George Rankin, J.

1. Mr. Pages first objection was that Bhairabendra should not have been substituted for Jogendra in the appeal brought by the latter pursuant to special leave. It is admitted that this objection, if upheld, could have no effect whatever on the present case, since Bhairabendra has an independent appeal of his own, but it is said that in another case some order has been made by a Bengal Court conditional on the Boards action or advice in this regard. Their Lordships have no occasion to observe upon the propriety of such an order as is said to have been made, and they do not propose to entertain an application which is without point so far as regards any matter before them.

2. The next contention advanced for the respondents was that, independently of any question whether it affected any property outside Assam, the Assam Act was ultra vires of the Assam legislature since it did not comply with the provisions of the Government of India Act and the Devolution Rules made under Section 45A thereof. The grounds of invalidity suggested are really two. First, that the case was within the 51st item of Part II. of Schedule I. of the Rules, which classes as a " provincial subject" " any matter which, though falling "within a central subject, is declared by the Governor-General "in Council to be of a merely local or private nature within the "province "--but no such declaration was obtained. Secondly, that though " civil law, including laws regarding status, "property, civil rights and liabilities and civil procedure " is specified as a central subject by item 16 of Part I. of the Rules, yet the Act was not one " regulating any central subject" within the meaning of Clause (e) of Sub-section 3 of Section 80a of the Government of India Act. Their Lordships are in agreement with both courts in India in holding on the first point that the fact that the subject-matter of the Assam Act was not made a provincial subject by declaration of the Governor-General in Council under item 51 of Part II. did not render the Assam legislature incompetent to deal with it as a central subject provided the sanction of the Governor-General in Council was duly obtained. They agree also with the courts in India upon the second point, and have no difficulty in deciding that the Act was one which regulated a central subject, and as such came within the competence of the provincial legislature when the necessary sanction had been given. By Sub-section 2 of Section 84 of the Government of India Act the validity of any Act of any local legislature is not open to question in any legal proceedings on the ground that the Act affects a central subject. Apart from any question of extra-territorial effect, their Lordships can find no ground for impugning the validity of the Assam Act as a law made "for the peace and good government" of Assam--a phrase which in Sub-section 1 of Section 80a has reference to the scope and not to the merits of the legislation.

3. The question next in order is whether the Act purports to have effect outside Assam, and if so, whether it must be held to be invalid in part or in whole on this account. The question of construction comes logically first, and is of importance by reason that items 8 and 9 of Schedule B to the plaint consist of a house in Calcutta and a rajbati at Benares. All the lands mentioned in the Schedule to the Act lie in Assam. The preamble refers to " the group of estates known as the " Bijni Raj in Assam." The only words by which the Act could be given effect on immovables outside the province would seem to be those occurring in the first clause of Section 2 whereby " the Raj " is defined--" together with all additions "and accretions to the property comprised therein." These words refer--though perhaps not exclusively--to the doctrine of law whereby the holder of an impartible estate may incorporate immovable property acquired by him with the impartible estate. An exposition of this doctrine is to be found in the judgment of the Board in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Prayag Kumari Debt L.R. 59 I.A. 331, which clearly shows that it is not applicable to movables. While there may be force in the consideration that the Assam legislature would little like to see the house in Calcutta or the rajbati at Benares descend in a different line of succession from that provided in the Act for the Assam estates, it may not have been thought wise to attempt to bring within the Act lands in another province. Much depends on the extent and the manner in which the Act was intended to have effect on the lands of the Raj. The Act must be carefully scanned to see whether the adjectival clause as to additions and accretions was intended to be controlled by no territorial limit. Their Lordships think that a consideration of the scheme of the Act, and in particular of the provisions of Sub-section 4 of Section 10, shows that the phrase as to additions and accretions is not intended to apply to land in other provinces. It can hardly have been anticipated that a holder of this estate should be able in the future to acquire land in any part of India and, by incorporating it with his impartible estate, should be able to make it free from attachment by legal process without the previous sanction of the Governor of Assam. Their Lordships think that the learned trial judge was right therefore in permitting the suit to proceed as regards the house in Calcutta and the rajbati at Benares. Had the Assam Act extended to these immovables, no doubt an important constitutional question as to the competence of the Assam legislature would have arisen. But on a true construction of the Act it does not arise, and though it was the subject of considerable debate at the hearing their Lordships do not think fit to discuss it.

4. It remains to consider whether the Act bars the plaintiffs claim to the other immovable properties of the Raj. These are all situated in Assam. Their Lordships cannot on this point accept the conclusions of the High Court. They see in the Act no intention to deal separately or differently with (a) ownership of the estate and (b) the status of holder of the Raj, or to give title to Jogendra and Bhairabendra, but only as against other claimants by succession and not so as to quiet their right to the estate. By its terms the Act makes Jogendra holder with effect from September 28, 1895, and " holder " is stated to mean owner. This result was effected on the passing of the Act, and it is not consistent with the Act that the title of Jogendra should have come to an end at some time before 1918. The Act contains provisions regulating the succession after Jogendras life and after Bhairabendras life, but its provisions as to succession in the future are not left hypothetical or in the air as regulations for succession to an estate which may no longer exist as such: on the contrary, they are given basis in reality by the enactment that Jogendra shall be owner for his life and Bhairabendra after him. To what extent adverse possession after 1931 might defeat the scheme of the Act is doubtless a question. But no adverse possession before 1931 has any effect to prevent Jogendra taking the estate which the Act on its coming into force vested in him. That his title is made not only a title in the present but also to relate back to 1895 is not intended to give it infirmity or to expose it to attack, but to give it validity ex post facto. Hence, with all due respect to the High Court, whose judgment in this case is most careful and elaborate, their Lordships find themselves in agreement on this point also with the learned trial judge. The result is that in their Lordships opinion the decree of the trial court was correct.

5. Mr. Page, for the respondents, asked that since it has been held by the Board in the case already cited that movable property cannot be incorporated with an impartible estate so as to form an accretion thereto, and since it does not appear that any separate issue as to movables was asked for by the plaintiff or framed by the trial court, their Lordships should direct that the suit should continue notwithstanding the provisions of the Assam Act as regards the items mentioned in the list of movables appearing in Schedule B to the plaint. But it appears to their Lordships that learned Counsel for the plaintiff in India may well have had good reason to make no separate case as to movables, if only on the ground of limitation. They are not prepared to extend the area of the present dispute without clear necessity in the interests of justice, and they are not of opinion that the decree of the trial court should be modified as proposed.

6. They will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be allowed, the decree of the High Court set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore, dated April 24, 1933, restored. The contesting respondents who have been substituted for Heramba, and the plaintiff Debendra, must pay to the appellant Bhairabendra one set of costs of this consolidated appeal and his costs of the appeal in the High Court.