A. Ansari, J.

1. Whether a statement, which is popularly known as disclosure statement, must be reduced into writing in order to make such a statement admissible in evidence, under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, is the question, which this reference has to answer.

2. The material facts, which have led to this reference, may, in brief, be set out as under:

(i) In Pandav Koya v. State of Assam, reported in 2006 (1) GLT 267 [LQ/GauHC/2005/589] , a Division Bench of this Court took the view that Section 27 of the Evidence Act would not be applicable if the accused persons statement, which is alleged to have led to the discovery of a fact, has not been reduced into writing.

(ii) In Anup Nath and others v. State of Assam, reported in 2008 (1) GLT 255; (2008 Cri L.J. (NOC) 605), another Divisional Bench, however, took the view that Section 27 of thewill not cease to be applicable merely because of the fact that the disclosure statement, made by the accused, has not been reduced into writing.

(iii) Yet another Division Bench, in Alphus Munda and others v. State of Assam, reported in 1996 (3) GLT 568, had held that Section 27 does not make it mandatory that the information, given by an accused to the police, be reduced into writing.

(iv) In Tazuddin Barbhuyan and another v. State of Assam, reported in 2004 (3) GLT 97, too, a Division Bench held that Section 27 does not require recording of statement and that even the oral information, given by accused to the police, which may lead to discovery of a fact, is admissible in evidence. In this regard, the Division Bench, in Tazuddin Barbhuyan (supra), also referred to the case of Alphus Munda (supra).

(v) On noticing that the decision, in Pandav Koya (supra), runs contrary to the decision in Alphus Munda (supra), a Division Bench, in Joyram Ingty v. State of Assam, reported in 2006 (4) GLT 33 [LQ/GauHC/2006/720] , pointed out that the decision, in Alphus Munda (supra), had not been brought to the notice of the Division bench in Pandav Koya (supra) and that the conflict of views, expressed in the said two decisions, is required to be resolved, in an appropriate case, by a larger Bench

(vi) Having noted, during the course of hearing of Criminal Appeal No.45/2005 (Rajiv Phukan v. State of Assam), that there is conflict of views, in this High Court on the question as to whether Section 27 of the Evidence Act will or will not be attracted if an accused persons statement, which claims to have led to the discovery of a fact, has not been reduced into writing, a Division Bench, has referred the matter to a larger Bench. In terms of the reference so made, this Full Bench has been constituted to resolve the controversy.

3. We have heard Mr. P. Bora, learned counsel, for the appellant, and Mr.Z.Kumar, learned Public Prosecutor, Assam.

4. The question as to whether a disclosure statement must be reduced into writing in order to make such a statement admissible in evidence, under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, cannot be correctly answered unless one takes into account not only the provisions embodied in Section 27, but also the provisions contained in Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Sections 25, 26 and 27 are, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow:

25. Confession to police officer not to be proved.- No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.

26. Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him.- No confession made by any person, whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.

27. How much information received from accused may be proved.- Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.

5. A bare reading of Section 25 makes it clear that this Section (Section 25) mandates that no confession, made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence. Similarly, Section 26 provides that the confession, made by an accused person, while in the custody of a police officer, cannot be proved against him unless, of course, the confession is made in the immediate presence of a magistrate. Thus, while Section 25 completely bare confession of an accused person, made to a police officer, from being proved against the accused. Section 26 bars from being proved a confession made by an accused person to anyone whomsoever if the accused person was, at the time of making the confession. In the custody of the police, unless the confession has been made in the immediate presence of a magistrate. However, to the bar, so imposed, by Sections 25 and 26, on the use of confession made by an accused person, Section 27 carves out an exception inasmuch as it provides that when, any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, while the accused person is in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. Thus, Section 27 acts as proviso to Sections 25 and 26. A statement, which falls under Section 27 and is generally termed as disclosure statement, is allowed to be used on the basis of the view that when a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by an accused person, some guarantee is afforded that the disclosure statement was true. Thus, Section 27 permits limited use of the information, which an accused may have disclosed to the police, while he was in the custody of the police.

6. The root of Section 27 lies in the principle of law, which was propounded in Rex v. Warckshall, in the year 1783, reported in 1 Leach CC 263, and which received support from Rex v. Warckshall, in the year 1785, as reported in leach CC 386.

7. In Warckshall (supra), accused made a confession before the police, which was inadmissible inasmuch as the confession was induced by promise of favour. However, in consequence of the information given by the accused in his confessional statement, the goods stolen were found between the sacking of the bed of the accused. The discovery of articles was held to be admissible, though the confession had to be excluded. Two years later, in Lockhard (supra), the prisoner was indicted for stealing a number of diamonds and pearls. While making confession to the police as regards the theft having been committed by him, the accused also told the police that part of the stolen properties had been given by him to one Mr. Grant. In Lockhard (supra) also, the confession had been made in pursuance of a promise of favour and, hence, the confession was found to be inadmissible. However, it was held that though the confession, improperly obtained, cannot be given in evidence, yet the bar, imposed on the admissibility of the confession, would not go to the extent of rejecting the evidence of the other witnesses, which were given in consequence of such confession. Thus, in Lockhard (supra), while the confession was not admitted, it was held that Mr. Grant could very well depose that he had got the jewels from the prisoners. The result of both these cases gave rise to the principle that when any information is improperly obtained from an accused and in consequence thereof, there is discovery of some material fact, e.g., stolen property or body of a person murdered, such discovery would be admissible in evidence. In other words, the principle, which the cases referred to above, gave rise to, was that the fact discovered is admissible, though the confession may be inadmissible and it is this principle which, broadly speaking, stands engrafted in the form of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

8. While considering the scope of Section 27, what needs to be borne in mind is that the first condition, which is necessary in order to apply Section 27 is that there must be discovery of a fact, albeit a relevant fact; in consequence of information received from a person, who is accused of an offence. The second condition for application of Section 27 is that the discovery must be deposed to. This, in turn, means that the factum of discovery has to come on record by way of evidence and not otherwise. The third condition is that at the time of receiving the information, the accused must have been in police custody. The fourth, but, perhaps, the most important condition is that only so much of the information, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, is admissible. The rest of the information, which an accused person might have given, must be kept excluded. The meaning of the expressions, so much of the information, and distinctly, have been subject of interpretation of a number of judicial pronouncements. The expression, so much of the information, means only that part of the information, supplied by the accused, which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery.

