Wanchoo, C.J.

1. These are two applications under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Raja Harisingh (No. 25) and Thakur Jaswant Singh (No. 33). The points raised in the two applications are exactly the same, and we propose therefore to decide them by one Judgment.

2. The case of the applicants is that they are jagirdars of certain villages in Tahsil Nawa, district Nagaur. Settlement operations were going on in that Tahsil for sometime past, and, on 31-8-1950, a notification was issued as provided by Section 81(1)(d) of the Marwar Land Revenue Act (hereinafter referred to as the Land Revenue Act) inviting objections to the rent rates published therein within one month. On the publication of this notification, the applicants raised a number of objections to the rent rates fixed, and said inter alia that the general principles governing settlement were not followed in fixing the rates, and in particular the provisions of the Land Revenue Act had not been complied with both as to the manner of the publication of the rates and to the method of arriving at them.

It was also objected that the Marwar Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act) and the Land Revenue Act were ultra vires. A date was then fixed for hearing of these objections, & the Assistant Settlement Commissioner heard them. It was pressed before him that it was impossible to submit proper objections in view of the fact that the report, on which the rent rates were based, had not been published, and the applicants were not being allowed to inspect the settlement records. No orders disposing of the objections were communicated to the applicants; but, on 25-10-1951, the applicants were informed that the rent rates had been approved by the Board of Revenue and the approval of the Government was being awaited. On 25-11-1951, the applicants were informed that the Government had sanctioned the rent rates, and Parchas would be distributed to the tenants accordingly.

The applicants then made representations to the Board of Revenue and the Revenue Minister, and the distribution of Parchas was stayed from time to time. Eventually, on 14-3-1952, the applicants were informed that distribution of Parchas would begin soon. In April, 1952, the applicants were informed that the cash rents fixed would take effect from Kharif St. 2008, i.e. July, 1951. Consequently the present applications were filed on or about 25-4-1952, praying that an appropriate writ, order, or direction be issued declaring the Land Revenue Act and the Tenancy Act ultra vires of the powers of the then Government of Jodhpur, and prohibiting the State from enforcing the rent rates nxed in contravention of the law.

3. A large number of grounds were taken in support of the applications, and we think it unnecessary to set them out one by one. Some of them were not pressed before us in arguments, and such of them as were pressed will appear from our decision on those grounds in the course of this judgment, and where we do not deal with any ground appearing in the applications, it will be because it was given up. But the main points urged were four and they are these-

(1) That the then Government of Jodhpur had no legal authority to enact any law after 30-3-1949, when the Rajpramukh assumed office under the covenant;

(2) That even if the two impugned Acts could be enacted by the then Government of Jodhpur, they have now become invalid under Article 14 of the Constitution in view of the discriminatory provisions which they contain;

(3) That the impugned Acts are invalid in view of Article 19(1)(f) as they impose unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the applicants to acquire, hold and dispose of property;

(4) That the fixing of rent under the Land Revenue Act was a quasi-judicial proceeding, and inasmuch as the procedure prescribed under the and principles of natural justice were not followed, the rent rates fixed should be set aside.

4. The applications have been opposed on behalf of the State, and all the points raised on behalf of the applicants have been traversed, it is not necessary to put down the various contentions raised by the State on the various points raised by the applicants as they will appear from our decisions on those points, but the reply of the State on the four main points is as follows:

(1) The then Government of Jodhpur had full power to enact the two impugned Acts, and legislative power vested in the then Government of Jodhpur till 6-4-1949, and the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan got the power to legislate for the State of Rajasthan from 7-4-1949.

(2) There is no discrimination in the two Acts, and both thes apply to all lands in Rajasthan, whether in jagir area or in Khalsa area, and therefore Article 14 is not applicable. If there is any apparent conflict between some of the provisions of the two Acts, that is a matter to be resolved if and when, the question arises. That, however, does not create any discrimination.

(3) The restrictions imposed by the impugned Acts are reasonable by all standards, and therefore the impugned Acts are not hit by Article 19(1)(f).

(4) The fixation of rent rates under the Land Revenue Act is a purely administrative or executive act. These rates have been fixed according to the procedure provided in the Land Revenue Act, and there is no question of the application of principles of natural justice in the circumstances.

