Courtney-Terrell, C.J.This second appeal arises out of a suit for defamation which suit, in my opinion, was wholly misconceived. The plaintiff complains that the defendants, who were a number of villagers, placed a petition before the Magistrate making allegations against him of oppressive treatment as a landlord, allegations that he oppressed his poor tenants in every possible way, that he extorted from them illegal cesses, that he took up the parti land which was used by them for grazing and that he closed their village paths and so on. It is said, and it has been held as a fact by the District Judge, that these allegations were devoid of foundation. Furthermore, the District Judge has held that they were not made in good faith. By these findings we are bound and the only point for our decision is the question as to whether or not, in so far as a suit for civil defamation is concerned, statements in the petition complained of are, or are not, protected by the law of absolute privilege and, therefore, cannot be made the subject of a civil suit for damages, whatever may be said of them as offering a possible ground for a criminal prosecution u/s 499, Penal Code.

2. The case came in the first place before the learned Subordinate Judge and he held as a matter of law that the libellous statements complained of were protected by the doctrine of absolute privilege and he held as a fact that the statements were true in substance and in fact and further that they were not made maliciously and he, there fore gave judgment for the defendants.

When the matter reached the District Judge on appeal he reversed the findings of fact of the Munsif, but so far as we are concerned, the only important part of his judgment is that he found that the statements complained of were not protected by the doctrine of absolute privilege, but I fear that he has not appreciated the fundamental principles of law which apart from the authorities should have solved the difficulty.

3. A long series of authorities has emphasised the distinction between criminal proceedings and civil proceedings for defamation in India. It has been pointed out again and again that in so far as criminal proceedings are concerned the law of defamation is not a matter of common law, but is a matter of statute and of Section 499, Penal Code. On the, other hand a civil action for damages for defamation is not a matter of any legislation. It is inherited from the English. Common law and is applicable in India by virtue of the principle that the India Courts in default of special legislation are to apply the rules of equity and good conscience, which have been held certainly in this particular case to include the English Common law of defamation.

4. We have therefore, in a case of civil action for defamation to apply the English Common law and it has long been a well-known commonly recognised maxim that statements made to a Magistrate for the purpose of getting him to act within the scope of his authority are matters of absolute privilege. That rule has been specifically applied in India in a number of cases notably that to which the learned Judge himself refers, namely, Chunni Lal v. Narsingh Das [1918] 40 All 341. The difference between the histories of the different remedies is laid down with great distinctness in the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court: Satis Chandra Ckakrabarti Vs. Ram Dayal De, . It is not necessary in my opinion to go further into a discussion of these authorites. The principle is perfectly clear. The reference in the judgment of the learned District Judge to Section 499, Penal Code; and to the eighth exception in that section shews that he did not appreciate the distinction between the civil and criminal remedy.

5. In my opinion, therefore, this suit should necessarily have failed and whether the alleged libel be well or ill founded is not a matter for us to enquire into and we are not concerned with the truth or falsity of the statements in the petition.

They are absolutely privileged in the interests of public policy because, as has been laid down in many of the English decisions, and particularly in the opinion of Lord Halsbury, which is quoted by the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court in the case I have referred to above, it is a matter of public interest that witnesses and other persons appearing in criminal proceedings should be able to offer their testimony or make their complaints without any fear whatever of civil liability in respect of the statements they make and more particularly is that the case when the law has already provided as it has in the Penal Code, for the punishment of persons who make false complaints or bring false cases.

6. I would, therefore allow this appeal with costs and dismiss the suit. The cross-objection is not pressed and is dismissed.

It would seem that some appellants from the order of the District Judge have withdrawn from their appeals. But the order dismissing the suit of the plaintiff will be made applicable against all the defendants against whom the suit was started, under the authority of the provisions of Order 41, Rules 4 and 33, Civil P.C.

Kulwant Sahay, J.

7. I agree.