9. The idea behind the partial lifting of the ban against the use of a confessional statement, made by a person, accused of any offence, to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the information given by the accused, it provides some guarantee of truth to that part of the information, which was the clear, immediate and approximate cause of discovery.

10. To put it a little differently, the provisions of section 27 of the Evidence Act are based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and consequently the said information can safely be allowed to be given in the evidence, because if such an information is further fortified and confirmed by the discovery of articles or the weapon of crime and which leads to the belief that the information about the confession made as to the articles of crime cannot be false. (See Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar (AIR 1994 SC 2420 [LQ/SC/1994/606] : (1994 Cri L.J 3271).

11. The word distinctly, appearing in Section 27, means directly, indubitably, strictly and unmistakably. The word has been advisedly used to limit and define the scope of the provable information. The phrase distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered and is the linchpin of the provision. This phrase refers to that part of the information, supplied by the accused, which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statement, which may indirectly or remotely relate to the fact discovered. (See Mohd. Inayatulla v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1976 SC 483 [LQ/SC/1975/337] ; (1976 Cri L,J 481).

12. It is necessary to point out, at this stage, that a fact discovered is not same as the recovery of an incriminating material or object, such as, a weapon of assault, etc. The courts have been reminding, time and again, that the discovery fact is not to be confused or equated with the recovery of incriminating material object, such as, weapon of assault, etc. The fact discovered embraces the place from where the object was produced/recovered and the knowledge of the accused as regards such subject-matter.

13. At one time, it was held that the fact discovered, as envisaged in Section 27, is restricted to a physical or material fact, which can be perceived by the senses, and that it does not include a mental fact. (See Sukhan v. Crown, ILR 10 Lah 283: (1929 (30) Cri LJ 414), ILR 56 Bom 172: (AIR 1932 Bom 286 [LQ/BomHC/1931/200] ): (1932 (33) Cri LJ 396). However, it is no longer doubted that the expression, fact discovered, includes not only the physical object produced, but also the place from where it was produced and the knowledge of the accused as to such fact (See Palukuri Kotayya v. Emperor (AIR 1947 PC 67 [LQ/PC/1947/6] ): (1947 (48) Cri LJ 533) and Udai Bhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1962 SC 1116 [LQ/SC/1962/38] ): (1962 (2) Cri LJ 251).

14. The scope and ambit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act were illuminatingly stated, in Phulukuri Kottaya (supra), which have become locus classicus, in the following words:

It is fallacious to treat the fact discovered within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added with which I stabbed A these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.

15. No doubt, the information permitted to be admitted in evidence is confined to that portion of the information which distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered; but the information to get admissibility need not be so truncated as to make it insensible or incomprehensible. The extent of information, which is sought to be admitted into evidence, must be such as would make the information understandable to a man of ordinary prudence. Mere statement that the accused led the police and the witness to the place, where he had concealed the articles is not indicative of the information given (see Bodhraj) v. State of J. & K. reported in (2002) 8 SCC 45 [LQ/SC/2002/898] : (2002 Cri LJ 4664), Section 27 would, therefore, not be attracted to a case, wherein no witness deposes that the accused person, while is the custody of the police, gave information, which, on being acted upon, led to the discovery of a fact.

16. In State of Maharashtra v. Damu. Reported in (2000) 6 SCC 269 [LQ/SC/2000/849] : (2000 Cri LJ 2301), the Court has explained as to what the commonly used expression, fact discovered, mans. In Damus case (supra), the accused, on his arrest, told the Investigating Officer Dipaks dead body was carried by me and Guruji (A-2) on his motor cycle and thrown in the canal. The High Court did not treat the said statement of A3 (Mukinda Thorat) as admissible in evidence on the ground that the dead body, spoken to by A3, was not recovered pursuant to the said statement. In this regard, the Apex Court has pointed out that pursuant to the said statement, made by A3, that he would point out the spot, police took him to the spot and, on arriving there, the Investigating Officer found a broken piece of glass lying on the ground. This piece of glass was picked up by the Investigating Officer. The recovery of the said broken piece of glass was considered by the Apex Court in the light of another piece of evidence on record, namely, a motorcycle, which had been recovered from the house of A2 (Guruji), and its tail lamp was found broken, and one piece of this tail lamp as missing. However, when the broken piece of glass, recovered from the spot (pointed out by A3), was placed on the broken sites of the tail lamp of the motor cycle, it fitted the space, in the said tail lamp, in such a way that the said piece of glass was gathered to be the missing pat of the broken tail lamp of the motorcycle.

17. Dealing with such a fact situation, the Supreme Court, in Damus case (2000 Cri LJ 2301) (supra), speaking through K. T. Thomas, J., observed and held as under:

36. The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature, but if it results in discovery of a fact it becomes a reliable information. Hence the legislature permitted such information to be used as evidence by restricting the admissible portion to the minimum. It is now well settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in the section. The decision of Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottayya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 [LQ/PC/1947/6] : (1947 (48) Cri LJ 533) is the most quoted authority for supporting the interpretation that the fact discovered envisaged in the section embraces the place from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect.

37. No doubt, the information permitted to be admitted in evidence is confined to that portion of the information which distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered. But the information to get admissibility need not be so truncated as to make it insensible or incomprehensible. The extent of the information admitted should be consistent with understandability. In this case, the fact discovered by .W. 44 is that A-3 Mukinda Thorat had carried the dead body of Dipak to the spot on the motor cycle.

