(1.) THIS is an appeal against the judgment and decree, dated 2-3-1979, passed by the Third Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil appeal No. 92 of 1976, in appeal preferred against the judgment and decree dated 18-1-1972 passed by the Civil Judge, Class II, Gwalior, in Civil Suit no. 229a of 1969 CO.

(2.) THE suit of the plaintiff was filed for eviction and arrears of rent of an accommodation situated on Roshni Ghar Road," Lashkar. The plaint allegations are that the plaintiff owns a house, bearing Municipal No. 418, situated in Halka No. 21. On two sides of the house, there are shops and there is a lane in between the shops. In one of the shops, one Bhaget Singh buta Singh carries his business. In the other shop, the defendant has put up a lathe machine and carries his business there. The disputed shop was given on rent to the defendant on 18-5-1966 for 11 months at the rent of Rs. 135 per month. The period for notice of eviction was fixed at one month. The rent-note is executed by the defendant and it is for 11 months. A notice for eviction was given on 24-8-1968, in which arrears of rent due were demanded by the plaintiff from the defendant. The notice dated 24-8-1968 was received by the defendant on 6-9-1968. By the notice, the tenancy was terminated from 17-10-1968 with a condition that if the defendant thinks that his tenancy comes to an end on some other date, he should treat his tenancy terminated on that date and should vacate the disputed premises. In spite of the notice, the defendant did not pay the arrears of rent and electricity charges. The rent due from 18-12-1967 to 17-11-1968 was in arrears, the amount of which comes to Rs. 1,458. Out of this amount, the defendant paid Rs. 1,080 on 9-11-1968. After deducting this amount, the amount left over is Rs. 378. As to the electricity charges, he demanded Rs. 42 along with the rent. The grounds taken by the plaintiff for eviction are that the defendant did not pay the arrears of rent within two months of the service of notice or demand on him, i. e. , to say, the ground under section 12 (a) of the Madhya Pradesh accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The second ground taken was that the defendant has broken and also demolished the flooring of the disputed shop. It is further said that because of the working of lathe machine, it has created a nuisance to the persons who live in the house, the vibrations produced by the running of the lathe machine, make it difficult for the members of the family of the plaintiff to stay in their house. It has caused a substantial damage to the house itself.

(3.) THE last ground taken was that the plaintiff wants bona fide the nonresidential accommodation which is in the possession of the defendant for having his office. The plaintiff wants an office which is up-to-date because he is a Government Supplier of heavy bulk material Coal and feed, the fodder and for keeping watch over the materials which are stocked in the open space, he bona fide needs the disputed shop to have his office. At present, he has got only one cabin in his possession, but that is not sufficient to meet the needs of the plaintiff and for his need, he has no other alternative accommodation in the City of Gwalior. It is also alleged in the plaint, but not in clear terms, that the defendant is carrying business along with some other partners who are not the tenants of the plaintiff i. e. , to say, the defendant has created sub-tenancy which is not lawful. Therefore, taking into consideration all these allegations in short the plaintiff has filed the suit for eviction on the grounds mentioned under section 12 (l) (a), 12 (I) (b), 12 (l) (c) and 12 (I) (f)of the Act.

(4.) THE defendant, in his written statement, has averred that the tenancy is a permanent one: that no amount of arrears of rent is due against him : that he has not created any nuisance as alleged by the plaintiff: that the amount of Rs. 270 which the plaintiff claims, was paid to him. As to electricity charges of Rs. 42, the defendant has deposited the amount in the trial Court within one month from the service of summons on him. As the tenancy is permanent, it cannot be terminated under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendant has not done any substantial damage to the accommodation in his possession as alleged by the plaintiff and it is in the same condition as it was when it was given to him. On rent the defendant has a lathe machine in the disputed premises and he is carrying on the business is admitted by the defendant. The lathe machine was installed with the clear understanding and permission of the plaintiff. Therefore, now he cannot have any right to complain against installation of the said machine and vibrations emanating because of the working of it. Therefore, the ground as alleged by the plaintiff, is denied. The need of the plaintiff for having an office was also denied. It was also denied that he has got a big business and it was said that the plaintiffs suit is a result of refusal by the defendant to pay the enhanced rate of rent. The plaintiff has other suitable non-residential accommodation in his possession. The allegation of creating sub-tenancy was also denied and in the end, it is submitted by the defendant that as no ground under section 12 (I) of the Act exists the suit should be dismissed.

