G.S. Singhvi, J. (Chairman)
1. In this complaint filed under Section 36A read with Section 10 and Section 12B of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (in short, the 1969 Act), the complainants have prayed that an inquiry may be held into unfair and restrictive trade practices indulged by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and they be directed to pay damages to the tune of Rs. 5,22,599 with interest @ 18% per annum. The complainants are resident of House No. 72, Sector 14, Gurgaon. In November, 2003, they decided to construct the first and second floor. When the construction of new floors reached the stage of woodwork, the complainants contacted Respondent No. 2, who was engaged in the business of selling plywood, boards, teak wood, laminates under the name and style of M/s. Build Aids Timber Pvt. Ltd. (Respondent No. 1) and was known to them. Respondent No. 2 is said to have promised that he would provide quality goods at a reasonable price. Thereupon, the complainants are said to have purchased the following articles from the respondents:
(i) 57 sheets of sunmica/laminates of white colour manufactured by Green Ply Industries Limited @ Rs. 480 per sheet and paid Rs. 27,360.
(ii) 22 sheets of Classic Gold laminates of 1 mm thickness of three different colours and paid @ Rs. 900 per sheet for Colour Nos. 9207 and 9034 and Rs. 1,100 per sheet for Colour No. 6819.
(iii) 51 Zircon Commercial Board of 19 mm thickness @ Rs. 38 per sq. ft.
(iv) 25 Zircon Ply sheets of 12 and 6 mm thickness @ Rs. 34 and Rs. 25 per sq. ft. respectively for a total price of Rs. 19,065.
(v) G.A.B. Brand One Side Teak (three sheets) @ Rs. 33 per sq. ft. for a total price of Rs. 2,772
(vi) 149.43 cubic ft. of Ivory Coast Teak Wood @ Rs. 850 - Rs. 1,050 per cubic ft. for a total cost of Rs. 1,52,149.
(vii) Margins (Champ Wood) - 4.17 cubic ft. @ Rs. 560 per cubic ft. and teak railing for staircase (65 running foot) @ Rs. 85 per running foot and 1/2 x 1/2 corner (100 running feet) @ Rs. 6.50 per running ft.
2. After the articles were utilized, the complainants discovered that they had been cheated because the quality of the goods was inferior to the one projected by Respondent No. 2 and they were made to pay prices higher than the market rates. According to the complainants the total cost of the goods purchased from the respondents was Rs. 3,05,000 and they had suffered loss to the tune of 40-50% on account of unfair/deceptive practices adopted by the respondents. The complainants have averred that they had contacted Respondent No. 2 on more than one occasions to complain against the quality and price of the goods and sought refund of the excess amount charged from them. They also lodged a First Information Report (FIR) against the respondents with the allegation that the latter have cheated them.
3. Since the complainants did not get favourable response from the respondents, they filed the present complaint. Paragraph 5 of the complaint, which contains the details of the purchases made by the complainants, reads as under:
"5. That the respondents have adopted monopolistic, unfair and deceptive method, for the sale, use and supply of the goods in terms of price, quality and quantity/grade to the tune of about Rs. 1 and half lacs as follows:
(i) Green laminates--Firstly, Mr. Banta sold to the applicants 57 (fifty seven) sheets of sunmica/laminate of white colour of the brand Green manufactured by Green Ply Industries Ltd. The respondents indulged in unfair trade practice firstly because Mr. Banta falsely represented to the applicants that the sunmica/laminate sheets were of .8 mm (point eight mm) thickness, whereas the sheets sold to the applicants were of .6 mm (point six mm) thickness. Secondly, respondent No. 2 sold each sheet which was of .6 mm thickness for Rs. 480 (Rupees four hundred only), whereas the price of .6 mm sheet is about Rs. 250 per sheet at the relevant time in the market.
Thus, the respondents charged the applicants Rs. 27,360 for sale of 57 sheets @ Rs. 480 per sheet, whereas the price should have been about Rs. 14,250 @ Rs. 250 per sheet, as the sheets were of 6 mm thickness.
The applicants learnt subsequently that the company Green has three categories of laminates depending upon the thickness--
1. mm (one mm)--Green Lam approx. Rs. 600 per sheet;
8. mm (point eight mm) - Green Touch -- @ approx. Rs. 425 per sheet; and
6. mm (point six mm) - Green Gloss - @ approx. Rs. 150 per sheet.
Copies of invoices dated 26 March, 2004, 3 April, 2004, 28 May, 2004 and 8 July, 2004 evidencing sale of GREEN white laminates have been filed with this petition.
Copies of the quotations received from other timber traders in Delhi/Gurgaon which apparently show the price of .6 mm Green Gloss sunmica/laminate sheet as ranging between Rs. 250 and Rs. 280 per sheet have been filed herewith.
(ii) Classic Gold Laminates--It is submitted Mr. Banta sold to the applicants about 22 (twenty-two) sheets of Classic Gold laminates of 1 mm thickness (being 10 sheets of colour 9207, 6 sheets of colour 9034 and 6 sheets of colour 6819), Colours 9207 and 9034 were priced at Rs. 900 (Rupees nine hundred only) per sheet and colour No. 6819 was priced at Rs. 1,100 (Rupees one thousand one hundred) per sheet.
Whereas, the correct price of Classic Gold laminate in the market at the relevant time was about Rs. 600 (rupees six hundred) per sheet only.