38. How the particular information led to the discovery of the fact No doubt, recovery of dead body of Dipak from the same canal was antecedent to the information which PW 44 obtained. If nothing more was recovered pursuant to and subsequent to obtaining the information from the accused, there would not have been any discovery of any fact at all. But when the broken glass piece was recovered from that spot and that piece was found to be part of the tail lamp of the motor cycle of A-2 Guruji, it can safely be held that the Investigating Officer discovered the fact that A-2 Guruji had carried the dead body on that particular motor cycle up to the spot.

39. In view of the said discovery of the fact, we are inclined to hold that the information supplied by A-2 Guruji that the dead body of Dipak was carried on the motor cycle up to the particular spot is admissible in evidence. That information, therefore, proves the prosecution case to the abovementioned extent.

18. We may also point out that the decision in Damus case (2000 Cri LJ 2301) (supra), was also referred so, and relied upon, in the case of Sanjay alias Kaka v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2001) 3 SCC 190 [LQ/SC/2001/347] : (2001 Cri LJ 1231). The principles deducible from Damus case (supra), were discussed in State (NCT) of Delhi. V. Navjot Sandhu, reported in (2005) 11 SCC 600 [LQ/SC/2005/761] , and not dissented from.

19. In Avtar Singh V. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2004) 10 SCC 657 [LQ/SC/2004/169 ;] : (2004 Cri LJ 1380), the Supreme Court has summarized the requirements of Section 27 as follows:

(1) The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue. It must be borne in mind that the provision ha nothing to do with the question of relevancy. The relevancy of the fact discovered must be established according to the prescriptions relating to relevancy of other evidence connecting it with the crime in order to make the fact discovered admissible.

(2) The fact must have been discovered.

(3) The discovery must have been in consequence of some information received from the accused and not by the accuseds own act.

(4) The person giving the information must be accused of any offence.

(5) He must be in the custody of a police officer.

(6) The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to.

(7) Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates distinctly or strictly to the fact discovered can be proved. The rest is inadmissible.

20. Let us, now, turn to the question as to how one should determine which part of the statement of an accused person would be admissible in evidence by taking resort to Section 27. In the case of Mohmed Inayatulla (1976 Cri LJ 481) (supra), the Apex Court has pointed out that the first step, in the process of determination as to what fact has been discovered, in consequence of a statement made by an accused person, is to pinpoint that fact, which can be said to have been discovered in consequence of the statement of the accused person. In Mohd, Inayatulla (supra), the statement of the4 accused read thus:

I will tell the place of deposit of the three chemical drums which I took out from the Haji Bunder on first August. In the statement to made by accused Inayatulla, the facts discovered, as pointed out by the Apex Court, in Mohd. Inayatulla (supra), were three fold, namely, (a) chemical drums, (b) the place, where the chemical drums lay deposited; and (c) the knowledge of the accused as regards the fact that such chemical drums lay deposited at the said place. The next step according to the Apex Court, ought to has been to split the said statement into its various components and to separate the admissible component from the inadmissible ones and, there after, only that component or portion, which was the immediate cause of discovery, ought to have been recorded as the legal evidence and not the rest of the statement, for the rest of the statement ought to have been excised and rejected. Thus, on splitting up the said statement of accused Inayatulla, the Apex Court fond that only the first part of the said statement, namely, I will tell the place of deposit of the three chemical drums:, was held admissible in evidence under Section 27. The rest of the statement, namely, which I took out from the Haji Bunder of first August, constituted only the past history of the drums or their theft by the accused and since this part of the statement of accused Inayatulla was not the distinct and proximate cause of the discovery, the same was ruled out of evidence altogether.

21. We, now, turn to yet another important aspect of Section 27. In view of the fact that Section 27 makes only so much of the information, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered provable, it clearly follows that a Court is required to know as to what exactly the accused had stated to the police so that the Court, before acting upon the evidence given, knows as to how much of the information, given by the accused, relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. The word distinctly, as pointed out in Mohd. Inayatulla (supra), has been used in order to define the scope of provable information.

22. The question, however, which states at us is, whether the law makes it mandatory to have a written record of the disclosure statement, which an accused, facing a trial, may be claimed by the prosecution to have made.

23. Leaving aside, for a moment, as to what the expression the fact thereby discovered means, what is imperative to note is that neither in the Evidence Act nor in the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is any specific provision with regard to the examination of an accused by a police officer. As far as examination of witnesses is concerned, the provisions have been made under Section 161, Cr.P.C. This Section shows that a police officer may examine orally any person suspected to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. Undoubtedly, the heading of the Section, (i.e., Section 161) reads, Examination of witnesses by police. However, the provisions, contained in Section 161, give no such indication that examination of a person, by the police, as contemplated under Section 161, is limited to witnesses alone and will not include an accused. Though, ordinarily, the heading of a section, in a statute, may help in the interpretation of the provisions contained in the section, the heading is not always determinative of the power, duty or function, which the section may seek to convey. Section 161(1) makes it clear that any police officer may examine orally any person, who is supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the given case. Sub-section (2) of Section 161 binds the person, who is so interrogated to answer truly all the questions put to him by the police officer, except, of course, those questions, which, if answered, would have a tendency to expose the person interrogated to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture. Section 161(3) permits the police officer to reduce into writing any statement, made to him, in the course of the examination under Section 161 and, if he does so, he shall make a separate and true record of the statement of each such person, whose statement he records.

24. Thus, the recording of a statement of a person, under Section 161, in writing, is optional for the police officer, who investigates a case. It is not, therefore, statutorily mandatory for a police officer to reduce into writing the statement made to him by a person, who may be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of a given case. Such a person, may also be the one, who has committed the offence.

25. What must, however, be remembered is that sub-section (1) of Section 162 debars a police officer from obtaining signature of the person, whose statement, he may have reduced into writing. Sub-section (1) of Section 162 also bars such statement, or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, from being used for any purpose, at any inquiry or trial, in respect of any offence under investigation at the time, when such statement was made, provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial, whose statement has been reduced into writing, as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused, and, with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner as provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act, and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination.

