Sir- Chinubhai to pay a sum of Rs. 25,000 to the Appellant No. 1 but only referred to an agreement by Sir Chinubhai to go to Rewa to consul the Appellant No. 1 in regard to the affairs of the Syndicate.

Even assuming that the Appellant No. 2 told Nagindas in the course of the conversations at the Guest House on the 8th March 1949 that Rs. 50,000 were offered by a third party for the rights of working the diamond mins and that amount could be reduced having regards to the fact that the Syndicate had been working the mines for a considerable period of time the part which Appellant No. 2 took in the affair was merely that of messenger of the Appellant No. 1 conveying the information to Nagindas.

Howsoever reprehensible his conduct may be in the matter of conveying the information from the Appellant No. 1 to Nagindas which information paved the way for the demand by the Appellant No. 1 of a bribe or illegal gratification, the part which the Appellant No. 2 took in the affair was not sufficient to establish the conspiracy between the Appellant No. 1 and Appellant No. 2 as alleged by the prosecution.

15. The evidence of Nagindas and Sir Chinubhai in regard to the complicity of the Appellant No. 2 in the affair was thus absolutely insufficient to establish the guilt of the Appellant No. 2 and there was no justification whatsoever for the Judicial Commissioner coming to the conclusion that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of the Appellant No. 2.

In our opinion therefore the Appellant No. 2 was wrongly convicted and his conviction for the offences under Sections 120-B and 161 is liable to be set aside. It follows that the conviction of the Appellant No. 1 also under Section 120-B is liable to be set aside.

16. As regard the Appellant No. 1, there was nothing in the events upto the 4th April 1949 which connected him directly with the affair. The applications had been from time to time by Pannalal for the resumption of the mining operations of the Syndicate and up to the 1st April 1949 in any event nothing had transpired beyond the issue of the questionnaire and the answers thereto given by Sir Chinubhai some time towards the middle of February 1949. Nagindas had seen the Appellant No. 1 on the 8th March 1949 but had been asked by him to see the Appellant No. 2 and there was no conversation between the Appellant No. 1 and Nagindas at all on this occasion.

After the 8th March 1949 also the matter had rested and Sir Chinubhai was the only person expected to see the Appellant No. 1 in order to straighten out the whole situation. The telegram dated the 29th March 1949 sent by Nagindas only intimated that Sir Chinubhai was agreeable to go to Rewa and see the Appellant No. 1 there in the following week. The file of the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate showed the progress of these events and the last entry recorded therein showed that on the 1st April 1949 a telegram was sent to Sir Chinubhai asking him to go over to Rewa next week as the matter had been considerably delayed.

It appears that the Appellant No. 1 had to go to Delhi by the 4th April 1949 and in view of that a letter was handed over to Pannalal asking Sir Chinubhai to see the Appellant No. 1 at Delhi.

The Appellant No. 1 reached Delhi on the 5th April 1949 and on the 6th April 1949 a telegram was sent by his P. A. to Sir Chinubhai asking him to see the Appellant No. 1 at 31 Constitution House on the 7th, 8th or 9th April for final talks regarding the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate. Sir Chinubhai sent a reply on the 9th April 1949 intimating that his Personal Assistant and Pannalal were reaching Delhi on the 9th with full power to negotiate with the Appellant No. 1 on his behalf.

17. So far the matters did not appear to have any sinister or untoward significance. Nagindas had up to this time the talks with the Appellant No. 2 which have been above referred to and he no doubt appears to have carried the impression that whatever sum was demanded by the Appellant No. 2 was by way of bribe or illegal gratification for the Appellant No. 1. The Appellant No. 2 however could not be said to have definitely breached the topic in the manner suggested by the Prosecution and the Appellant No. 1 was certainly not directly connected with these talks.

The file of the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate was no doubt taken by the Appellant No. 1 to Delhi but that was for the apparent purpose of talking over them matters with Sir Chinubhai when he went to Delhi as required on or about the 8th or 9th April 1949. It was only Nagindas who had the idea of the bribe or illegal gratification to be paid to the Appellant No. 1 at the back of his mind when he arrived in Delhi on the 9th April 1949 and he came there with the definite idea of trapping the Appellant No. 1. The events that happened in Delhi after the arrival of Nagindas on the 9th April 1949 assumed a definite shape when Nagindas saw the Appellant No. 1 at the Constitution House at about 11 A. M. on the 10th April 1949.

