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Raj Kumari Amrit Kaur v. Maharani Deepinder Kaur

Raj Kumari Amrit Kaur v. Maharani Deepinder Kaur

(High Court Of Punjab And Haryana)

Civil Revision No. 4212 of 1997 | 08-10-2001

V.K. Jhanji, J.

1. This order will dispose of Civil Revision No. 4212 and 4306 of 1997 as both have arisen out of order dated August 30, 1997 passed by Senior Sub Judge, Chandigarh whereby Plaintiffs have been directed to first correctly assess the market value of the suit property and then make up deficiency in court fee. Question of law and facts involved in both these civil revisions are common. Facts have been taken from Civil Revision No. 4212 of 1997.

2. Raja Harinder Singh Brar Bans Bahadur was the ruler of erstwhile Faridkot State. He had three daughters and one son. Raja Harinder Singh died on 16.10.1989 whereas his only son, namely, Tikka Harmohinder Singh died on 13.10.1981 i.e. during his life time. Raja Harinder Singh allegedly executed Will dated 1.6.1982 whereby he is purported to have created a Trust known as Maharwai Khewaji Trust to be managed by the Trustees named in the said Will. Plaintiff who is daughter of Raja Harinder Singh filed the present suit challenging the Will in question on the ground that the same is a result of misrepresentation, undue influence and is fictitious, not made voluntarily and one Baljinder Pal Singh Brar, Advocate who is one of the attesting witnesses to the Will, exercised undue influence upon Raja who also left out Maharani Mohinder Kaur, his mother who was alive at the time of execution of the Will. It is further alleged that the Will is shrouded by suspicious circumstances and is most unnatural. Raja who was Jat Sikh by caste was governed by Hindu Succession Act, 1956 after the merger of the State in the Union of India.

3. It is not necessary for me to go into the various grounds attacking the Will and creation of Trust because the short question for adjudication before me is with regard to the quantum of court fee leviable on the claim set up in the plaints.

4. In the suit filed by Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, she has claimed the following reliefs:

1. issue a decree or declaration to the effect that the Plaintiff is the owner to the extent of l/3rd share in the properties, the details whereof are given in Annexure I and that the Plaintiff is deemed to be in joint possession of the said properties along with Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and such consequential relief as may be necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice;

2. Issue a decree of declaration that the alleged Will of His Highness the Raja of Faridkot is invalid, void and unenforceable and that accordingly the purported Maharwai Khewaji Trust is illegal and any action taken by it was and is void ab initio;

3. In the alternative, if this Honble Court holds that the Will of Late Raja of Faridkot is valid, issue a decree of declaration that the alleged Meharwal Khewaji Trust is illegal as being in perpetuity, and or contrary to the provisions of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 and or any other law in force;

4. Issue a decree of declaration that the trustees of the purported Meharwal Khewaji Trust are personally liable for all their actions executed whilst perpetuating the fraudulent/illegal trust and are liable to account for any and alt amounts howsoever had and received or spent in their capacities as trustees;

5. Issue a decree of declaration to the effect that any and all transactions and or conveyance executed by the alleged Meharwal Khewaji Trust are liable to be set aside;

6. In the alternative, if this Honble Court holds that the law of primogeniture and or the Raja of Faridkots Estate Act, 1948 are applicable, issue a decree of declaration to the effect that the Plaintiff is the owner to the extent of 100% share in the properties, the details whereof are given in Annexure-1 along with such consequential relief as may be necessary in the facts ad circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice;

7. Restrain the Defendants from alienating, mortgaging, transferring, leasing, encumbering, exchanging, or in any manner charging the suit properties or transferring possession of such properties.

5. During the pendency of suits, Defendants Filed an application for rejection of the plaint on the ground of non payment of proper court fee. In the application, it was inter-alia contended that the suit properties involved are worth several crores of rupees and the suit is not simpliciter for declaration but consequential reliefs have also been claimed whereon the court fee is leviable on the market value of the property.

