S. Mohan & M.K. Mukherjee, JJ.

Here is a case where the suit for possession filed by the landlord-appellant ended in a compromise decree. The terms of the compromise which ultimately ended in such a decree are as under :

"We have compromised the suit between us. The agreed terms are as under :

It is agreed that defendant has to pay Rs. 4,425/- to the plaintiff towards rent and damages for the period after the filing of the suit till 31.12.1984. Out of the said sum of the defendant has deposited Rs. 625/- in the Court. The balance of Rs. 3800/- is due. The said Rs. 3800/- will be paid to the plaintiff by the defendant on or before 15.12.1985 and receive a receipt therefor or deposit the said amount in the Court.

The plaintiff agrees to allow the defendant to stay in the suit house till 31.12.1985. If the defendant fails to deliver vacant possession to the plaintiff by 31.12.1985, the plaintiff will have the right to file execution proceedings for taking possession.

From 1.1.1985 till date of vacation of suit house the defendant will pay Rs. 200 to the plaintiff as damages (mesne profits) at the end of every month for which a receipt will be issued. In addition the defendant will separately bear the actual expenses of electricity and water charges.

If within the stipulated period an amount of Rs. 3800 is not paid to the plaintiff or if there is any default in paying the monthly amount of Rs. 200 or if any one of these conditions is breached, the plaintiff will have right to get the premises immediately vacated.

The costs of the suit will be borne by the respective parties."

2. The date of the decree is 3.1.1985. Thereafter, what had happened is a notification exempting certain categories of buildings from the purview of C.P. and Berar Letting of House and Rent Control Order, 1949 issued under clause 30 of the said order came to be struck down on the ground that it was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This decision was rendered on 9.6.1985. When the decree was sought to be executed, the tenant albeit the compromise raised an objection that the decree become unexecutable since the civil court had lost jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction in view of the decision. That objection was overruled by the court of first instance and the court of appeal. Thereafter, when the matter went up to the High Court, this objection of the judgment-debtor was sustained. Hence, the civil appeal.

3. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court thoroughly misunderstood the scope of the judgment declaring the notification under clause 30 in relation to exemption of certain categories of buildings as bad. In his submission, there was no want of jurisdiction on the date when the civil court passed the decree. May be, subsequently, one had to obtain permission from the Rent Controller for evicting a tenant, but that does not affect the decree validly passed earlier. It could never be termed nullity. In other words, the jurisdiction will have to be determined with reference to the date of the decree and not the later declaration under the judgment.

4. Dr. Ghatate, learned counsel for the respondent, urges that on the date of execution of the decree, the Civil Court lost the jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction. Hence the point relating to jurisdiction could be raised even during the execution stage.

5. On our careful consideration, we find that the appellant is entitled to succeed. It is undeniable that on the date when the compromise memo fruitioned into a decree on 3.1.1985, the civil court had every jurisdiction to pass such a decree. It is true the notification issued under clause 30 of C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 came to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This was on 19.6.1985. The decision rendered thereunder cannot have any effect of rendering the decree passed on 3.1.1985 a nullity which decree has become final. No judgment of any court can have any retrospective operation because that is the plenary power of Parliament (Legislature as well). The courts do not have such power. If that be so, the High Court had clearly gone wrong in holding that the decree on the date of execution is a nullity. As correctly contended by Mr. Sanghi, learned counsel for the appellant, the jurisdiction will have to be decided on the date of the decree namely, 3.1.1985. On that date undoubtedly it had every jurisdiction. Therefore, we hold that the High Court fell into an error in upsetting the concurrent findings of the courts below. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and allow the civil appeal. There shall be no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.