26. When none of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or of the Evidence Act makes it mandatory for a police officer to reduce into writing the statement, which an accused may have made, it is not only difficult, but also impossible to hold that a disclosure statement cannot be proved at all if the disclosure statement has not been recorded, or when the written record of the disclosure statement has not been introduced into evidence.

27. What needs to be noted is that in the case of a judicial confession, what an accused might have stated before a Magistrate is provable by the written record. In the case of an extra-judicial confession, no such written record may be available. In such circumstances, the extra-judicial confession cannot be treated to be wholly inadmissible in evidence merely because of the fact that the extra-judicial confession does not stand reduced into writing. Though prudence demands that a Court, before acting upon an extra-judicial confession, knows as to what exactly the accused person had stated, the fact remains that a Curt cannot refuse to bring, on record, an extra-judicial confession on the ground that no written record, as regards the exact words used by the accused in his extra-judicial confession, is available. However, the probative value of such a confessional statement will be a question of fact. If, on the basis of the deposition of the witness or witnesses, the Court is in a position to determine as to what exactly the accused had stated or confessed to, and, if the Court believes that the evidence, given as regards the fact that an extra-judicial confession had been made by the accused is true, it would not be impermissible for the Court to make use of such a statement even if such a statement ha not been reduced into writing. Similar is the situation with regard to a disclosure statement. A disclosure statement is not, as noticed above, statutorily required to be reduced into writing, but prudence demands that when a statement has been made by an accused person, while in the custody of a police officer, and the investigating officer intends to act upon the statement, then, the Investigating Officer should record, at least, that part of the statement, which is likely to lead to the discovery of a fact so that a contemporaneous record remains available to prove that the statement, as claimed by the Investigating Officer, had, in fact, been made, and the Court knows as to what the accused had actually stated and what part or portion of his statement had, or can be said to have, in fact, led to the discovery of the fact.

28. There is yet another reason why a Court cannot refuse to bring on record a disclosure statement on the ground that it has not been reduced into writing. In a given case, it may so happen that a police officer, upon being informed that a police officer, upon being informed that an offence, say, for instance, a murder, has been committed, goes to the village, where the dead body was found, all the villagers gather there, when the police officer arrives. If the deceased happens to be, in such a case, a woman, there may be suspicion in the mind of the co-villagers of the husband of the deceased that he was, perhaps, the one, who had killed the woman. In such circumstances, it would not be unreasonable to expect that the police officer takes into custody the husband for the purpose of interrogating him on the ground that his relation with his wife was inimical and none other than the husband (i.e., the accused) and the wife (i.e., the deceased) were present, at the relevant point of time, at the house, where the dead body was found lying. In such circumstances, having taken the accused into custody, the police officer may, though he should not, interrogate the accused in presence of the co-villagers of the accused. In such a case, if the accused makes a statement that he had stabbed his wife to death and, on a query made by the police officer, if the accused states that he has thrown the dagger at the backyard of his house and expresses, on further query made by the police officer, that he would be able to show the place, where he has hidden he dagger, the police officer may, in such circumstances, accompanied by the co-villagers of the accused, go to the place, where the accused leads them to, and the accused, on reaching the place, picks up the dagger and produces, before the police, the dagger, which may be seized in the presence of witnesses, seizure list may be prepared and serological test may reveal that the blood stains, found on the dagger, were of the deceases wife of the accused. In such circumstances, let us assume, for a moment, that the police officer did not record the statement of the accused before the accused had led them to the place, where the accused had picked up and handed over the dagger to the police. Would it serve the interest of justice by insisting, when the statute does not no require, that since the police officer has not reduced into writing the accused persons statement, it must be treated as inadmissible, though the co-villagers may have given evidence as to what the accused had started and how the accused happened to had over the dagger to the police, and the Court finds no reason to disbelieve their evidence. When the statute has not made it mandatory for a police officer to reduce into writing, the disclosure statement of an accused person, it would be impossible to treat the evidence of the co-villagers as inadmissible and thereby reject the same. The written record of the disclosure statement is really required for the purpose of inspiring confidence of the Court that the statement, as deposed to, had, indeed, been made and such a written record would further help the Court to know as to what exactly the accused had stated to the police and what statement, or which part of a given statement of the accused, had really led to the discovery of the fact.

29. It is quite possible that, in a given case, no written record of disclosure statement has been produced, but the investigating officers deposition, in the Court, that the accused had made the statement, which had led to the discovery of a fact, is found believable or is not even disputed, would it be possible to discard such statement of the investigating officer only on the ground that he had not reduced into writing the said disclosure statement. Such an approach to a piece of evidence, particularly, when the statute has, in the language used therein, given no such mandatory indication.

30. It is also worth noticing that the disclosure statement has to be recorded, if it is recorded by a police officer, before the fact is discovered or before the accused leads the police to the discovery of a fact. It is meaningless to record a disclosure statement after the disclosure statement has already been acted upon.

31. It is also necessary to point out that it is not always necessary that an accused must, after having made a disclosure statement, led the police to the place where, say, for instance, the weapon of offence is lying or the stolen property has been kept. It is quite possible that, having recorded the statement of an accused person and having known from the statement, so made, a to where the stolen article would be found, the police officer, acting upon the information, so received, goes to the place, where the accused ahs claimed to have kept the stolen articles, and the police officer finds the stolen article at the place, where the accused had claimed have kept. In such circumstances, too, the disclosure statement would be admissible and can be relied upon, though the accused might not have personality led the police to he place, where the stolen article was found.