6. Upon contest, trial Court held that the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction and the Plaintiff is required to first assess the market value of the suit property correctly and then make up the deficiency in court fee. Against the said order, present civil revisions have been filed.

7. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff contended that the Plaintiff is in joint possession of the property and she has claimed simpliciter declaration regarding deemed joint possession by way of present suit and that Defendants in their written statement have admitted that property known as Fairy Cottage (Country Club) situated in Bir Chahal. Tehsil and District Faridkot, Flat No. 32 Rivera Apartment, The Mall, Delhi and one another property stand vested in a declaratory Trust known as Faridkot Ruling Family Housing Trust created by the later owner Col. Sir Harinder Singh Brar bans Bahadur KCSI and the beneficiaries of this Trust are all the three daughters of the settlers and the said properties are in possession of the beneficiaries. He contended that in view of this admission, Defendants stand precluded from agitating that the Plaintiff is out of possession of the properties and require to pay court fee on the market value of the properties in dispute so as to seek possession thereof in view of judgment of this Court in case Gurjivan v. Jagar-Singh etc., : (1990)97 PLR 261. He further contended that the suit is merely for declaration and the injunction, if any, claimed is an independent relief and not the consequential one flowing from the declaration sought and thus Plaintiffs cannot be asked to pay court fee. He also contended that it was not possible for the trial Court at a preliminary stage to determine the value of the reliefs sought in the plaint. In this regard, he has placed reliance on M/s. Commercial Aviation and Travel Company and Ors. v. Mrs. Vimla Pannalal.2 : AIR 1988 SC 1636 [LQ/SC/1988/322] and Kesho Mahton and Ors. v. Ayodhya Mahton and others,3 : AIR 1983 Pat 67 [LQ/PatHC/1982/122] , Daljit Singh v. Joginder Singh,4 : AIR 1985 P & H 184. BPC etc. v. Sat Parkash etc., 1992 PLJ 220 and Kaushiklal Nanalal Parikh etc. v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and others, : AIR 1995 Guj 115 [LQ/GujHC/1994/154] to contend that question of treating the issue of court fee as preliminary does not arise because it is a mixed question of law and facts and can only be proved after leading evidence along with other issues. He further contended that the trial Court while passing the impugned order has not indicated as to what is the value of suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction and what amount of court fee is deficient and as such the matter is required to be remanded to the trial Court for redetermination of the issue in regard to the value for the purpose of court fee and the court fee leviable thereon.

8. On the other hand. Mr. Sarin appearing on behalf of the Defendants contended that the present civil revision is not maintainable in view of Mahant Sunder Dass Chela Mahant, Arjan Dass v. Gurpartap Das alias Gurpartap Singh, (1978)80 PLR 21. He further contended that the suit in the present case is not for mere declaration but is one for consequential relief also and as such court fee under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Punjab Court Fee Act is leviable on the Memorandum of Suit. In this regard, he placed reliance on Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Parshad and Ors. 1973 SC 2384, [LQ/SC/1973/224] Labh Singh and Ors. v. Puran Singh (deceased), (1978)80 PLR 28, Hukam Singh and Ors. v. Mussammat Gian Devi and others, Recorded Civil judgment No. 87 (1916), Bura Mal v. Tulsi Ram 1927 Lah 890. Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh : (1998)119 PLR 417 [LQ/PunjHC/1998/441] . and Ranjit Singh and Ors. v. Balkar Singh and Ors., (2000)125 PLR 382 because in such suits cancellation of the document is necessary to be sought which falls within the definition ofconsequential relief.

9. Section 7 of the Court Fee Act deals with computation of court fee payable in certain suits. Sub-section (iv) of said section reads under;-

(iv) in suits-

(a) for moveable property of no market value.- for moveable property where the subject matter has no market value, as, for instance, in the case of documents relating to title,

(b) to enforce a right to share in joint family property.- to enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property,

(c) for a declaratory decree and consequential relief - to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed.

