(1) Under Section 113 of the Code ot Civil Procedure the Additional District Judge of Bhagalpur has stated a case for the opinion o the High Court on the question whether the provisions of Section 48 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1 of 1951), are void and inoperative.

(2) Section 48 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts, Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1 of 1951) is in the following terms :

"48. (1) The Board, or with the previous sanction of the Board, any person interested in a religious trust may make an application to the District Judge for an order- (a) removing the trustee of such religious trust, if such trustee (i) acts in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the said trust; or (ii) defaults on three or more occasions in the payment of any amount payable under any law for the time being in force in respect of the property or income of the said trust or any other statutory charge on such property or income; or (iii) Defaults on three or more occasions in the payment of any sum payable to any beneficiary under the said trust, or in discharging any other duty imposed upon him under it; or (iv) is guilty of a breach of trust; (b) appointing a new trustee; (c) vesting any property in a trustee; (d) directing accounts and inquiries; or (e) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. (2) The order of the District Judge under Subsection (1) shall be final."

(3) The view taken by the Additional District Judge is that the provisions of Section 48 of the Act are unconstitutional because the order of the District Judge upon the application has been made final by Section 48 (2) of the Act and there is no right of appeal to the aggrieved party from the decision of the District Judge to any higher authority. When the reference was heard in this Court, Mr. C.P. Das on behalf of the opposite party supported the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge and contended that the provisions of Section 48 of the Act are ultra vires for the reason that no right of appeal is provided against the order of the District Judge to any higher judicial authority. In our opinion, the opinion expressed by the learned Additional District Judge is erroneous, and the provisions of Section 48 of Bihar Act 1 of 1951 must be held to be constitutionally valid and operative. It is true that no right of appeal is provided from the order of the District Judge made under Section 48 (1) on the application of the Board or with the previous sanction of the Board by any person interested in a religious trust. The mere fact that the Act does not provide a right of appeal to an aggrieved party is not sufficient to show that from a procedural point of view there is an unreasonable restriction imposed on the fundamental right of the trustee of a religious trust under Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. The reason is that the power of removing a trustee or appointing a new trustee under Section 48 (1) of the Act is conferred upon a high judicial officer of the status of a District Judge and not upon any executive authority. It is also to be noticed that the power of removing a trustee conferred by Section 48 (1) is not an unrestricted and; unfettered power. The statute specifies the circumstances in which the power of removal should be exercised by the District Judge. For instance, Section 48 (1) (a) provides that the power of removal may be exercised if a trustee acts in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the said trust, or defaults on three or more occasions in the payment of any amount payable under any law for the time being in force in respect of the property of the trust or any other statutory charge on such property. It is manifest, therefore, that the statute contains the principle on which the power of removal of the trustee can be exercised, and, as we have already said, the power is to be exerciesd by an officer of the rank of a District Judge. We, therefore, hold that in the context of the object and purpose of the Act the absence of the provision of the right of appeal against the order of the District Judge under Section 48 does not constitute any infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. Reference was made by Mr. G.P. Das on behalf of the opposite party to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa, 1954 SCR 1046 [LQ/SC/1954/43] : (AIR 1954 SC 400 [LQ/SC/1954/43] ). In that case a question arose whether sections 38 and 39 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939, as amended by the Amending Act II of 1952, were constitutionally valid. These two sections related to the framing of a scheme for the due administration of the endowed property. The objection was taken on behalf of the appellant that the Act provided for the framing of a scheme not by a civil court or under its supervision but by the Commissioner, who was a mere administrative or executive officer. It was also objected that there was no provision for an appeal against the order of the Commissioner to the civil court, and it was pointed out that under Sub-section (4) of Section 39 the order passed by the Commissioner with regard to the framing of a scheme was final and conclusive. In these circumstances, it was observed by the Supreme Court that Sections 38 and 39 of the Act were invalid and those sections required redrafting. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that the settling of a scheme in regard to a religious institution by an executive officer without the intervention of any judicial tribunal amounted to an unreasonable restriction upon the right of property of the superior of the religious institution which is blended with his office. It should be noticed that the gist of the Supreme Court decision is that the sections were invalid not because of the absence of the right of appeal but because the scheme was settled by an executive officer without the intervention of any judicial tribunal. We think that this line of reasoning of the Supreme Court does not apply to the present case because Section 48 of the Bihar Act specifically provides that the application is to be made to the District Judge and it is the District Judge who makes an order, after hearing the evidence of the parties, for removing a trustee oi a religious trust or for appointing a new trustee. In our opinion, the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court in 1954 SCR 1046 [LQ/SC/1954/43] : (AIR 1954 SC 400 [LQ/SC/1954/43] ), has no application to the present case. On behalf of the opposite party Mr. G.P. Das also referred to the decision of this Court in Jugal Kishore Bhadani v. Labour Commissioner, Bihar, 1958 Pat LR 93: (AIR 1958 Pat 442 [LQ/PatHC/1958/39] ), in which it was decided that sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act 1953 (Act VIII of 1954) were unconstitutional as there was an infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. But this case is also distinguishable and it has no bearing on the decision of the present case. The question for decision in Jugal Kishore Bhadanis case 1958 Pat LR 93: (AIR 1958 Pat 442 [LQ/PatHC/1958/39] ), was whether Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 26 of Bihar Act VIII of 1954 were constitutionally valid. Section 26 (1) of the Act states as follows :