Thus, the respondents sold 22 sheets of Classic Gold laminates for a total of Rs. 21,000 whereas the correct price @ Rs. 600 per sheet should have been a total of Rs. 13,200 only. The respondents therefore, have been dishonest and treated the applicants unfairly and have caused loss to the applicants and have unjustly enriched by making wrongful gain to the tune of approx. Rs. 8,000 on this particular sale.
Copies of invoices dated 28 May, 2004, 2 June, 2004 and 9 July, 2004 evidencing sale of 22 sheets of Classic Gold laminates have been filed herewith.
(iii) Zircon Commercial Board 19 mm--It is submitted that in purchase of this material Mr. Banta sold to the applicants commercial board of company brand Zircon of 19 mm for Rs. 38 (Rupees thirty-eight) per sq. ft. Mr. Banta indulged in unfair trade practice and acted dishonestly and made false representation to the applicants in two ways (a) firstly when the applicants learnt about this unfair trade practice and the fraud, they sent a decoy customer and Mr. Banta sold the identical product to the decoy customer Rs. 28 (Rupees twenty-eight) per sq. ft. Thus, Mr. Banta and respondent No. 1 apparently indulged in monopolistic and unfair trade practice by heavily overcharging for the boards (b) secondly, when after discovering the unfair trade practice, the applicants met the said Mr. Banta in about July, 2004 and inquired about the details of the company manufacturing Zircon boards i.e., its address, whether it was truly ISI marked as claimed and represented by Mr. Banta, etc. The respondent No. 2 failed to given any definite and satisfactory answer. The applicants again inquired about the details of Zircon vide their letters to the respondents dated 22 October, 2004 and 1st February, 2005 but the respondents did not bother to respond. The applicants reasonably apprehend and suspect that Mr. Banta sources commercial board from various manufacturers and himself falsely stamps them with the brand name Zircon and sells the boards to consumers misrepresenting and materially misleading the consumers like the applicants that the board is ISI mark and of a reputed company.
Mr. Banta sold the applicants "Zircon" commercial boards of 19 mm as follows:
30 (thirty) boards of 8 ft. x 4 ft. x 19 mm
20 (twenty) boards of 7 ft. x 4 ft. x 19 mm
1 (one) board of 8 ft. x 3 ft. x 19 mm
for a total of approx. Rs. 58,672
Given that the Zircons boards actual price ranged between Rs. 26 and Rs. 28 per sq. ft., the price of 51 Zircon boards mentioned above should have been about Rs. 40,144. Thus, Mr. Banta and the respondent No. 1 indulged in the unfair trade practice and caused loss to the applicants to the tune of approx. Rs. 20,000 (twenty thousand) on sale of the particular boards.
Copies of invoices dated 9 March, 2004, 28 May, 2005 and July, 2004 evidencing sale of Zircon commercial boards of 19 mm have been filed herewith.
Copies of invoice No. 129 of the decoy customer evidencing that Mr. Banta sold identical Zircon board of 19 mm thickness for Rs. 28 per sq. ft. has been filed.
(iv) Zircon Plys: Fourthly, Mr. Banta indulged in monopolistic and unfair trade practice in terms of both quality/standard and price of water proof ply. (a) Firstly, the applicant asked Mr. Banta to give them plys which were "Boiling Water Proof" (BWP). Mr. Banta wilfully misrepresented that the "Zircon" plys were BWP. The applicants subsequently learnt that the plys sold by respondents to applicants were not BWP. The plys which are truly BWP go through proper chemical treatment and the layers of ply inside are dark. However, in plys of inferior manufacturing the chemical treatment not having properly given, the chemical is applied merely on the surface of the ply and the surface therefore, appears dark, whereas the layers of ply inside remain untreated and the ply is not BWP. Such inferior variety of ply is called by some traders in the market locally as "Pooncha - Mar ply" because a fabric dipped in chemical is applied to the surface. Mr. Banta deliberately falsely represented and materially mislead that "Zircon" plys were BWP. (b) Secondly, Mr. Banta further indulged in unfair trade practice on the price by selling such inferior ply which was not actually BWP at a price which would be appropriate for truly well treated BWP branded plys such as Duor or Century. On market survey the applicants found that price of top branded plys like Century, Duro, Green, etc. which are truly BWP is about Rs. 38 per sq. ft. for 12 mm thickness and Rs. 24 for 6 mm thickness.
Mr. Banta of the respondent No. 1 sold to the applicants a total of 25 Zircon plys on 9 March, 2004 as follows:
(i) 5 plys of 8 ft. x 4 ft. x 12 mm @ Rs. 34 per sq. ft.
(ii) 10 plys of 7 ft. x 4 ft. x 6 mm @ Rs. 25 per sq. ft.
(iii) 5 plys of 8 ft. x 4 ft. x 6 mm @ Rs. 25 per sq. ft.
(iv) 5 plys of 7 ft. x 3 ft. x 6 mm @ Rs. 25 per sq. ft.
for a total of about Rs. 19,065
The Zircon ply sold by Mr. Banta which he falsely represented was BWP is a local and inferior ply, whose cost could never be higher than that of top branded BWP like Century or Duro. The correct price of local Zircon ply should have been in the range of Rs. 15-20 for 12 mm thickness; and Rs. 7 to Rs. 12 for 6 mm thickness. Thus Mr. Banta indulged in unfair trade practice and caused loss to the applicants to the tune of about Rs. 13,000 (rupees thirteen thousand) on the sale of Zircon ply.