Before he saw the Appellant No. 1 Nagindas had made his contacts with Shri Bambawala and Pandit Dhanraj had acquainted them with the intentions of the Appellant No. 1 as he understood them to be. A definite arrangement was arrived at between Pandit Dhanraj and Nagindas at this time to trap the Appellant No. 1. Whether the idea of trapping the Appellant No. 1 originated with Pandit Dhanraj as he stated in his evidence or it originated with Nagindas and was communicated by him in his turn to Pandit Dhanraj the fact remains that at this meeting between Pandit Dhanraj and Nagindas an arrangement was definitely arrived at between them to trap the Appellant No.1.

Nagindas thereafter saw the Appellant No. 1 at the Constitution House and it was at that meeting that the Appellant No. 1 according to Nagindas definitely intimated to him that no less than a sum of Rs. 25,000 would be acceptable to the Appellant No. 1 by way of bribe or illegal gratification for giving of the resumption order in favour of the Syndicate. All this was communicated by Nagindas in his turn to Pandit Dhanraj and Nagindas contrived with the help of the police authorities to obtain the sum of Rs. 25,000 which was ultimately to be passed on to the Appellant No. 1.

When Nagindas saw the Appellant No. 1 in the afternoon of the 11th April 1949 at the Constitution House the Appellant No. 1 asked Nagindas to hand in an application in Hindi for the resumption of the mining operations by the Syndicate. Pannalal who was taken there by Nagindas was called into the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 and he wrote out an application in Hindi with the pen of Nagindas, and put down the date the 1st April 1949 at the foot of the application at the instance of the Appellant No. 1 who ascertained from Pannalal that he was present at Rewa on that date.

Whether this date the 1st April 1949 was subscribed to the application by Pannalal at the instance of the Appellant No. 1 or at the instance of Nagindas makes not the slightest difference because if the date the 1st April 1949 was appended thereto though the application was written on the 11th April 1949 the offence of forgery would be complete. The Appellant No. 1 had the file of the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate with him and the application thus written out by Pannalal was endorsed by the Appellant No. 1 to the effect that the application should be put with the file before him.

This endorsement was also subscribed as of the 1st April 1949 and the application was put by the Appellant No. 1 in the file. Nagindas thereafter left the Constitution House promising the Appellant No. 1 that he would attend again at 9 P. M. with the requisite amount. The Appellant No. 1 thereafter dictated the resumption order to his stenographer, Mukherji who took down the dictation on loose sheets of paper, transcribed the same on the typewriter, prepared four copies of the same and these documents were kept ready by the Appellant No. 1 before 9 P. M. when Pannalal and shortly thereafter Nagindas saw him at the Constitution House.

Pannalal was kept waiting in the outer room and Nagindas and the Appellant No. 1 went into the bedroom. Nagindas was then handed over the resumption order which had been kept ready typed by the Appellant No. 1 and when he noticed that instead of the 10 years extention which was talked about between himself and the Appellant No. 1 the resumption order mentioned only an extension of four years he brought that fact to the notice of the Appellant No. 1 but the Appellant No. 1 consoled him by stating that the requisite extension for the further period would be granted later on an application being made in that behalf a few months thereafter.

The appellant No. 1 signed the resumption order and dated it the 2nd April 1949 and handed it over to Nagindas who asked for another copy of the same whereupon the Appellant No. 1 also initialled another copy and handed it over to Nagindas. After this was done Nagindas handed over to the Appellant No. 1 the sum of Rs. 25,000 which he had got from Pandit Dhanraj before the raid was organised and the Appellant No. 1 put the bundles of currency notes in the top drawer of the dressing table in his bedroom. Nagindas thereafter shouted to Pannalal to bring his cigaratte case from the taxi and on that prearranged signal Pannalal went out and the raiding party consisting of Pandit Dhanraj, Gordas Mal and Shantilal Ahuja, the additional District Magistrate rushed in.

The Appellant No. 1 was accosted by the raiding party and asked whether he had taken the bribe. The Appellant No. 1 refushed but on being threatened with a search by Pandit Dhanraj brought out from the top drawer of the dressing table the bundles of currency notes which had been handed over by Nagindas to him.

Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate called upon the Appellant No. 1 to render an explanation of the moneys which had been thus found and the Appellant No. 1 made a statement claiming these Rs. 25,000 as his own being the balance out of Rs. 40,000 which he had brought from his home when he came to Delhi stating that he had spent Rs. 15,000 for purchasing a motor car and the balance was there for effecting purchases of ornaments which were required on the occasion of his daughters marriage.

The two witnesses Gadkari and Perulkar were in the meantime brought by the police authorities into the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 and the Appellant No. 1 also repeated his statement to each of them claiming the moneys thus found as his own and rendering to them the same explanation as he had given to Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate as above. The number of the notes which were found there were tallied with the numbers of the notes which were shown in the memorandum prepared by the police authorities at the house of Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate before the raid was organised and on this fact brought to the notice of the Appellant No. 1 he was called for his explanation in that behalf.

The Appellant No. 1 however got confused and could render no explanation at all. A search of the person as well as the portfolio of Nagindas was made and the two copies of the resumption order were recovered therefrom and the police authorities carried on further investigation and the Appellant No. 1 was put under arrest.

18. All these facts were deposed to by Nagindas, Pannalal, the police authorities, Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate and by Gadkari and Perulkar. If the had rested merely with the evidence of Nagindas and Pannalal and/or the evidence of the police authorities and Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate, it would have been difficult to carry the guilt home to the Appellant No. 1.

So far however as the execution of the two documents, viz., the application bearing date, the 1st April 1949 and the resumption order bearing date, the 2nd April 1949 is concerned we have one significant circumstance that there is no reliable proof of the application having been written and handed over by Pannalal to the Appellant No. 1 on the 1st April 1949 or of the resumption order having been in fact signed by the Appellant No. 1 at Rewa on the 2nd April 1949. If this application had been handed in on the 1st April 1949 and the resumption order has been signed by the Appellant No. 1 on the 2nd April 1949 we would have certainly found in the record of the file of the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate some mention of these facts.

These were important documents which came into existence according to the version of the Appellant No. 1 on these respective dates, 1st April 1949 and the 2nd April 1949 and they would certainly have found their place in the file or at least in the record of the file if they had in fact come into existence as alleged on these respective dates.

There is further on the record the evidence of Dixit, the dealing clerk, Jagmohanlal Khare, Assistant to the Appellant No. 2 and Mahajan, who was a clerk in the office of the Appellant No. 1 that this file did not leave the office up to the 4th April 1949 when it was called for by the Appellant No. 1 on his departure for Delhi and of Jagmohan Khare that neither the application bearing date the 1st April 1949 nor the resumption order bearing date the 2nd April 1949 was in the file at the time it was handed over on the 4th April 1949 to the Appellant No. 1.

Considerable cross-examination was addressed to these witnesses on the contents of the file, the regular recording of the movements thereof and the dealings of the Appellant No. 1 therewith and it was elicited that sometimes the movement of the file was recorded and the necessary entries made therein days after the events had taken place. This evidence however is not sufficient to probabilise that the application bearing date the 1st April 1949 and the resumption order bearing date the 2nd April 1949 came into existence on those respective dates.

If these documents had come into existence on the dates which they respectively bear we would not have found the telegram dated the 1st April 1949 sent by the Appellant No. 2 to Sir Chinubhai complaining that the matter was already delayed and that his presence at Rewa in the following week was essential. The granting of the resumption order was very essential from the point of view of the Syndicate. Once that was done the other matters which would have remained outstanding for discussion were merely ancillary.

Even the settlement of liquidated damages claimed by the State or the compensation claimed by the Syndicate and the further talks about the speeding up of the mining operations by installing fresh machinery or exploiting the new plug which had been discovered in the mining area were subsidiary to the main question of the resumption of the mining operation by the Syndicate and once that was done there was no particular urgency of the settlement of these subsidiary questions and of Sir Chinubhai seeing the Appellant No. 1 in connection therewith either at Rewa or at any other place.

