Dawson-Miller, C.J.In this case the appellant prays that the period for depositing the security for costs and the amount of printing costs in an appeal to the Privy Council may be extended. Under Order 45, Rule 7, Civil P.C. as it existed before the amendment of 1920 it was provided that where a certificate is granted the applicant shall, within six months of the decree complained of, or within six weeks from the grant of the certificate, which ever is (she later date, furnish security. Under that rule no mention was made of the discretion of the Court to extend the period beyond that prescribed by the rule.

2. It was, however, laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that the High Court might extend the time allowed for giving security and making the deposit, provided that there were cogent reasons for doing so and the Madras High Court in the case of Ranga sayi v. Mahalakshmamma [1891] 14 Mad. 391, held that cogent reasons must be such as would lead the Court to believe that the party was diligent in due time to be prepared to lodge the deposit within the limited period, and that he was prevented from doing so, not owing to the absence and difficulty of getting funds, but owing to some circumstances, accidental or otherwise, over which he had no control, or owing to mistake, which the Court would consider not unreasonable or caused by negligence.

3. On the other hand the Chief Court of the Punjab held that poverty was a cogent reason for extending the time if the amount required was large and the applicant had deposited a substantial portion of the amount within the time originally allowed. Since those decisions, however, Rule 7, Order 45, has bean remodeled and it now reads thus:

Where the certificate is granted, the applicant shall, within 90 days or such further period not exceeding 60 days, as the Court may upon cause shown allow, from the date of the decree complained of, or within six weeks from the date of the grant of the certificate, which ever is the later date furnish security etc.

4. It seems to me that this new rule has been dratted with great care in order to show exactly what discretion in the to after the Court has and the only discretion which it has is to extend the period of 90 days from the date of the decree to a further period of 60 days and no discretion, is given to extend it beyond the period of six weeks from the date of the grant of the certificate. I am of opinion, therefore, that we have no-discretion to allow an extension of time beyond six weeks after the grant be the certificate. The total period from the date of the decree up to the present; day exceeds the period of five months which would be the full time that was might allow under the earlier part of the rule. Therefore our discretion in that respect can no longer be exercised. I am fortified in the view I take by the decision of the Allahabad High Court is the case of Ram Dhan v. Prag Narain AIR 1922 All. 43 . The question which had to be considered in that case was exactly the same as has to be considered now and the Chief Court consisting of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Pramada Gharan Banerji considered whether having regard to the very careful drafting of the amendment, the discretion of the Court was not curtailed and limited as regards the period from the date of the decree to an extension of 60 days beyond which under no circumstances the Court could go. They were of opinion that that was the real meaning and intended effect of the section and they pointed out the period of six weeks from the grant, of the certificate was not coupled with any discretionary power as in the case of the period of 90 days from the date of the decree and held that they bad no power to extend the period beyond the time which is now definitely and clearly set out in the amended rule. They considered that to decide otherwise and fed grant an extention beyond the period of six weeks from the grant of the certificate would defeat the object and intention o the amendment. In my opinion, that decision was rightly come to and should be followed in this Court.

70. There is, however, in the particular-circumstances of this case another reason I think for refusing to grant this, application. The only ground upon which it is sought to have the period, extended is that the applicant a few days after the order was made was trying to raise money for the deposit of the security and the printing costs and approached Babu Debimangal Singh the zamindar of Bagaha and he promised to advance the sum within the course of a month. That promise was male some time before the 5th November. The time for depositing the security is the 7th December. Therefore if the zamindar of Bagaha carries out his promise then the applicant would be in a position f to pay the money by the 7th December. He states that he got ill but his illness took place after he received the promise from the zamindar of Bagaba.

8. Therefore on the facts disclosed there appears to be no reason in the present case to grant an extension even if we had power to do so. The application is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee three gold mohurs.

Foster, J.

I agree.