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Rajinder Singh v. Government Of The National Capital Territory Of Delhi

Rajinder Singh v. Government Of The National Capital Territory Of Delhi

(High Court Of Delhi)

Civil Appeal No. 2368 of 2000 | 17-09-2002

S.B. SINHA, J.

(1) INTERPRETATION of Rule 8 (d) (ii) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as, the said Rules) falls for consideration in these writ petitions.

This writ petition is directed against an order dated 29. 03. 2000 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as, the Tribunal) whereby and hereunder the Original Application being O. A. No. 1805 of 1995 filed by the petitioner herein, was dismissed. C. W. P. NO. 5006 OF 2000 :-An order dated 26. 07. 1999 passed by the Tribunal whereby and where under the Original Application being O. A. No. 432 of 1994 filed by the petitioner herein was dismissed is in question in this writ petition. C. W. P. NO. 61428 OF 2001 :-An order dated 29. 05. 2001 passed by the Tribunal whereby and where under the Original Application being O. A. No. 60 of 2000 filed by the petitioner herein was dismissed is in question in this writ petition.

(2) FOR the purpose of adverting to the question involved in these writ petitions, it is necessary to quote the following from an order dated 13. 10. 1994 passed against Shakti singh:-

"the charge leveled against Inspr. Shakti Singh, No. D-1/231 is fully proved. . . Thus, the pay of Inspr. Shakti Singh, no. D-1/231 is reduced by Rvc stages from rs. 2525/- to Rs. 2100/- in the time scale of pay for a period of five years. He will not earn increment of pay during the period of reduction and on the expiry of this period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay. "

(3) RULE 8 of the said Rules provides for different nature of penalties which may be imposed upon the delinquent officers. Rule 8 (d) of the said Rules is as follows :-

"8. Principles for inflicting penalties. (d) Forfeiture of approved service. Approved service may he forfeited permanently or temporarily for a specified period as under :- (i) For purposes of promotion or seniority (Permanent only). (ii) Entailing reduction in pay or deferment of an increment or increments (permanently) or temporarily).

Rule 8 (d) of the said Rules provides that approved service may be forfeited permanently or temporarily for a specified period as mentioned therein. Such a forfeiture of approved service may be (i) for purposes of promotion or seniority, which can only be permanent in nature; (ii) entailing reduction of pay; and/or (iii) deferment of an increment or increments permanently or temporarily.

(4) IT is not in dispute that by reason of the order impugned before the Tribunal, the services of the petitioner were forfeited as a result whereof reduction in his pay was directed. Thus, his pay was further reduced by five stages from Rs. 2525/- to Rs. 2,100/- in the time scale of pay for a period of five years. Yet again, it was directed that he would not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction and on the expiry of the said period such reduction would have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay. Rule 8 (d) (ii) of the said Rules is disjunctive in nature. It employ the word or and not and. Pursuant to and/or in furtherance of the said Rules, either reduction in pay may be directed or increment or increments, which may again either permanent or temporary in nature be directed to be deferred. Both orders cannot be passed together. Rule 8 (d) (ii) of the said Rules is a penal provision. It, therefore, must be strictly construed. The words of the statute, as is well known, shall be understood in their ordinary or popular sense. Sentences are required to be construed according to their grammatical meaning. Rule of interpretation may be taken recourse to, unless the plain language used gives rise to an absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. Keeping in view the aforementioned basic principles in mind, the said rule is required to be interpreted.

(5) IT is not in dispute that the respondents themselves have understood the aforementioned rule in the same manner as has, been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The respondent in terms of the decision of the Tribunal in its judgment dated 14. 10. 1997 in O. A. No. 1474 of 1992 and other cases issued a circular dated 16. 04. 2002, which is in the following terms :-