The intimation which was given to Sir Chinubhai on the 4th April 1949 and the telegram which was sent by the P. A. to the Appellant No. 1 to Sir Chinubhai on the 6th April 1949 were in the same strain and really required the presence of Sir Chinubhai to strainghten out all the disputes which were till then subsisting between the Syndicate and the State. In view of these communications it is difficult to believe that the application for the extension of the period of lease was handed in on the 1st April 1949 on that the Appellant No. 1 passed the resumption order on the 2nd April 1949.

If as a matter of fact these two documents had come into existence on the 1st April 1949 and the 2nd April 1949 respectively Pannalal who went to Bombay taking with him the letter dated the 4th April 1949 addressed by the Appellant No. 2 to him would certainly have informed Sir Chinubhai about the resumption order made by the Appellant No. 1 in favour of the Syndicate and even though the Appellant No. 1 sent the telegram dated the 6th April 1949 to Sir Chinubhai there would have been no urgent necessity for Sir Chinubhai to send Nagindas to the Appellant No. 1 at Delhi on the 9th April 1949.

19. The contents of the application as well as the resumption order were also not such as to fit in with the version of the Appellant No. 1. It was not elicited in the evidence of Nagindas or Sir Chinubhai that an extension of 10 years was negotiated between the parties before the 10th April 1949. The claim of the Syndicate so far was for being allowed to resume the mining operations and being given compensation for the wrongful stoppage of the mining operations by the Panna Durbar. The contents of the application however required the Appellant No. 1 either to grant compensation for the wrongful stoppage of the mining operations or in lieu thereof an extension of the period of the lease by 10 years apart from the resumption of mining operations.

This was a clear after-though and appears to have been though of when the talks finally took place between Nagindas and the Appellant No. 1 in regard to the payment of Rs. 25,000 as a bribe or illegal grantification. It was in answer to this request for an extension of the period of the lease for 10 years that the Appellant No. 1 in the resumption order which he dictated to his stenographer granted an extension of the period for four years.

In the resumption order however all the claims of the State against the Syndicate either by way of liquidated damages of otherwise were given up and the four years period of extension was granted to the Syndicate by way of compensation for the wrongful stoppage of the mining operations by the Panna Durbar. Far from being an order prejudicial to the interest of the Syndicate it was an order in favour of the Syndicate. All the claims of the Syndicate against the State were thereby reserved and it was expressly stated therein that these claims would be investigated and orders passed subsequently in regard to the same.

The extension of the period of the lease was also granted confirming in favour of the Syndicate all the terms and conditions of the original lease including the option to extend the period of the lease by further 15 years on the expiration of the period, thus granting to the Syndicate an option to renew the period of the lease by 15 years after the expiration of the extended period of the lease. All these terms were for the benefit of the Syndicate and it was impossible to urge that the Appellant No. 1 passed an order which was prejudicial to the interest of the Syndicate.

20. It is also significant to observe that if in fact these two documents had come into existence on the respective dates, they bore and the Appellant No. 1 had in fact signed the resumption order on the 2nd April 1949 and handed it over to Pannalal it is impossible to believe that Sir Chinubhai as well as Nagindas would have entertained the idea of trapping the Appellant No. 1 into accepting a bribe or illegal grantification.

Once the resumption order was obtained no purpose at all was to be served by the offer of such a bribe or illegal gratification and it is inconceivable that the shrewd businessmen that Sir Chinubhai and Nagindas were they would have conceived the idea to taking such a step which, to say the least, would be suicidal and would, if successful, throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the resumption order and would put the Syndicate into the wrong box with the State authorities.

21. All these circumstances go to show that far from these documents coming into existence on the respective dates which they bore they were in fact brought into existence on the afternoon of the 11th April 1949 at the Constitution House as alleged by the prosecution and were ante-dated to the 1st April 1949 and the 2nd April 1949 respectively with a view to show that the resumption order had already been granted by the Appellant No. 1 to the Syndicate at Rewa on the 2nd April 1949. The evidence of Nagindas and Pannalal thus in respect of the forgery of these documents bears the stamp of truth and deserves to be accepted.

22. The investigation by the police in the circumstances surrounding this forgery was not quite satisfactory. Mukherji, the stenographer who is alleged to have typed the four copies of the resumption order at the Constitution House was not examined by the police in Delhi nor was his shorthand note-book called for nor were the torn pieces of the sheets of paper dictated by the Appellant No. 1 to Mukherji found in the waste paper basket in the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1. It was not until the 18th July 1949 when Gurdas Mal examined Mukherji at Rewa that these facts were brought to light.

