D. P. Wadhwa, J.

( 1 ) PLAINTIFF sued Punjab National Bank for directing it to give details about its settlement with liquidators of pffs. company; for injunction restraining Deft. from enforcing settlement and for not implementing the settlement without his concurrence as he was guarantor. Pff. made applications for amendment of plaint and also for addition of certain parties (U. O. I. , Reserve Bank and some of his English Companies ). Deft. also filed an application contending that pff. had no locus standi to file the suit and that the Delhi Courts had no jurisdiction. Pff. wanted to add U. O. I, and RBI as parties as Deft. had sought their permission to enter into settlement with the Liquidator Trustees of Jokai Tea Co. (L.) whose shares had been pledged with Deft. The contention of the Deft. was that pff. had been adjudged as Bankrupt by English Courts and he could not sue in India. Pffs plea was that lie was never given opportunity to defend himself in English Courts as at relevant time he was in Jail in India. About making UOI and RBI parties, plea of pff. was that Finance Minister had stated in Parliament that report of RBI would be placed on the table of the house which was never done]. After detailing above, Judgment is :-

( 2 ) (B) This (question of making UOI or RBI parties) is entirely a new cause of action unconnected with the suit. If any record is, however, sought, from either U. O. I, or R. B. I. it can be summoned during the course of trial, if permissible in law. The impugned transaction is a commercial transaction, which the pff. seeks to challenge in the suit. No questions of "public interest" or "banking policy" are involved which I have to consider in the suit. Except for the U. O. I, or R. B. I, no other party sought to be added can be least interested in these questions. I will not allow widening of the base of the suit by adding U. O. I, or R. B I. , otherwise there is going to be misjoinder of causes of action and parties and the suit bad for multifariousness. Moreover service of notice u/s 80, Civil Procedure Code. on the U. O. I, is mandatory and the application, I. A. 5403/90, does not specify any ground for me to exercise discretion under sub-sec. (2) of 80. No urgent or immediate relief is sought against the Central Govt. This applition is, therefore, to be dismissed. Prayer of the pff. to add U. O. I, and R. B. I. as parties to the suit is declined.

( 3 ) THERE is no cause of action against other defendants sought to be added arising in India. None of these defendants carries on business in Delhi, or for, that matter, any place in India. No leave of the court has been obtained to sue them in these proceedings as required u/s. 20 (b) of the Civil Procedure Code. Admittedly, whole of the transaction sought to be challenged took place outside India. English courts are seized of the matter to which jurisdiction all the parties have submitted. Addition of these defendants in these proceedings wi!l cause them a great deal of harassment, hardship and unnecessary expense. Even in the application no grounds have been given as to why these defendants are sought to be added parties, though, in the proposed amendments, some indication is discernible. I see no ground in law or even in equity to add them as parties in this suit. This is apart from the submission of Mr. Khanna that this court lacks inherent and territorial jurisdiction to try this suit as well. I, therefore, decline the request of the pff. to add any one of these defendants as party to the suit.

( 4 ) MR. Khanna contended with reference to the prayers made in the suit that these had since become infructuous. One of his arguments was that since this court lacked jurisdiction to try the suit itself, it could not allow any one to be added as a parly in the suit or allow amendments to the plaint and, thus, assume jurisdiction indirectly. In support of his submission he referred to Mst. Zohra Khatoon vs. Janat Mohammad AIR 1978 Cal. 133 [LQ/CalHC/1977/328] .

( 5 ) AT this stage, I am only concerned with the application seeking amendment of the plaint as originally laid and I do not think I should go into the question of my jurisdiction to try this suit as submitted by Mr. Khanna and for which I. A. 11264/90 was filed. If I look at S, 20, C P. C. again I find I have territorial jurisdiction to try this suit filed against P. N. B. as it is not disputed that P. N. B. voluntarily resides and carries on business in Delhi where it has its principal office. Whether I should proceed with the suit in view of the proceedings in London courts is a different matter altogether. In support of his submission Mr. Khanna referred to a bench decision of A. P. High Court in The Black Sea Steamship and Ors. v. U O. I. , AIR 1976 A. P. 103, which was rendered on S. 28, Contract Act, 1872. In this case condition 26 in the agreement between the parties was "all claims and disputes arising under and in connection with this bill of lading shall be judged in the U. S. S. R. "

( 6 ) IT was common ground that but for this condition courts both in the U. S. S. R. and Visakhapatnam would have jurisdiction to entertain this suit. But, the petitioner before the court contended that Visakhapatnam courts jurisdiction stood excluded because of condition 26. The court, after considering various submissions, held; "the above discussion yields the firm conclusion that it is perfectly open to the court to consider the balance of convenience, the interest of justice and like circumstances, when it decides the question of jurisdiction of a court, in the light of a clause in the agreement between the parties choosing one of several courts or forums which were available to them. Indeed, such a consideration is essential in the interests of international trade and commerce for the better relations between the countries and the people of the world. "

