Meredith, J.The appellant is a cashier in the Indian Nation Press upon a monthly salary of Rs. 75. He applied for adjudication as an insolvent, and on 8th June 1940, he was duly adjudicated insolvent by the learned District Judge of Patna in accordance with the provisions of Section 27, Provincial Insolvency Act. In passing the order of adjudication the learned Judge directed the appellant to pay into Court out of his salary Rs. 15 per month for one 1 year commencing from July 1940. It is this portion of the order to which the appellant objects.

2. Under the provisions of Section 28, Clause (4) of the Act all property which is acquired by or devolves on the insolvent after the date of an order of adjudication and before his discharge shall forthwith vest in the Court or receiver. This however must be read with the provisions of Clause (5) which say that "the property of the insolvent for the purposes of this section shall not include any property (not being books of account) which is exempted by the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, or by any other enactment for the time being in force from liability to attachment and sale in execution of a decree.

3. Section 60, Civil P.C., as amended by Act 9 of 1937 provides that certain specified particulars shall not be liable to attachment or sale in execution Of a decree, and amongst those particulars there are in Clause (h) "the wages of labourers and domestic servants, whether payable in money or in kind; and salary, to the extent of the first hundred rupees and one-half the remainder of such salary."

4. The appellant contends that as his salary is less than Rs. 100 the whole of it is exempt under these provisions. It is argued on behalf of the respondents that the word "salary" as used in Clause (h) of Section 60 is meant to be confined to the emoluments of labourers and domestic, servants. The clause, upon its plain wording, does not appear to me to be open to that construction, because it is clear that it makes a distinction between salary and the wages of labourers and domestic servants. In the case of wages of labourers and domestic servants, whether payable in money or in kind, it provides for the exemption of the whole. On the other hand, in the case of salary, provision is made only for the exemption of the first hundred rupees and one-half the remainder. It is clear that in this clause "salary" is distinguished from "wages," and different provisions are made with regard to each. It is not possible upon the wording of the clause to hold that by "salary" was merely meant wages of labourers and domestic servants in such cases as those wages might exceed Rs. 100.

5. Apart from the wording of the clause itself, the matter is made completely clear by the provisions of Expl. 2 to the section. The explanation is in the following terms:

In Clause (h) and (i), "salary" means the total monthly emoluments, excluding any allowance declared exempt from attachment under the provisions of Clause (1), derived by a person from his employment whether on duty or on leave.

6. In other words, there is here provided a definition of the word "salary" abused in Clauses (h) and (i). That definition by its terms clearly shows that the word "salary" as used in Clause (h) means something more than the wages of labourers and domestic servants, since there is provision for the exclusion from that term of allowances deolared exempt under the provisions of Clause (1). But for these words of exclusion therefore the word salary as defined would include all the emoluments referred to in Clause (1). Clause (1) deals with allowances forming part of the emoluments of any public officer or of any servant of a railway company or local authority. It is plain that this is something other than the wages of labourers and domestic servants, and it follows that when the word "salary" was used in Clause (h) something other than, and contrasted with, the wages of labourers and domestic servants was intended.

7. In my view Clause (h) of Section 60 read with Section 28(5), Provincial Insolvency Act, must be held to exempt the appellants salary, as it is less than Rs. 100 per month. It was not, therefore, open to the learned Judge to attach this rider to the order of adjudication. This portion of his order must therefore be set aside. In saying this I must not be taken to imply that, should the appellant, when the time comes, apply for his discharge without having made any contribution towards the discharge of his liabilities, the Court in dealing with the application will not be entitled to take into consideration the fact that he has been in receipt of a monthly salary of seventy-five rupees.

8. I would allow the appeal with costs and set aside the order directing the appellant to pay into Court Rs. 15 per month out of his salary.

Harries C.J.

I agree.