S.O. Misra, J.

(1) This appeal involves a controversial question with regard to the effect of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, on the right of the reversioner to challenge an alienation made by the Hindu female in possession of a property as a limited owner. The plaintiff, Sheopujan Pandey, brought a suit for a declaration that two deeds of gift, dated 1-12-1948 and 31-5-1944, executed by defendant No. 3, Barta Kuer, in favour of Nema Fandey and Ramsewak Ojha, respectively, were "farzi, collusive, illegal, null and void and ineffective." They were accordingly not binding upon him, and the aforesaid deeds were illegal, false and fit to be cancelled against the plaintiff. A genealogy was appended to the plaint in support of the plaintiffs reversionary right to challenge the alienations made by Barta Kuer (defendant No. 3). The defendant resisted the suit on a number of grounds. It is, however, unnecessary to refer to those facts in detail because the learned counsel for the parties have not argued any question of fact. The Court below passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff from which defendants Ramsewak Ojha, Nema Pandey and Mt. Barta Kuer have preferred an appeal to this Court.

(2) Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that in view of the various decisions of this Court taking the view that in terms of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, such a suit by a reversioner is not maintainable, this appeal must be allowed. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, has drawn my attention to the decision of this Court in Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh, First Appeal No. 114 of 1950: (AIR 1958 Pat 581 [LQ/PatHC/1958/94] ) (FB) wherein a Division Bench of this Court has thought it fit to refer the matter to a larger Bench with certain observations with regard to the soundness of the view taken by the various Benches of this Court so far. Learned Counsel for the appellants, however, has contended that the decision in First Appeal No. 14 of 1950: (AIR 1958 Pat 581 [LQ/PatHC/1958/94] ) (FB) is not material in so far as the present appeal is concerned and, in the next place, he has urged that the opinion expressed by this Court in the other Division Bench decisions should be held to be correct. As to the view adopted by the Division Bench in First Appeal No. 114 of 1950: (AIR 1958 Pat 581 [LQ/PatHC/1958/94] ) (FB) it may be stated that Sinha J. reconsidered his own opinion expressed in a previous judgment and concluded that since the case was not argued before him in the light of the correct meaning of the word "possessed", he had followed a previous decision of this Court in the case of Ram Ayodhya Missir v. Raghunath Missir, 1956 BLJR 734: ( (S) AIR 1957 Pat 480 [LQ/PatHC/1956/154] ). Having considered the matter afresh, however, he felt that the word "possessed" referred to the possession of the properly by the widow at the time the Act came into force and could not possibly refer to the case of a widow, who, though she might be alive at the date of the enforcement of the Act had already absolutely transferred the property in question by way of sale or gift before the law was enacted and before it came into force. In Ramsaroop Singh v. Hiralal Singh, First Appeal No. 189 of 1950: (AIR 1958 Pat 319 [LQ/PatHC/1958/30] ), which is a Bench decision of this Court, to which I was a party, I have gone into the matter with regard to the meaning of the word "possessed" occurring in Section 1

4. I have expressed the opinion that the word "possessed" cannot be confined in its operation only to the possession of the Hindu female at the date of the enforcement of the act cither on a grammatical view or even in view of the texture of the section itself. With reference to the observations in the judgment in First Appeal No. 114 of 1950: (AIR 1958 Pat 581 [LQ/PatHC/1958/94] ) (FB), I think it proper to clarify the position a little further. Ordinarily, this would have been unnecessary. Since in the present case the matter is one of considerable importance, it is worthwhile to adopt this course. With regard to the use of the words actual possession" in that judgment, I may state that when I used the words "actual possession" I also quoted the passage from the judgment of Viswanatha Sastri, J., which is quoted in the above judgment. In fact, I emphasised at more than one place the broad sense in which the word "possessed" was construed by Viswanatha Sastri, J. At page 219 of the report (1958 BUR) : (at p. 323 of AIR), I stated the position as follows :

"As Viswanatha Sastri, J. of the Andhra High Court has observed, the word possessed has been used here in a broad sense (I agree with respect with that view), in which even alone the Hindu female can have a right to recover possassion of the property which may not be in her actual possession but to which she may have a right in law to recover possession, such as her suit against a trespasser who has not perfected his title by adverse possession." As for the use of the words "actual possession," Lord Davey in delivering the judgment of the Board in the case of Secy, of State for India v. Krishnamoni Gupta, ILR 29 Cal 518 at p. 534, made the following observations :