"circular the punishment of "forfeiture of approved service" being imposed on the subordinate ranks of Delhi Policy under the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 on the basis of PHQ circulars issued vide endst. No. 13726-800/cr-1, dated 4. 7. 1989 and No. 8587-8650/cr-1, dated 15. 3. 1994, have been, found combination of punishments of reduction in pay and deferment of increments as contrary to the provisions of rule 8 (d) (I) and (ii) of Delhi Police (P and A)Rules, 1980 by the Humble Central administrative Tribunal vide judgment dated 14. 10. 1997 in O. A. No. 1474/92 -om Prakash Meena vs. C. P. Delhi and Ors. and O. A. No. 1561 / 98-HC (Dvr) Vijender Singh vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi and Ors. Now in O. A. No. 1612/94 - Const. Attal Singh vs. DCP/north east Distt and Ors. vide judgment dated 22nd sept. , 1998, the Humble CAT while allowing the oa has held that the penalty order imposed amounts to double penalty for the alleged misconduct since reduction in pay as a result of forfeiture of service and postponement of future increments on the expiry of the period of reduction are two independent penalties under rule 5 of the DP (P and A) Rules, 1980 and therefore the orders of punishment are not in accordance with rule 8 (d) of the Delhi Police (P and A) Rules, 1980 and on this ground also, the impugned orders are not sustainable. The judgment was examined by Law Deptt. of gnct, Delhi and case was found not fit for filing further appeal and such a judgment has been implemented. 2. The above cited two circulars dated 4. 7. 1989 and 15. 3. 1994 were issued on the basis of Govt. of Indias order No. 2 mentioned below FR 29 which relates to penalty of "reduction to lower stage in the time scale of pay" prescribed under rule 11 (iii) and (iv) of the ccs (CC and A) Rules, 1965 not applicable to the subordinate ranks of Delhi Police. As per section 21 (1) (d) (e) and (f) of Delhi Police Act, 1978 and Rule 5 (iv), (v) and (vi) of the DP (P and A)Rules 1980 framed there under, Applicable to subordinate ranks of Delhi Police forfeiture of approved service, reduction in pay and withholding of increments are three different authorized punishments. Rule 8 of the D. P. (P and A) Rules, 1980 contains the principles for inflicting penalties. Rule 8 (d) of these rules, provides as under: -"forfeiture of approved service: approved service may be forfeited permanently or temporarily for a specified period as under: - (i) For purpose of promotion or seniority (permanent only). (ii) Entailing reduction in pay or deferment of an increment or increments (permanently or temporarily.)3. Therefore, whereas both the above phqs two circulars have declared contrary to the provisions of rule 8 (d) (1) and (ii) of the existing DP (P and A) Rules, 1980, these become anfractuous on implementing the above judgment dated 22. 9. 98 of the Honble CAT. 4. In order to comply with the provisions of rules 8 (d) of the DP (P and A) Rules 1980 while inflicting penalty of "forfeiture of approved service" the orders are required to be issued in the following manner: -"that his -- years approved service is forfeited permanently for purpose of his further promotion or seniority. " or "that his _______ years approved service is Forfeited permanently entailing reduction in his pay from Rs. ______to Rs. _____" or "that his _________ years approved service is Forfeited temporarily entailing reduction in his pay from Rs. _______to Rs. . . . . . ____for a period of_________years. " or "that his ______. . . years approved service is Forfeited by deferment an increment or increments permanently or temporarily (in case of deferment of increment temporarily, specific period be mentioned.)" 5. These instructions may be brought to the notice of all concerned and (disciplinary authority may follow the provisions of rules 5 and 8 of the D. P. (P and A) Rules, 1980 while inflicting any penalty under the DP (P and A)Rules. 6. As regards punishment being inflicted upon class IV employee or on civilian Delhi police employees, the procedure contained in ccs (CC and A) Rule, 1965 as well as FR 29 and orders of Govt. of India mentioned there below shall be followed. 7. This circular supersedes the PHQs earlier circulars issued vide No. 13726-800/cr-I, dated 4. 7. 1989 and No. 8587-8650/cr-I, dated 15. 3. 1994. sd/- (T. N. MOHAN)DY. COMMISSIONER OP POLICE. HDQRS. : DELHI. "

(6) HOWEVER, there is no dispute that the matter was referred to the Full Bench of the Tribunal for the purpose of correct interpretation of the said Rule in A. S. J. Chander Pal No. 809/d v. Delhi Administration and Anr. , O. A. No. 2225 of 1993, which has since been disposed of on 18. 05. 1999. The penalty, which was imposed on the applicant of that case, is similar to the one involved herein. The Full Bench of the Tribunal observed :-