(5.) THE learned trial Court framed the following issues:-

"1. (a) Whether the plaintiff had orally agreed to a permanent lease of the suit premises (b) If so, whether such a lease was valid and according to law 2. Whether the tenancy had not been duly determined 3. Whether the defendant failed to pay full arrears within two months of the service of notice of demand If so, effect 4. Whether the defendant was in arrears of rent amounting to rs. 1458 on 17-11-1968 5. (a) Whether the defendant had paid Rs. 270 by cheque No. 109082 dated 23-4-1968 (b) Whether the aforesaid cheque was encashed by the plaintiff through Baldevraj Sharma on 25-4-1968 from Punjab National Bank 6. (a) Whether the defendant has broken front Dasa of the suit premises on the road side and has also broken the flooring of the shop. (b) If so, whether he has thereby substantially damaged the suit property 7. (a) Whether the defendant by running his machine in the suit shop causes abnormal vibrations in the remaining portion of the house (b) If so, has he thereby created nuisance (c) If so, whether the plaintiff had acquiesced in the running of the said machine If so, effect 8. Whether the plaintiff bona fide requires the suit premises for opening his office in connection with his business if so, whether the plaintiff is not in occupation of any other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation of his own in the City of gwalior 9. Whether the plaintiff wanted to enhance the rent If so, effect 10. Whether the defendant has unlawfully sublet the suit premises 11. Whether the defendant by claiming permanent tenancy has incurred the liability for ejectment 12. Whether plaintiff is entitled to claim mesne profits 13. Relief and costs "

After taking evidence, the trial Court decreed the suit, holding that the ground under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act is proved by the plaintiff. Aggrieved by this judgment, the defendant took up the matter before the appellate Court. The learned appellate Court on 30-3-1977, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment of the trial Court. The defendant took up the matter before this Court in Second Appeal, which is numbered as 174 of 1977. This Court, by its order dated 2-9-1977, set aside the decree and judgment passed by the courts below and passed the following order :-

"shri H. C. Mishra, counsel for the appellant. Shri M. L. Gupta, counsel for the respondent. Learned counsel for the parties are heard on the question of admission. 2. Learned counsel for the respondent has no objection to the admission of the appeal the parties that the only question for decision" in this appeal, which is a substantial question of law is : "whether the Additional District Judge i. e. the lower appellate Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by not deciding the applications of the defendant appellants under Order 41, Rule 27, Civil procedure Code, dated 6*8-73, and under Order 6, Rule 17, Civil Procedure code dated 1-1-1976". It is further admitted by the learned counsel for the parties that this will have a substantial bearing on the decision of the plaintiff-respondent under section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. The learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent has further submitted that he concedes that in view of these two applications having not been decided by the learned Additional District Judge, the impugned judgment should be set aside and the case should be remanded to the lower appellate Court for deciding these two applications and redeciding the appeal in the light of the decision on these applications.

3. In view of the concession by the learned counsel for the respondent the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside and the case is sent back to the lower appellate Court with the direction that it shall redecide the appeal after hearing the parties on merits as well as the aforesaid application, namely (i) under Order 41, Rule 27 dated 6-8-1973, and (ii) under Order 6, Rule 17, dated 1-1-1976.

4. I made no order as to costs, but in view of the fact that this appeal is allowed and the case is sent back to the lower appellate Court, the Court fees paid on appeal be refunded to the appellants.