Even though the investigation by the police authorities is thus liable to criticism it is difficult to get away from the position that these documents were brought into existence on the afternoon of the 11th April 1949 as alleged by the prosecution and could not have been in existence before the 11th April 1949 as suggested by the Appellant No. 1 We are of the opinion that having regard to all the circumstances of the case these documents were really forged on the afternoon of the 11th April 1949 and the Appellant No. 1 was guilty of the offences under Sections 465 and 466 o the Indian Penal Code.

23. After these documents were forged the next important event was the passing of the sum of Rs. 25,000 as and by way of bribe or illegal gratification by Nagindas to the Appellant No. 1. Here also it would have been difficult for the prosecution to establish the guilt of the Appellant No. 1 if the matter had rested merely on the evidence of Nagindas or that of the police witnesses supported as they were by Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate, Nagindass evidence suffering from the infirmity pointed out before could not be enough to carry conviction with the Court.

He was out to trap the Appellant No. 1 and had been clever enough also to have inveigled the police authorities to procure the wherewithal of the bribe for him. It is patent that but for the procurement of these Rs. 25,000 by the police authorities and their handing over the sum to Nagindas, Nagindas would not have had the requisite amount with him and the offence under Section 161 would never have been committed. The police authorities also exhibited an excessive, zeal in the matter of bringing the Appellant No. 1 to book and their enthusiasm in the matter of trapping the Appellant No. 1 was on a par with that of Nagindas and both the parties were thus equally to blame in the matter of entrapping the Appellant No. 1.

The evidence of these witnesses therefore was not such as to inspire confidence in the mind of the Court. Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate also lent himself to the police authorities and became almost a limb of the police. His position as the Additional District Magistrate was submerged and he reduced himself to the position of an ordinary witness taking part in the affair as the member of the raiding party and his evidence could be no batter or no worse than that of the police witnesses themselves.

If therefore the matter had rested merely upon their evidence it would have been difficult to carry the guilt home to the Appellant No. 1. The evidence as to the recovery of this sum of Rs. 25,000 from the top drawer of the dressing table in the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 and also in regard to the handing over of that sum by the Appellant No. 1 to Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate was equally tainted and if that evidence stood by itself no Court would have been safe in acting upon the same. The statement which was made by the Appellant No. 1 to Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate was inadmissible in evidence.

Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code rendered the statement made by the Appellant No. 1 to the police officers inadmissible. The investigation into the offence had already started immediately on the F.I.R. being registered by the police authorities and Pandit Dhanraj himself admitted in his evidence that the investigation into the offence had thus started before the raid actually took place. The statement made by the Appellant No. 1 to Shanti Lal Ahuju, the Additional District Magistrate was therefore made after the investigation had started and during the investigation of the offence and was therefore hit by Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

It was urged on behalf of the Respondent that this statement was not a confessional statement and was therefore not hit by Section 164 and Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate could therefore depose to such statement even though the same was not recorded as required by the provisions of Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. There is authority however for the proposition that once the investigation had started any non-confessional statement made by the accused also required to be recorded in the manner indicated in that Section and if no such record had been made by the Magistrate, the Magistrate would not be competent to give oral evidence of such statement having been made by the accused. See - Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 [LQ/PC/1936/58] (2) (C) and - Legal Remembrancer, Bengal v. Lalit Mohan Singh Roy, AIR 1922 Cal 342 [LQ/CalHC/1921/136] (d), followed in - Abdul Rahim Mansukh v. Emperor, AIR 1925 Cal 926 (E) and - Karu Mansukh v. Emperor, AIR 1937 Nag 254 (F). The statement made by the Appellant No. 1 therefore to Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate not having been recorded by him in accordance with the provisions of Section 164 was inadmissible in evidence and could not be proved orally by him. If therefore the statement was thus eliminated from evidence nothing remained so far as the witnesses Nagindas and Pannalal on the one hand and the police witnesses as well as Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate on the other hand were concerned which could bring the guilt home to the Appellant No. 1.

