GITA MITTAL, J.

(1) Smt. Raj rani gupta and shri gurdip singh madhok brought a suit for perpetual injunction, praying for restraining the municipal corporation of delhi, defendant no. L, by a decree of perpetual injunction from demolishing any part of the structures existing on the properties situated at khasra no. 452, village khirkee, tehsil mehrauli, new delhi (hereinafter referred to as the "suit land)- the plaintiff further prayed for decree of perpetual injunction against the dda, arrayed as defendant no. 2, for restraining it from dispossessing the plaintiffs from the afore-stated suit land. The claim of the plaintiffs was based on the plea that they were entered as a bhoomidars in the revenue record; they had constructed a residential dwelling unit on the suit land in the year 1988 and were living therein since then; that suddenly on 5th march, 1990 some officials of the defendants came to the site and started demolishing properties in the village in the vicinity of the plaintiffs and threatened to demolish the plaintiffs' property and dispossess them without any notice under section 343 of the delhi municipal corporation act and without notice to show cause under the delhi development act. The plaintiffs challenged the authority and the jurisdiction of the defendants to do so alleging that the suit land did not belong to either of the defendants. The plaintiffs also challenged the jurisdiction of the two statutory authorities and applicability of the delhi municipal corporation act, 1957 on the plea that m. C. D. Was not providing civic amenities to them and of the delhi development authority that the land did not fall in the development area of the dda.

(2) Based on these allegations the suit came to be filed on the original side of this court on 7th march, 1990. By an ex parte order of injunction dated 8th march, 1990, the learned single judge directed maintenance of status quo in respect of property in the suit till further orders.

(3) It appears that as a result of the amendment to section 5 sub-section 2 of the delhi high court act 1966 as amended by the delhi high court (amendment) act, 1991, on account of the valuation of the reliefs sought sought in the plaint in the present case being betow rs. 5 lacs, the case was transferred to the district court, delhi.

(4) It is noteworthy that plaintiff no. 2 shri gurdip singh madhok expired during the pendency of the case. The plaintiff. No. 1 smt. Raj rani gupta filed an application under order 22 rule 2 cpc for deleting his name and to proceed with the suit as the sole plaintiff. The learned trial judge dismissed this application vide order dated 12th august, 2002 holding that the right to sue does not survive with the plaintiff no. 1.

(5) On the same date, the learned trial judge framed two preliminary issues which are as hereunder:-

"1. Whether the present suit of the plaintiffs is not maintainable in the present form Opd 2. Relief. "

(6) The matter proceeded for arguments on these two issues and resulted in the judgment and decree dated 4th october, 2002 whereby the learned trial court found against the plaintiffs on the preliminary issue no. 1. Consequently, the suit of the plaintiff came to be dismissed. This judgment and decree has been impugned by smt. Raj rani gupta, plaintiff no, 1 before us in the present appeal.

(7) Though the order framing the issue does not reflect as to the nature or ground on which the maintainability of the suit was being objected to, however the basis of the objections can be discerned from the impugned judgment and decree. It appears that the learned trial court was concerned with the pronouncement of the supreme court of india in the case titled shiv kumar chadha vs. Mcd reported at 1993 vol. 3 scc 161. In this case, the bar contained in section 347-e of the delhi municipal corporation act whereby the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain any suit application or other proceedings in respect of any order or notice appealable under section 343 or section 347-b is curtailed, was under judicial scrutiny before the supreme court. After a detailed discussion and examination of several pronouncements, the hon'ble supreme court had held as hereunder:-