5. Before we deal with these four points we should like to dispose of the other points which have been raised on behalf of the applicants. It is said that the petitioners believed that the Land Revenue Act and the Tenancy Act did not receive the assent of His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur on 6-4-1949, and that on that day His Highness was not in Jodhpur. The two Acts as published show that the assent of His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur was given to them on 6-4-1949. The burden, under the circumstances, lay heavily on the applicants to prove that this was really not so. The belief of the applicants that assent was not given would not serve the purpose. The fact that the Maharaja was not in Jodhpur on the 6th April, even if correct, is in itself not enough to prove that his assent could not have been obtained. There are other methods of obtaining his assent, viz. by telephone, or by telegram, or by sending a special messenger to wherever he was.

An affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State, and it is said therein that the impugned Acts received the assent of His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur on 6-4-1949. In the face of this affidavit and the recital in the Gazette at the time of the publication of thes, it is not possible to hold that the assent of His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur was not given to these Acts on 6-4-1949.

6. Then it is urged that these Acts were published in a Gazette Extraordinary, dated 6-4-1949, and that this was physically impossible, if the assent of His Highness was obtained on the 6th April. We do not see any force in this argument. The bills, on which these Acts are based, were published some weeks before, and there is not much difference between the bills and thes. If the type-setting had been preserved, and it may very well have been preserved considering that the creation of the Rajasthan State was expected at any time, it would have been quite possible to publish the impugned Acts in an Extraordinary Gazette of the 6th of April immediately after the assent of His Highness had been obtained. We, therefore, see no force in this contention.

7. Then it is said that the Gazette Extraordinary, in which the impugned Acts were published, bears No. 96 (a). The Gazette Extraordinary bearing No. 96 is dated 5th April, and the Gazette Extraordinary bearing No. 97 is dated the 7th of April, we are asked to infer from this that the impugned Gazette Extraordinary containing the impugned Acts was really published after 7-4-1949t as otherwise it should, in the normal course, have borne No. 97, and the Gazette Extraordinary of the 7th April should have borne No. 98. We are of opinion that this inference is not a necessary corollary from the facts. After all, Government orders are received in the Press sometime before their publication.

If, for example, the Extraordinary Gazette of: the 7th of April was printed on the 6th of April, as it may very well have been, and if the Press-received an urgent order on the 6th to publish the impugned Acts on that very day, it could only bring out the Gazette Extraordinary containing thes as No. 96 (a), as it would not change the number that was given to the Gazette Extraordinary of the 7th of April. We are, therefore, not prepared to accept that merely because the Extraordinary Gazette containing the impugned Acts bore No. 96(a), it must have been issued after 7-4-1949.

8. Then it was urged that the impugned Acts were ultra vires because they were not passed in accordance with the Jodhpur Government Act of 1947, and the proclamation of His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur, dated 31-8-1948. The argument is that though the Legislature of Jodhpur was not actually sitting on 6-4-1949, it had neither been prorogued nor dissolved, and therefore the two impugned Acts could not have been submitted for the assent of the Ruler, and could not be passed into law in that manner. It is submitted that His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur could only pass ordinance under Section 31 of the Jodhpur Government Act, 1947, and could not pass permanent legislation of this kind.

The Jodhpur Government Act of 1947 became law in that year. In Chapter III of the, there, was provision for the legislature. Later, however, His Highness the Maharaja issued a proclamation on 31-8-1948. By that proclamation he appointed a coalition ministry consisting of a President and a Council of Ministers which were to be responsible for the entire administration of the State; It was also provided that the Council of Ministers would function pending the inauguration of a fully democratic Constitution framed by the Constitution making body based on adult franchise.

Then comes the following paragraph which may be quoted:

"Until the formation of the Constituent Assembly, which will also act as a legislature, the provisions of the Government of Jodhpur Act, 1947, relating to the Jodhpur State Legislative Assembly and such other provisions of the said Act as are inconsistent with this proclamation, shall remain inoperative."