24. Reliance was therefore placed by the prosecution on the evidence of Gadkari and Perulkar. They occupied responsible positions in life and were absolutely independent witnesses. Two criticism were levelled against their evidence by the Special Judge. The one criticism was that contrary to the evidence of Pandit Dhanraj they asserted that their statements were not recorded on the night of11th April 1949. Pandit Dhanraj had recorded their statements after they had left the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 at the Constitution House relying upon his memory of the events that had happened that night.

These statements however were not read over to them and therefore could not have the value which otherwise they would have had. The other criticism was that they had appended their signatures to the Panchanama of the numbers of the currency notes recovered at that time which Panchanama contained the statement that on being asked the Appellant No. 1 had produced the bundles of currency notes from the top drawer of the dressing table. The statement was not factually correct as both these witnesses were brought into the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 after the recovery of the Government currency notes by the police from the Appellant No. 1.

It was certainly indiscreet on their part not to have scrutinised the contents of the Panchanama before they appended their signatures thereto. That is however a far cry from coming to the conclusion that they acted in a highly irresponsible manner and their testimony was unreliable.

The circumstances under which the numbers of the currency notes were recorded in the Panchanama, the statement made by the Appellant No. 1 to them and the confusion into which the Appellant No. 1 fell when he was questioned by the police authorities on the tallying of the numbers contained in the memo prepared when the raid was organised with the numbers of the currency notes actually found in the bedroom of the Appellant No.1 were events which would indelibly print themselves in the memory of these witnesses and even though they were examined in the Court of the Special Judge about 10 months after the occurrence, these events and particularly the fact that the Appellant No. 1 claimed these moneys which were thus recovered as his own would certainly not be in any manner whatever forgotten by them.

The only suggestion which was made against the credibility of these witnesses on this point was that they must not have exactly remembered what transpired on that night in the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 and that they might have committed an honest mistake when narrating the events that had happened on that night.

An honest lapse of memory would not doubt be a possibility but having regard to the circumstances of the case we are of the opinion that the events that happened that night in the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 and which were deposed to by these witnesses were not such as to be easily forgotten by them and when these witnesses deposed to the fact that the Appellant No. 1 claimed this sum of Rs. 25,000 as his own and was utterly confused when explanation was sought from him by the police authorities in regard to the tallying of the numbers of these Government currency notes, it is not easy to surmise that they were suffering from any lapse of memory.

25. The evidence of these witnesses in regard to the statement made by the Appellant No. I before them was also attacked on the ground that Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrates asking the Appellant No. 1 to repeal the statement which he had earlier made before him to these witnesses was a mere camouflage. Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate knew very well that the statement made by the Appellant No. 1 to him was not recorded under the provisions of Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code and was therefore inadmissible in evidence and he therefore resorted to these tactics of having the Appellant No. 1 repeat at the very same statement to these witnesses so as to avoid the bar of Section 164.

Reliance was placed in this behalf on - Hakam Khuda Yar v. Emperor, AIR 1940 Lah 129 (FB) (G), where it as held that if on the facts of any case it was found that a statement made to a third person was in reality intended to be made to the police and was represented as having been made to a third person merely as a colourable pretence in order to avoid the provisions of Section 162 the Court would hold it excluded by the Section.

The same ratio it was submitted applied to the statements made to these two witnesses because they were a colourable pretence to avoid the provisions of Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code which had certainly not been complied with by Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate. It has however to be observed that every statement made to a person assisting the police during an investigation cannot be treated as a statement made to the police or to the Magistrate and as such excluded by Section 162 or Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

The question is one of fact and has got to be determined having regard to the circumstances of each case. On a scrutiny of the evidence of these two witnesses and the circumstances under which the statements came to be made by the Appellant No. 1 to them we are of the opinion that the Appellant No. 1 was asked by Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate to make the statements to these two witnesses not with a view to avoid the bar of Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code or by way of colourable pretence but by way of greater caution particularly having regard to the fact that the Appellant No. 1 occupied the position of a Minister of Industries in the State of Vindhya Pradesh.

The Statements made by the Appellant No. 1 to these witnesses therefore did not suffer from this disability and were admissible in evidence.

26. The evidence of these witnesses being thus worthy of credit and the statements made by the appellant No. 1 to them being admissible in evidence there is no doubt that the Appellant No. 1 claimed these moneys, viz., Rs. 25,000 which were recovered from the top drawer of the dressing table in the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 as his own being the balance of Rs. 40,000 which he had brought from his home when he came to Delhi.