"28. According to us, it cannot be urged that the provisions of the act have created any right or liability and for enforcement thereof remedy has been provided under the act itself. The act purports to regulate the common law right of the citizens to erect or construct buildings of their choice. This right existed since time immemorial. But with the urbanisation and development of the concept of planned city, regulations, restrictions, on such common law right have been imposed. But as the provisions of the act intend to regulate and restrict a common law right, and not any right or liability created under the act itself, it cannot be said that the right and the remedy have been given uno flatu e. G. "in the same breath". Most of the cases of this court referred to above related to statutes creating rights or liabilities and providing remedies at the same time. As such the principles enunciated therein, shall not be fully applicable in the present case. In spite of the bar prescribed under sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 343 and section 347-e of the corporation act over the power of the courts, under certain special circumstances, the court can examine, whether the dispute falls within the ambit of the act. But once the court is satisfied that either the provisions of the act are not applicable to the building in question or the basic procedural requirements which are vital in nature, have not been followed, it shall have jurisdiction, to enquire and investigate white protecting the common law rights of the citizens. Can a court hold a suit to be not maintainable, although along with the plaint materials are produced to show that the building in question is not within the corporation limits, or that the constructions were made prior to coming into force of the relevant provisions of the act We are conscious of the fact that persons who make unauthorised constructions by contravening and violating the building bye-laws or regulations often run to courts, with pleas mentioned above, specially that no notice was issued or served on them, before the corporation has ordered the demolition of the constructions. 29. It is well known that in most of the cities building regulations and bye-laws have been framed, still it has been discovered that constructions have been made without any sanction or in contravention of the sanctioned plan, and such constructions have continued without any intervention. There cannot be two opinions that the regulations or bye-laws in respect of buildings, are meant to serve the public interest. But at the same time it cannot be held that in all circumstances, the authorities entrusted with the demolition of unauthorised constructions, have exclusive power, to the absolute exclusion of the power of the court. In some special cases where "jurisdictional error" on, the part of the corporation is established, a suit shall be maintainable. According to us : (1) the court should not ordinarily entertain a suit in connection with the proceedings initiated'for demolition, by the commissioner, in terms of section 343 (1) of the corporation act. The court should direct the persons aggrieved to pursue the remedy before the appellate tribunal and then before the administrator in accordance with the provisions of the said act. (2)the court should entertain a suit questioning the validity of an order passed under section 343 of the act, only if the court is of prima facie opinion that the order is nullity in the eyes of taw because of any "jurisdictional error" in exercise of the power by the commissioner or that the order is outside the act. "

(emphasis supplied)

(8) The law laid down by the supreme court was followed by this court in the judgments reported at 77 (1999) dlt 5 entitled manohar lal chatrath and another vs. Municipal corporation of delhi; 1995 ii ad (delhi)573 entitled anz grindlays bank plc. Vs. Commissioner, mcd and in the judgment reported at 2001 iii ad delhi 911 entitled prabhu dayal vs. Mcd and another. We are bound by the dicta of the supreme court. We also respectfully agree with and the aforestated pronouncements of this court.

(9) No doubt it has been held that the appellate forum under the dmc is an alternative and efficacious remedy which puts a specific bar on the civil court to entertain certain categories of suits, however such remedy is not an absolute prohibition to civil suits of every nature. It is necessary for a court to examine as to whether a plaint laid before it along with materials produced on record falls within the mischief which has been sought to be remedied in the categories laid down by the supreme court of india.