Copy of the invoice dated 9 March, 2004 which evidences the sale of 25 sheets of Zircon ply as aforesaid has been filed.
(v) G.A.B. brand One Side Teak (OST): Mr. Banta also sold to applicants 0.6 mm One Side Teak (OST) plys. When on discovering unfair trade trace and the fraud as mentioned above, the applicants met Mr. Banta and inquired about the details of the company GAB, Mr. Banta did not given any definite and satisfactory answer. The applicants further inquired from him about the details of the company GAB in their letters addressed to him dated 22 October, 2004 and 1st February, 2005, but he failed and neglected to respond.
The applicants reasonably and bona fide believe that there is no company by the name of GAB as represented by Mr. Banta and apparently, Mr. Banta buys OST from local manufacturers and stamps them with the brand GAB and he is indulging in false, deceptive and unfair trade practice.
Also, Mr. Banta sold such inferior/sub-standard quality 3 sheets of 7 ft. x 4 ft. x 0.6 mm OST for Rs. 33 per sq. ft., at a total of Rs. 2,772. However, the price of such total OST sheet should have been in the range of Rs. 18 - Rs. 20 per sq. ft. and as per the conservative estimate of the applicants the respondents caused loss to them as a result of unfair and deceptive trade practice to the tune of Rs. 1,260 in the sale of 3 OST sheets.
Copies of invoices dated 28 May, 2004 and 8 July, 2004 which evidence sale of GAB OST have been filed.
(vi) Ivory Coast Wood: Significantly, the applicants also purchased 149.43 cubic ft. of Ivory Coast/Teak Wood from Mr. Banta of the respondent No. 1 @ Rs. 850 - Rs. 1,050 per cubic ft. on 21 March, 2004. The total cost of wood was Rs. 1,52,149 (Rupees one lakh fifty-two thousand one hundred forty-nine only). Copy of the bill dated 21 March, 2004 evidencing the sale of wood has been filed. In fact, when Mr. Banta came to know that the applicants needed natural teak wood, the respondents especially approached and contacted the applicants induced and misrepresented that very good quality wood had arrived at their shop and that they must buy the teak wood from their shop.
The applicants have been told by one of Mr. Bantas employees at the shop, who were involved in measuring and cutting the Ivory Coast Wood, that Mr. Banta has misrepresented the applicants on measurement because the respondents measured more whereas the actual wood sold to the applicants was less. In fact, after the applicants had purchased the wood and left the shop, the employees remarked to each other that their employer, Mr. Banta was such a shameless person that he had not spared even his relative/known customer. Even that Mr. Banta has indulged in unfair trade practice outrageously on branded items, which have very definite sizes and more or less fixed prices in the market, the applicants have every reason to believe that Mr. Banta has caused loss to the applicants to the extent of 40%-50% on sale of natural teak wood.
(vii) Other Material: Finally, the applicants also purchased other material from Mr. Banta like margins, champ wood (4.17 cubic ft. @ Rs. 560) and teak railing for staircase (65 running foot @ Rs. 85 per running foot) and 1/2 "x 1/2" corner) 100 running feet--Rs. 6.50 per running feet). Mr. Banta sold teak margins 6 mm thickness--
(a) 1" (one inch) width - 1,000 running ft. for Rs. 6 per running feet costing Rs. 6,000;
(b) 1 1/2 (one and half inch) width--450 running ft. for Rs. 8 per running fit costing Rs. 32,000; and
(c) 2" (two inch) width--500 running ft. for Rs. 8 per running feet costing Rs. 4,000.
Whereas the correct price of 1", 1 1/2 and 2" teak margins is Rs. 2.50, Rs. 3.50 and Rs. 5 per running feet (approx.) in the market respectively as per the thorough survey done by the applicants.
Thus Mr. Banta willfully indulged in unfair trade practice by falsely representing and by materially misleading the applicants the price at which the goods are ordinarily sold or provided in the market. The aforesaid act resulted loss to the tune of more than Rs. 7,000 (Rupees seven thousand) on the sale of margins alone. Invoices dated 9 March, 2004 and 2 June, 2004 evidencing sale of margins as above have been filed."
4. The erstwhile Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (for short, the Commission) passed an order dated 3.9.2007 for issue of notice. The respondents filed reply dated 12.11.2007 to controvert the allegation of unfair trade practice. The complainants filed rejoinder on 5.5.2008 and reiterated the allegations made by them.