If this was so the very fact that the numbers of these Government currency notes of the value of Rs. 25,000 tallied with the numbers of the notes which had been handed over to Nagindas earlier when the raid was organised and which number were also specified in the memo prepared at that time was enough to establish the falsity of the allegation made by the Appellant No. 1 that he had brought these moneys from his home. These moneys were proved to have been provided by the police authorities and given to Nagindas when the raid was organised and were the instruments of the offence of the taking of the bribe or illegal gratification by the Appellant No. 1.

If the numbers of these notes tallied with the numbers of the notes which were thus handed over by the police authorities to Nagindas they could not have belonged to the Appellant No. 1 and were certainly brought there by Nagindas and handed over by him to the Appellant No. 1 as alleged by the prosecution. A suggestion was made that there was opportunity for Nagindas to plant these moneys into the top drawer of the dressing table when the back of the Appellant No. 1 was turned upon him.

Even assuming that there was that possibility it is sufficiently negatived by the fact that when these moneys were recovered from the top drawer either at the instance of Nagindas as alleged by the Appellant No. 1 or at the instance of the Appellant No. 1 did not express any surprise at these moneys being thus found there. If the version of the appellant No. 1 was correct he had only brought about Rs. 25,000 from his house. Rs. 15,000 has been already spent by him in the purchase of the car. About Rs. 10,000 were spent by him in the purchase of the ornaments and only a sum of Rs. 100 odd was the balance left with him.

According to that version there was not the alightest possibility of the sum of Rs. 25,000 being found in the top drawer of the dressing table. Far from expressing a surprise in this manner the Appellant No. 1 claimed these moneys as his own. The Appellant No. 1 could not have by any mischance failed to appreciate that these Government currency notes which were thus recovered from the top drawer of the dressing table exceeded by far the amount which according to him he had left with him by way of balance and the most natural reaction to the recovery of this large sum of money would have been that he would have certainly denied that these moneys were his and he would have been surprised at finding that such a large sum of money was thus found there.

No such reaction was registered on his face. On the contrary if the evidence of the two witnesses Gadkari and Perulakar is to be believed and we see no reason why it should not be believed, the Appellant No. 1 claimed this sum of Rs. 25,000 as his own being the balance out of the money which he had brought from his home when he came to Delhi. This is sufficient to establish that these moneys which earlier had been handed over by the police authorities to Nagindas found their way into the top drawer of the dressing table in the bedroom of the Appellant No. 1 and were the primary evidence of the offence under Section 161 having been committed by the Appellant No. 1.

The further circumstance that on the numbers of these notes being tallied and his explanation in that behalf being asked for by the police authorities the Appellant No. 1, was confused and could furnish no explanation in regard thereto also support this conclusion and there is no doubt left in our minds that the Appellant No. 1 was guilty of the offence under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code with which he was charged.

27. We cannot however leave this case without expressing out strong disapproved of the part which the police authorities and Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate took in this affair. As already observed this offence would never have been committed by the Appellant No. 1 but for the fact that the police authorities provided Nagindas with the wherewithal of the commission of the offence. Sir Chinubhai as it appears from the evidence was not in a position to provide Nagindas with this sum of Rs. 25,000 or any large sum and in fact in spite of the telephone calls made by Nagindas upon him had not provided any amount beyond Rs.3,000 which was meant for the other expenses of Nagindas, to him.

Nagindas was therefore not in a position to provide this sum of Rs. 25,000 for payment of the bribe or the illegal gratification to the Appellant No. 1. But for the adventitious aid which he got from the police authorities the matter would not have progressed any further, and Nagindas would have left Delhi empty handed. The police authorities however once they got scent of the intention of Nagindas thought that it was too good an opportunity to miss for entrapping the Appellant No. 1 who occupied the position of the Minister of Industries in the State of Vindhya Pradesh. They therefore provided the sum of Rs. 25,000 on their own and handed it over to Nagindas.

The police authorities in this step which they took showed greater enthusiasm than Nagindas himself in the matter of trapping the Appellant No. 1. It may be that the detection of corruption may some times call for the laying of traps, but there is no justification for the police authorities to bring about the taking of a bribe by supplying the bribe money to the giver where he has neither got it nor has the capacity to find it for himself. It is the duty of the police authorities to prevent crimes being committed. It is no part of their business to provide the instruments of the offences.