"necessary implication of forfeiture of approved service, as explained in para 10 of this order, is that the position of the delinquent officer permanently goes down in the Seniority list. This is explained in clause (i) of rule 8 (d)of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal)Rules, 1980 and, therefore, it was not necessary to mention so in the penalty order. Accordingly the impugned penalty order is also silent in this regard. In so far as the "reduction in pay" is concerned, it is also implicit in the penalty of "forfeiture of approved service" as explained in para 10 of this order. It means, the "reduction in pay" has the effect of "withholding of increment". "withholding of increment" may be permanent in nature, or for a limited number of years. Accordingly "reduction in pay" may also be permanent in nature, or limited to a certain number of years. It has to be clarified in the penalty order, whether the "withholding of increment", or "reduction in pay" is to be permanent, or temporary in nature. For this reason, when penalty of "forfeiture of approved service" is imposed, it becomes necessary to mention in the penalty order itself if its consequence of "reduction in pay" or "determent of an increment or increments" shall have permanent or temporary effect. Accordingly we are of the view that the penalty of forfeiture of x years approved service permanently entailing reduction in pay by x stages for a period of x years with the condition that the delinquent police official would not earn increment/increments during the period of reduction and on the expiry of that period the reduction would have the effect of postponing the future increment is in accordance with law. "

(7) THE said order appears to be self-contradictory in nature. Whereas the Tribunal did not say that the expression or used in Rule 8 (d) (ii) of the said Rules can be read conjunctively, it proceeded to hold that the penalty of forfeiture for a specified number of years of approved service permanently entailing reduction in pay by the same number of stages for a period of same number of years with the condition that the delinquent police official would not earn an increment and/or increments during the period of reduction and on the expiry thereof, the period of reduction would have the effect of postponing the future increment is in accordance with law. Let us take one example wherein an employee was receiving a salary of Rs. 100/-; by reason of forfeiture of his 2 years of service, his pay comes down to Rs. 80/- whereby he suffers reduction of pay. He was, therefore, deprived of his future increment for two years. If consequent upon the forfeiture of two years of service, his pay becomes Rs. 80/-, to which he may be entitled to an increment of Rs. 10/- per year; by reason of forfeiture of service consequentially although there had been reduction of pay for a period of two years, he would again be deprived from future increment, which, in our opinion, would lead to a situation, which Rule 8 (d) (ii) of the said Rules sought to avoid.

(8) CAN in a situation of this nature be said that he shall be deprived also from the future increment, which is to be earned by him. The answer to that question must be rendered in negative.

(9) IN the aforementioned view of the matter, and particularly in view of the fact that even the respondents while issuing the aforementioned circular letter dated 16. 04. 2002 arrived at the same conclusion, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Full Bench of the Tribunal is not in accordance with law.

(10) IN Manmohan Das Shah and Ors. v. Bishun Das, AIR 1967 SC 643 [LQ/SC/1966/253] the Apex court was interpreting Section 3 (1) (c) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, which reads thus :-

"3 (1) (c) That the tenant has, without the permission in writing of the landlord, made or permitted to be made any such construction as, in the opinion of the Court, has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value. " the Apex Court in that case laid down the law in the following terms :-"6. . . . The language of the clause makes it clear that the legislature wanted to lay down two alternatives which would furnish a ground to the landlord to sue without the District magistrates permission, that is, where the tenant has made such construction which would materially alter the accommodation or which would be likely to substantially diminish its value. The ordinary rule of construction is that a provision of a statute must be construed in accordance with the language used therein unless there are compelling reasons, such as where a literal construction would reduce the provision to absurdity or prevent the manifest intention of the legislature from being carried out. There is no reason why the word "or" should be construed otherwise than in its ordinary meaning. If the construction suggested by Mr. Desai were to be accepted and the word "or" were to be construed as meaning "and" it would mean that the construction should not only be such as materially alters the accommodation but is also such that it would substantially diminish its value. Such an interpretation is nod warranted for the simple reason that there may conceivably be material alterations which do not, however, diminish the value of the accommodation and on the other hand there may equally conceivably be alterations which are not material alterations but nevertheless would substantially diminish the value of the premises. It seems to us that the, legislature intended to provide for both the contingencies and where one or the other exists it was intended to furnish a ground to the landlord to sue his tenant without having to obtain the previous permission of the District Magistrate. The construction of Cl. (c) placed by the High court is, therefore, not correct. "

(11) IN Puran Singh and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh,air 1965 SC 1583 [LQ/SC/1965/24] the apex Court while interpreting Section 130 (1) of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939 held :-

"5. In our judgment, the High Court was right in the view it has taken. The Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence is bound to issue summons of the nature prescribed by sub-s. (1) of S. 130. But there is nothing in that sub-section which indicates that he must endorse the summons in terms of both the cls. (a) and (b) : to hold that he is so commanded would be to convert the conjunction "or" into "and". There is nothing in the words used by the Legislature which justifies such a conversion, and there are strong reasons which render such an interpretation wholly inconsistent with the scheme of the. "

(12) IN Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Henderson. Bros, (1888) 13 AC 595 at 603 lord Asbury observed that reading of or as and is not to be resorted to, unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done.