9. Learned counsel for the applicant urges that this proclamation itself was beyond the powers of His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur, and relies on Section 6 of the Government of Jodhpur Act in this connection. That section to our mind does not support this conclusion. It says that all sovereign powers, legislative, executive and judicial, and sovereign authority and jurisdiction appertaining or incidental to the State and the Government are hereby declared to be and to have always been possessed and retained and exercisable by His Highness the Maharaja. This provision clearly shows that sovereignty was retained by the Maharaja. Then follow the following words:

"nothing, except in so far as in this Act provided, shall affect or be deemed to have affected the sovereign right and prerogative of His Highness to make laws and issue proclamations, orders and ordinances by virtue of all such sovereign authority."

These words clearly show that His Highness was voluntarily limiting his sovereign powers so long as he allowed the Government of Jodhpur Act, 1947, to continue; but his power to abrogate the Government of Jodhpur Act, 1947, still remained with him under the first part of the section, and we cannot accept the contention that he had no power to abrogate the Government of Jodhpur Act, 1947, when we find that he had reserved all sovereign authority in himself by Section 6 of the. Therefore, it was open to him to suspend the Government of Jodhpur Act, or any part thereof in exercise of his sovereign authority. This is what he actually did by the proclamation of 31-8- 1948, to which we have referred, and which was published in the Jodhpur Government Gazette Extraordinary, Vol. 83, No. 89, dated 31-8-1948. He had, therefore, full power to suspend any part of the Government of Jodhpur Act, 1947, and we now turn to see what parts he had suspended by this proclamation.

10. We have already quoted the paragraph relative to the legislative assembly. By that paragraph, that part of the Government of Jodhpur Act which related to the Jodhpur State Legislative Assembly, was suspended. That part, in our opinion, is Chapter III dealing with the legislature. The legislature1 was to consist, under Section 16, of His Highness the Maharaja, and a chamber to be known as the Jodhpur State Legislative Assembly. The remaining provisions of Chapter III from Sections 17 to 51 all deal with the powers of the legislative assembly and certain supplemental provisions in case that assembly was not sitting.

Section 31 is a section which provides that when the assembly is not in session, and it is necessary to pass any law, the Government may frame the law and pass it after getting the assent of His Highness the Maharaja. Such law would be in force for a period of six months or if the period is extended for another six months, and may be terminated at any time by His Highness the Maharaja, provided that when the Assembly next meets the Government shall place the law before the Assembly so that it may be passed therein.

Now this section could only apply when the provisions relating to the Jodhpur State Legislative Assembly remained in force; but in his proclamation of 3lst August, His Highness the Maharaja said that all the provisions relating to the Jodhpur legislative assembly would remain inoperative. There was, therefore, no case for exercising powers under Section 31, and what happened was that, after 31-8-1948, the restriction, which the Maharaja had put on himself about legislation by Chapter 111 of the Government of Jodhpur Act, was done away with. He, therefore, had full powers to pass any law, and the provisions of Chapter III of the Government of Jodhpur Act would not apply to such exercise of power by him. We, therefore, see no force in the contention that the impugned Acts are invalid because they do not comply with the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Government of Jodhpur Act,. 1947.

11. The next point, that is urged, is that all the actions of the Settlement Officer were invalid as no rules had been prescribed under the Land Revenue Act. In particular, it was urged that as no rules had been prescribed under Section 81(1)(d) of the Land Revenue Act, the fixing of rent rates was illegal. Reference in this connection may be made to Section 2(2) of the Land Revenue Act, which says that all previous rules, notifications and orders relating to matters for which provision may be made by rules, notifications or orders under this Act, shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions thereof, continue in force as if they had been made or issued under this Act.

It is not denied that there were previous rules relating to settlement operations in Marwar.. Therefore, Section 2(2) continued those previous rules except where they were inconsistent with the. As to Section 81(1)(d), which prescribes publication of rent rates in such manner as may be prescribed, it is urged that no rules were prescribed indicating, the manner in which rent rates should be published, and that the old rules also did not prescribe any such manner. It may be accepted that the old rules did not prescribe anything about publication of rent rates. It is admitted that no new rules were made for this purpose. But the mere fact that certain rules were not made would not make the publication of the rent rates irregular, or the rent rates sanctioned after due publication invalid, what Section 81(1)(d) requires is that the rent rates should be published. That is a mandatory provision. The manner, in which these rent rates should be published, is merely directory, and the provision as to making of rules Is only an enabling provision. If no rules are prescribed, it would be the duty of the Settlement Officer to see that rent rates are published in such manner as, in his opinion, will carry out the object of the legislature. That object was to give publicity to the rent rates, so that jagirdars and tenants, or all those who are interested in the fixing of rent rates, may have information.

