Faizanuddin, Actg. C.J.

This second appeal by the principal debtor/ defendant No. 1 has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated June 13, 1985, passed by the first additional judge to the Court of District Judge, Durg, in Civil Appeal No. 12A of 1982, arising out of the judgment and decree-dated October 30, 1981, passed by the Additional Civil Judge, Class-I, Durg, in Civil Suit No. 9A of 1980,

The plaintiff/respondent No. 1, Dena Bank, is carrying on banking business. It has its branch at Gunderdehi, Tahsil and district Durg. The appellant/defendant No. 1, Ram Ashre Chandrakar, applied to the respondent-bank for grant of loan to meet his agricultural needs, namely, for purchase of seeds and fertilizer for cultivation of his land. The respondent-bank granted a loan of Rs. 4,728.25 to the appellant/defendant No. 1 for the said purpose and advanced the said amount to the appellant on July 25, 1971, for which the appellant executed a demand promissory note dated May 25, 1971 (exhibit P-3). The said promissory note recites that the p loan amount shall carry interest at 4 1/2 per cent. per annum above the rate of interest notified by the Reserve Bank of India or at least at the rate of 11 per cent. per annum. One Heera Ram (since deceased) and respondent No. 2, Sonau Ram, stood as guarantors to the principal-debtor. The promissory note (exhibit P-3) was signed by the principal debtor and his two guarantors. The principal-debtor and his guarantors also executed a letter of continuity (exhibit P-4) on May 25, 1971, as well as deed of agreement (exhibit P-5) pledging the produce in favour of the respondent-bank which was to be raised on his agricultural land as security for repayment of the loan amount. The appellant/defendant No. 1 failed to repay the said loan amount with interest and, therefore, the respondent-bank served a notice, exhibit P-8, to the principal debtor/defendant No. 1 and his two guarantors to repay the loan amount with interest and when the principal debtor and his guarantors failed to pay the amount with interest, the respondent-bank filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 13,210 including the principal and the interest.

Heera Ram, one of the guarantors, who was impleaded as defendant No, 2, died during the pendency of the suit and as no legal representatives were brought on record, the suit abated against him. The second guarantor defendant/respondent No. 2, Sonau Ram, did not defend the suit and preferred to remain ex parte. The principal-debtor/defendant No. 1, however, contested the suit by filing the written statement denying the plaintiff/respondent No. 1s claim. He took the plea that the alleged loan amount of Rs. 4,728.25 was not advanced to him in cash by the respondent-bank; but he was supplied with the fertiliser of that value with interest at the rate of 41/2 per cent. per annum. The appellant/defendant No. 1 averred that the respondent-bank had obtained his signatures on various blank papers. He also took the plea that the respondent-bank had filed the suit through its development manager, who had no authority to do so and, therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed having been filed by an unauthorised person. The appellant/defendant No. 1 also averred that the rate of interest was 41/2 per cent. per annum and the suit was barred by time.

The learned trial judge after recording the parties evidence, rejected all the defence pleas and decreed the plaintiff/respondent No. 1s suit for Rs. 10,995.34 with future interest at the rate of 11 per cent. per annum from the date of institution of the suit till recovery/The respondent-bank filed a photostat copy of a power of attorney in favour of Shri U. C. Koya, Development Manager, Raipur, along with an application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The said application was allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial court was affirmed with a modification that on November 10, 1980, a sum of Rs. 7,272.40 as principal amount alone was due against the appellant and, therefore, instead of a decree for Rs. 10,995.34, the lower appellate court passed a decree for Rs. 7,272.40 only with future interest at the rate of 11 per cent. per annum with effect from November 10, 1980, till recovery against which this appeal had been directed.