32. According itself to the question as to whether an accused must lead the police to the discovery of some material object, in order to apply Section 27, the Apex Court has replied that on receiving the information, it would be for the police officer to take or not to take the accused, who has given the information, to the spot, and if, in a given case, the police officer does not take the accused concerned to the spot, it will have no bearing on the question of admissibility of the information given and/or recovery of material object within the ambit of Section 27. The relevant observations, made on this aspect of law, in Navjot Sandhu (supra), read as under:

There is one more point which we would like to discuss i.e. whether pointing out a material object by the accused furnishing the information is a necessary concomitant of Section 27. We think that the answer should be in the negative. Though in most of the cases the person who makes the disclosure himself leads the Police Officer to the place where an object is concealed and points out the same to him, however, it is not essential that there should be such pointing out in order to make the information admissible under Section 27. It could very well be that on the basis of information furnished by the accused, the Investigating Officer may go to the spot in the company of other witnesses and recover the material object. By doing so, the Investigating Officer will be discovering a fact viz., the concealment of an incriminating article and the knowledge of the accused furnishing the information about it. In other words, where the information furnished by the person in custody is verified by the Police Officer by going to the spot mentioned by the informant and finds it to be correct, that amounts to discovery of fact within the meaning of Section 27. Of course, it is subject to the rider that the information so furnished was the immediate and proximate cause of discovery. If the Police Officer chooses not to take the informant-accused to the spot, it will have no bearing on the point of admissibility under Section 27, though it may be one of the aspects that goes into evaluation of that particular piece of evidence.

33. In Navjot Sandhu (supra), two of the important questions of law, with regard to the application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, were raised. These two questions read as under:

The interpretation of Section 27 of the Evidence Act has loomed large in the course of arguments. The controversy centered round two aspects: (i) whether the discovery of fact referred to in Section 27 should be confined only to the discovery of a material object and the knowledge of the accused in relation thereto or the discovery could be in respect of his mental state or knowledge in relation to certain things-concrete or non-concrete. (ii) whether it is necessary that the discovery of fact should be by the person making the disclosure or directly at his instance. The subsequent event of discovery by the police with the aid of information furnished by the accused whether can be put against him under Section 27.

These issues have arisen specially in the context of the disclosure statement (Ext. PW-66/13) of Gilani to the police. According to the prosecution, the information furnished by Gilani on certain aspects, for instance, that the particular cell phone belonged to the other accused. Afzal and Shaukat, that the Christian Colony room was arranged by Shaukat in order to accommodate the slain terrorist Mohammed, that police uniforms and explosives were arranged and that the names of the five deceased terrorists were so and so are relevant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act as they were confirmed to be true by subsequent investigation and they revealed the awareness and knowledge of Gilani in regard to all these facts, even though no material objects were recovered directly at his instance.

34. Having taken notice of a number of authorities, the Apex Court answered by holding that the discovery of fact, as contemplated by Section 27, would not apprehend a pure and simple mental fact or state of mind relating to a physical object dissociated from the recovery of the physical object. The observations made, in this regard, by the Apex Court, read thus:

The next endeavour of Mr. Gopal Subramanium was to convince us that the precedential force of the judgment in Om Prakash (1972 Cri LJ 606) has been considerably eroded by the subsequent pronouncement. Two decisions have been cited to substantiate his contention. They are: Mohd Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra (1976 Cri LJ 481) and State of Maharashtra v. Damu (2000 Cri LJ 2301). We do not think that in any of these decisions discovery of fact was held to comprehend a pure and simple mental fact or state of mind relating to a physical object dissociated from the recovery of the physical object.

35. In Navjot Sandhu (supra), the Apex Court has pointed out that joint disclosures or simultaneous disclosures are per se, not inadmissible under Section 27. The expression , a person accused, occurring in Section 27, need not, point out the Apex Court in Navjot Sandhu (supra), necessarily be a single person and that it could be plurality of the accused also. The Apex Court has pointed out, in Navjot Sandhu (supra), thus:

Before parting with the discussion on the subject of confessions under Section 27, we may briefly refer to the legal position as regards joint disclosures. This assumes relevance in the context of such disclosures made by the first two accused viz. Afzal and Shaukat. The admissibility of information said to have been furnished by both of them leading to the discovery of the hideout of the deceased terrorist and the recovery of a laptop computer, a mobile phone and cash of Rs.10 lakhs from the track in which they were found at Srinagar is in issue. Learned senior counsel Mr. Shanti Bhushan and Mr. Sushil Kumar, appearing for the accused. Contend, as was contended before the High Court, that the disclosure and pointing out attributed to both cannot fall within ken of Section 27, whereas it the contention of Mr. Gopal Subramanium that there is no taboo against the admission of such information as incriminating evidence against both the accused informants. Some of the High Court have taken the view that the wording, a person excludes the applicability of the Section to more than one person. But that is too narrow a view to be taken. Joint disclosures, to be more accurate, simultaneous disclosures, per se, are not inadmissible under Section 27. A person accused need nor necessarily be a single person but it could be plurality of the accused. It seems to us that the real reason for not acting upon the joint disclosures by taking resort to Section 27 is the inherent difficult/in placing reliance on such information supposed to have emerged from the mouths of two or more accused at a time. In fact, joint or simultaneous disclosure is a myth, because two or more accused persons would not have uttered informatory words in a chorus. At best, one person would have made the statement orally and the other would have stated so substantially in similar terms a few seconds or minutes later or the second person would have given unequivocal nod to what has been said by the first person. Or, two persons in custody may be interrogated separately and simultaneously and both of them may furnish similar information leading to the discovery of fact. Or, in rare cases, both the accused may adduce the information into writing and hand over the written notes to the police officer at the same time. We do not think that such disclosures by two or more persons in police custody go out of the purview of Section 27 altogether. If information is given one after the other without any break, almost simultaneously and if such information is followed up by pointing out the material thing by both of them, we find no good reason to eschew such evidence from the regime of Section 27. However, there may be practical difficulties in placing reliance on such evidence. It may be difficult for the witness (generally the police officer), to depose which accused spoke what words and in what sequence. In other words, the deposition in regard to the information given by the two accused may be exposed to criticism from the standpoint of credibility and its nexus with discovery. Admissibility and credibility are two distinct aspects, as pointed out by Mr. Gopal Subramanium. Whether and to what extent such a simultaneous disclosure could be relied upon by the Court is really a matter of evaluation of evidence. With these prefatory remarks we have to refer to two decisions of this Court which are relied upon by the learned defence counsel.

