R.S. Mongia, J.

1. This writ petition was filed by the petitioners who are working as Ticket Verifiers on daily wage basis since 1988 with the Haryana Roadways with a prayer that the respondents be directed to pay salary to them (petitioners) in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1500 which is paid to Ticket Verifiers who are employed on regular basis and further the respondents be directed to consider the case of the petitioners for regularisation.

2. The first relief, as mentioned above, is based on principle of equal pay for equal work. Reliance was placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in C.W.P. No. 17741 of 1991. Smt. Neelam Rani v. State of Haryana rendered on April 28, 1992. The Motion Bench had some reservations about the principle laid down in the aforesaid judgment and admitted the case to Full Bench. That is how we are seized of this matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner cited another Division Bench judgment in C.W.P. No. 9192 of 1995 (Rajkumar v. State of Haryana) rendered on November 23, 1995.

The Division Bench after noticing the judgments in Randhir Singh v. U.O.I P. Savita v. U.O.I. : AIR 1985 SC 1124 [LQ/SC/1985/171] ; Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P.. Surinder Singh v. Engineer in chief Bhagwan Das v. State of Haryana, : AIR 1987 SC 2049 [LQ/SC/1987/534] : Jaipal v. State of Haryana V. Markendeya v. State of Andhra Pradesh State of U.P. v. J. P. Chaurasia (SC) and Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers Union v. Union of India held that the daily wagers were entitled to the same salary as a regularly appointed person on the principle of equal pay for equal work. It was also observed that the same salary would mean minimum of the pay scale prescribed for a post held by the regular employees. Further, the petitioner also relied upon the same authorities of the Apex Court as were noticed by the aforesaid Division Bench in C.W.P. No. 9192 of 1995.

3. It is not necessary for us to go into any detail of the judgments of the Division Bench and the other judgments of the Apex Court as the Apex Court in case reported as State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh after noticing the authorities reported as Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Vikram Chaudhary Harban Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences State of U.P., v. J. P. Chaurasia, (supra); Jaipal v. State of Haryana (supra); Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) v. Union of India 1994 III LLJ 979 Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P., (supra) and Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (supra) held that daily rated workers cannot be treated as on par with persons in regular service and they cannot be paid minimum of regular pay scales. It will be apposite to notice what the Apex Court observed while noticing the earlier case law on the point :

"5. The principle of equal pay for equal work is not always easy to apply. There are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating work done by different persons in different organisations, or even in the same organisation. The principle was originally enunciated as a part of the Directive Principles of State Policy in Article 39(d) of the Constitution. In the case Of Randhir Singh v. Union of India (supra), however, this Court said that this was a constitutional goal capable of being achieved through constitutional remedies and held that the principle had to be read into Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In that case a Driver-constable in the Delhi Police Force under the Delhi Administration claimed equal salary as other Drivers and this prayer was granted. The same principle was subsequently followed for the purpose of granting relief in Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P. (supra) and Jaipal v. State of Haryana, (supra). In the case of Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) v. Union of India (supra), however, this Court explained the principle of equal pay for equal work by holding that differentiation in pay scales among Government servants holding same posts and performing similar work on the basis of difference in the degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality would be a valid differentiation. In that case different pay scales, fixed for Stenographers (Grade I) working in the Central Secretariat and those attached to the heads of subordinate offices on the basis of a recommendation of the Pay Commission was held as not violating Article 14 and as not being contrary to the principle of equal pay for equal work. This Court also said that the judgment of administrative authorities concerning the responsibilities which attach to the post, and the degree of reliability expected of an incumbent, would be a value judgment of the concerned authorities which, if arrived at bona fide, reasonably and rationally, was not open to interference by the Court.

6. In the case of State of U.P. v. J. P. Chaurasia (supra) this Court again sounded a note of caution. It pointed out that the principle of equal pay for equal work has no mechanical application in every case of similar work. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who are left out. Of course, these qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In the case before the Court, the Bench Secretaries in the High Court of Allahabad claimed the same pay as Section Officers. While negativing this claim the Court said that in service matters merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. That apart, a higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. It observed that although all Bench Secretaries may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Bench Secretaries (Grade I) are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority. A higher pay scale granted to such Bench Secretaries who are evaluated by a competent authority cannot be challenged.