Learned counsel appearing for the defendant/appellant first assailed the findings of the courts below by contending that the suit was filed by an incompetent and unauthorised person and, therefore, it ought to have been dismissed on that count-alone. He submitted that during the pendency of the suit in the trial court, the appellant had given a notice to the respondent-bank on November 12, 1980, to produce the relevant documents and the alleged power of attorney but no power of attorney was produced in the trial court. He, therefore, strenuously urged that the learned lower appellate court was not justified at all in allowing the application of the respondent-bank filed under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code, along with photostat copy of power of attorney said to have been given to U. C. Koya, Development Manager of the bank. He went on to contend further that the learned lower appellate court committed an error in acting upon the photostat copy of the power of attorney without formal proof thereof in accordance with law. After giving serious consideration to all the aforementioned submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellant, I am unable to persuade myself to accept the same.

It cannot be disputed that the plaintiff-bank is a corporate body having been constituted under the provisions of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, and functioning under various statutory provisions and regulations and, therefore, the genuineness of the power of attorney can hardly be doubted. It appears that the said document was not produced in the trial court due to inadvertence on the part of the bank officials. The objection regarding the authority of Shri U. C. Koya in signing, verifying and filing of the suit on behalf of. the plaintiff-bank is of a formal nature which has been negatived by production of a photostat copy of the power of attorney in favour of Shri U. C. Koya. Learned counsel for the appellant was unable to show any apparent prejudice that may have been caused to the appellant in producing the photostat copy of power of attorney in the lower appellate court, the production of which was for the substantial cause in order to enable the lower appellate court to do justice to the parties. A perusal of the power of attorney on the record of the lower appellate court will go to show that it authorised Shri U. C. Koya to take all lawful proceedings for recovering and realising the debts and. advances made by the plaintiff-bank and to commence, prosecute and defend at law all actions, suits, claims, demands and disputes in the name of and on behalf of the bank. A power of attorney is a written document under the seal authorising another person who is called the attorney of the person appointing him, to do any lawful Act for and on behalf of another. It is either general or special. The nature of the instrument is to give the attorney the full power and authority of the maker to accomplish the act intended to be performed. The power of attorney in question before this court fully conforms to these requirements and authorised Shri U.C. Koya to sign, verify and institute the suit. In view of these facts, the aforesaid contentions have, therefore, no substance.

Learned counsel for the appellant then urged that the alleged loan was advanced to the appellant on May 25, 1971, but the suit was filed on August 21, 1980, which was prima facie barred by limitation ; yet the courts below instead of dismissing the suit as barred by time, decreed the same illegally. After examination of the documents on record, 1 do not find any merit in this submission either. The plaintiff-bank has produced and proved the execution of the letter of continuity (exhibit P-4), dated May 25, 1971, as well as the document (exhibit P-5) of the same date. Both these documents are signed by the principal-debtor, i.e., the appellant/ defendant No. 1 and his two guarantors. Exhibit P-4 is the document relating to the continuing security whereby the appellant and his two guarantors agreed that the demand promissory note (exhibit P-3) is accepted as a continuing security. It is settled law that in the case of a continuing guarantee and an undertaking by the debtor to pay any amount that may be due to a bank on the general balance of its account or any other account, so long as the account is a live account in the sense that it is not settled and there is no refusal on the part of the principal and the guarantor to carry out the obligation, the period of limitation for a suit to enforce the bond cannot be said to have commenced running and the limitation would only run from the date of breach under article 55 of the Limitation Act. See Margaret Lalita Samuel v. Indo-Commercial Bank Ltd. : [1979]1SCR914 . In the present case, admittedly, there is an agreement for a continuing guarantee (exhibit P-4). There is also no dispute that the appellant/defendant No. 1 or any of his guarantors at any point of time refused to carry out the obligations under the documents relied on by the plaintiff-bank. There is evidence that the plaintiff-bank, before institution of the suit, had issued a notice of demand (exhibit P-8) to the appellant/defendant No. 1 some time in the year 1978 and when the appellant failed to pay the amount due against him, the suit was presented on August 21, 1980, which is within three years from the date of breach of payments. The courts below have, therefore, rightly rejected the appellant/defendant No. 1s objection with regard to the limitation.

