Dawson Miller, C.J.This is an appeal on behalf of the judgment-debtor from a decision of Mr. Justice Ross, dated the 23rd May 1921.

2. The respondent obtained a decree against the appellant on the 23rd May 1911 in the Court of the Munsif at Bhagalpur. Within three years of that date, viz., on the 1st May 1914, the decree-holder applied for a certificate to execute the decree in Monghyr where it appeared the judgment-debtor had certain property. At the same time he asked for issue of a notice under Order XXI, Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code. The issue of such a notice at that stage of the proceedings was not necessary. However, the application was allowed and the notice was issued and the certificate be asked for was granted. The matter, however, was not in fast transferred to the Monghyr Court and no farther steps were taken in that application. On the 22nd November 1916, that is, about two years and six months later, the decree holder again applied for the same relief and both his prayers were allowed. He again failed to take any further steps. On the Sri September 1919, that is, within three years of the last application, the decree holder applied a third time and on this occasion the judgment debtor objected that his application was time-barred.

3. The first point made by the appellant, whose objection was not allowed either by the Munsif or the District Judge or by the Judge of this Court; is that the applications made on the 1st May 1914 and again in 1916 were not steps taken in aid of execution and were not in themselves application for execution within the meaning of the 182nd Article of the Limitation Act. We are not concerned to enquire whether applications of the nature referred to were applications in execution. The better view appears to be that they are not. I have no doubt whatever, however, that such an application is a step-in-aid of execution and it is a step which is always necessary where the decree-holder desires to obtain execution against property situate outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which made the decree. In fact there are certain decisions to the effect that such an application is a step in-aid of execution, whereas the learned Vakil for the appellant has been unable to put before us any case in which the contrary view has been expressed, I should have thought myself that there could be no question upon this point.

4. The next point urged by the appellant is that the Bhagalpur Court had no jurisdiction to issue a not me under Order XXI, Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court did in fast issue such a notice but it was not necessary at that stage of the proceedings and it is not contended that any other notice was necessary. Whether the Court issued such a notice or not and whether it had jurisdiction to do so or not does not seem to me to be a matter of any consequence in this appeal.

5. The third point and the substantial point made by the appellant was that the Bhagalpur Court having once purported to act u/s 39 of the CPC had ceased to have any farther jurisdiction in the matter and could not then make any further order which would be binding upon the parties and that such order, if made, could be treated as a mare nullity and that, therefore, it could not be contended that any step had been taken between the 1st May 1914 and the 3rd September 1919 when the third application was made, and that more than three years having elapsed the decree-holders right to have his decree executed was barred by limitation. Assuming, without deciding, that where a Court issuing a decree has made an order u/s 39 of the CPC and has in fast transmitted a copy of the decree to the Court in which the decree is to be executed, it ceases to have any further jurisdiction in the matter, that was not the case which arose here. All that was done in the present instance was that an application was made by the decree-holder and that application was granted. But the copy of the decree was never sent to the Monghyr Court and certainly never received by that Court. If that had been so the Monghyr Court undoubtedly would have had jurisdiction to execute the decree against the property of the judgment-debtor within its jurisdiction. But the Monghyr Court never in fact, in my opinion, got jurisdiction to do anything at all and that seems to me to be obvious upon considering what the effect of Section 42 of the CPC is. That section says; "The Court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself," In the present case the decree was never sent to the Monghyr Court. The decree-holder having obtained his order, for some reason or other best known to himself, either because he was not satisfied as to the existence of the property or for some other reason, never carried out the order which he had obtained and the decree was never in fact sent. It seems, therefore, clear that no jurisdiction was ever transmitted from the Bhagalpur Court to the Monghyr Court and, in my opinion, this appeal fails.

6. It is not necessary in this case to decide whether a Court having made a decree ceases to have jurisdiction in execution proceedings where it has once sent a copy of the decree and the other papers to another Court for execution, and I merely wish to stats that it is not my intention that anything I have said in this judgment should lead to the conclusion that I consider the Court which made the decree would, in such circumstance, lose all jurisdiction in the matter.

7. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Jawala Prasad, J.

8. I agree.