5. The parties are directed to appear before the lower appellate Court on 15th September 1977. No further notice for their appearance would be necessary. "

This Court ordered that the application filed under Order 41, Rule 27, Civil procedure Code on 6-8-1973 and another application dated 1-1-1976 under order 6, Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code, should be reconsidered and after considering these applications, the appeal should be heard on merits. I may refer to these two applications. The application dated 6-8-1973 mentioned that the portion given on rent to the defendant was vacated under a decree on 18-5-1964. The relevant execution proceedings are numbered as 14/60 and 65. The applicant wants to produce the copy of the judgment given by this court and also the report of the Nazir by which, on 7-1-1968, possession of the property under decree was given to the plaintiff-decree-holder in that case. After giving possession, the plaintiff immediately has given the disputed portion on rent on 18-5-1964, which clearly shows his mala fides.

(6.) THE second application under Order 6, Rule 17 Civil Procedure code filed by the defendant on 1-1-1976 is for adding the additional ground of defendant in his written statement. It is as under:-

That the plaintiff has, either in his name or in the name of his wife or some family member, purchased the accommodation said to have been vacated because of an ejectment decree passed in favour of Shri D. K. Jadhav along with some open land and has got built a magnificent building over it having many rooms and offices. He can use any room or the same building for his alleged office purpose, if he is at all in need of it Really the need is false and the said suit has been filed to secure higher rent and illegal benefits. "

(7.) ON 21-11-1977, the appellate Court allowed both the applications and asked the parties to amend their pleadings accordingly and it sent the case to the trial Court to take evidence on issue No. 8 and the learned Court was asked to send its findings to the appellate Court within a period of two months. The parties were directed to appear in the trial Court. The trial court took the evidence as was directed by the appellate Court and gave its finding on 22-1-1978. The finding is to the effect that "after considering the evidence produced by the parties, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff is a big contractor and for doing his business, he has bona fide need for the disputed portion. The evidence produced by the plaintiff is satisfactory to come to this conclusion and he has proved his need also. There is no other alternative non-residential accommodation in his possession. Therefore, issue No. 8 is decided in affirmative. "

(8.) AFTER getting the findings, the real controversy regarding the proceedings before the appellate Court starts.

(9.) BEFORE proceeding further, I will have to mention the finding given by the trial Court regarding issue No. 8 on 29-4-1978. The same learned judge has come to the conclusion in para 5 thatjthe plaintiff has not proved bona fides of his need. Therefore, the learned trial Court held that issue no. 8 is not proved. Why the trial Court came to this finding is clear from the order sheet dated 20-4-1978. From the order, it seems that the trial court asked the defendant to cross-examine the statement given by the plaintiff. To this, Shri M. L. Gupta replied that he has no intention to lead any evidence on behalf of his side. When certain questions, the learned court wanted to put to the plaintiff, Shri Gupta requested the Court that the Court should put questions to him because he is the counsel of the party. Again Shri Gupta requested that his right of giving rebuttal evidence be reserved. But, the Court has observed that as there is no specific order of the appellate Court, he cannot go beyond the orders passed by the appellate court. After this order and the two findings, which I have mentioned above, the file went before the appellate Court.

(10.) THE main grievance of the learned counsel for Raj Kumar is that when the trial Court gave a finding regarding issue No. 8 in his favour, the appellate Court should not have allowed Ved Prakash to lead evidence and the appellate Court should have decided the appeal on the basis of the finding given by the trial Court. Ved Prakash has filed an application before the appellate Court on 29-6-1978 in which he has said that the finding of the trial court is against the evidence produced before it and when the file was sent for recording evidence on additional issues, the defendant was not present. Therefore, the plaintiff examined himself and after examining himself as a witness, the proceedings came to an end. The examination of the plaintiff was to satisfy the trial Court prima facie and, therefore, the plaintiff could not produce all his evidence. The trial Court was in error in thinking that there will be only cross-examination on the statement given by the plaintiff and because of this interpretation put by the trial Court on the order of the appellate Court, the plaintiff could not produce his whole evidence. Therefore, it is submitted that the case be remanded to the trial Court for giving parties an opportunity to lead the evidence. This application was contested by the defendant-appellant. After considering the merits of the application, the appellate Court, on 16-11-1978, allowed the application and ordered that the Court will take evidence of both the parties and also will decide the point whether the land on which the Allahabad Bank stands is purchased by the plain tiff-respondent or by his wife. This order is hotly attacked by the learned counsel for the appellant, saying that the appellate Court was in error in taking additional evidence. But, I do not think that there is any force in the submission of the learned counsel. The powers of the appellate Court are mentioned in section 107, Civil Procedure Code. Section 107 (1) (d), Civil procedure Code is clear on this point. It gives the appellate Court power to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed. Therefore, I do not think anything illegal in the appellate Court taking- evidence of the parties. Now, we have to see what are the conditions and limitations on the powers of the appellate Court while taking additional evidence. . To know the restrictions and limitations on this power, I will have to refer to Order 41, rule 27, Civil Procedure Code. Order 41, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code is as under:-