5. The Commission considered the pleadings and passed order dated 12.8.2008 for holding an inquiry into the matter. On being noticed, the respondents filed detailed reply dated 12.10.2009. They objected to the maintainability of the complaint by asserting that the allegations falling under Section 36A read with Section 10 are required to be proved by the complainants but no inquiry can be held under Section 12B of the Act read with Regulation 77 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission Regulations, 1991 for award of compensation because no independent application has been filed by the complainants. Another objection taken by the respondents is that the complaint is barred by time. According to the respondents, the complainants had made only two purchases vide Bills/Vouchers dated 9.3.2004 and 9.7.2004 and a suit for damages could have been filed latest by 8.7.2007, but the complaint was filed only on 11.7.2007. In support of this objection respondents have relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in R. Rudraiah and Another v. State of Karnataka and Others, III : (1998) SLT 351 : (1998) 3 SCC 23 , Stare of Kerala and Others v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty and Another, III : (1999) SLT 602 : (1999) 3 SCC 657 and V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao and Another, IV : (2005) SLT 410 : (2005) 4 SCC 613. The respondents have also raised an objection of misjoinder of parties by asserting that the presence of Complainant Nos. 1 and 3 and Respondent No. 2 is not necessary for deciding the issue of whether the respondents have indulged in unfair/restrictive trade practices. On merits, the respondents have averred that the complainants had made only two purchases vide Bill No. 552 dated 9.3.2004 and Bill No. 127 dated 9.7.2004 and that neither they had charged excessive price nor the quality of goods was inferior. According to the respondents, without getting the goods tested in a laboratory, the complainants cannot accuse them of having supplied goods of inferior quality. The respondents have also accused the complainants of fabricating the case for extracting compensation from them by making allegations of unfair trade practice.
6. In the rejoinder filed by them the complainants have contested the version of the respondents that the goods were purchased only through Bill No. 552 dated 9.3.2004 and Bill No. 127 dated 9.7.2004 and averred that in addition to those bills, the respondents had raised six hand written invoices dated 9.3.2004, 21.3.2004, 3.4.2004, 28.5.2004, 3.6.2004 and 8.7.2004 against the purchase of laminates, wood, etc. and they had made payments through cheques. The complainants have referred to the talks held with Respondent No. 2 and pleaded that despite promises made by him, the said respondent neither refunded the excess price nor paid the damages. According to the complainants, Captain Amar Malli and (Retd.) Wing Commander Satya Prakash had accompanied with them during their visit to the shop of the respondents and witnessed the conversation. They have also given details of the payments made through cheques. This is evinced from paragraph 2 of the rejoinder, the relevant parts of which are extracted below:
"2.............. When the Complainants realized that Respondent No. 2 had adopted unfair trade practices and, what ought to have been the correct prices for the various products, they sent their friend, Mr. Sushmit Sen, who resides in Gurgaon as a decoy customer to make certain purchases. Mr. Sushmit Sen purchased 1 (one) "ZIRCON" 19 mm. commercial board from the Respondents shop, who issued an (undated) invoice No. 129 against the said purchase. It is submitted that the unfair trade practices of Respondents is clearly evident from this invoice which shows that the ZIRCON commercial board of 19 mm thickness which Respondent No. 1 sold to Complainants for Rs. 38 (Rupees thirty-eight) per sq. ft., was sold to the decoy customer for Rs. 28 (Rupees twenty-eight) per sq. ft. It is submitted that as per the Complainants market survey (the estimates received from other timber merchants in Gurgaon are already on record of this Honble Tribunal), show that a board of local brand like ZIRCON (as compared to high-end and well known brands like DURO, CENTURY and GREEN), ought to have cost between Rs. 26-28 per sq. ft. thus, the Respondents adopted unfair trade practices by inter alia misleading the Complainants about the price and quality of ZIRCON commercial boards under the terms of Section 36A(1)(i) and (ix) of the Act respectively and by charging them Rs. 10 per sq. ft. higher than the prevalent rate in the market. Complainants reserve the right to make appropriate submissions in this regard at the time of hearing.
The said Bill No. 129 issued to the decoy customer is on Respondents stationary and, in the same handwriting as the Hand-Written Invoices. Therefore, the submission of Respondents that it cannot be proved against them because it is not signed by the Complainants is vague, incorrect and irrelevant. The date of the said Bill No. 129 can be easily verified from the documents and records maintained by Respondent No. 1 in the ordinary course of its business and Respondents are called upon to produce the same.
It is blatantly false and vehemently denied that the Hand-written Invoices were merely rough estimates and do not belong to the Respondents. In this regard, it is sufficient to note that the hand-writing in the two invoices dated 9 March, 2004 and 9 July, 2004 (which are admitted by the Respondents) is identical to the hand-writing in Hand-written Invoices.
Furthermore, on 8 July, 2004 the Complainants purchased certain items costing Rs. 2,637 (Rupees two thousand six hundred thirty-seven). However, at the same time, Complainants also returned certain items which they had purchased earlier and which were not used in the construction which cost Rs. 5,025 (Rupees five thousand twenty-five). Thus, in the invoice dated 8 July, 2004 the Respondents adjusted the invoice amount of Rs. 2,637 against Rs. 5,025 and refunded the excess Rs. 2,388 (Rupees two thousand three hundred eighty-eight) to the Complainants. It is submitted that the invoices of 9 March, 2004 and 9 July, 2004 and all the aforesaid Hand-Written Invoices formed a chain of transactions and, no refund would have been possible in the Hand-Written Invoice of 8 July, 2004 if such Hand-Written Invoices were merely "rough-estimates" as falsely claimed by the Respondents.
That, the Hand-Written Invoices showed detailed calculations of the material supplied, including costs of cartage and loading of such materials. The invoice of 21 March, 2004 which is for natural teak wood, also shows labour costs of sawing such wood, which would not have been there, if there were merely rough estimates obtained by Complainants from the market as alleged.