(13) THE learned counsel appearing for the respondents would refer to Fundamental Rule 29 (1) and (2) and Government of indias decision No. 2 wherein allegedly it had been laid down that while imposing a penalty of reduction of the lower scale in the time scale of pay, the operative portion of the punishment order should be worded in the following form :-

"it is, therefore, ordered, that the pay of shri__________________be reduced by______ stages from Rs. _________to Rs. . . . . . . . . . . in the time-scale of pay for a period of-------years/months with effect from__________. It is further directed that Shri_______________ will/will not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction and that on the expiry of this period, the reduction will/will not have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay. "

(14) RULE 29 (1) and (2) of the Fundamental Rules reads thus :-

"f. R. 29. (1) If a Government servant is reduced as a measure of penalty to a lower stage in his time-scale, the authority ordering such reduction shall state the period for which it shall be effective and whether, on restoration, the period of reduction shall operate to postpone future increments and, if so, to what extent. (2) If a Government servant is reduced as a measure of penalty to a lower service, grade or post or to a lower time-scale, the authority ordering the reduction may or may not specify, the period for which the reduction shall be effective; but where the period is specified, that authority shall also state whether, on restoration, the period of reduction shall operate to postpone further increments and, if so, to what extent. "

The wordings of the aforesaid Rule are, thus, absolutely different from Rule 8 (d) (ii) of the said Rules. The said Rules are self-contained ones and, thus, for the purpose of construction of the said Rules, the provisions of the Fundamental Rules cannot to be taken recourse to.

(15) IN this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the petitioners herein could not have been inflicted with both the punishments. We, therefore, set aside the second part of the order whereby and where under their future increments had also been stopped permanently.

(16) LET us now consider the merit of each matter separately. C. W. P. NO. 2368 OF 2000 :-

(17) THE submission of Mr. Shyam Babu, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, is to the effect that several documents, particularly statement of the Doctor of mohan Nursing Home before the SDM Shahdara and copy of the statement of the father of late Shri Darshan Lal made to the SDM Shahdara, had not been supplied. However, it is not in dispute that copies of the statements made by the said witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Civil procedure during investigation of the Crime Branch had been supplied. The learned Tribunal has arrived at a finding of fact that the said documents were not at all material for the enquiry. It was held :-

"8. . . . Moreover, in the application seeking these supply of documents it was not shown how the said documents are material to the enquiry. It is well settled that prejudice must be shown to have caused to the delinquent for not supplying with certain documents. No such prejudice is shown to have caused to the applicant except stating that they have material bearing to the applicants defence. "

Keeping in view the aforementioned finding of fact, we do not find any merit in the aforementioned contention.

(18) THE learned counsel would then contend that the order of the Enquiry Officer was perverse. He would take us through the evidences of PW - 3 and PW - 5 for the purpose of showing that the petitioner had no knowledge that the boys in question were kept in AATS. Appreciation of evidence is not within the domain of this Court. The fact that the petitioner was the supervisory authority of the constables is a question is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the deceased Darshan Lal was in the custody of the staff of aats.

The evidences of the witnesses must be read in their entirety. Circumstantial evidences in the matter of this nature must also be held to have great role to play. The fact remains that the fathers of the boys never knew where they had been kept. They went to AATS with the purpose of finding them. They had not been taken to the boys. The fact that the boy had died because of the torture meted out by the subordinates of the petitioner is not in dispute. Furthermore, in this case, the death took place on 16. 03. 1992 and even on that day, the petitioner did not inform the higher authorities about the said incident. Only on 17. 03. 1992, such information was sent. In this situation, the petitioner was charged with the following :-"from the above, it is clear that the deceased Darshan Lal remained in the custody of AATS from 10. 3. 92 to 16. 3. 92 which shows that you Inspr. Shakti Singh had failed to inform your senior officers about the illegal detention/torture of Darshan Lal by your subordinates. Thus you failed to supervise your subordinates. "

Thus, the deceased was in the custody of the staff since 10. 03. 1992, they were supposed to be in AATS of which the petitioner was in charge. He did not examine any defense witness. If according to him, he had no knowledge about the incident in question and/or he had marked the constables concerned as absent, as was contended by Mr. Shyam Babu before us, he could have raised the said contentions before the Enquiry Officer, but having not done so, we are of the opinion that he cannot be permitted to do so before this Court. We, therefore, do nut find any reason to interfere with the judgment of the Tribunal as regard thereto. C. W. P. NO. 5006 OF 2000 :-