It was next contended that the courts below, while granting pendente lite and post-decretal interest, totally ignored the provision of Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). Learned counsel for the appellant contended that there was no justification to deny application of the provision of Section 34 of the Code by granting 6 per cent. interest per annum, instead of 11 per cent. as decreed by the courts below. After giving serious thought to these submissions and on a critical examination of the proviso attached to Sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Code read with Explanation II, I find that the submissions are without any merit. It appears that while advancing the afore-mentioned arguments, learned counsel for the appellant ignored to look into the proviso attached to Sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Code read with Explanation II which read as under :

"34. Interest.--(1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate not exceeding 6 per cent. per annum, as the court deems reasonable on such principal sum, from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the court thinks fit :

Provided that where the liability i relation to the sum so adjudged had arisen out of a commercial transaction, the rate of such further interest may exceed 6 per cent. per annum, but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions .

Explanation II.--For the purposes of this section, a transaction is a commercial transaction, if it is connected with the industry, trade or business of the party incurring the liability."

A plain reading of the proviso reproduced above will go to show that the provision of Sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Code with regard to the award of pendente lite and post-decretal interest at the rate of 6 per cent. will not apply to the liabilities arising out of commercial transactions for which the rate of interest would be either the contractual rate of interest or where there is no such contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transaction. Explanation II further clarifies the expression "commercial transaction" and states that any transaction connected with the industry, trade or business of the party incurring the liability would amount to a commercial transaction. In the present case, therefore, the simple question is whether the loan obtained by the appellant/defendant No. 1 for agricultural purpose such as for seeds and fertilised, would amount to a commercial transaction and whether the profession or occupation of agriculture would fall within the ambit of the word "business" used in Explanation II.

The words "industry", "trade" or "business", as used in Explanation II, have not been defined in the Code. In a situation where an expression "term" or any word, which has some significance in determining the controversy involved in a case, has not been defined in the relevant statute, then the court has no option but to resort to the meaning in the general sense in which they have been understood in common parlance or to look to the dictionary meaning of the term or the word in question. In the present case, as said earlier, the loan was obtained by the appellant to meet his agricultural needs such as seeds and fertiliser, etc. If the profession or occupation falls within the meaning and ambit of the word "business" as used in Explanation II, the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 34 with Explanation II would be fully attracted and the appellant/defendant No. 1 would not be entitled for the benefit of the provisions of Section 34(1) of the Code for the purpose of payment of pendente lite or post-decretal interest ; but he would be liable to pay the contractual rate of interest and in the absence of any agreement in respect of rate of rent to pay at the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to the commercial transactions.

The word "business" is a word of indefinite import and has a very extensive and wide meaning. In a general sense, "business" means practically anything which is an occupation distinguished from some pleasure. It encompasses within its fold any venture in the nature of trade, commerce, manufacture or any profession, calling and vocation. The word "business" connotes some real substantive and systematic and organised course of activity with a definite purpose and object, It, therefore, turns out that all professions are business. The question, therefore, arises whether "agriculture" is a profession which falls within the ambit and scope of the word "business" or not so as to attract the application of the proviso attached to Sub-section (1) of Section 34 read with Explanation II thereof. As commonly understood "agriculture" means the science and art of cultivating the land and allied activities or conduct, The ultimate use of the produce from the land may not be human consumption. Even if it is used for trade or commerce, the land yielding the produce will be used for agricultural purposes. There may.be a variety of activities which may well be styled as "agriculture". It, therefore, necessarily follows that agriculture will amount to a profession of cultivation which would fall within the meaning of "business".

