1. The defendants in this case until lately were residents of Indore and Sihore, and carried on business in those places, both of which are beyond the local jurisdiction of this Court, and lie, in fact, outside British India. The only jurisdiction, therefore, which this Court can exercise over them is that given by clause XII of the Letters Patent. Under that clause, the plaintiffs have obtained the usual leave to file their suit in this Court, hut that leave was, in fact, granted in respect of the trial of the cause of action disclosed in the plaint as it then stood. If I now permit an amendment of the plaint in the sense indicated by Mr. Kirkpatrick, I shall be permitting the plaintiffs to obtain in this suit an adjudication by the Court upon a cause of action different from that for which the leave of the Court has been obtained, and one, too, which must be substantiated by very different evidence, and which must involve an investigation of an entirely different character-I consider that such a proceeding is not sanctioned by the law. In Shaikh Abdool Hamed v. Promothonauth Bose I Ind. Jur. (N.S.), 218, Phear, J., decided in Calcutta that the leave required by clause XII of the Letters Patent must be granted, if at all, at the time of the acceptance of the plaint, and cannot be granted afterwards. And this view, which is entirely in consonance with the express words of clause XII, has, I believe, been always accepted in this Court. In DeSouza v. Coles 3 Mad.H.C. Rep., 384, the learned Judge, to whom the plaint was presented for acceptance, declined to grant leave under that clause, and the Appellate Court held that the order refusing leave was a judicial order subject to appeal, although they affirmed the order in the circumstances of that particular case. In Hadjee Ismail Hadjee Habeeb v. Hadjee Mahomed Hadjee Joosul 13 Beng. L.R., 91 Maepherson, J., granted leave under clause XII to institute the Suit in the High Court of Calcutta, but on appeal Couch, C.J., and Pontifex, J., reversed his order. Couch, C.J., said (at p. 101) that the order under that clause "is not a mere formal order, or an order merely regulating the procedure in the suit, but one that has the effect of giving a jurisdiction to the Court which it otherwise would not have." In that case, too, I notice that an attempt was made to get the Court of appeal to treat the suit as one merely against defendant No. 1 to set aside a release, when the plaint was against four defendants, and was, in substance, a plaint for an account of the estate of a deceased person, and for the payment to the plaintiff of his share in such estate after ascertainment of it by the Court. Upon that attempt, Couch, C.J., in the course of his judgment made some remarks which have an important bearing on the point I have here to decide: "The plaintiff," he said (at p. 98), "cannot be allowed, when the case comes hero on an appeal from the order of Macpherson, J., to say that he would pro for to put his suit in another form. He filed his plaint against the four defendants, and prayed for relief against all, and in the order by which he was at liberty to bring his suit in this Court, the object of it was expressly stated. We must, therefore, treat it as a suit which has been brought against all four defendants, and properly (sic) against them." Although there is no such express statement of the object of the present suit in the order of Bayley, J., as appears to be usual by the practice of the High Court of Calcutta, I cannot think that that ought to make any difference in the application of the principle indicated by Couch, C.J. Even without any such distinct order, which by the practice of this Court is not separately drawn up, the grant of the leave must, I think, be taken to relate to the suit as put forward in the plaint on which the Leave is endorsed by the Judge accepting the plaint. In my opinion, this result must follow from the very character of the order as explained by the authorities. And if, as held in the case now under citation, a plaintiff, even on appeal from the order granting leave, cannot be allowed to "put his case in another form," it seems to me that, a fortiori he must not be allowed to do so, when that order stands in full force, and the trials takes place under the jurisdiction conferred by that very order. Again, in the case of Jairam Narayan Raje v. Atmaram Narayan Raje I.L.R., 4 Bom., 432, whore the plaintiff had obtained leave to sue in forma pauperis under the Code of Civil Procedure, but had not obtained or asked for leave under clause XII of the Letters Patent, West, J., said (at p. 488): "But it (i.e., leave under clause XII) was, in fact, not asked for. I am told that I ought to infer it from leave having been granted to the plaintiff to sue as a pauper, but such leave does not by any means necessarily imply that this particular question was judicially considered. The leave of the Court ought to have been as distinctly sought and obtained for the purpose of joining the different elements of the cause of action in a single suit in this Court, as for the purpose of suing in forma pauperis."

2. From all these authorities it seems to me to result, that the grant of leave under clause XII of the Letters Patent is a judicial act which must be held to relate only to the cause of action disclosed in the plaint as presented to the Court at the time of the grant; that such leave, which affords the very foundation of the jurisdiction, is not available to (confer jurisdiction in respect of a substantially different cause of action which was not judicially considered at the time it was granted; that, in respect of such a different cause of action, leave under clause XII cannot be granted after the institution of the suit; and that, therefore, the Court cannot try such different cause of action, except in another suit duly instituted.