"As regards the northern portion of the disputed lands, other considerations apply. The Government have never had actual possession of the land through their ijaradars for a continuous period of twelve years, because the lands became submerged prior to the year 1869, and remained so (it is found by the High Court) until within ten years of the commencement of the suit. But it is urged on behalf of the Government that, having been in possession through their tenants when the lands became submerged, their possession must be deemed to have continued in law while the lands were under water and to have revived on their being re-formed, and reliance is placed on a case of Kally Churn Sahoo v. The Secy. of State. ILR 6 Cal 725, decided by the High Court in 1881. For the purpose of trying the question whether limitation applies, the Govt. must be regarded as a trespasser and dispossessor of the rightful owners, and in the opinion of their Lordships it would be contrary both to principle and authority to imply such constructive possession in favour of a wrong-doer, so as to enable him to obtain thereby a title by limitation. In order to sustain a claim to land by limitation under the Indian Act, there must in their opinion be actual possession of a person claiming as of right by himself or by persons deriving title from him."

(3) A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Umatul Mehdi v. Kulsum., ILR 35 Cal 120 at p. 128, observed thus :

"It may be conceded that under the Land Registration Act, a person who claims to have acquired an interest in an estate by succession or transfer and to be in possession by virtue of such title, is not entitled to be registered merely upon proof of possession. He must show that his possession is not wrongful and is attributable to the title which he sets up. But it does not follow, conversely, that, if he proves his title merely, but not his possession, he is entitled to have his name registered. As a wrongdoer in possession is not entitled to claim registration, so the rightful owner, if out of possession is not entitled to claim registration merely on the ground that the legal possession is in him. To hold otherwise, would be to ignore the clear distinction between possession and right to possession which is recognised in Sections 42 and

55. In the case before us, it has been found that the petitioner, the widow, is in possession of the estate by receipt of rent from the lessees. It is not quite accurate to describe this as constructive possession. In the case of Zemindaries where the proprietor can be in possession only by receipt of rent, he is in actual possession of his interest, if he is in receipt of rent. The Zemindars possession of the right to collect rent from the tenants in occupation is actual possession of a tangible property : Sarbananda Basu v. Pransankar Roy, ILR 15 Cal 527 [LQ/CalHC/1888/26] , Surb Narain Singh v. Birj Mohun Thakur, ILR 23 Cal 80 [LQ/CalHC/1895/98] . When a person has proprietary interest in land and as such is entitled to receive rent, he is in possession of his interest if he is in receipt of rent while his tenant who is in actual possession has possession which in a sense, is the possession of the landlord or superior proprietor : see the observation of Lord Davey in ILR 29 Cal 518."

It is significant to note that the word "possession" within the meaning of section 55 of the Bengal Land Registration Act was under consideration in this case and it was construed as being synonymous with "actual possession" and the legal import of this expression was explained as above. The distinction between "actual occupation" and "actual possession" has been brought out in unmistakable language by their Lordships. In my opinion therefore, when Viswanatha Sastri, J., included the possession of a mortgagee and a lessee, i.e., a person deriving title from one in actual possession, as the possession contemplated under section 14, the meaning and scope of "possession" are the same as contemplated under Section 55 of the Bengal Land Registration Act (Act VIII of 1876). It may, therefore, be made clear that the words actual possession" used in my judgment are based upon the authority of the Judicial Committee and of the Calcutta High Court. It may further be made clear that Viswanatha Sastri, J., referred to actual physical possession at one place which may be distinguished from "actual possession." There is also a marked difference between "actual occupation" and "actual possession." Corpus Juris (Vol. 49, p. 1096) dealing with the lands of "possession" has thus dealt with the matter : "Kinds of Possession-- 1. Actual and Constructive. Possession may be actual or constructive." "Actual possession" is a term with an understood legal meaning and is that possession which exists where the thing is in the immediate occupancy of the party, or of his agent or tenant. The possession, therefore, of the mortgagee or of the lessee, who is a tenant, comes within the scope of the meaning of the phrase "actual possession." I need not elaborate that the possession of the licensee is the possession of the licensor as it is beyond question, I think it unnecessary further to refer to the broader sense of "possession" synonymous with "owner-ship" which I have considered . in my judgment in the case of Brijnandan Singh v. Jamuna Prasad, First Appeal No. 205 of 1948 disposed of on 14-1-1958 : (AIR 1958 Pat 589 [LQ/PatHC/1958/10] ). Since, however, Viswanatha Sastri, J., himself has taken the word "possession" in a broader sense with which I agreed, I thought it unnecessary to elaborate this point further. But it may be noted here to remove any doubt that in Corpus Juris (Vol. 49 at the same p. 1096) also occurs the following :