It is further submitted that the two invoices dated 9 March, 2004 and 9 July, 2004 and all the Hand-Written Invoices were paid for by the Complainants by way of cheques drawn from the bank account No. 002101075511 of Mrs. Nidhi Lall, wife of Complainant No. 2 at ICICI Bank, Sector 14, Gurgaon, Haryana (hereinafter referred to as the "Nidhi Lalls Account") during the period March, 2004 to July, 2004.
It is further significant to note that the amounts and dates of Hand-Written Invoices match the amount and dates of debits from Nidhi Lalls Account.
These details are as follows:
It was the practice of Respondents to encash the cheques simultaneously with the dispatch of goods. Respondent No. 2 demanded payment in cash, but since the Complainants did not want cash dealing, the Complainants had to provide self/bearer cheques, which could be immediately encashed across the counter. Thus, all bearer/self cheques at the time of encashing from the ICICI Bank were endorsed by one, Mr. Suresh Kumar and, only one cheque was endorsed by one Mr. Kashyap, (copy of Mrs. Nidhi Lalls Account statement for the period 3 January, 2004 to 30 September, 2004 showing the names Mr. Suresh Kumar and Mr. Kashyap as endorsees of the cheques is already on record of the Honble Tribunal). The Complainants believe that both Mr. Suresh Kumar and Mr. Kashyap are/were employees of the Respondent No. 1, which may be verified by calling for relevant records of Respondent No. 1.
As submitted hereinabove, the complaint was filed well within the limitation period of three years and the submissions of the Respondents in this regard are misconceived and misleading and hence denied."
7. The complaint remained pending before the Commission till 31.8.2009. After the amendment of Section 66 of the Competition Act, 2002 (for short, the 2002 Act) with effect from 1.9.2009 and repeal of the 1969 Act, the complaint stood transferred to the Competition Appellate Tribunal which had been established under Section 53A of the 2002 Act.
8. By an order dated 25.10.2010, the Tribunal framed the following issues, (1) Whether the case of unfair trade practice as alleged has been made out against the respondents; and (2) If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, whether any public interest is involved.
By another order dated 9.12.2010, the Tribunal framed an additional issue:
"Whether the complainant is entitled to any compensation (This should be read as "Whether the complainants are entitled to any compensation").
9. Between October, 2010 and April, 2015, the parties conducted admission/denial of documents, filed affidavits of evidence and cross-examine the witnesses of their opponents. On behalf of the complainants, Complainant No. 3 Ms. Anuradha Lall filed affidavit dated 23.2.2011 as CW1. She also filed documents marked as CW1/1 to CW1/20. She was cross-examined on 25.10.2013, 20.1.2014 and 17.2.2014. (Retd.) Wing Commander Satya Prakash filed affidavit dated 15.9.2011 as CW-2. He was cross-examined on 22.12.2011. Captain Amar Singh Malli filed affidavit dated 15.9.2011 as CW-3. He was cross-examined on 10.5.2012. Shri Susmit Sen filed affidavit dated 24.9.2012. He was cross-examined on 1.10.2012. The complainants also examined Gaurav Kumar (Accounts Manager, Goyal Ply-N-Wood Pvt. Ltd.), Vasant Kunj, New Delhi. Shri Manmohan (Purchase Manager of M/s. Wood Peckers India (P) Ltd., Paharganj) New Delhi, Shri Rajesh Jain, (Partner of M/s. Siddharth Plywood, Gurgaon), Shri Harekrishna Kajaria (Director, Srishti Plywood Pvt. Limited, Gurgaon) and Shri Jagvir Singh Koyal (Junior Officer, ICICI Bank, Sector 14, Gurgaon). All of them were cross-examined by the Counsel representing the respondents.
10. Respondent No. 2 filed affidavit dated 12.3.2014 as RW 1. He was cross-examined on 7.8.2014, 9.12.2014, 27.4.2015 and 28.4.2015.
11. Mr. Om Prakash, learned Counsel for the complainants, extensively referred to the pleadings of the parties and argued that the action of the respondents to sell laminates, plywood, teakwood, etc. of inferior quality and to charge prices substantially higher than the market rates should be declared as unfair trade practice within the meaning of Section 36A of the 1969 Act and they be directed to compensate the claimants. Mr. Om Prakash referred to Section 36A(1)(i) and argued that the false representation made by Respondent No. 2 about the quality and grade of goods and their price constitutes unfair trade practice. Learned Counsel submitted that the complainants had purchased laminates, plywood, teakwood, etc. from the respondents because they had reposed a trust in Respondent No. 2 but he misled them in believing that the goods sold at his shop are of a very good quality and he would charge reasonable price. Learned Counsel relied upon the statement made by CW 4, Shri Susmit Sen to show that Zercon Board of 19 mm was sold to him at the rate of Rs. 28 per sq. ft. whereas the same article was sold to the complainants at the rate of Rs. 38 per sq. ft. and argued that this should be treated as sufficient to prove cheating on the part of the respondents. Learned Counsel then referred to the statement of CW 1 to drive home the point that his clients had purchased various items on the basis of invoices prepared on behalf of Respondent No. 1. He submitted that the payments made by the complainants by cheques were withdrawn by the respondents on the same day and this is an indication of the fact that apart from two bills dated 9.3.2004 and 9.7.2004, the respondents sold other items on the strength of vouchers. In the end, learned Counsel argued that even though the complainants have not examined by any expert to prove that quality of the goods sold by Respondent No. 1 was inferior than the one represented by Respondent No. 2, the oral testimony of CW 1, CW 2 and CW 3 should be treated sufficient for recording a finding on this issue in favour of the complainants.