(10) The present case appears to be a classic instance of the suit referred to by the hon'ble supreme court of india where constructions are raised without any intervention or compliance of legal provisions. Protection of court is sought by injunction in order to perpetuate the illegality. The trial court records have been produced before us and we have been taken through the same with assistance of the learned counsel for the parties. We find that the plaint is in a cyclostyled proforma with the names of the plaintiff and the khasra number where the property is stated to have been situated filled in. There is no document supporting any of the contentions raised by the plaintiff filed atongwith the plaint. No material, showing that the jurisdiction of the defendants was ousted, is forthcoming on record. The plaintiff has filed a single photo copy of a property tax to receipt in order to support its claim of occupation. The reliance on a receipt purportedly issued by the municipal corporation of delhi itself tantamounts to an admission of the defendant no. 1-mcd having jurisdiction over the suit property. Even this receipt does, not show the extent of construction, if any. Construction raised only in accordance with law can be protected further. There is not even a whisper in the plaint of the manner in which the plaintiff acquired title or possession over the suit property nor any document placed on record. A photo copy of the document purporting to be a khasra girdawari has been filed. This photo copy does not show the year to which it relates nor supports the contentions of the plaintiffs that they were in possession as owner or that any construction existed on the suit property or its legality. Bald assertions of title, possession and prior construction unsupported by any material whatsoever are of no consequence in the eyes of law. Similarly bald pleas of alleged illegalities on the part of the statutory authorities are of no avail to a plaintiff inasmuch as, following the pronouncement in shiv kumar (supra), the court is required to scrutinise and examine the material as well as the pleas raised in order to see prima facie sustainability of the contentions made by the plaintiff.

(11) We may test also the pleas raised on behalf of the defendant as the suit would fail on this count as well. The mcd has stated on record that it had proposed no action in the year 1990 and that it has issued a show cause notice in the year 1995. From this plea, it is also apparent that the plaintiff has no cause of action for bringing the suit in the year 1990 and was merely putting up a bogey of proposed demolition action on the part of the mcd. Despite the plea of the mcd of having issued a show cause notice and proceeded in accordance with law in the year 1995, the plaintiff does not appear to have taken any action in respect of the same before the appellate tribunal. This action was obviously after the filing of the suit and as such is not subject matter of the plaint. The plaintiff has not impugned this action in any appropriate proceedings.

(12) In the instant case the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case in support of its claim. It has placed no material on record to oust the jurisdiction of mcd or the dda. There is no material whatsoever placed on record to show existence of construction. The plaintiff has neither averred nor placed on record any material also to prima facie show, let alone conclusively establish, the validity or legality or the extent of its construction. We may also notice that it is settled law that, in any event, relief of injunction shall not be issued merely on the making out of a legal point. [ (re: air 1997 sc 1326 (para 10) ramniklal n. Bhutta vs. State of maharashtra)].

(13) An objection as to the maintainability of a pleading, which does not require examination of depositions is in the nature of a demurrer. Such objection relates to the form and a substance of the pleading, is apparent on its face and does not require any further material to be looked at. It relates to an objection in a point of law. In order to decide such a plea it assumes as true the facts lodged by the other party and declares that those facts are not sufficient to raise the legal inference or to afford ground of relief, for which the other party contends. A demurrer merely declares that that party's own allegations are insufficient to support the contention which it puts forward. Such objections include defendants' objection that opponents pleading disclose no cause of action or grounds or defence as the case may be. (re: halsbury's law of england iiird edn. Vol. 30 page 17 para 35); 1969 (3) all er 1537.

(14) In the instant case the question which was raised by the learned trial, judge as a preliminary issue was not in the nature of a mere objection in law raised by the other party. In view of the dictum of the supreme court of india in shiv kumar chadha's case, the court is required to scrutinise no only the plaint but also the materials produced with it in order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether or not the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred. For this reason we have examined the entire material placed before the learned trial judge for the purposes of adjudication of the issue raised.

(15) So far as the plea of the defendant that the land was not the subject matter of acquisition inasmuch as the acquisition resorted to delhi administration had been quashed by the division bench of this court in respect of 13 villages including village khirki is concerned, we may point out that the same is now the subject matter of authoritative pronouncements of the hon'ble supreme court of india in the cases reported at 2000 (7) scc 296 entitled delhi administration vs. Gurdip singh uban. The plaintiff has not contended that it had objected to the proposed acquisition and, therefore, does not fall within the exclusion provided by the supreme court of india in the afore stated case. We have commented on this aspect of the matter in view of the authoritative pronouncements by the hon'ble supreme court of india on this aspect by which we are bound.

(16) Therefore, we are unable to agree with the contentions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. We find no merit in the appeal which is hereby dismissed.