3. It follows from those considerations that any amendment, such as Mr. Kirkpatrick proposes to make in the plaint, cannot be of any avail. If the Court cannot in this suit try the cause of action in respect of the entire accounts between the plaintiff and the defendants, and amendment of the plaint for the purpose of praying for those accounts to be taken, and for the payment of the balance that may be found to be due on foot of such accounts, cannot enable the plaintiff to obtain a decree. In the course of the argument, I did, indeed, suggest that the Court might perhaps consider itself seized of the case by virtue of the leave when once granted, and that being so seized of the case, it might then proceed to deal with any application for amendment as in a case under the ordinary jurisdiction. But, in view of the authorities above referred to as to the nature of the order under clause XII, and having regard to the fact that the point is one relating, not to procedure, but to jurisdiction, it appeals to me that that suggestion cannot be maintained.

4. But it was further argued that this case was one in which, as originally instituted, no leave under clause XII was necessary at all; that the grant of it by Mr. Justice Bayley must be taken to have been made only ex majori cautela; and that, therefore, it is open to the Court to allow an amendment in this case in the same manner and to the same extent as it can allow amendments in ordinary cases where no question of jurisdiction arises. It has been conceded by the Advocate-General that an application for leave under clause XII by a plaintiff, or a grant of the leave under that clause by the Court, cannot operate, by way of estoppel or otherwise, as decisive on the question of the necessity for obtaining such leave. And it becomes, therefore, necessary to consider whether the case is one in which this Court had jurisdiction independently of the leave granted under clause XII. Now, in the first place, it is to be remarked that, according to the evidence of the plaintiff Harbilas, the contract between him and Chotmal in respect of the Sihore business took place at Indore, and the transactions in respect of which this suit is brought were entered into in pursuance of that contract. It follows, therefore, that if the contract and the breach of it constitute together the cause of action, the whole cause of action in this case did not arise within the jurisdiction of this Court, an essential part having arisen in Indore--see Laljee Lal v. Hardey Narain I.L.R., 9 Calc., 105 and the cases there cited. In that view of the case, the argument for the plaintiffs is obviously untenable.

5. Looking at the case, however, apart from this evidence of the plaintiff, and dealing with it on general grounds as a suit by the drawee of hundis against the drawers, Mr. Kirkpatrick relied on the case of Dhanraj v. Gobindaram: 1 Beng. L.R. (O.J.), 76 as showing that the whole cause of action here arose in Bombay. That was a suit for a balance of account claimed by the plaintiff in respect of transactions which had taken place in Calcutta, and in which he had acted as "araidar" of the defendant. It may well be that the view which the Court took of the case was that the plaintiff there was agent of the defendant; that the agency transactions were intended to take place, and did in fact take place, in Calcutta; that the hundi (for the report mentions only one, and that, too, drawn several months after the despatch of the goods which wore consigned for Bale in Calcutta) was only a mode of paying money to the principal, and was not part of a series of regular mercantile transactions in hundis, and that the cause of action in respect of expenses incurred by the plaintiff in the course of the agency transactions must, therefore, be held to have arisen in Calcutta. In that view of the case it would be, in principle, somewhat like the case of Luckmee Chand v. Zoranur Mull 8 Moo. I.A., 291 before the Privy Council. But the special circumstances now indicated distinguish that case from the one before me, and, therefore, I do not think that the case of Dhanraj v. Gobindaram 1 Beng. L.R. (O.J). 76 is an authority binding on the Court in this case.

6. On the other hand, the case of Sichel v. Borch 33 L.J. Ex. (N.S.), 179; S.C., 2 H. & C., 954, to which I drew attention in the course of the argument, appears to be a strong authority for holding that, in such a case as the present, a part of the cause of action arises where the bill of exchange or hundi is drawn. Counsel for the plaintiff very fairly admitted that that case was not distinguishable from the present one, and, in truth, this case scorns in one circumstance to be even stronger than Sichel v. Borch 33 L.J. Ex. (N.S.), 179; S.C., 2 H. & C., 954. In that case, the, defendant, a merchant in Norway, and not a British subject, drew in Norway his bill of exchange payable in London at four months, and after endorsing it to the order of D. tent it by post to D. in London; D. endorsed it to the plaintiff also in London. On motion to set aside the writ of summons, notice of which was served in Norway under section 19 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1852, it was argued (as in the Calcutta case) that "there was no complete contract until the bill reached D. in London." Pollock, C.B., however, after saying that the words 'cause of action in the section above mentioned meant the whole cause of action, went on to observe as follows:--"The cause of action hero is the contract and the breach of the contract; and it is not because the breach of the contract was in this country that the cause of action is within the jurisdiction. We must consider the contract which gives rise to the breach. The contract, strictly speaking, is neither in Norway nor in this country. The contract, so far as one of the parties is concerned, is, no doubt, in England; but the contract, so far as the party is concerned, is in Norway," And Baron Martin said: "The cause of notion means the entire cause of action. The cause of action would be the drawing of the bill, or the endorsement of the bill, both of which took place in Norway." It is clear that, according to that case, the whole cause of action here did not arise within the jurisdiction of this Court.