According to Websters Dictionary, the word "business" means employment, profession, vocation or any occupation for livelihood. In the same dictionary the word "agriculture" means the science and practice of the cultivation of the soil. Again, according to Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the word "business" means occupation, profession or trade and the state of being busily engaged in anything. In a general sense, it means action which occupies time, demanding attention and labour, serious occupation and work as opposed to pleasure or recreation or pastime. In the same Oxford Dictionary, the ward "agriculture" means the science and art of cultivating the soil including the allied pursuits of gathering crops and rearing of livestock, tillage, husbandry and farming. It, therefore, necessarily, follows that "agriculture" will amount to a profession or cultivation of land which would fall within the meaning of "business". From the aforesaid discussion also, no other tenable meaning is discernible of the word "business" which will exclude the inclusion of "agriculture" within the meaning of a profession which ultimately means a business. In the case of CIT v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy : [1957]32ITR466(SC) it has been observed that "agriculture" in its root sense means ager, a field and culture, cultivation, cultivation of field which of course implies expenditure of human skill and labour upon land. Similarly, in the case of Barendra Prasad Ray v. ITO : [1981]129ITR295(SC) it has been held that the word "business" is one of wide import and it means an activity carried on continuously and systematically by a person by the application of his labour or skill with a view to earning an income. Again, in Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee : [1989]3SCR1038 , their Lordships had an occasion to deal with the words and phrase like "profession", "occupation", "trade" and "business", It has been observed that the word "business" is a very wide term and would include anything which occupies the time, attention and labour of a man for the purpose of profit. It may include in its form trade, profession, industrial and commercial operations, purchase and sale of goods, and would include anything which is an occupation. It has been further held that the word "occupation" has a wide meaning such as any regular work, profession, job, principal activity, employment, business or a calling in which an individual is engaged. From the above discussions, it has to be held that agriculture is a profession which falls within the four corners of the word "business" and if it is a business, it would be covered by Explanation II of the proviso to Section 34 of the Code. Consequently, it would be open to the courts to award the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to the commercial transactions.

Learned counsel for the appellant lastly contended that having regard to the language of Sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Code pendente lite interest or post-decretal interest can be awarded on the principal sum advanced to the debtor and not on the aggregate of the principal and interest accrued till the date of institution of the suit. He submitted that in the present case, the principal sum which is said to have been advanced to the appellant as loan was a sum of Rs. 4,728.25 and, therefore, the pendents lite and post-decretal interest would be payable on this amount only and not on the aggregate and combined amount including the interest, I find much substance in these submissions.

It may be pointed out that prior to 1956, Section 34 did not exist in the present form. By Amending Act No. 66 of 1956, the words "with further interest at such rate not exceeding 6 per cent. per annum as the court deems reasonable on such principal sum", in Sub-section (1) of Section 34 were substituted for the words "with further interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged", and the words "on such principal sum" were substituted for the words "such aggregate sum". The expression "principal sum adjudged" was interpreted differently by different High Courts of our country. Some High Courts took the view that the expression "principal sum adjudged", occurring in Section 34 of the Code, means the amount found due on the date of the suit including any interest accrued up to that date. In other words, interest on interest was permissible even by the amended Section 34. As against this, several High Courts took a contrary view by holding that Section 34, as it stood after the amendment, would allow interest only on the principal sum advanced to the debtor and not on the aggregate sum or the principal and the interest accrued thereon. This controversy, however, has been set at rest by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Union Bank of India v. Dalpat Gaurishankar Upadyay [1993] 76 Comp Cas 494 wherein the Full Bench, after considering the expression "principal sum adjudged" and different conflicting views of different High Courts, came to the conclusion that the said expression means only the original amount lent without addition thereto of any interest whatsoever. The said Full Bench also held that any agreement between the parties or any prevailing banking or trade practice to the contrary is irrelevant. I find myself in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Full Bench. As a consequence of this conclusion, the plaintiff-bank in the present case would be entitled to charge pendents lite and post-decretal interest only on the original sum lent to the defendant/appellant, i.e., on Rs. 4,728.25.

As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal partly succeeds and is hereby allowed, The decree passed by the lower appellate court is modified only to the extent that the plaintiff-bank would be entitled to interest on the original principal sum, i.e., Rs. 4,728.25, at the rate of 11 per cent. per annum with effect from November 10, 1980, till recovery thereof. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs of this appeal.