"The word by which reference is made to the word possession has been defined as ownership, whether rightful or wrongful; and it has been used in the sense of ownership, when referring to realty, as well, also as when referring to personalty. So. generally, as used in statutes regarding the possession of prohibited articles, it means something more than mere handling, or temporary physical control or .custody, and implies the element of ownership."

With great respect. I am unable to agree with the opinion of the Orissa High Court, Sansir Patelin v. Satyabati Naikanj, AIR 1958 Orissa 75, where their Lordships have expressed their disagreement with view of Viswanatha Sastri, J. with regard to the Hindu females right to hold in absolute state the property which is in the trespassers possession. That obviously is to give a narrow meaning to the word "possession" unlike Viswanatha Sastri, J. who construed it as "ownership."

(4) Corning to the expression "shall be deemed always to have been held", I may also explain further that if the Legislature had used the words shall be deemed always to have been held" after the words "shall be held" in Section 14, that section would have been expressly retrospective. That expression occurs as a rule in a declaratory Act which states that the law must be deemed in the past also to have been the same as it is enacted to be under the particular statute or under the particular section, but in a remedial statute or remedial section of a retrospective character those words may not occur and yet a remedial statute may also be of a retrospective character in which event its field of operation converges upon the field of operation of a declaratory statute. But the mere absence of these words would not necessarily imply that the particular provision will not operate retrospectively, Much stress has been laid on the words "shall be held" as having the sense of operation in future. To meet this position, I may refer to the case of Main v. Stark. (1890) 15 AC 384 at p. 388, quoted by Craies on Statute Law (5th edition, page 363). Lord Selborne observed :

"Their Lordships, of course, do not say that there might not be something in the context of an Act of Parliament, or to be collected from its language, which might give to words prima facie prospective a larger operation, but they ought not to receive a larger operation unless you find some reason for giving it."

In the "Cases and Other Materials on Legislation" by H. E. Reid and J. W. MacDonald, the following passage occurs :

"The decisions sometimes say that "shall" is used in remedial statutes to include both past and future. Here the Courts attempt to interpret a word which they might simply-disregard."

Reference has been made in this connection to a number of American cases on the authority of which the above opinion has been expressed by the learned authors. Even in this view of the matter, just because the words used in this section are "shall be held" it does not necessarily follow that merely on that account these words have no reference back to the past and that, therefore, the section applies only to properties which are possessed by a Hindu female at the commencement of the Act or which may be acquired and possessed by her subsequent to the enforcement of the Act. It is well established that when the word "shall" occurs in a statute, the intention of the Legislature is directed more towards its imperative character, to show command more than point towards its futurity. It is obvious, therefore, that although the words are "shall be held" which prima facie may be of a prospective character, nevertheless, in my opinion, there are good reasons to give these words also a larger operation in the language of Lord Selborne.

(5) Emphasis has been laid on the general intention of the Legislature that their main object was to enlarge the powers of a Hindu female and they never intended to confer a higher right upon the alienee from a Hindu female in regard to which the reversioners right was left untouched. The position however, seems to be that the Legislature was thinking all the times, no doubt, of conferring an absolute right upon the Hindu females, even in respect of the properties held by them before the commencement of the Act as limited owners, and it was not thinking of the alienees. But it must be held that when such statutes are passed enlarging certain rights it is seldom that other rights are not incidentally affected. Dealing with this aspect of the matter, at page 58, Craies states the position as follows :

"Remedial Acts are subdivided by Blackstone into enlarging and restraining Acts, the former widening the common law where it was too strict or narrow, the latter taking away or cutting down rights existing at common law ...... Both terms are in truth purely relative. The same statute may be enlarging as to one set of persons, restraining as to others. Every creation of a new offence enlarges the scope of the criminal law and restrains pro tanto the liberty of individuals. The Irish Land Acts enlarged the rights and interests of the tenant, and restricted those of the landlord. Indeed, the same Act may be "remedial from one point of view and penal from another."