12. Mr. M. Dev Kamal, learned Counsel for the respondents, argued that the complaint is liable to be dismissed as barred by time because the same was filed after more than three years of the accrual of the cause. Learned Counsel submitted that last purchase was made by the complainants vide bill dated 9.7.2004 and, therefore, the complaint could have been filed latest by 8.7.2007 whereas the same was filed on 11.7.2007. In support of this argument, Mr. Kamal relied upon judgments to which reference has been made hereinabove. In addition, he relied upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in Corporation Bank and Another v. Navin J. Shah, II : (2000) SLT 140 : I (2000) CPJ 13 (SC) : AIR 2000 SC 761 . He further argued that the statement of Shri Susmit Sen cannot be relied upon for recording a finding that the respondents had overcharged the complainants because the same has not been corroborated by any independent testimony. As regards the quality of goods, Mr. Kamal argued that the allegation made by the complainant on this score has remained unsubstantiated because no cogent evidence has been produced to prove the same.
13. I have considered the respective arguments and carefully perused the record. Keeping in view the objection of limitation taken by the respondent, I shall first consider whether the complaint filed on 11.7.2007 is barred by limitation and is liable to be dismissed as such.
14. The respondents have pleaded that the cause of action had accrued to the complainants on 9.3.2004 and 9.7.2004 whereas the complaint was filed on 11.7.2007 that is after more than three years of the last accrual of cause of action and as such it is liable to be dismissed as barred by time. It is the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents that the limitation prescribed for filing a civil suit should be applied for determining whether the complaint filed under Section 36B or Section 36D read with Section 10 or otherwise is within limitation and the present complaint should be dismissed because the same was filed after more than three years of the accrual of cause of action.
15. In my opinion, there is no merit in the objection of limitation taken by the respondents. There is no provision in the Act or Regulations by which any particular period of limitation has been prescribed for filing complaint of unfair or restrictive trade practice. In the absence of such statutory prescription, a complaint filed under the Act after more than three years cannot per se be dismissed as barred by time. Of course the Tribunal can refuse to entertain a complaint if the same has been filed after long lapse of time without any cogent explanation. This is precisely what the Supreme Court has held in Corporation Bank and Another v. Navin J. Shah, (supra). In that case, the Supreme Court considered the correctness of an order passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, which had rejected the point of limitation raised by the appellant and awarded damages to the respondent. The facts of that case were that the respondent had effected exports of 13 consignments of tea to M/s. Sudan Tea Company, Khartoum, Sudan during the period between December 11, 1980 and March 2, 1981. The respondent who had credit facilities with the appellants entrusted the documents relating to export of tea for the purpose of realising the proceeds thereof from the consignee. The appellants issued advice of purchase of bills to the respondent in respect of the goods covered by several invoices. The appellants negotiated the documents relating to the exports effected by the respondent through M/s. E.L. Nilein Bank, Khartoum, Sudan [hereinafter referred to as the foreign bank]. The respondent claimed that he did not ask the appellants to negotiate the export documents through any particular bank in Sudan but the appellants on their own appointed the foreign bank for realising the export proceeds from the consignee; that the appellants had not at any time consulted or even obtained the respondents opinion in the matter of appointing the foreign bank; that the appellants had to release the export documents to the consignee only on payment of the export value in U.S. Dollars and the instructions to release the shipping documents to the consignee to enable him to take delivery of the consignment as denoted by the expression cash against documents. It is further claimed that the appellants should not have realized the export documents without receiving the export value from the consignee in U.S. Dollars. It is contended that the invoices were realised in U.S. Dollars and the appellants could not have realised the export documents before ensuring that the export proceeds could be repatriated to India in U.S. Dollars. In accordance with the directions of the Reserve Bank of India in the matter of exports, the proceeds had to be realized and repatriated to India only in U.S. Dollars and not in any other currency. The appellants did not inform the respondent of any difficulties experienced by them in the matter of negotiations of the aforesaid export documents at any time prior to the completion of the exports covered by the invoices in question. Moreover, the appellants did not approach the respondent in effecting any changes in the authority given by it in the matter of negotiating the said documents. The respondent had taken insurance coverage for the exports effected by them from the Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited [hereinafter referred to as the Corporation] to cover the risks involved in the export business. After the respondent was advised by the appellants that they could not realise the export proceeds in U.S. Dollars due to certain restrictions imposed by the Sudan Government and requested the respondent to approach the Corporation to settle the claim using the insurance policy taken by the respondent in respect of the goods covered by the documents in question. The Corporation finally paid ninety per cent of the export proceeds covered by the documents. After almost ten years of the dispatch of consignment, the respondent filed complaint under the Consumer Protection Act for award of damages. The plea of limitation taken by the appellant was rejected by the Commission and the claim of the respondent was partly allowed. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the National Commission by recording the following observations:
"We may further notice that there is another strong reason as to why the claim made by the respondent should not have been granted. The transactions in question took place in the years 1979 and 1981. The difficulties in realization of the amounts due from the consignee also became clear at the time when the claim was made before the Corporation and the claim had been made as early as on December 19, 1982. The petition before the Commission was filed on September 25, 1992 that is clearly a decade after a claim had been made before the Corporation. A claim could not have been filed by the respondent at this instance of time. Indeed at the relevant time there was no period of limitation under the Consumer Protection Act to prefer a claim before the Commission but that does not mean that the claim could be made even after unreasonably long delay. The Commission has rejected this contention by a wholly wrong approach in taking into consideration that foreign exchange payable to Reserve Bank of India was still due and, therefore, the claim is alive. The claim of the respondent is from the bank. At any rate, as stated earlier, when the claim was made for indemnifying the losses suffered from the Corporation, it was clear to the parties about the futility of awaiting any longer for collecting such amounts from the foreign bank. In those circumstances, the claim, if at all was to be made, ought to have been made within a reasonable time thereafter. What is reasonable time to lay a claim depends upon facts of each case. In the legislative wisdom, three years period has been prescribed as the reasonable time under the Limitation Act to lay a claim for money. We think, that period should be the appropriate standard adopted for computing reasonable time to raise a claim in a matter of this nature. For this reason also we find the claim made by the respondent ought to have been rejected by the Commission."