(d) for injunction - to obtain an injunction.

(e) for easements - for a right to some benefit (not herein otherwise provided for) to arise out of land, and

(f) for accounts. - for accounts,

according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.

In all such suits the Plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought for:

Provided that minimum court fee in each case shall be (thirteen rupees)

Provided further that in suits coming under Sub-section (c), in cases where the relief sought is with reference to any property such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by Clause (v) for this section.

Sub-section (v) of Section 7 of the Court Fee Act reads as under:

(v) for possession of lands, houses and gardens.- in suits for the possession of land, houses and gardens-according to the value of the subject-matter; and value shall be deemed to be-where the subject-matter is land, and -

(a) where the land forms an entire estate or a definite share of an estate paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such an estate and is recorded in the collectors register as separately assessed with such revenue and such revenue is permanently settled-ten times the revenue so payable.

(b) where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid: and such revenue is settled, but not permanently (ten) times the revenue so payable;

(c) where the land pays no such revenue or has been partially exempted from such payment, or is charged with any fixed payment in lieu of such revenue

and net profits have arisen from the land during the year next before the date of presenting the plaint-

fifteen times such net profits:

but where no such net profits have arisen therefrom-the amount at which the Court shall estimate the land with reference to the value of similar land in the neighbourhood;

(d) where the land forms part of an estate paying revenue to Government, but is not a definite share of such estate and is not separately assessed as above mentioned-the market value of the land.

11. It is the allegation in the plaint that determines the court fee payable in a suit. The nature of the suit is determined by the plaint and the plaint alone, and the court fee has to be paid on the determination and scope of it. It is not to be determined upon the pleas taken by the Defendant in his written statement. The main test is what is sued for because the word used is suit and the test has reference to what is asked for in the plaint and not to any question or dispute that may arise upon any pleadings of the Defendant. The application of any particular clause of court fee depends upon the substance of the plaint and not on mere word used in the plaint and further nothing should be imported into the plaint which it does not contain actually or by necessary implication. Plaintiff has every right to insist that the court fee should be assessed on the basis of which he has framed his plaint although there might be room for suspicion that the plaint has been so drafted as to avoid inconvenient facts and payment of higher court fee. Reference in this regard may be made to law laid down by Honble Supreme Court in case 5. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, : AIR 1958 SC 245 [LQ/SC/1957/131] wherein it was held that the question of court fees must be considered in the light of allegations made in the plaint and its decision cannot be influenced either by he pleas raised in the written statement or by the final decision of the suit on merits.

12. If the first argument raised by Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff that Defendants have admitted in written statement that Plaintiff is in joint possession of some property is examined in the light of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred to judgment, then that argument fails simply on the ground that no substance can be attached to the admission made in the written statement in regard to possession and quantum of court fee has to be strictly assessed as per claim set up in the paint. In the plaint, it is not where stated that the Plaintiff is in joint possession of any property. Thus, the relief claimed in regard to deemed joint possession is nothing else but a consequential relief flowing form the declaration sought in regard to the Will being a fictitious document having been obtained by misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence.

13. The claim set up in the plaint is clearly one for declaration with consequential relief of joint possession and also for injunction. The consequential reliefs set up are neither superfluous nor ancillary but directly flows from the declaration. The argument of Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff that these claims are independent and have been properly valued, is thus not tenable. Only those claims which do not flow from each other are termed as independent claim. In the present suit, so long as declaration in regard to the Will whereby a Trust has been created, is not granted in favour of the Plaintiff, Defendants cannot be restrained as prayed for nor the Plaintiff can be deemed to be in joint possession in her individual capacity.