"r. 27. Production of additional evidence in appellate Court. (i) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate court. But if- (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason fcr its admission. "

The grievance before me is that the court could have decided the case on the evidence which was taken by the trial Court and there was not any other sufficient reason to take evidence of the parties as is taken by the appellate court. But, this submission also I am not in a position to accept. It was further submitted that any other sufficient reason should be interpreted "ejusdem generis", that is to say, that the words for any other substantial cause must be read with the word requires in the beginning of the sentence, so that It is only where for any other substantial cause the appellate Court requires additional evidence, that this Rule will apply. But, this submission also, I cannot accept, because the words for any other substantial cause need not be construed in a narrower sense suggested by the doctrine of ejusdem generis, and the power to allow additional evidence may be exercised when any point is required to be cleared up in the interest of justice.

(11.) BEFORE applying these principles to the present case, I may refer to lndrachand v. Bhagwandas, 1951 N L J 454=a I R 1952 Nag. 248. The test prescribed in the said judgment for asking for additional evidence is thus:

"in admitting additional evidence the test in every case must be whether upon the state of record, as it exists, the appellate Court can pronounce a judgment. The existence of any evidence on the record is not a sine qua non for the exercise of the appellate Courts power. "

(12.) THE words any other substantial cause were considered in M s. J. C. Mills Ltd. v. Deshraj, 1958 MPLJ89=air 1959 MP 118 . [LQ/MPHC/1957/208] and this Court has observed as under:

"the principles for admission of additional evidence under Order 41, rule 27 (I) (b) are (i) that the discretion given to the appeal Court to receive and admit additional evidence is not an arbitrary one, but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitation specified in the rule, (ii) that the legitimate occasion for the application of the rule is when, on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent, not where a discovery is made, outside of the Court, of fresh evidence and the application, is made to import it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. The true test laid down in clause (b) of Order 41, Rule27 (I) is not whether any tribunal would be unable to pronounce any judgment without production of the additional evidence but whether the mind of the Appellate Judge is in such a condition on the evidence on the record that he requires any additional documents to be examined to enable him to pronounce judgment. "

(13.) THERE is one more pronouncement of this Court on the questions of admitting additional evidence in Inderan v. Ramdin, 1961 MP L J 273=a I R 1961 MP 200. [LQ/MPHC/1960/305] It lays down as under:-

"the learned counsel for the respondents opposed the appellants prayer for admission of additional evidence. In the present case, I think it necessary to allow additional evidence to be adduced in the interest of justice. In the absence of the same, no complete adjudication of the ques-tion arising in the present appeal can vbe made. It would be necessary for the Court to admit the additional evidence for the purpose of doing complete justice between the parties. There can be no doubt that where the Court feels the necessity of admitting additional evidence, the same can be allowed as observed by Mudholkar J*, in Indtachand v. Bhagwandas. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down the principles for exercising discretion to admit additional evidence in Arjansingh v. Kartar singh, AIR 1951 SC 193 [LQ/SC/1951/15] . The discretion that is being exercised by this Court is", in my opinion, in consonance with the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Therefore, I admit the additional evidence for the purpose of doing complete justice between the parties. "

(14.) AFTER going through these rulings, I have no hesitation in saying that the appellate Court was within its powers in taking additional evidence and seeing that the case may not be delayed unnecessarily, it took upon itself to record the evidence of the parties. I also do not see anything wrong in it. The trial Court, as I have already stated above, decided issue No. 8 first in favour of the plaintiff and at second time, decided it in favour of the defendant. That being the position in the case, to do justice in the case, it was the bounden duty of the appellate Court to take additional evidence and I feel nothing wrong in it. Therefore, the submission made by the learned counsel that the appellate Court exercised jurisdiction which was not vested in it by taking additional evidence, I cannot accept.