(19) THE petitioner in the instant case was charged with the following :-

"charge i, Inspr. Chandra Prakash, E. O. D. E. Cell (Vig.) hereby charge you, Costs. Mahan Singh no. 706/ne and Yash Pal No. 1329/ne for carelessness, gross misconduct, and negligence in the discharge of your official duties misusing your official powers for accepting illegal gratification of Rs. 700/- for releasing one spasmodic S/o Mohd. Rafiq r/o 922/7, Rishi kardam Marg and also released Hazi Manjoor ahmed of 17/22, Brah mourn after settling to accept from him as illegal gratification of rs. 700/- while you were posted in P. S. / sealampur, and were detailed to guard / watch them on 18/11. 90 in the Police Station seala mpur along with 9 other persons who were brought in a raid conducted by order of Inspr. Surjeet Singh, the then SHO P. S. Seal amour on the night intervening 17/18-11-90. Inspr. Chandra Prakash inquiry Officer. "

(20) MR. Shyam Babu, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, in this case also would lake us through the evidence of the witnesses and in particular those of sham suddin and Mehak Singh with a view to show that there is no evidence that the petitioner had taken a sum of rs. 700/- from the concerned authorities. Although on the first splash, the submission of Mr. Shyam Babu appears to be attractive, but the question in a proceeding of this nature, as is well known, must be considered from the entire materials on record. PW - 6 in his evidence categorically stated :-"pw-6 Inspr. Surjit Singh SHO Anand Vihar (the then SHO PS Seela mpur) in his statement said that being posted as SHO on 17/18. 11. 90 morning at Seel ampur called unauthorized slaughters through Const. Mahak. Singh and yashpal present now and left them under their supervision/watch. After some time a special worker Mr. Nadeem Dehlvi and told that both the above Const. had left 2 persons named sham sudden and Hazi Manzoor and Rs. 700/-were settled from each for their release and they had accepted Rs. 700/- and Rs. 700/- are yet remaining. Hearing the same the checked only 9 persons sitting out of 11 in the room reaching there. Sham sudden and Hazi manzoor were not present. He conducted the enquiry from both the constable present. Ct. Yash Pal confessed for accepting Rs. 700/ to release the both the persons. He on his PW demand agreed to pay the said amount. He took out Rs. 200/- from his pocket and took rs. 500/- from present Ct. Mahak Singh and produced the said amount to him, which were taken by memo already exhibited bears sign of anadem Dehlvi i. e. Ex. PW-1/a and thumb impression of Shamsuddin PW 4/a. On enquiry it was revealed that the said amount was brought by Mirazuddin the son of sham sudden from his house on asking by sham sudden were given to Ct. Mahak Singh by mohd. Afsar. He informed the senior officers regarding all matters on telephone and on their instructions suspended both the constables and mentioned in detail in DD 16a dt. 18. 11. 90 Ex. PW 5/a. He recorded the statements of Mr. Nadeem Hazi Manzoor, shas adding and Mohd. Afsar according to their wordings, which has been already exhibited. He submitted his detail report Ex. PW - 6 /a senior officers for needful action. "

(21) IT is not possible for us to discredit the said witness only because PW - 1 exonerated the petitioner. The matter relating to analysis of the evidence is within the domain of the Enquiry Officer. It is not a case where no evidence at all was brought on record so as to attract the principles of wed Newbury Unreasonableness. If the petitioners were not guilty, there is no reason for them to refund the said amount of Rs. 700/- when a complaint was made. They as police Officers must be presumed to know the consequences of such acts.

In the instant case, the petitioner had confessed before PW -6 that he had accepted a sum of Rs. 700/- to release both persons. His confession together with his act by taking out rs. 200/- from his pocket and Rs. 500/- from Mahek Singh and producing the said amount to PW-6 is a pointer to the guilt of the petitioner. We, therefore, find no merit in the aforementioned contention. C. W. P. NO. 61428 OF 2001 :-