36. From the observations made above, it becomes clear that simultaneous statement, by itself, cannot be discarded as inadmissible evidence. However, if the Court is not in a position to ascertain as to who, between two, or amongst more than two, accused persons, had given the information, or on the basis of whose information a discovery of fact was made, it may be difficult for the Court to arrive at a correct conclusion, but this will nor make simultaneous disclosure statement inadmissible in evidence. In fact, the Apex Court has, in Navjot Sandhu (supra), in no uncertain words, held that simultaneous disclosures by more than one accused cannot, as a proposition of law, be said to be inadmissible in evidence, though the evidentiary value will be a question of fact in each case.

37. In Pandav Koya (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has held at para 22, thus: To attract Section 27 of the Act, the statement of the accused leading to discovery of the fact is required to be recorded and that too in first person singular. Unless the confession or statement through which the accused leads the police or Magistrate to the place where he concealed the dead body is reduced in writing, it is unsafe to believe and rely upon it. The exact statement of the accused person leading to information and discovery is needed to make ti admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the. In the instant case, neither the record nor the testimony of the witnesses does reveal that such statement of the appellant who is in police custody confessing the murder of the deceased and information leading to discovery of the incriminating articles used in committing the crime was ever recorded either by PW-6, the Magistrate of PW-8, the I.O. and hence the applicability of Section 27 of thecannot be brought in the case at hand.

(Emphasis is supplied)

38. Though, it is true that the exact statement of an accused, which is sought to be proved, under Section 27, must be disclosed before the Court and that such a statement should be reduced into writing, in order to enable the Court to believe that such a statement had indeed been made by the accused and also to enable the Court know as to hat the accused had exactly stated, the mere fact, that the written record has not been produced, cannot be held to have made Section 27 in applicable. With respect, we are of the view that the decision in Pandav Koya (supra), which gives an indication as if Section 27 would not apply at all to a case, where the disclosure statement is not proved to have been reduced into writing, is not a correct exposition of the law. Whether a Court, in a given case should, or should not, believe a disclosure statement, which has not been reduced into writing, is a question, which relates to the merit of the case and not to the admissibility of the oral evidence as regards the fact that the statement, leading to he discovery of a fact, has been made by the accused.

39. When the number of accused persons involved in a case, is more than one and it is alleged that more than one accused person had made statements, which led to the discovery of the fact, Section 27 would not be applied to such a case unless it can be ascertained as to whose statement it was, which had led to the discovery of the fact. An information given by an accused person is not like a chorus, sung by all the accused persons together, and, hence, it is necessary that in a case, where in more than one accused person are involved, it is clearly proved by the prosecution as to who was the accused person, whose statement had led to the discovery of the fact.

40. What emerges from the above discussion is that Section 27 does not provide for writing the information, which may have been given by an accused; hence, the information can be verbal and also be proved against the accused, who gives the information; but when the verbal information given by the accused is not deposed to by the Investigating Officer or when the Investigating Officer does not depose as to what exactly the accused had stated before him, Section 27 would not apply as there would be, strictly speaking, no proof of disclosure statement. Section 27, in such a case, becomes inapplicable not because of the fact that no written record has been proved as regards the disclosure statement, but because of the fact that the Court does not know as to what the accused had stated, which led to the discovery of the fact.

41. In Arjun Biswas (20-05 Cri LJ 554) (supra), a Division bench of this Court, in a given fact situation, observed, and we are of the view that the Division bench, correctly so observed.

18. . When a statement made by an accused is sought to be introduced into the evidence on record by taking recourse to Section 27, the Court shall, first, determine what fact was really discovered in consequence of the statement made by the accused and, then, the Court shall split up the statement into different components in order to enable the Court to shift the admissible portion(s) of the statement from the inadmissible ones. Only that component or portion of the statement, which was the immediate cause of the discovery, would be the legal evidence and not the entire statement. What is, now, required to be noted is that a fact discovered shall not be treated as equivalent to the object produced. The fact discovered, in fact, embraces, within its ambit the place from where the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to whether the object produced was lying (see State of Rajasthan v. Bhup Singh reported in (1997) 10 SCC 675 [LQ/SC/1997/37] ).

19. In the case at hand, the fact discovered is the fact that the dead body of Krishna Biswas was lying in the house in which she used to live along with not only the accused appellant, but also her parents-in-law and other members of their family and the knowledge of the accused-appellant that Krishna Biswas was dead and as to where her dead body was lying. Keeping in view the fact, which has been so discovered, we are, now, required to split up the statement recorded in Ext.6 into different components and determine as to which parts) of the statement, so made, actually led to the discovery of the said fact. The statement (Ext 6) made by the accused appellant that on 19-7-1992, at about 4.30/5.00 a.m. he had cut his nabow (i.e., the elder brothers wife) Krishna Biswas to death with the dao, which he had brought along, and that the blood sticking to the dao is of his sister-in-law are inadmissible pieces of evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act inasmuch as the statement, so made, amounts to confession made to he police and the same did not lead nor can the same be claimed to have led to he discovery of the facts pointed out hereinbefore. The part of the statement, which really led to the discovery of the facts aforesaid, was the statement, shall show the place, where nabow is lying, for, it was acting upon this information that the police had come, led by the accused, to the house, in question, and found the dead body of Krishna lying there. In short, the immediate cause of the discovery was, as laid down in Mohmed Inayatullah (supra), the accused-appellants statement, I shall show the place, where nabow is lying.

20. It logically follows from the above discussion that the statement of the accused made to the police that he had cut Krishna to death did not actually lead to the discovery of the fact, in question. This apart, there is also no clinching evidence on record that the dao produced by the accused appellant was the real weapon of assault inasmuch as while the dao, in question, had blood-stains, the fact remains that even the knife, with which the father of the accused had come out of the house, also bore blood stains.