It follows from the above that when the Legislature enlarged the powers of the Hindu females, it necessarily restrained the powers of the reversioners and while it enlarged the powers of the Hindu females and restrained the powers of the reversioners, or even terminated their status (which however is a different aspect of the question altogether), there is no reason to think that incidentally it did not also confer a benefit upon the alienees who, prior to the passing of the Act, could not claim an absolute interest in respect of the rights conveyed to them by a limited owner like a Hindu female. In my opinion, therefore, nothing turns upon the a priori view that in enacting Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act the Legislature purported to deal only with the rights of a Hindu female and did not deal with the rights of the alienee from such a person. In fact, there would be no occasion for such a provision as, once the Hindu female stood on the pedestal of an absolute owner, the legal consequences with regard to her rights of alienation will follow under the proper statutes and terms of contract entered into by her, and it was not necessary to incorporate anything to that effect under the Hindu Succession Act.

(6) I may also amplify my point of view a little further with regard to certain anomalies which will arise if the other view is adopted. It is well settled that a reversioner to the estate of a deceased Hindu whose properties are in the hands of a limited owner, such as a Hindu female, are entitled to challenge all unauthorised alienations, e.g. sale, gift, mortgage and leases which are not in the ordinary course of management. A reversioner may even challenge, for instance, settlement of bakasht lands in the hands of the Hindu female by which means she might diminish the corpus of the estate and convert it into ready money to the prejudice of the interest of the reversioners. Even according to the construction put upon the word "possessed", giving the word a wide meaning, making it synonymous with ownership or right to possession, the reversioners would have no right to challenge the validity of a mortgage, lease, settlement or other perpetual grants in which the widow has preserved even a nominal right, because all that might be comprehended within the word "possessed." In respect of the property dealt with in this manner. the widow will acquire an indefeasible right under Section 14 and the mortgagee, lessee or settlee from her would get accordingly an absolute interest in terms of the grant in their favour by the Hindu female prior to the passing of the Act. The right of the reversioners would be accordingly diminished to the extent of such disposition of property. The only alienees, therefore, affected by the Act would he the limited class of persons who are the donees or vendees from such a owner; yet it is obvious that in many cases a Mukarrari settlement with a nominal rent by a Hindu female or a perpetual thika would be no better than a sale out and out. Take for instance the case where a Hindu female has sold without legal necessity certain lands belonging to the estate of her husband at a certain rate which is the fair market price and in certain other transactions the same object of converting the land value into cash is achieved by making Istamrari Mokarrari settlement at a nominal rent. Both classes of alienees stand on the same footing for all practical purposes, so far as the payment of consideration is concerned. On the view that under Section 14 if the Hindu female is found to be in possession in any sense as having concern with the property, she will acquire an absolute right thereto; but if she has sold or gifted away her property, the vendees or donees would have only the right subsisting during the lifetime of the female alienor, an anomalous position would result. Holder of the permanent Mokarrari interest would have an absolute right beyond the reach of the reversioner, but a vendee having paid an identical consideration would have only a limited right. In my opinion, the Legislature could never have contemplated such an inequitable and discriminatory position. Nor do I think there is any warrant for the conclusion that the word "possessed" should be given a meaning which will bring about this result. If the rights of the reversioners have been affected for a large proportion of the alienations referred to above, there is no reason to think that that right will remain operative only in respect of a limited class of alienations.

(7) Another anomaly which I conceive would arise is in regard to the Hindu females power to surrender the property held by her to a reversioner. If the view is accepted that the property which the Hindu female has sold or gifted away is one in which the vendee or donee has only a limited interest to last during the lifetime of the Hindu female and that a reversioners right to get back such property after her death has not been affected by Section 14 of the Act, it implies that the Hindu female has the power to surrender such interest. The position has now been put beyond controversy by the decision in the case of Natvarlal Punjabhai v. Dadubhai Manubhai, AIR 1954 SC 61 [LQ/SC/1953/102] , wherein it has been held that the widow can surrender to the reversioner even that property which she has lost by way of sale or title by adverse possession obtained by anyone. There was a salutary check upon such surrender by the widow or any limited owner in possession in Hindu Law prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, because in order that surrender might become valid in law a limited owner had to surrender the entire interest which was in her hand. It was a grave danger, therefore, in a limited owner surrendering such properties to the reversioner who might turn dishonest and deprive her of all claim to such properties. In the altered situation, under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the Legislature recognised the absolute interest of the Hindu female in all properties of which she is in possession, so that there is no question of surrender of such interest in favour of the reversioner. She may, however, be still competent to make a surrender only of those properties which she has already sold or gifted away inasmuch as the reversionary interest would be deemed to subsist in regard to such properties. This will amount to putting a premium on fraud, but the Legislature cannot be credited with the intention to act in aid of such fraudulent conduct by the Hindu female. These are some of the anomalies which will arise if the construction put upon Section 14 by some other High Courts is accepted. I have already mentioned that it is not the canon of interpretation to construe an Act in such a manner as-to bring about such anomalous positions, unless the language leaves no alternative to the Court but to interpret it in that manner. As Craies, cited above, at page 82 says,