16. The proposition which can be culled out from the above extracted portion of the Supreme Courts judgment is that even where no period of limitation is prescribed an action is required to be filed within a reasonable time and the period prescribed for filing a suit could be treated as appropriate standard for computing reasonable time. This means that whenever an objection of limitation is raise qua a complaint filed under the 1969 Act, the Tribunal is required to consider whether the complainant has acted with due diligence and has not been negligent in pursuing his/her/its remedy.
17. In R. Rudraiah and Another v. State of Karnataka and Others, (supra), the Supreme Court held that the limitation of six months for filing an application under Section 45 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 for registration as occupant starts from 1.1.1979 and ends on 30.6.1979 and that after Section 48A of the Act which empowered the competent authority to condone the delay for sufficient cause, was deleted and it was not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to exercise power for condonation of delay.
18. In V.R. Kalliyanikuttys case, the Supreme Court held that the debts which had become barred by time cannot be recovered under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. The discussion on the issue of limitation is contained in paragraphs 8 to 11 of the judgment which are extracted below:
"8. Looking to the object of Section 71 we have to examine whether time-barred claims of the State Financial Corporation and the banks can be recovered under it. Is the object only speed of recovery or is it also enlargement of the right to recover The respondent-institutions rely on the words amount due in Section 71 as encompassing time-barred claims also. Now, what is meant by the words amounts due used in Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act as also in the notifications issued under Section 71 Do these words refer to the amounts repayable under the terms of the loan agreements executed between the debtor and the creditor irrespective of whether the claim of the creditor has become time-barred or not Or do these words refer only to those claims of the creditor which are legally recoverable An amount due normally refers to an amount which the creditor has a right to recover. Wharton in Law Lexicon defines due as anything owing; that which one contracts to pay to another. In Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Edn., at p. 499 the following comment appears against the word due:
The word due always imports a fixed and settled obligation or liability; but with reference to the time for its payment there is considerable ambiguity in the use of the term, the precise signification being determined in each case from the context. It may mean that the debt or claim in question is now (presently or immediately) matured and enforceable, or that it matured at sometime in the past and yet remains unsatisfied, or that it is fixed and certain but the day appointed for its payment has not yet arrived. But commonly and in the absence of any qualifying expressions, the word due is restricted to the first of these meanings, the second being expressed by the term overdue and the third by the word payable.
There is no reference in these definitions to a time-barred debt. In every case the exact meaning of the word due will depend upon the context in which that word appears.
9. In the case of Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., : AIR 1933 PC 63 : 60 IA 13, the Privy Council was required to interpret the words money due under Section 186 of the Companies Act, 1913. Section 186 dealt with the recovery of any money due to the company from a contributory. Interpreting the words money due, the Privy Council said that the phrase would only refer to those claims which were not time-barred. It noted that the section is concerned only with moneys due from a contributory. A debtor who is not a contributory, is not affected by it. Moneys due from him can be recovered only by a suit in the companys name. Secondly, the section creates a special procedure for obtaining payment of moneys. It is not a Section which purports to create a foundation upon which to base a claim for payment. It creates no new rights. Thirdly, the power of the Court to order payment under that section is discretionary. It may refuse to act under that section, leaving the liquidator to sue in the name of the company. Therefore, the respondent under the procedure of Section 186 cannot be deprived of some defence or answer open to him in a suit for the same moneys.
10. The same reasoning would apply in the present case also. The Kerala Revenue Recovery Act does not create any new right. It merely provides a process for speedy recovery of moneys due. Therefore, instead of filing a suit, (or an application or petition under any special Act), obtaining a decree and executing it, the bank or the financial institution can now recover the claim under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. Since this Act does not create any new right, the person claiming recovery cannot claim recovery of amounts which are not legally recoverable nor can a defence of limitation available to a debtor in a suit or other legal proceeding be taken away under the provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. In fact, under Section 70 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, it is provided that when proceedings are taken under this Act against any person for the recovery of any sum of money due from him, such person may, at any time before the commencement of the sale of any property attached in such proceedings, pay the amount claimed and at the same time deliver a protest signed by himself to the officer issuing the demand or conducting the sale as the case may be. Sub-section (2) of Section 70 provides that when the amount is paid under protest, the officer issuing the demand or the officer at whose instance the proceedings have been initiated, shall enquire into the protest and pass appropriate orders. If the protest is accepted, the officer disposing of the protest shall immediately order the refund of the whole or part of the money paid under protest. Under Sub-section (3) of Section 70, the person making a payment under protest shall have the right to institute a suit for the refund of the whole or part of the sum paid by him under protest.
