1. Appellant filed this appeal under Section 173(1) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against award passed by the learned Claims Tribunal dated 10/01/2019 for enhancement of compensation.

2. The appellants filed I.A. No.4447 of 2024, an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. As per the report of Registry of this Court, the appeal is barred by 1383 days.

3. On perusal of the application causes shown for the delay is that the appellants have no knowledge of law and due to financial constrain, they could not take appropriate steps to file appeal and to pay Court-fee within a period of limitation and as soon as they came to know, they filed this appeal with a delay of 1383 days. If the delay is not condoned the appellants put to irreparable loss and hardship.

4. Thus question for consideration is whether there is sufficient cause to condone the delay of 1383 days in filing this appeal.

5. Undisputedly, the appellants filed claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the same was allowed and awarded an amount of Rs.3,40,000/- with interest of 6% from the date of claim petition till payment was made.

6. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Claim Tribunal, appellants filed this appeal with an application (IA No.4447/2024) to condone the delay of 1383. This Court considered this aspect of the matter and very lenient view is to be taken, particularly appeal filed by the victim against the insurer on the award passed by the learned Claims Tribunal within reasonable delay. Hon’ble the Apex Court held that substantial cause should be shown and lenient view could be taken to above substantial aspect. However, even after taking the averments in the application and the reasons mentioned in the affidavit in the available circumstances, according to which on the date of passing of impugned award, appellants has to file appeal within 90 days, but the reasons mentioned in the application as well as the affidavit that they being labour were not aware about filing of appeal. Further stated that they were taking time to secure money to pay the court fees and file this appeal, which are not plausible reasons based on material on record.

7. Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in Allala Bhagavanth Rao vs Garvandula Vijayalaxmi and others 2016 (4) ALT 43 , in paras-12 to 15 held as follows:-

"12. The word ‘sufficient cause’ is not defined either in the Limitation Act or in the C.P.C.; the reason appears to be that there is no straight jacket formula to decide whether the cause shown for condonation of delay is sufficient cause or not. Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the Court can exercise discretion and decide the sufficient cause. Sufficient cause shall be construed liberally without adopting any pedantic approach. It cannot be stretched to frustrate the very intention of Legislature in specifying the period for filing appeal or petition etc.

13. In Lanka Venkateswarlu (Died) by L.Rs. v. State of A.P., (2011) 1 UPLJ 242 (SC), the apex Court heavily laid on the Courts when to allow the petitions, though no sufficient cause is made out, and ruled as follows: “We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation, especially in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.”

“14. In fact, the petitioner did not make out any sufficient cause except making a bald unsubstantiated allegation in the affidavit If such lame excuses for condoning the delay are accepted as sufficient causes, virtually denuding or jettisoning the substantive law of limitation.

15. In view of the law declared by the apex Court basing on the concept of real justice, substantial justice the Courts cannot allow petitions under Section 5 of Limitation Act, when no sufficient cause is made out. Therefore, basing on lame excuse or unsubstantiated cause, it is difficult to condone the delay, liberally construing the word sufficient cause.”

8. In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statues, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the costs. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the delay of more than seven years.”

9. In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the Hon’ble Apex Court broadly culled out the following principles:

"i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.

iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude."

10. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

"a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a nonserious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challan manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters."

11. In Majji Sannemma alias Sanyasirao Vs. Reddy Sridevi and others 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed:-

“17. In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [(1962 2 SCR 762] (supra), it is observed and held as under:—

In construing s.5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light- heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, “s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant.”

18. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC 556], while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously.

12. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448], it is observed as under:

— “The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and 8 preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.”

20. In the case of Basawaraj Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81], it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature.”

13. In Kilaru Appa Rao Vs. Sunku Prathapa Reddy 2022 (6) ALT 288 (TS) , the Hon’ble Court observed:-

“11. The dictum of law is that the delay if inordinate, should not be condoned by adopting casual or liberal approach. Courts are not expected to condone the delay in the following circumstances:-

“1. When the reason urged is found to be concocted.

2. When the party who seeks for condonation of delay is found to be thoroughly negligent.

3. In case condonation of inordinate delay leads to substantial injustice to the opposite party due to the subsequent events.

4. The inordinate delay, if condoned, results in unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The list is illustrative and not exhaustive.”

14. A conspectus of above the judgments referred to (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. It was further held that the primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties and they are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. Hon’ble Apex Court also cautioned that if the delay is occasioned by party deliberately to gain time then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. The explanation should not be fanciful and concocted. The Courts while dealing with an application to condone delay should keep in mind the right accrued to other side and should deal with such application with utmost care and caution.

15. Under such circumstances as per the expressions of Hon'ble Apex Court, while condoning the delay, the Court must see whether the deponent explained sufficient rights of parties alone is not the criteria, unless; sufficient cause is shown, that in case of inordinate delay, condoning the delay does not arise.

16. In the present case, the appellants failed to show sufficient cause to condone the delay as per the application and affidavit on record, the delay is nearly 1383 days, this Court does not find any ground to condone the delay. Thus I.A. No.4447 of 2024 is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, I.A. No.4447 of 2024 is dismissed.

17. Consequently, the present appeal fails and dismissed. No order as to costs.

18. As a sequel, all the pending applications shall stand closed.