1. This appeal is directed against an order by which theCourt of appeal below has dismissed an appeal preferred against three distinctorders in three different execution proceedings. The appellant was thejudgment-debtor under three decrees passed in as many different suits for rent.His objections in the execution cases were overruled in the original Court; butas the objections taken in the several cases were of the same description, onejudgment was delivered. It is clear, however, from the order sheet thatdistinct orders were recorded in the different cases. The appellant preferredone appeal against these three orders. Objection was taken by the decree-holderthat the appeal was incompetent, and that under the law three different appealsought to have been preferred, one against each order. The learned DistrictJudge has given effect to this objection and held that the appeal was irregularand could not be entertained. This view has been controverted with muchpersistence by the appellant who has argued this case in person and he hasrelied upon a number of judicial decisions to show that his contention iswell-founded. We have carefully examined those authorities and arrived at theconclusion that not one of them supports the argument of the appellant.

2. The case of Enayetoolah v. Radha Churn Roy 15 W.R. 395,and Kashi Prosad Singh v. The Secretary of State 29 C. 140, show that if twosuits have been consolidated and if one decree has been made, the decree can beattacked by one appeal although it disposes of what was originally two distinctsuits. The decisions of the Judicial Committee in the cases of Gopal LallTagore v. Tilluck Chunder Rai 3 W.K. 1 (P.C.) : 10 M.I.A. 183, and DoorgaPershad Roy v. Tara Pershad Roy 3 W.B. 11 (P.C.) : 10 M.I.A. 203, point in thesame direction. The case of Soorendra Pershad Dobey v. Nundun Misser 21 W.K.196, shows that such consolidation cannot be forced upon the litigants and thattwo suits can be consolidated only by consent of all the parties concerned. Itis further clear that if suits have not been consolidated, the decrees must betreated as distinct decrees, the validity of which can be questioned only bydistinct appeals. It is sufficient, in support of this proposition, to refer tothe case of The Royal Insurance Company v. Akhoy Coomar Dutt 6 C.W.N. 41, whichdealt with an application for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council againstthe decision of this Court in the case of the Royal Insurance Company v. AkhoyCoomar Dutt 5 C.W.N. 337. The same view is supported by the observations of thelearned Judges of the Madras High Court in Panchanada Velan v. VaithinathaSastrial 29 M. 333 : 16 M.L.J. 63. [See also Mariamnessa Bibee v. Joynab Bibee33 C. 1101 : 10 C.W.N. 934 : 4 C.L.J. 149; Damodardas v. Sheoramdas 29 A. 730 :A.W.N. (1907) 245 : 4 A.L.J. 589; Zaharia v. Debia 33 A. 51 : 7 A.L.J. 861 : 7Ind Cas. 156]. The case of Chhatrapat Singh v. Gopi Chand 4 C.W.N. 446 : 26 C.750 is clearly distinguishable, as there in the original Court, the applicationfor execution appears to have been made in respect of two different decreesheld by the same decree-holder against the same judgment-debtor. No objectionwas taken to this procedure and the order which was made in execution wastreated as one order covering the whole matter in controversy. We must,therefore, hold that there is no authority in support of the position taken upby the appellant. That position is undoubtedly inconsistent with what has beenthe settled practice in this Court for many years past; in our opinion, it isalso inconsistent with first principles. The Code allows appeals againstdecrees and orders and clearly contemplates separate appeals from separatedecrees and orders. In the case before us, there was no consolidation. Distinctorders were made in the Court of first instance and the only method by whichtheir propriety could have been challenged was by way of distinct appeals. Thiscourse the appellant resolutely refused to adopt. We may further add that thelearned District Judge mentions in his judgment that he was willing to treatthe appeal preferred to him as directed against one of the orders in questionat the option of the appellant. The appellant, however, would not accept theoffer and declined to make the election; he insisted upon the appeal beingtreated as one against all the three orders. This position is, as we havestated, entirely untenable. The only course open to us, therefore, is todismiss the appeal with costs. We assess the hearing fee at two gold mohurs.

.

Rakhal Chandra Tewaryvs. Manmatha Nath Mitter(15.12.1910 - CALHC)3