(22) THE summary of allegations in the instant case is as follows:-

"summary OF ALLEGATIONS it is alleged against HC Ishaq Mohd. No. 1173/pcr (PIS No. 28761008), HC Rajinder singh, No. 1743/pcr (PIS No. 28730090) and ct. (Dvr.) Raj Kumar, No. 1517/pcr) PIS no. 28931494) that in the night of 11/12-8-98 inspr. V. K. Gupta of South West Zone/pcr was informed by Z-4 that PCR Van Z-82 has been damaged in an accident with a half body truck on its base. Inspr. V. K. Gupta front side. Its buffer, bonnat, head lights, front show, right side door and wind screen were completely damaged. HC Ishaq Mohd. No. 1173/pcr i/c Van, HC Rajinder Singh, No. 1743/pcr gunman and Ct. (Dvr.). Raj Kumar, no. 4517/pcr disclosed that a half body truck coming with a fast speed from sector - 9 dark collided with the van on its front side and caused damaged. They further stated that they chased the truck for about 2 Kms. to intercept it. During this process the truck driver suddenly stopped the truck and again the van, which was chasing the truck struck at the back side of the truck. The PCR Van staff could not note thereafter. A case vide FIR No. 455/98 u/s. 279/ipc was got registered at PS najaf Garh, Delhi regarding this incident by the Ct. (Dvr.) Raj Kumar, No. 4517/pcr. The alleged truck has not been identified so far and the story of hitting the van by the truck has been found suspicious. The PCR van staff chased the truck for good two KMs for extraneous reasons at the instance of I/c van HC Ishaq Mohd. No. 1173/pct, and the gunman and the driver abetted the chase. The above act on the part of HC Ishaq mohd. No. 1173/pcr, HC Rajinder Singh, No. 1743/pcr and Ct. (Dvr.) Raj Kumar, no. 4517/pcr amounts to gross misconduct, negligence that is unbecoming a member of disciplined force which renders them liable for departmental action under the provisions of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules 1980. "

(23) THE petitioners are Gunmen. They had been charged with chasing a truck for extraneous reasons. The defense of the petitioners had been that the PCR Van was hit by the truck and as such it was being chased. We have perused the defense of the P. W. s, but we fail to understand that when a truck was being chased, how can the truck suddenly break, put the vehicle in reverse gear and hit the vehicle in question. A finding of fact has been arrived at that the truck had been chased for about two kms. , it is, therefore, wholly unlikely that even during the said period, the number of the said truck could not have been noted down, particularly when according to the petitioners themselves, the truck was being chased as it had hit the police van earlier. If the police van was hit by the truck, the truck in question would be chased and the first attempt on the part of the police authorities would be to note down the number thereof. They did not do so. Furthermore, why the truck could not be identified is a mystery. In that situation, the enquiry Officer held :-

"pw-4 and 5 : Sh. Ranbir Singh, ACP and Inspr. V. K. Gupta, have fully supported the prosecution story and there is no reason to disbelieve their testimony being an independent and sole witnesses. The contention of all the three delinquents that a half body truck (Dumpher)sped away after hitting their PCR Van at its base and while they chased the truck it suddenly applied the brake and their van collided the truck from the back side resulting damages the PCR Van does not seem to be correct which in itself is doubtful and concocted. There was no reason to get noted down the Regn. No. of the truck (Dumper) in question as all the three delinquents have themselves admitted that they all were present in PCR Van and near the PCR Van at the time of incident. "

(24) THE standard of proof in a domestic enquiry is not the same as that of a criminal trial. Preponderance of probability in. such matter is the Rule. It is not for the Enquiry Officer to arrive at a finding of fact that the charges must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

(25) IN view of the aforementioned situation, we do not find any reason to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal or merit of the matter.

(26) HOWEVER, having regard to the findings as on interpretation of Rule 8 (d) (ii) of the said Rules, we are of the opinion that the matter should be remitted back to the disciplinary authority for imposition of punishment in terms of this judgment.

(27) THESE writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. However in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

Advocate List
  • For the Appearing Parties Kailash Gambhir, P. Varma, Pravin Kumar, Shyam Babu, Advocates.
Bench
  • HON'BLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. S.B. SINHA
  • HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
Eq Citations
  • LQ/DelHC/2002/1777
Head Note

Income Tax — Non-residents — TDS — When assessee liable to pay under S.?192 read with S.?201 of the IT Act, 1961 — Question of limitation if survived — TDS held to be deductible on foreign salary as a component of total salary paid in India, in Eli case, (2009) 15 SCC 1 — Hence, held, question whether orders under Ss. 201(1) and 201(1-A) were beyond limitation purely academic in these circumstances as question would still be whether assessee could be declared as assessee in default under S. 192 — Question of limitation left open, since assessees had paid differential tax and interest thereon and undertaken not to claim refund thereof — Income Tax Act, 1961, Ss. 192, 201(1) and 201(1-A)\n(Paras 3 and 5)\n