"Manifest absurdity or futility, palpable injustice, or absurd inconvenience or anomaly to be avoided."

In my opinion, the language of the section does not lead to that conclusion and I see no reason why it should be construed in a manner which will bring about the anomalous positions to some of which I have referred above.

(8) I think it unnecessary to add anything to the construction of this section as to whether it is retrospective in operation, because on this point there appears to be no difference of opinion among the Judges of this Court and the other High Courts in so far as the section has been held to be at least partially retrospective. No case has taken the view that the section is prospective only except in so far as it relates to the rights to be acquired after the passing of this Act. To that extent it is definitely prospective. That position has not been challenged so far and, in fact, cannot be challenged. The Allahabad High Court has held that the section is partly retrospective in so far as the past rights of the limited owners are concerned, which have been enlarged into absolute rights, and the section is prospective in so far as the rights acquired after the commencement of this Act are concerned, vide AIR 1958 All 304 [LQ/AllHC/1957/319] ; Hanuman Prasad v. Mst. Indrawati. Das J., in the case of Smt. Kamala Devi v. Bachulal Gupta, AIR 1957 SC 434 [LQ/SC/1957/4] , has observed that the Act is undoubtedly retrospective. As for the opinion that it cannot be retrospective because it does not come within the meaning of the term "retrospective" as stated by Craies, where the learned author states that a statute is deemed to be retrospective which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past, but a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing, I have only to say that the passage, which is based upon the view of (1890) 15 AC 384, cannot be taken to be exhaustive of the meaning of the words "retrospective legislation which has been variously defined and applied to other situations as well. Whenever a statute affects a right either by way of enlarging it or impairing it relating back to a date prior to the passing of the Act, it must be characterised as retrospective legislation. It is true, no doubt, that merely because a part of the requisites for the action of the statute has been taken from the past or from a time antecedent to its passing, it does not become retrospective. An instance given in an American case is, for example, that the keeping of opium was not an offence under the law up to a certain date but beyond that the keeping of opium was a violation of the statute. Part of the requisites for the operation of the Act is taken from the past in the sense that a person possessing opium up to, that date had it legally under the law as it then stood. But the mere fact, therefore, that as a result of the passing of the new Act possession which was lawful, would become unlawful, will not necessarily make the Act retrospective. Where, however, a particular right has been either impaired or enlarged or a certain right has been conferred positively, where none existed before relating back to a past date, there is no reason to hold that it is not retrospective legislation. A typical instance of this also would be the Bihar Restoration of Bakasht Lands and Reduction of Arrears of Rent Act, 1938 (Act IX of 1938) which conferred a new right upon the tenants to be restored to possession of certain lands sold in execution of rent, decrees obtained by the landlords who were in possession on the date of the passing of the Act. That too is a clear instance of a retrospective Act although it only conferred a new right upon the tenants in place of the rights which were extinguished and acquired by the landlords prior to the commencement of the Act.

(9) A retrospective law has been defined in a series of American cases also not only as a law affecting only previous transaction but also affecting rights, obligations, acts, transactions and conditions performed or existing prior to the adoption of the statute (quoted in the dictionary of words and phrases (volume 37A) page 231). At page 236, on the authority of other cases, the following definition has been given:

"A retrospective law may be further defined as one intended to affect transactions which occurred, or rights which accrued, before it became operative, and which ascribes to them effects not inherent in their nature, in view of the law in force at the time of their occurrence."