"26. (1) NO employer shall discharge from his employment any employee who has been in such employment continuously for a period of not less than six months except for a reasonable cause and without giving such employee at least one months notice or one months wages in lieu of such notice. Provided that such notice shall not be necessary where the services of such employee are dispensed with on a charge of such misconduct as may be prescribed by the State Government, supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an inquiry held for the purpose."

Section 26 (2) reads as follows :-

"26. (2) Every such employee shall have a right of appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that- (i) there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services, or (ii) no notice was served on him as required by Sub-section (1), or (iii) he had not been guilty of any misconduct as held by the employer."

Section 26 (3) provides that the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the employer and the employee. It should be noticed that the appellate authority under the Act was the Labour Commissioner who was not a judicial officer and it was further pointed out in that case that Section 39 of the Bihar Act gave a fight of appeal to an employee against the order of the appellate authority under the Act, but did not give such a right to the employer. For these reasons it was held that Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 26 of the Bihar Act were unconstitutional. But, as we have already pointed out, the material provisions of Section 48 of Bihar Act 1 of 1951 are entirely different. The authority empowered under Section 48 for removing the trustee or for appointing a new trustee of a religious trust is an officer of high judicial rank, and the mere fact that no right of appeal is provided against his decision to any higher judicial authority is not a circumstance for holding that there is an unreasonable restriction on the right of the trustee of a religious trust guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. It is important in this context to bear in mind that no abstract test of reasonableness of the law within the meaning of Article 19 (5) of the Constitution can be laid down as being applicable to all cases. We think that the test of reasonableness cannot be confined within the straight jacket of any narrow and rigid formula. In our opinion the question of reasonableness of the law has to be answered with reference to the circumstances oi each particular case. We have to take into account the character of the right which is said to be infringed, the underlying purpose for which the restriction is imposed, the authority to whom the power of decision is conferred and the character and status of the deciding authority. The provision of the right of appeal may be one of the factors to be taken into account in considering whether the law is reasonable from the procedural standpoint, but it is not a conclusive factor. It is equally manifest that the absence of a provision with regard to the right of appeal does not necessarily mean that the law is unreasonable from the procedural aspect. In the present case we hold, for the reasons already given, that the provisions of Section 48 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1 of 1951) do not impose unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of property guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution, and, in our opinion, the provisions of Section 48 of the Act are constitutionally valid and operative. That is our answer to the question of law referred to the High Court by the Additional District Judge of Bhagalpur.

(4) Let the records of the case be sent down to the lower court with the copy of our opinion for being dealt with in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs with regard to the hearing of this reference.