It is not the applicants case that they had no information of the rent rates intended to be applied. They obviously had information and had objected, as provided by Section 81(1)(e). The absence, therefore, of any rules prescribing the manner of publication, when it is not disputed that the rates were published and the applicants had knowledge of them, would not invalidate the subsequent proceedings. We, therefore, hold that there is nothing in this objection.

12. Then it is urged that the Settlement Officer did not follow the mandatory provisions of Section 81 and did not inspect every village in the local area and divide the local area into soil-classes and assessment circles, and further that he did not follow the criteria prescribed in Section 82 of the Land Revenue Act in arriving at the rent rates. The reply of the State to this objection is that the provisions of Sections 81 & 82 were fully complied with, and that reply, in our opinion, concludes the matter. In these extraordinary proceedings, we cannot turn ourselves into an appellate court in respect of the proceedings before a settlement officer. We have no reason not to accept the affidavit of the State that the provisions of Sections 81 and 82 were complied in fixing rent rates. There is no force, therefore, in this contention either.

13. Then it is urged that so far as the petitioner knew neither the Revenue Board, under Section 81(3),, nor the Government, under Section 83, had approved and sanctioned the proposals of the settlement officer. The affidavit of the State in reply to this is that the Revenue Board had approved of the proposals, and the Government had sanctioned them. This, in our opinion, finishes these objections.

14. The other minor grounds, that appear in the applications, were not pressed before us, and it is unnecessary to deal with them.

15. We now come to the main point urged on behalf of the applicant, namely that the Government of Jodhpur had no right to pass any legislation after 30-3-1949, and therefore the two impugned Acts, as they were passed on 6-4-1949, were invalid. Reliance is placed on Article 10(3) of the Covenant constituting the United State of Rajas-than, read with Article 3(5) and (8). Article 10(3) is as follows;

"Until a Constitution so framed comes into operation after receiving the assent of the Raj Pramukh, the legislative authority of the United State shall vest in the Raj Pramukh, who may make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good Government of the State or any part thereof, and any Ordinance so made shall have the like force of law as an Act passed by the legislature of the United State."

Later, there was an amendment of this Article, but that related only to the period up to which the Rajpramukh would have the authority to legislate, and is immaterial for our purposes.

16. The argument of the applicants runs thus--They say that Article 10(3) conferred power on the Rajpramukh to pass laws for the United State of Rajasthan. Article 3(5) provided that the Ruler of Jaipur would be the first President of the Council of Rulers, and shall enter upon the duties of his office on 30-3-1949, while Article 3(8) provided that the President of the Council of Rulers shall be the Raj Pramukh of the United State. Therefore, it is urged that as the Rajpramukh took office on 30-3-1949, he was immediately clothed with legislative authority over the whole of the United State of Rajasthan, and the Government of Jodhpur had no legislative authority left thereafter. Reliance is placed in support of this argument on --State of Saurashtra v. Bholanath Jatashankar AIR 1952 Sau 49.

16a. The reply to this argument is that, under Article 6(2) of the Covenant, it was provided that the Ruler of each new Covenanting State, which included Jodhpur, shall, not later than 7-4-1949, make over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh, and thereupon all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertain or are incidental to the Government of the Covenanting State shall vest in the United State and shall thereafter be exercisable only as provided by this Covenant or by the Constitution to be framed thereunder. The Ruler of Jodhpur handed over the administration of his State on 7-4-1949, and it was thereafter that the rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler of Jodhpur vested in the United state and became exercisable only as provided in the covenant. Therefore, the Ruler of Jodhpur had authority to make laws I up to 6-4-1949, and as these impugned Acts were passed on 6-4-1949, they were valid.