(10) I have dealt with this point somewhat elaborately even after the judgment of this Court in the case of 1958 BLIR 214: (AIR 1958 Pat 319 [LQ/PatHC/1958/30] ), to which I was a party, because of the importance of the question involved and because the High Courts of Calcutta, Andhra, Kerala and the Punjab have taken a view contrary to the view of a number of Division Bench decisions of this Court. It may, however, be stated that the High Court at Allahabad has come to the same conclusion as the view of this Court with reference to sections 14 and 15 of the Act. I may only observe here that if section 14 is given a narrow meaning with regard to the use of the word "possessed" as confining it to possession at the date of the commencement of the Act and possession to arise after the commencement of the Act, as their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have also held to come to the same conclusion that the reversioners suit should be dismissed in view of Section 15 of the Act, it appears to me to give rise to a somewhat difficult position. If Section 14 is held to preserve the rights of the reversioners in some kind of alienations, there is no reason to hold why under Section 15 the Legislature would think of taking away the self-same right. In my opinion, therefore, Sections 14 and 15 are not to be read in isolation to each other, but they are to be read together and Section 14 must be given a meaning, provided the section is capable of bearing that meaning, which would make it consistent with Section 15 and not opposed to it. To read them in dissociation with each other would amount to holding that the Legislature brought about a contradiction between the two sections of the Act in so far as the rights of the reversioners to challenge the alienations made by Hindu females are concerned.

(11) Mr. Dutt, however, has contended that it is not necessary even to go into the question of soundness or otherwise of the two points of view which have appealed to the learned Judges of this Court and the other High Courts, because the present appeal can be disposed of with reference to the allegation in the plaint itself. Since in paragraph 7 the plaintiff has stated that the deeds of gift are of a character in regard to which he has sought a declaration that they are farzi, collusive, illegal, null and void and ineffective, it is obvious that according to his allegation possession did not pass to the donees. Even in the relief portion he has stated that defendant No. 3 is in possession and occupation of the property as a Hindu widow, as a limited owner with limited right and merely as a maintenance-holder. Accordingly, the case does not fall outside the ambit of the decisions of this Court or of other High Courts with regard to Section 14 of the Act. If, according to the plaintiff, Mt. Barta Kuer was in actual possession, she must be held to have acquired indefeasible right in terms of Section 14 and, accordingly, the donees have acquired absolute right to the gifted properties. It has, however, been contended on behalf of the respondent that paragraph 7 of the plaint must not be construed in such a strict manner. What the plaintiff stated in paragraph 7 was that the deeds of gift were not binding upon him and the use of the word "farzi", which would imply that it was a sham transaction, and possession remained with the donor, should not be construed too literally. In my opinion, it is difficult to accede to this contention because the Court has also given a finding in regard to the gift in favour of Nema Pandey to the following effect:

"The allegation that after the gift Nema Pandey had been put in possession was not proved satisfactorily. I have already referred to the ignorance of Nema Pandey about the details of the property. It is more than probable that the gift has remained inoperative".

There is no such finding, however, in regard to the other gift. To put the matter beyond controversy, however, I may refer to the evidence of the plaintiff himself, who said:

"The deed of gift in favour of Nema Pandey is farzi. It was obtained by Muninath Pandey. The property covered by the gift is still in possession of Barta Kuer."

Learned counsel for the respondent, however, contended that whether Section 14 would apply or not should depend upon the finding of fact to be given by this Court in appeal in regard to whether she was in possession or not. Mr. Dutt, for the appellants, however, has urged that his clients were defendants to the suit and he represents them as appellants, in this Court. He accepted the plaintiffs allegation made in the plaint with regard to Barta Kuer being in possession of the property and in that view Section 14 in terms must apply to the present case. In my opinion, there is force in this contention and it must be held that under the provisions of Section 14, the plaintiff-respondent now has no cause of action and the suit must be dismissed.

(12) Learned counsel for the respondent has brought to my notice an order by a single Judge of this Court in First Appeal 73 of 1950 in support of his contention that the learned Judge has referred a similar question to a Division Bench pending the decision of the Full Bench on this point. It appears, however, that in that case the prayer of the plaintiff was that a sale deed executed by two Hindu females was not binding on the reversioner. There was no allegation of farzi or that possession had not passed. I see no justification, therefore to await the decision of the Full Bench so far as the present case is concerned, because it is Clearly distinguishable even if the Full Bench were to come to a decision contrary to the view which has found favour with the majority of Judges of this Court so far and adopted the line of reasoning of some other High Courts.

(13) The appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgment and decree of the Court below are set aside and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, parties shall bear their own costs throughout.