We cannot too strongly disapprove of the step which the police authorities took in this case in the matter of providing the sum of Rs.25,000 to Nagindas who but for the police authorities thus coming to his aid would never have been able to bring the whole affair to its culmination.

28. Not only did the police authorities thus become active parties in the matter of trapping the Appellant No. 1, they also provided a handy and an ostensibly independent witness in the person of Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate. Even though he was a member of the judiciary he lent his services to the police authorities and became a limb of the police as it were. The part which Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate took in this affair cannot be too strongly condemned.

We can only repeat in this connection the observations of the Privy Council in - AIR 1936 PC 253 [LQ/PC/1936/58] (2) at p. 258 (C), in regard to the Magistrates placing themselves in positions where they would have to step into the witness box and depose as ordinary citizens-

"In their Lordships view it would be particularly unfortunate if Magistrates were asked at all generally to act rather as police officers under Section 162 of the Code; and to be at the same time freed, notwithstanding their position as Magistrates, from any obligation to make records under Section 164. In the result they would indeed be relegated to the position of ordinary citizens as witnesses and then would be required to depose to matters transacted by them in their official capacity unregulated by any statutory rules of procedure or conduct whatever........"

This position was laid down with greater emphasis by Mr. Justice P. B. Mukharji in --- M. C. Mitra v. State, AIR 1951 Cal 524 [LQ/CalHC/1951/186] at p. 523 (H), where the learned Judge observed -

"Before I conclude I wish to express Courts great disapprobation of the practice that seems to have become very frequent of sending Magistrates as witnesses of police traps. The Magistrate is made to go under disguise to witnesses the trap laid by the police. In this case it was Presidency Magistrate and in other cases which have come to our notice there have been other Magistrates who became such witnesses.To make the Magistrate a party or a limb of the police during the police investigation seriously undermines the independence of the Magistrate and perverts their judicial outlook. The Magistrates are the normal custodians of the general administration of criminal justice and it is they who normally decide and pass judgments on the acts and conduct of the police. It is not enough to say, therefore, that the Magistrate acting as a witness in a particular case does not himself try that case. This practice is all the more indefensible here specially when there is no seperation of the executive from the judiciary.The basic merit of the administration of criminal justice in the State lies in the face that the person arrested by the police is entitled to come before an independent and impartial Magistrate who is expected to deal with the case, without the Magistrate himself being in any way a partisan or a witness to police activities.There is another danger and that is the Magistrates are put un the unenviable and embarrassing position, of having to give evidence as a witness and then being disbelieved. That in not the way to secure respect for the Magistracy charged with the administration of justice. In my judgment this is a practice which is unfair to the accused and unfair to the Magistrate.It is also unfair to the police. Because charged with the high responsibility and duty of performing a great and essential public service of this State the police can not afford to run the risk of opprobrium, even if unfounded, that they have enlisted the Magistrate in their cause. That risk in too great and involves forgetting public respect and confidence......."

We perfectly endorse the above observations made by Mr. Justice P. B. Mukharji and hope and trust that Magistrate will not be employed by the police authorities in the manner it was done by the Special Police Establishment in this case before us. The independence of the judiciary is a priceless treasure to be cherished and safeguarded at all costs against predatory activities of this character and it is of the essence that public confidence in the independence of the judiciary should not be undermined by any such tactics adopted by the executive authorities. We have therefore eliminated from our consideration the whole of the evidence given by Shantilal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate and come to our conclusion in regard to the guilt of the Appellant No. 1 relying solely on the testimony of the two independent witnesses Gadkari and Perulakar.

29. The result therefore is that the appeal of the Appellant No. 1 will be dismissed except with regard to his conviction and sentence under S. 120-B of the I. P. C. and the convictions and sentences passed upon him by the Judicial Commissioner under S. 465 and S. 466 as also S. 161 of the I. P. C. will be confirmed. The appeal of the Appellant No. 2 will be allowed and he be acquitted and discharged of the offences with which he was charged and immediately set at liberty. The bail bond of the Appellant No. 2 will be cancelled.

30. Order accordingly.