( 7 ) IT will, thus, be seen that the court at no stage held that the jurisdiction of Visakhapatnam court was excluded altogether on account of condition 26 aforesaid. Reference is also made by Mr. Khanna to Lloyds Triestino Societa vs. Lakshminarayan, AIR 1959 Cal. 669 [LQ/CalHC/1958/237] ; Lakshminarayan, vs. N. V. Vereenigde AIR 1960 Cal. 45 [LQ/CalHC/1958/351] , and B. R. Herman and Mohatta (India) Ltd. vs. Swedish East Asia Co. Ltd. , AIR 1967 Cal. 24 [LQ/CalHC/1959/86] .

( 8 ) UNDER S. 28, Contract Act, every agreement by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals or which limits the time within which he may, thus, enforce bis rights is void to that extent. There are two exceptions to this section which are not relevant for my purpose. Mr. Khanna said that in the guarantee which the plaintiff executed in favour of P. N. B. at London, there was clause 20, which is as under:

"20. This guarantee is to be governed by and construed according to English Law and the Guarantor agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the English Courts and it is understood and agreed that none of the terms and provisions of this Guarantee may be waived, altered, modified or amended except in writing to be signed for and on your behalf. "

( 9 ) ON the basis of this clause, Mr. Khanna said that this court will have no jurisdiction in the matter. I am afraid, I cannot agree with Mr. Khannas submission. As noted above, u/s. 20, Civil Procedure Code. , this court has territorial jurisdiction to try the present suit. When S. 28 talks of "usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals" it refers to proceedings in this country. Any agreement that parties will not have recourse to Indian courts would be void. It is no answer that an aggrieved party could file proceedings in England or in any other foreign country under agreement between the parties. Provisions of S. 20, Civil Procedure Code. cannot be set at naught like this taking shelter u/s. 28, Contract Act. Further any agreement between the parties which provides that provisions of a statute shall not be applicable unless the statute itself gives such a right, would be opposed to public policy and void u/s. 23, Contract Act as well. Thus, if the argument is that the agreement between the parties restricts any party absolutely from enforcing his rights under a contract by usual legal proceedings in this country which rights the party otherwise has under the statute, it cannot be sustained as the agreement would itself be void u/s 28, Contract Act. Whether the court should stay a suit either u/s. 10 or S. 151, Civil Procedure Code. is other matter, and will depend upon the circumstances of each case. In the judgments referred to, the court did exercise the discretion in staying the proceedings before it : when in one case there was a clause in the agreement that disputes would be decided by a foreign court and where the evidence was readily available within the jurisdiction of the foreign court. It is also not correct that the pff. should be non-suited on the ground that he has already submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign court. That may be a consideration for stay of the suit, but, certainly not to reject the plaint when the court has jurisdiction in the matter. Then, Mr. Khanna submitted that since the pff. was an undischarged insolvent, he could not maintain the present proceedings The pff. has not been declared an insolvent under the Provincial Insolvency Act as applicable It is admitted, however, that he has been declared bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Laws of England (Bankruptcy Act 1914 ). Mr. Khanna said that S. 13, Civil Procedure Code. would be applicable and a foreign judgment on this account would be conclusive. No judgment declaring the pff. as bankrupt has been brought on record. Mr. Lekhi on the other band submitted with reference to clause (d) of this section that the judgment in such a case would not be conclusive on the question of bankruptcy of the pff. in as much as the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained were opposed to natural justice. His submission was that at the time of proceedings of bankraptey in England, the pff. was confined in Jail in India and was unable to defend those proceedings. In the absence of any such judgment on record, it is difficult to say that the provisions of S. 13 would become applicable in the present case. A foreign judgment would have shown if the pff. was duly served and if he had an opportunity to defend the proceedings against him there. I have to see the applicability of the Provincial Insolvency Act and I find, the pff. has not been declared insolvent by any court in this country. No rule of International Law as well has been brought to my notice to oust my jurisdiction and this court. Pleas of the Khanna, therefore, fail and I. A. 11264/64 is dismissed.

( 10 ) BUT, since the relief now sought to be added cannot be granted to the plaintiff in the absence of other parties to the sale and transfer of shares of Jokai Tea Holdings Limited, the pff. cannot be permitted to add this prayer by way of amendment. The relief sought by way of amendment is also rather too vague and is not at all necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties as originally laid in the suit. It is bad for multifariousness as well. This cannot be permitted. Request to add the prayer is declined. In this view of the matter, the amendments sought would appear to be rather superfluous. If, however, the plaintiff wants any of the amendments by way of additional facts, he will be permitted to do so on separate application being filed and if the amendments fall within the purview of Order 6 Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code.