James, J.These are twelve appeals, eleven from the decision of the District Judge of Darbhanga and one from the decision of the Additional District Judge. They all arise out of suits for ejectment of the cultivators in possession of portions of Plot No. 198, in Bakarpur. This village formally belonged jointly to the Maharaja of Darbhanga and the plaintiff whose property was partitioned at about the time of the preparation of the Record-of-Rights. Plot No. 198 the backwater of a river known as Daria Margang, was left in joint possession of the two zamindars. The backwater gradually silted up and the defendants took possession of the land which formed adjacent to their holdings.

2. In some instances settlement was made on behalf of the Maharaja of Darbhanga of newly formed land within this plot. In 1929 there was a second partition by which the eastern portion of the plot was allotted exclusively to the plaintiff. The Courts below have found for those plots which lie adjacent to the existing holdings of the defendants that the newly formed area has become in each instance an accretion to the holding by virtue of the provisions of Clause (4) of Regn. 11 of 1825 and for the rest that the settlements were made by the Maharaja of Darbhanga in good faith and accepted in good faith by the tenants; acquiesced in by the plaintiff and that the defendants have acquired occupancy right. Mr. L.K. Jha on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant argues that in many instances the provisions of Regn. 11 of 1825 cannot properly be applied to these plots, because the holdings to which the newly formed land accreted were in many instances held under the Darbhanga estate from the time of the earlier partition. This argument applies to the land with which we are concerned in Second Appeal Nos. 15, 22, part of the land of Second Appeal No. 24 and the land in Second Appeal No. 678.

3. On the question of limitation on which the findings of the Courts below are against the plaintiff, Mr. Jha suggests that the defendants could not prescribe for a limited interest and further that their possession should be regarded as having been annually interrupted by the inundation of the land. Where the defendants have been found entitled to hold by virtue of settlement, Mr. Jha argued that the defendants cannot properly claim title by the fact that they have been inducted on the land by a co-sharer of the plaintiff.

On the question of accretion I doubt whether the defendants can claim the benefit of the provisions of Clause (4) of Regn. 11 of 1825, because in each instance the accreted portion lay under proprietors other than the proprietor of the parent holding.

4. The provisions of Clause (4) of the Regulation appear to contemplate that the parent holding and the accretion shall together form one single holding and that the estate of the occupier in the accreted land shall be exactly the same as the estate which he enjoys in the parent holding. This is not possible where the accreted land is held under proprietors other than the proprietors of the parent holding; and it appears to be clear that the parent holding and the accreted land cannot form one single holding and must be regarded as separate holdings. On the question of limitation, the respondents stand on stronger ground. Mr. Jha suggests that annual inundation have interrupted the tenants possession, but the Courts have found that these occasional floods have never been such as to interfere with the ordinary agricultural operations so that there has been actually no interruption of possession.

5. Mere occasional flooding of this kind cannot be treated as estopping the running of limitation: Nand Lal v. Rashdhari Lal (1932) 16 PLT 659. The raiyats entered into possession of the land as it formed and the findings of the Courts below are that they have enjoyed such possession for considerably over a period of twelve years against the plaintiff. The defendants are not, therefore, liable to ejectment. The defendants claim no more than the interest of occupancy raiyats, but possession of a limited interest in immovable property may be just as much adverse for the purpose of barring a suit for the determination of that limited interest, as adverse possession of a complete interest in the property operates to bar a suit for the whole property: Ishan Chandra Mitter v. Raja Ramranjan Chakrabutty (1905) 2 CLJ 125.

6. This disposes of Appeals Nos. 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22 and 23. In Appeals Nos. 17, 19, 25 and 678, together with Appeal No. 24, the defendants claim title by settlement from the Maharaja of Darbhanga. Mr. L.K. Jha argues that u/s 99, Estates Partition Act, a settlement by a single co-sharer cannot be treated as binding on another co-sharer to whom the land may be allotted on partition. In Midnapore Zamindari Co. Ltd. v. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy AIR (1924) PC 144 which has been cited by the learned Munsif, it was held by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that a single co-sharer has no power to confer a right of occupancy on a raiyat, but as the learned Munsif has pointed out, their Lordships remarked in that case that no evidence had been brought to their attention to show that any of the raiyats in question had held any of the land in suit for twelve continuous years before suit, so as to be able to claim right of occupancy u/s 180, Ben. Ten. Act.

7. In the present case the claim is not that a right of occupancy was conferred by the Darbhanga estate, but that a right of occupancy has accrued by operation of law under Sections 20 and 21, Bihar Tenancy Act.

The Courts below have relied upon the decision in Dakahyani Dassi v. Mana Raut AIR (1914) Cal 577 and have found that the Darbhanga estate was managing this property in good faith and that the raiyats in good faith accepted settlement from the estate, and further that the plaintiff acquiesced in the settlement when it was made. It appears to be clear that the settlements were made in the ordinary course of management and that this settlement of newly appearing waste land for the purpose of reclamation was made by the co-sharer in good faith and for the benefit of the estate as a whole and the Courts have reasonably held, as was held in the case upon which they have relied, that the position of the defendants could not be worse than what it would have been if they had accepted rent in good faith from a trespasser in actual occupation of the land.

8. When they obtained settlement in this way, they became raiyats and after occupation for twelve years they acquired an occupancy right by the operation of the provisions of the Bihar Tenancy Act, and u/s 25 of the Act, they cannot be ejected except on the conditions prescribed by that Section. I would dismiss these appeals with, costs: there will be one consolidated hearing fee of Rs. 64.

Chatterji, J.

9. I agree.