Dawson-Miller, C.J.This is an application for leave to appeal to his Majesty in Council from a decision of a Division Bench of this Court refusing leave to the petitioner to appeal in forma pauperies. The petitioner claims that the order of the Court refusing leave to appeal in forma pauperis was a final order, which was appealable to His Majesty in Council u/s 109(a) of the Civil P.C. The only question is whether the order passed on that occasion is a final order or not.

2. In my opinion it is clearly not a final order which is appealable to His Majesty in Council. The order did not in any way finally determine the rights of the parties. It was merely an interlocutory order prescribing the procedure under which the plaintiffs appeal should be conducted. The Court in fact having refused the application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis granted the appellant time in which to pay the Court fee; and had he been able or willing to pay the Court-fee then his appeal would have proceeded in the ordinary course. His rights as an appellant with regard to the subject-matter in dispute in the appeal were, therefore, in no way determined by the order passed from which it is now sought to appeal.

3. The case of Sakan Singh v. Gopal Chandra Neogi [1903] 8 C.W.N. 296, has been referred to by Mr. Hasan Imam on behalf of the respondent in which it was decided by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that in the converse case, where the Court grants leave to appeal in forma pauperis such an order is not appealable to His Majesty in Council, on the ground that it is not a final order, and that case appears to me to have been rightly decided. The only argument addressed to us is that the decision does determine the right of the party to appeal in forma pauperis and, therefore, it is a final adjudication of that right.

4. That, however, is not the class of right with regard to which finality must exist in order to make it a final decree or order. Every order in one sense finally determines some right of the parties whether it be a right to appeal or whether it be a right to have an extension of time or whether it be any other kind o right; but before one can have a final decree or order there must be some final adjudication upon the subject-matter of the suit, that is to say the rights claimed by one party in the suit itself and denied by the other. The rights claimed in the present suit are rights as to a partition of what is alleged to be joint property. The order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in no way determined anything connected with those rights.

5. For these reasons I think that this application must be rejected. The respondent is entitled to his costs of this, application.

Foster, J.

I agree.