(15.) THE next submission made before me is that the property on which the Allahabad Bank stands and the building itself should be considered as an alternative accommodation and the appellate Court, after holding this, should have dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. To this, also I cannot agree. To this, the simple answer is that the property belongs to the wife of the plaintiff and it cannot be termed to be his own The bare reading of the section itself shows that the alternative accommodation should be that of the landlord himself and that is not the case here. It was not stated before me that when the registration of the sale-deed of the plot took place, plaintiff himself was present and he has taken active part in purchasing the property and getting the building of Allahabad Bank constructed. But, this is not borne out from the facts and the evidence produced in the file. The plaintiff has produced evidence to show that the plot was purchased by wife of the plaintiff and wife of the plaintiff has mortgaged the property with the Allahabad Bank. That being the case, I am of the view that it cannot be termed to be an alternative accommodation and that will not be a ground for disallowing the claim of the plaintiff.

(16.) THE next submission made before me is that there are two other shops and they were let out by the plaintiff before filing of the suit and this itself is sufficient to show that the plaintiffs need is not bona fide. I have considered this argument, but no evidence has been produced on behalf of the defendant to show that these shops in possession of the tenants really belong to the plaintiff. The alleged tenants have not been examined by the defen-dant. Neither any document is produced to substantiate the allegation made by the defendant against the plaintiff. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the allegations made by the defendant to come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has alternative accommodation in his possession, which he has let out before filing the suit cannot be accepted and this submission is rightly rejected by the appellate Court. I confirm the same.

(17.) THE other submission made before me was that the plaintiff should have proved objectively his need, that is to say, that the present cabin which is in his possession is not sufficient for him to look after his business. But this also, I am not in a position to accept. The plaintiff has given his evidence and has stated that the present cabin is not sufficient for his business and the appellate Court has believed his statement and has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has to look after his business of coal and other business. I also see nothing wrong in it. Therefore, the finding of the appellate Court, I do not think, requires any interference. I confirm the same.

(18.) THE learned counsel for the appellant submitted before me that there cannot be any decree for non-payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff. The reason, he submitted before me, is that the defendant raised a dispute as to the amount of rent due and, therefore, it was the duty of the trial Court to pass an order under section 13 (2) of the Act and to give time to the defendant to deposit the arrears. After going through the file, I see that there is a dispute by the defendant with respect to the amount of the arrears of rent and the trial Court has not passed any order under section 13 (2) of the Act. But the rent is already deposited as claimed by the plaintiff. Therefore, in my opinion, if I pass an order now in the appeal, the effect will be that as the rent is already deposited in the Court, the plaintiff will not be entitled to get possession under the decree passed on the ground of non-payment of rent, i. e. , under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act, but the counsel for the respondent did not challenge this submission very seriously and I think, correctly. Therefore, as the defendant has deposited the rent, the plaintiff will not be entitled to get possession of the disputed property on the basis of the decree passed against the defendant under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act.

(19.) ONE more point which was argued before me by the learned counsel for the appellant was that if the plaintiff really wanted to have his office in the disputed portion, then he should have constructed it when he gave up the vacant possession under the decree on 18-5-1964 from the person in whose possession the property was. On these facts as the plaintiff has immediately given on rent the disputed portion to the defendant after getting the vacant possession of it, I should hold that the need of the plaintiff is not genuine. But it is true that in eviction suit, the genuineness of the need alleged is to be seen and not the genuineness of the landlord is to be seen. A need is not a static thing. In my opinion, the need will vary from person to person, place to place and from profession to profession. The dictum which was made applicable by Thesiger L. J. in Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch DP 856. can be well applied in case of need also. It is observed therein as under :-