7. The case of Lalji Lall v. Hardey Narain I.L.R., 9 Calc., 105, which Mr. Kirkpatrick cited in favour of his argument, was decided on section 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and proceeded upon the basis that the phrase "cause of action" there did not mean the whole cause of action. The decision in that case, therefore, is not of binding authority hero. But the following passage in the judgment of Cunningham, J., is important in support of the view I have above expressed The learned Judge said (at pp. 108, 109):

"Conflicting decisions have been given by the English Courts as to the meaning of the corresponding words to the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, section 18, the latter of the two just mentioned views being taken in Sichel v. Borch 33 L.J. Ex. (N.S.), 179; S.C., 2 H. & C., 954, Allhusen v. Malgarejo L.R., 3 Q.B., 340 and Cherry v. Thompson L.R., 7 Q.B., 573; the former in Jackson v. Spittall L.R., 6 C.P., 542, and ultimately by agreement in Vaughan v. Weldon L.R., 10 C.P., 48. On the Original Side of this Court, the provisions in the Letters Patent enabling a suit to be brought, 'with the leave of the Court,' if the cause of action has arisen wholly or partially within the local jurisdiction, has been understood as suggesting the inference that 'cause of action' means, for the purposes of suits on the Original Side, the contract as well as the breach; and this view appears to have been taken on the Original Side of the Bombay, and until recently, of the Madras High Courts: see Suganchand Shiudas v. Mulchand Joharimal 12 Bom. H.C. Rep., 113."

8. Another of the cases relied on, via., Lleuhellin v. Chunni Lal I.L.R., 4 All., 423 (see also Bishunath v. Ilahi Baksh I.L.R., 5 All., 277, where this case was followed), is also of no authority on the question before mo, because it was decided, like the last case, on the words 'cause of action' in section 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, which were interpreted to mean "material portion of the cause of action." Muhammad Abdul Kadar v. The East Indian Railway Company I.L.R., 1 Mad., 375, which was also cited, was, however, a decision on the charter. It was, apparently, the case which Cunningham, J., had in mind when referring to the view of the Madras High Court in the words be uses at the close of the passage just cited. The interpretation, however, which the learned Judges in that case put upon the phrase 'cause of action' has not prevailed in this Court. Kernan, J., said : "Section 12 of the Letters Patent applies to cases in which the cause of action arises partly outside the jurisdiction, e.g., if the contract of the company in this case had been to deliver a portion of the goods, say, at Arcanum, outside the jurisdiction, and a portion in Madras, and if the action was brought, alleging, as breach, non-delivery at both places. In such cases, the cause of action could not be said to have arisen wholly in Madras I.L.R., 1 Mad., at p. 377 And Kindersley, J., said that the words 'cause of action' "rather relate to cases of several 'causes of action' contained in one and the same suit, some of which have arisen out of the jurisdiction." I.L.R., 1 Mad., at p. 377.

9. I do not think that in this Court I can act upon this interpretation of the phrase 'cause of action'; and I may further remark that in the Madras case, Morgan, C.J., at the original hearing had taken a different view from that which prevailed in appeal, and that the Appellate Court there followed the case of Gopikrishna Gosami v. Nilkomul Banerjee 13 Bang. L.R., 461 in Calcutta, which had been decided, not on the charter, but on section 5 of the old Civil Procedure Code, and in which Birch, J., expressly based his judgment on that section, making a point of the case coming upon "the Appellate Side of the Court;" and Mark by, J., the other member of the Bench, said that he did not "pretend" that the rule laid down in the case was "applicable to other Courts governed by other statutes."

10. I must, therefore, hold that in this case, which is governed by clause XII of the Letters Patent, the leave of the Court was necessary under that clause to give the Court jurisdiction; that the jurisdiction so conferred was confined to the clause of action disclosed in the plaint as originally framed; and that the Court cannot now allow an amendment which shall substantially alter that cause of action in this view it becomes unnecessary to consider whether the cause of action intended to be introduced into the suit by amendment would itself be one over which this Court could exercise jurisdiction without leave granted under clause XII.

11. That being the opinion at which I have arrived, I must find in the negative on issue No. 6, in the affirmative on issue No. 15, in the negative on issue No. 22, and, without finding on the other issues, I must dismiss the suit with costs.