Manohar Lall Ag. C.J.

1. This is an appeal by a defendant Ram Narain Dass who is aggrieved by the appellate order of the Special Subordinate Judge of Chaibassa dated 2nd February 1944, by which he reversed the decision of the learned Munsif of Jamshedpur and held that the plaintiff-respondent, the Governor-General-in-Council had a right to maintain the suit in ejectment.

2. The facts are no longer in dispute and may be shortly stated. The plaintiff as a result of certain land acquisition proceedings took possession u/s 16, Land Acquisition Act, on 17th July 1920, of the lands which are the subject of this appeal and other lands. Thereafter in accordance with the terms of an indenture dated 9th March 1887, entered into between the Secretary of State for India in Council and the Bengal Nagpur Railway, the land in question was made over to the railway, but the appellant did not give possession to the Bengal Nagpur Railway. The position of the appellant is admitted to be that of a trespasser and he has been found to be in possession for more than twelve years from the date of the suit which was instituted on 20th December 1941. During the pendency of the appeal before the learned Subordinate Judge the management of the Bengal Nagpur Railway passed into the hand of the Governor-General-in-Council, the plaintiff.

3. The learned Munsif came to the conclusion that upon these facts the plaintiff was the lessor and the Bengal Nagpur Railway Company was the lessee and as the lands in question had been made over to the Bengal Nagpur Railway the plaintiff having no present right of possession could not maintain the action in ejectment. Accordingly he dismissed the suit.

4. In appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge upheld the findings of the learned Munsif on questions of fact, but in disagreement with the trial Court he held that the plaintiff had a right to maintain the suit. No question of limitation arose, as the period of 60 years adverse possession had not been completed by the defendant appellant. Hence, the second appeal to this Court.

5. Mr. M.K. Mukherji on behalf of the appellant contended that the only relief which the plaintiff could claim was the relief u/s 42, Specific Belief Act, namely, that the title of the plaintiff to the lands in suit could be declared, but he argued that the plaintiff could not maintain the suit for present possession and that it was only the Bengal Nagpur Railway Company who was entitled to maintain the suit, and if the Bengal Nagpur Railway Company had been the plaintiff the suit for possession could not have been decreed in favour of the Railway Company as on the findings of fact the Railway Company was out of possession for over 12 years.

6. Upon the finding that the Bengal Nagpur Railway Company is now vested in the plaintiff, the matter becomes easy of solution. The interests of the lessor and the lessee have now become vested in the same person, namely the plaintiff, and, therefore, the plaintiff has every right to maintain the suit for ejectment: See Section 111(d), T.P. Act.

7. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the Court is bound to give a decision in the suit on the facts and circumstances as they exist on the date of the suit and should not take notice of events which have happened after the date of the suit. Ordinarily this is so. But it has been held in many cases that the Court has power to take notice of events subsequent to the suit in order to shorten the litigation. In the present case there is no possible defence to the defendant if the Governor-General in Council instituted the suit on the date the Bengal Nagpur Railway Company came to be owned by the plaintiff. No fresh facts could be adduced in favour of the defendant. I have already stated that the findings of fact are in favour of the appellant, namely, that he has been in possession for more than twelve years from the date of the suit or let it be assumed from the date when the Bengal Nagpur Railway Company came to be vested in the Governor-General-in-Council. Moreover in this case the Bengal Nagpur Railway Company is itself a defendant and, therefore, the Court would be justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff and the possession would be delivered to the plaintiff through the lessee, the Bengal Nagpur Railway Company. In the present case, however, the Bengal Nagpur Railway Company is the same as the plaintiff. Therefore, as the rights of the plaintiff as the owner of the lands in suit are admitted and have been found to be subsisting, the decree which would be passed in the case would be a decree for ejectment of the defendants and possession delivered to the Governor-General-in-Council.

8. For these reasons the appeal must be dismissed and the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge affirmed though for reasons different from those which commended themselves to that Judge. In the circumstances each party will bear his own costs of this litigation in all the Courts.

Das, J.

9. I agree.