"whether anything is a substance or not is a question to be determined, not merely by an abstract consideration of the thing itself but in reference to its circumstances, what would be a nuisance in Belgrave square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey. "

So, the need for space to have an Office at Bada a busy locality of the town, will have to be judged with different standard from the space required for having an office at some other place like Lala-ka Bazar (another Locality of the town which is not so busy). In the present case, the plaintiff has proved his need by showing that he is a big contractor. He deals in feed and fodder and coal and the office cabin which is presently in his possession is not sufficient to meet his need. This question of fact, the appellate Court has found in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, only because he has given on rent, the portion on which the cabin stands after giving up vacant possession on 18-5-1964, it cannot be said that his need is not genuine. He has filed the present suit in the year 1968 and he- got the vacant possession on 18-5-1964. The need of the plaintiff is to be judged at the time when he has given the notice of eviction and at the time when the suit is filed. The plaintiff has filed the suit after over four years of getting possession. Therefore, only on this aspect of the case, it cannot be held that the claim of the plaintiff is not genuine. Therefore, I reject the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant. If the defendant feels that the claim of plaintiff is not genuine, even after giving possession, the defendant has enough checks against the non-genuine claim of the plaintiff under the Act.

(20.) THE last submission made before me is that the plaintiff will not be entitled to get possession of the suit accommodation unless he pays compensation to the defendant as required under section 12 (6) of the Act. It was obje objected to by the learned counsel for the respondent saying that as the appellant did not press this point before the appellate Court, he is estopped from claiming the compensation as is submitted by the learned counsel. But, I cannot accept this submission of his because payment of compensation to the tenant is a condition precedent for getting possession by the plaintiff-decree-holder and there cannot be any estoppel against law. Therefore, the plaintiff will be entitled to get possession under the decree passed against the defendant under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act when he pays or deposits in the court the compensation as mentioned in section 12 (6) of the Act to be paid to the defendant.

(21.) WHILE admitting the appeal, the following substantial points were framed for decision: -

(1) Whether there was any valid or legal ground on which the learned Additional District Judge could set aside the finding of the learned trial Court passed on 29-4-1978. (2) Whether it was the bounden duty of the learned Additional district Judge to obtain the findings of the learned trial Court before giving his findings on it. (3) Whether without making out the essential ingredients of Section 12 (1) (f) any decree for ejectment be sustained in law. (4) Whether the notice to quit is legal. (5) Whether the learned Additional District Judge could order ejectment on the ground enumerated under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P.

Accommodation Control Act without awarding compensation on the basis of standard rent as directed under Section 12 (6) of the Act, and they are answered as under:-

There was valid reason for setting aside the finding of the learned trial Court passed on 29-4-1978. I have discussed this point already. 2. It was the bounden duty of the learned Additional District Judge to do justice in the case and he was not bound by the finding of the trial court as submitted before me by the learned counsel. This point also, i have discussed in my Judgment. I need not repeat it again. 3. The appellate Court has considered the essential ingredients of section 12 (1) (f) of the Act and has given a decree for eviction after satisfying itself that the essential ingredients mentioned in Section 12 (1) (f) are satisfied by the evidence produced by the plaintiff and his statement. 4. After the judgment of the Supreme Court that in eviction cases, no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary, i feel no necessity of deciding substantial point No. 4 whether the notice to quit is legal or not. Even otherwise, I find that the notice is perfectly legal and after efflux of time mentioned in the rent note, there is no need of giving notice to quit. 5. As to issue No. 5, I have already mentioned in my Judgment that the defendant will be entitled for compensation under Section 12 (6)of the Act before handing over the possession of the disputed property. The decree being under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act, under the Act itself, the defendant is entitled to get two months time for vacating the premises, but looking to the nature of business, the defendant is carrying in the disputed non-residential accommodation, I feel that he should he given time upto 31st December, 1980 to vacate the premises.

(22.) THE result, therefore, is that I see no valid ground to allow the appeal -. It fails and is dismissed with costs subject to the conditions mentioned above, Counsels fee Rs. 150/-, if certified. Appeal dismissed.