7. In the case of Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences (supra), a classification based on difference in educational qualifications was held as justifying a difference in pay scales. This Court further observed that the judgment of the Pay Commission in this regard relating to the nature of the job, in the absence of material to the contrary, should be accepted. Referring to these decisions, this Court in the case of Harbans Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh (supra) summed up the position by stating that a mere nomenclature designating a person as a Carpenter or a Craftsman was not enough to come to the conclusion that he was doing the same work as another Carpenter in regular service. In that case, Carpenters employed by the Himachal Pradesh Handicraft Corporation on daily wages sought parity of wages with Carpenters in regular service. This Court negatived this contention, holding that a comparison cannot be made with counterparts in other establishment with different management or even in the establishment in different locations though owned by the same management. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of equal pay for equal work requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. The latest judgment pointed out in this connection is the decision in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Vikram Chaudhary (supra). After noticing the aforesaid authorities, the Apex Court went on to observe as under :

"8. It is, therefore, clear that the quality of work performed by different sets of persons holding different jobs will have to be evaluated. There may be differences in educational or technical qualifications which may have a bearing on the skills which the holders bring to their job although the designation of the job may be the same. There may also be other considerations which have relevance to efficiency in service which may justify differences in pay scales on the basis of criteria such as experience and seniority, or a need to prevent stagnation in the cadre, so that good performance can be elicited from persons who have reached the top of the pay scale. There may be various other similar considerations which may have a bearing on efficient performance in a job. This Court has repeatedly observed that evaluation of such jobs for the purpose of pay-scale must be left to expert bodies and unless there are any mala fides, its evaluation should be accepted.

9. xxx xxx xxx

10. The respondents, therefore, in the present appeals who are employed on daily wages cannot be treated as on a par with persons in regular service of the State of Haryana holding similar posts. Daily rated workers are not required to possess the qualifications prescribed for regular workers, nor do they have to fulfil the requirement relating to age. They are not selected in the manner in which regular employees are selected. In other words the requirements for selection are not as rigorous. There are also other provisions relating to regular service such as the liability of a member of the service to be transferred, and his being subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the authorities as prescribed, which the daily rated workmen are not subjected to. They cannot, therefore, be equated with regular workmen for the purposes for their wages. Nor can they claim the minimum of the regular pay scale of the regularly employed."

4. A Division Bench of this Court, in which one of us (R. S. MONGIA, J.) was a member in C.W.P. No. 9766 of 1995, decided on November 8, 1995, after noticing the judgment of the Apex Court in Ghaziabad Development Authoritys case (supra) had held that a daily wage employee cannot be equated with a regular employee for the purpose of pay scale. It was observed that "a daily wage employee is not subject to disciplinary control of the employer inasmuch as he may come for work on a particular day or may not come and still the employer would have no right to take any disciplinary action against such an employee who may be absent for a day or for a longer period. He is not required to take any leave from the employer for a particular day on which he does not wish to come."

5. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court, we are of the opinion that the view expressed by the Division Bench in C.W.P. No. 17741/1991 and C.W.P. No. 9192 of 1995 and in any other judgment to the same effect would be no longer good law and would stand overruled. Consequently, the petitioners would not be entitled to claim the same salary as is being paid to a regular Ticket Verifier.

6. So far as the prayer of the petitioners that they are entitled to regularisation in service having put in a particular number of years of service as Ticket Verifiers on daily wages, they (petitioners) may make necessary representation in that behalf to the appropriate authority and if any such representation is made by petitioners or through their counsel within two months, the same be considered in accordance with the relevant instructions on the point within three months of its receipt. It would be appreciated if a reasoned order is passed on the representation.

7. Subject to the observations made above, we find no merit in this writ petition, which is hereby dismissed.