17. In -- AIR 1952 Sau 49 (A), mentioned above, the court held that though the administration of Wadhwan State was handed over to the Raj Pramukh on 16-3-1948, legislative authority over the whole State passed to the Raj Pramukh from 1-2-1948, the date on which he entered upon the duties of his office by virtue of Article 9(3) of the Covenant. It may be mentioned that Article 9(3) of the Saurashtra Covenant corresponds exactly with Article 10(3) of the Rajasthan Covenant. It was, therefore, held that certain rules passed by the Ruler of Wadhwan, after 1-2-1948, but before 16-3-1948, were invalid, as the Ruler had no legislative powers.

This case certainly supports the submission of learned counsel for the applicants, and stress has been laid by the learned Judges of the Saurashtra High Court on the absence of the words subject to the provisions of this Covenant from their Article 9(3) (equal to our Article 10(3)), and their presence in their Article 8 (equal to our Article 9) which provides for exercise of executive authority of the United State. It was, therefore, held that their Article 9(3) conferred legislative powers on the Raj Pramukh on the day he entered upon the duties of his office, as it was not subject to the other provisions of the Covenant.

Reference was made by the learned Judges to Article 6 of their Covenant, which corresponds to Article 6 of our Covenant. But it was held that the making over of the administration, of the various states naturally took some time, and during that time the Rulers of the States were merely in the position of caretakers, and were to run the day to day administration till the actual handing over of the administration to the Raj Pramukh.

18. With great respect to the learned Judges, we feel that this interpretation of Article 6 is not justified, and it cannot be said that the Rulers were merely care-takers between 30-3-1949, and 7-4-1949, when the actual administration was handed over. We are of opinion that Article 10(3) merely provides for exercise of legislative authority by the Raj Pramukh. It does not lay down the date from which the legislative authority would be exercised, and we have to find the date from the other provisions of the Covenant. The Raj Pramukh derived his authority, both legislative and executive, from the Rulers, and this could only be from the date on which the administration of a particular State was handed over to the Rajpramukh. Article 6(2) clearly shows that it was only upon the handing over of the administration that the rights, authority and jurisdiction, belonging to the Ruler, vested in the United State, and were exercisable as provided in the Covenant.

19. Article 6(2)(a) of the Vindhya Pradesh Covenant which was exactly similar to our Article 6(2)(a), came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in -- Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pra., : AIR 1953 SC 394 (B), & the learned Judges, while dealing with the legislative authority of the Raj Pramukh, observed as follows at page 403-

"The Authority of the Rajpramukh .... is not only the unfettered legislative authority "to make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good Government of the united States or any part thereof" vested in him by Article 9 (which corresponds to our Article 10) of the integration Covenant dated 18-3-1948, but also that which is vested in him under Article 6 (which corresponds to Article 6 of our Covenant) of the said agreement. This Article vests in him "all rights, authority, & jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler of each Covenanting State and incidental to the Government thereof."

The learned Judges then went on to point out that the State of Rewa in particular had the power to pass extra-territorial laws to a certain extent, and that power was not, in any way, curtailed either by the integration covenant or the Instrument of Accession.

It is clear therefore that Article 6(2)(a) contemplates both legislative and executive authority, and this authority passed to the Raj Pramukh only when the administration of the State was handed over, and thereafter the Raj Pramukh was the sole authority to pass laws under Article 10(3). But before the State was handed over all legislative authority and jurisdiction remained in the Ruler who could pass laws up to the date of handing over. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Rulers were mere care-takers looking after the day to day administration after 30-3-1949.

20. The absence of the words subject to the provisions of this Covenant in Article 10 is clearly explicable as those words were not necessary in that Article. Article 9, where they appear, provides for the exercise of executive authority, and such exercise must be subject to the legislative authority vested in the Raj Pramukh by Article 10, if not in any other manner. But the legislative authority vested in the Rajpramukh by Article 10 was unfettered at the time when the Covenant was passed, and it only came to be fettered with the passing of the Constitution of India. The absence, therefore, of these qualifying words from Article 10 does not necessarily mean that Article 6(2)(a) was not applicable to the exercise of legislative authority by the Raj Pramukh so far as the date from which it was to arise.