14. The question of cancellation of such documents has arisen time and again and this Court from time to time, in such suits where declaration for avoiding any document is sought, has held that suits containing consequential relief of avoiding such documents, court fee is leviable under Section 7(iv)(c) of Court Fee Act. Similar question had come up for consideration before Full Bench of Lahore High Court in case Mt. Zeb-Ul-Nisha and Ors. v. Chaudhary Din Mohammad and Ors.,15 : AIR 1941 Lah 97 wherein dispute was with regard to cancellation of sale deed made by Karta of the family. In that case, Honble Full Bench held that if the alienation of joint family property is effected by a manager of Joint Hindu Family, for such an alienation is binding on the other members of the family (even if they are not party to it) and if a co-parcener sues for declaration that such an alienation is null and void, the declaration must be held to include consequential relief similarly, this Court in case Iqbal Kaur and Ors. v. Chanan Singh and Ors.,16 1978 RLR 62 and Joginder Singh and Ors. v. Major Singh,17 (1983)85 PLR 225 [LQ/PunjHC/1982/339] has held that in such suits court fee is leviable under Section 7(iv)| (c). The claim set up in the present suit if examined in light of the judgment of Full Bench and the judgments rendered by this Court in the above referred to cases, it is evident that the present suit is not simpliciter suit for declaration, joint possession and injunction but the one which falls under Section 7(iv(c) of the Court Fee Act and court fee on the memorandum of suit is leviable as provided under Section 7(v) of the.

15. In this view of the matter, I do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment. The question raised by Mr. Sarin that the present civil revision is not maintainable, is not necessary to be gone into.

16. At this stage, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff urged that his client may be allowed to amend the plaint so as to omit the consequential reliefs claimed by her, In this regard, he moved civil miscellaneous application No. 15829-CII-2001 filing therewith copy of the amended plaint. Mr. Sarin opposed the said application saying that simpliciter suit for declaration will not be maintainable. Without going into the question whether the suit would be maintainable or not, it is stated that Plaintiff is always at liberty to move application for amendment of plaint and omit any of the relief claimed by her at any stage by making a prayer to the trial Court in this regard. I have no manner of doubt that if such an application is made to the trial Court, it shall allow the Plaintiff to amend his plaint and in that eventuality Defendants shall also have an opportunity to file written statement to the amended plaint by taking all defences available to them including the one that suit has not been property valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction On completion of the pleadings, trial Court shall frame an issue in regard to sufficiency of court fee leviable on the memorandum of suit and decide the same on merits along with other issues after affording the parties to lead evidence in support of the same.

The present civil revision are disposed of in the terms indicated above.

Advocate List
  • For Petitioner : Mr. H.S. Mattewal with Mr. B.R. Gupta
  • Mr. S.S. Saran
  • For Respondent : Mr. M.L. Sarin, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Sweena Panmu, Mr. Chetan Mittal, Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Vikram Aggarwal
Bench
  • HON'BLE JUSTICE V.M. JAIN
Eq Citations
  • (2001) 3 PLR 808
  • 2002 (1) RCR (Civil) 284
  • 2001 (1) CivilCC (P&H)
  • 2002 (1) CivilCC 391
  • LQ/PunjHC/2001/1482
Head Note

Exports and Imports — Incentives/Subsidy — Sales tax deferment/exemption — 1996 Policy — Non obstante clause — Effect of — Held, non obstante clause contained in R. 4-B(1) overrides provisions contained in R. 4-A, but also in R. 4(3) and (4) of 1991 Rules and, therefore, concept of incremental production cannot be invoked for granting benefit of sales tax deferment to an industrial unit like the petitioner which undertook expansion after April 1, 1996 — Further held, provisions of R. 4(3) and (4) of 1991 Rules cannot be applied by respondents to incentives granted to petitioner under 1996 Policy read with Incentive Code, 1996 and, therefore, condition embodied in certificate, annexure P2, requiring petitioner to keep separate accounts of existing unit and expansion unit is liable to be declared ultra vires to provisions of 1996 Policy and Incentive Code, 1996 — Sales Tax — Sales tax deferment/exemption — 1996 Policy — Incentives/Subsidy — Incremental production — Non obstante clause — Effect of