21. Thus, the facts discovered namely that eh accused knew that Krishna Biswas was dead, that her dead-body was lying at the said house and that the said dead-body was, eventually found lying at the said house are not in themselves sufficient to hold that it was none, but the accused-appellant, who had killed Krishna Biswas, and even the father of the accused could have been the assailant of Krishna Biswas as indicated by the evidence of PW.4 and, more particularly, when there is no clinching and concrete evidence that the dao, which the accused appellant allegedly produced at the police station, was the real weapon of assault.

42. In Trilokya Gogoi v. State of Assam, reported in 2002 (1) GLT 407, a Division Bench of this Court had the occasion to deal with the disclosure statement, wherein the accused had stated. I threw the dao near a ridge in the northwest direction of my father-in-laws homestead..I shall be able to produce the dao in presence of public. Referring to the statement, so made, the Division Bench observed, as follows:

14. It is abundantly clear from a bare reading of the above two sentences that both these sentences could have individually helped the police to recover the dao.

15. Close on the heels of the above evidence of PW-7, PW-3 (Mohan Gogoi) has stated that the accused had led the police to bamboo groves and had produced the dao therefrom. To the same effect is the evidence of PW-4 (Dilip Phukan). Coupled with this, seizure list (Ext-1) shows that on being led by the accused, the dao was recovered from the north-west direction of the house of Meghiram Gogoi. This fits into the description of the place, (which the accused had indicated in Ex-2), as the place, where he had thrown the dao. We may hasten to add here that though the learned Sessions Judge relied on the evidence of PW-3 given to the effect that the accused had told the police that with the said dao, he had cut his father, we have kept this piece of evidence wholly excluded from the purview of our consideration, because of the embargo placed by Section 25 of Evidence Act making the said statement, which amounts to confession, inadmissible on the ground that the said confession, which was made in presence of police, had nor led to the discovery of any fact.

16. In the instant case, though the statement of the accused given to the effect as to where he had thrown the dao is incriminatory, it becomes admissible under Section 27 of he Evidence Act, because on the strength of this statement coupled with the fact that the accused expressed his willingness to produce the dao, the police did recover the dao, which, in turn, proves in the light of Ext.2, that it was the accused, who had thrown the dao at the place aforementioned.

17. We derive strength for the conclusion that we have reached above from a close reading of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyay (AIR 1960 SC 1125 [LQ/SC/1960/159] ) : (1960 Cri LJ 1504), wherein treating as incorrect the view of the High Court that mere fetching of the gandasa from its hiding place did not establish that Deoman himself had put it in the tank and that an inference could legitimately be raised that some body else had placed the gandasa in the tank or that Deoman about the gandasa lying in the tank. Supreme Court held that the information so given by Deoman is provable in so far as it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered and, thus, his statement that he had thrown the gandasa in the tank is an information, which distinctly relates to the discovery of the gandasa.

18. We deem it necessary to point out here that a fact discovered, as envisaged by Section 27, cannot be equated to the object produced/recovered. The fact discovered embraces the place from where the object was produced/recovered and the knowledge of the accused on such subject-matter. Information supplied by a person in custody that I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house does not really lead to he discovery of a knife; what such information does it to lead to the discovery of the fact that a knife is kept concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered become very relevant. Reference may, in this regard, be made to Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor (AIR 1947 PC 67 [LQ/PC/1947/6] ) : (1947 (48) Cri LJ 533).

19. In this case at hand, the statement of the accused, contained in Ext-2, coupled with the recovery of the dao, shows that not only that the accused knew where the dao was, but that it was the accused, who had thrown the dao there.

20. In the recent case, namely, State of Maharshtra v. Damu, (2000) SCC (Cri) 1088 [LQ/SC/2000/849] : (2000 Cri LJ 2301) wherein the accused had told the police. Dipaks dead body was carried be me and Guruji (A-2) on his motorcycle and thrown in the canal. Supreme Court treated the statement as admissible, because of the recovery of broken pieces of the tail lamp of the motorcycle of the accused holding that the police had thereby discovered that the accused had carried the dead body on that motorcycle to the spot.

43. We express our complete agreement with the exposition of law in Trilokya Gogi (supra). It is also necessary to emphasize that though a written record of the statement, made by the accused, leading to the discovery of a fact, is not necessary in order to make the statement admissible in evidence, what is necessary, and must be borne in mind, is that there must be evidence, on record, to show that before discovery of fact took place, a statement was made by the accused, though such statement may not have been reduced into writing. If the accused merely accompanies a police officer and helps in the recovery of an incriminating piece of evidence or points to the place, where the stolen article is found, Section 27 will not be attracted if there is no evidence to the effect that the accused had made any statement, which had led to the discovery of the fact. The pointing out to the place, where the stolen articles was found, may, in such a case, be relevant, in terms of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, as conduct of the accused.

44. We, however, make it clear that ordinarily, the prosecution should prove the statement, which is sought to be used in Section 27, ipsissima verba. There is also no doubt that, as held in Phusu Koiri v. State of Assam, reported in 1986 Cri LJ 1057 (Gau.), the provisions of Section 27, being in the form of exception to Sections 25 and 26, have been strictly construed. We must, however, hasten to point out that in the case in hand, we are only deciding the question as to whether a statement, which has not been reduced into writing, but has led to the discovery of a fact, can be admitted into evidence or not, or can be allowed to be proved as evidence or not; and not the question as to whether, in a given case, the Court should or should not believe, and rely upon, the evidence given as regards a disclosure statement, which was not reduced into writing.

45. We may pause here to point out that in State of Rajasthan v. Bhup Singh, reported in (1997) 10 SCC 675 [LQ/SC/1997/37] , the dying declaration had been recorded not in the language in which the deceased was claimed to have made the dying declaration; rather, the dying declaration was recorded in Hindi language, which was the language of the Court. The Apex Court, while dealing with this aspect of the matter, observed, in para 10 and 11, thus:

10. Assuming that deceased gave her statement in her own language, the dying declaration would not vitiate merely because it was recorded in a different language. We bear in mind that it is not unusal that Courts record evidence in the language of the Court even when witnesses depose in their own language. Judicial officers are used to the practice of translating the statements from the language of the parties to the language of the Court. Such translation process would not upset either the admissibility of the statement or its reliability, unless there are other reasons to doubt the truth of it.

11. Nor would a dying declaration go bad merely because the Magistrate did not record it in the form of questions and answers. It is axiomatic that what matters is the substance and not the form. Questions put to the dying man would have been formal and hence the answers given are material. Criminal Courts may evince interest in knowing the contends of what the dying person said and the questions pot to him are not very important normally. The part of the statement which relate to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death gets the sanction of admissibility. Here it is improper to throw such statement overboard on a pedantic premise that it was not recorded in the form of questions and answers. (Vide Ganpat Mahadeo Mane v. State of Maharashtra) (1993 Cri LJ 298).

46. What has been laid down in the case of Bhup Singhs case (supra), applies, with equal force, to a statement, which is sought to be proved under Section 27. If the police officer happens to record an accused persons statement, leading to the discovery of a fact, in a language other than the language used by the accused, particularly, when the language, in which the statement is recorded, is an official language of the State, there would be no impediment in applying Section 27 to such a statement and/or in placing reliance on such a statement, if the Court, otherwise, believes that such a statement had; indeed, been made by the accused.

47. Similarly, in a case under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it is not material as to whether the statement has been recorded in the form of questions and answers or not. What is, however, necessary is that the Court must know as to what exactly the accused had stated so as to enable the Court hold as to what statement of the accused had actually led to the discovery of the fact.

48. It need to be, however, pointed out that the discovery of fact must be subsequent to the making of the disclosure statement. Where a disclosure statement is made subsequent to the discovery of a fact, the disclosure statement cannot be proved under Section 27, for, a disclosure statement, whether it amounts to confession or not, would ne relevant only when the statement precedes the discovery of fact.

49. We may pause here to point out that evidence, relating to recovery, is acceptable even when non-official witnesses do not support the recovery and make departure from the statements, claimed to have been made by them during investigation. In Antar Singh (2004 Cri LJ 1380) (supra), the Court, while dealing with the similar aspect of the case, referred to the decision, in Modan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1978 Cri LJ 1531), wherein it was observed. that where the evidence of the Investigating Officer, who recovered the material objects is convicting, the evidence as to recovery need not be rejected on the ground that seizure witnesses did not support the prosecution version. Similar view was taken in Mohd, Aslam v. State of Maharashtra. It was held that even if panch witnesses turned hostile, which happens very often in criminal cases, the evidence of the person, who effected the recovery, would not stand vitiated.

50. Notwithstanding, therefore, that in a given case, the evidence witness may turn hostile, the evidence, given by the investigating Officer as regards the disclosure statement, may still be believed by the Court provided, of course, that such evidence inspires confidence and, in order to enable the Court to safely rely on the evidence of the Investigating Officer, it is necessary that the exact words, attributed to an accused, a statement made by him, be bought on record and, for this purpose, it is advisable to reduce, into writing, the disclosure statement, before any recovery is made.

51. The Apex Court had, in no uncertain words, pointed out, in Mohd. Abdul Hafiz (AIR 1983 SC 367 [LQ/SC/1982/178] ) : (1983 Cri LJ 689), that if evidence, otherwise confessional in character, is admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is obligatory upon the investigating officer to state and record who gave the information, when, he is dealing with more than one accused, what words were used by him so that the recovery pursuant to the information received may be connected to the person giving the information so as to provide incriminating evidence against that person.

52. From the observations, so made, in Abdul Hafiz (supra), it becomes clear that though Section 27 does not make it mandatory to record the disclosure statement, the fact remains that when more than one accused is involved in a given case, the investigating Officer, who records the statement, which leads to the discovery of the fact, must depose in the Court, as to which accused person, amongst the accused persons, facing the trial, was the one, who had made the statement first and had, thereby, led to the discovery of the fact.

53. In Bhup Singh (supra), it has been pointed out that when a fact is found to have been discovered as a result of disclosure statement made by a person, who was accused of an offence and was, at the time of making the statement, in police custody; such statement can be used in connection with another case. The Supreme Court has observed that it is immaterial as to whether the information was supplied in connection with the same crime of a different crime. Thus, it is possible, in the light of the law, laid down in Bhup Singh (supra), that a disclosure statement, made by an accused in one case, he used in disclosure statement in another case.

54. In Bodhraj v. State of J & K, reported in (2002) 8 SCC 45 [LQ/SC/2002/898] : (2002 Cri LJ 4664), the Court, dealing with this subject, observed thus. The statement which is admissible under Section 27 is the one, which the information leading to the discovery. Thus, what is admissible being the information the same has to be proved and not the opinion formed on it by the police officer. In other words, the exact information given by the accused while in custody which led to the recovery of the articles has to be proved. It is, therefore, necessary for the benefit of both the accused and the prosecution that information given should be recorded and proved and if not so recorded, the exact information must be adduced through evidence. The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered as a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature but if it results in discovery of a fact, it becomes reliable information.

55. From the emphasized portion of the observations made above, in Bodhraj (2002 Cri LJ 4664) (supra), it becomes clear that though the information (which the prosecution relies upon to show that the accused gave the information, which led to the discovery of a fact), should be recorded and proved, but if it is not so recorded, the exact information must be adduced through evidence. Obviously, such evidence would mean oral evidence, or some other evidence in the form of audio visuals or tape. Nonetheless, what clearly transpires from the decision, in Bodhraj (supra), is that even when a statement, leading to discovery of fact, has not been reduced into writing, such a statement is still admissible in evidence, though the probative value thereof would depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case.

56. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we conclude that a disclosure statement, to be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, is not statutorily required to be reduced into writing, though prudence demands that such an information should be reduced into writing in order to enable the Court to know exactly as to what the accused is allegedly to have stated and he extent to which the information given by him is admissible. The reference shall stand answered accordingly.

Order accordingly.