11. Therefore, under Section 70(3) a person who has paid under protest can file a suit for refund of the amount wrongly recovered. In law he would be entitled to submit in the suit that the claim against which the recovery has been made is time-barred. Hence no amount should have been recovered from him. When the right to file a suit under Section 70(3) is expressly preserved, there is a necessary implication that the shield of limitation available to a debtor in a suit is also preserved. He cannot, therefore, be deprived of this right simply by making a recovery under the said Act unless there is anything in the Act which expressly brings about such a result. Provisions of the said Act, however, indicate to the contrary. Moreover, such a wide interpretation of amount due which destroys an important defence available to a debtor in a suit against him by the creditor, may attract Article 14 against the Act. It would be ironic if an Act for speedy recovery is held as enabling a creditor who has delayed recovery beyond the period of limitation to recover such delayed claims."
In V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao (supra), the Supreme Court considered the question whether special period of limitation prescribed under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 was violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and answer the same in negative. Paragraphs 35 to 37 of the judgment which deals with this issue read as under:
"35. The classification has a reasonable nexus to the object it seeks to achieve. The submission made on behalf of the appellant that though a suit may be filed within six months, the trial of the suit could take place long after this and that the evidence would never be fresh at that stage is fallacious inasmuch as once the suit is filed against a party, the party is put on notice and will, therefore, gather the relevant documentary evidence when fresh and preserve such evidence for the trial whenever the same would take place.
36. The submission of Mr. R.F. Nariman, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, that in the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 no provision for condonation of delay for institution of a suit has been made because a relatively longer period of limitation has been provided as compared to limitation provided for appeals and other applications and, therefore, providing relatively shorter period of six months for filing the suit under the provisions of Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 without a provision for condonation of delay, would make the section arbitrary, excessive, disproportionate and unreasonable restriction on the appellants right under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution cannot be accepted. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy that an unlimited and perpetual threat of litigation leads to disorder and confusion and creates insecurity and uncertainty. Therefore the Legislature has sought to balance the public interest in providing limitation on the one hand and at the same time not to unreasonably restrict the right of a party to initiate proceedings on the other. Once a suit is filed the object of limitation as a statute of repose is satisfied inasmuch as the opponent party knows what he has to defend. The Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 is a special Act. It is a settled legal proposition that the provision of the special Act shall prevail over the general Act. Section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 relates to savings. For proper appreciation of the legal position Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is reproduced below--
29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
37. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 envisages special or local laws which can provide a period of limitation for suits as well as for appeals and applications, different from the period prescribed by the Schedule of the Limitation Act where provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 can be expressly excluded by such special or local laws. There are many special or local laws which provide for a short period of limitation for filing of appeals as well as applications and where the provisions of Section 5 are expressly excluded or curtailed. Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 34 prescribes time-limit within which an application for setting aside of an award must be made and although the Court is given the power to extend the time on sufficient cause being shown, the said power to extend the time is restricted but for a period of 30 days only and not thereafter."
19. Notice may also be taken of the judgment of the Delhi High Court in M.S. Shoes East Ltd. v. M.R.T.P. and Others, : 107 (2003) DLT 595 (DB). In that case the Delhi High Court upheld the order passed by the Commission dismissing the Compensation Applications filed by the appellant under Section 12B as barred by limitation. The High Court noted that the cause of action for filing applications, but the same were filed after five years of the accrual of cause of action and affirmed the order of the Commission that the same were barred by time. In its judgment, the High Court relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha, : 1969 (SLT Soft) 517 : (1970) 1 SCR 335 , Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P.K.K. Amson & Besom, Kerala, : 1976 (SLT Soft) 583 : (1977) 1 SCR 996 , Ram Chand v. Union of India, : 1993 (SLT Soft) 533 : (1994) 1 SCC 44 , Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Bombay Tiers International Ltd. and Others, IV : (1998) SLT 70 : AIR 1998 SC 1629 , State of Kerala and Others v. Kalliyanikutty & Ors., III : (1999) SLT 602 : (1999) 2 SCR 372 , and observed:
"26......There is no doubt that the Legislature in its wisdom has not prescribed any limitation for preferring compensation petition under Section 12B of the MRTP Act. There are large number of similar Acts where the Legislature in its wisdom has not specified a period of limitation. On proper analysis of various judgments of the Apex Court and the other Courts, the ratio which clearly emerges is that all those cases where the Legislature has not specified any statutory time limit, the claim has to be filed within reasonable time. In aforementioned judgments of the Apex Court particularly in the case of Corporation Bank (supra), the Supreme Court observed that Act in which no statutory limitation has been prescribed that does not mean that claim petition can be entertained anytime. The ratio of the judgment is that the claim ought to be made within reasonable period. What is the reasonable time to lay a claim depends upon the facts of each case. In the legislative wisdom, three years period has been prescribed to lay a claim for money. The Court observed that the period of three years is the reasonable period to raise a claim in a matter of this nature. The claim of the petitioner is in the nature of a money claim and on the analogy of the Corporation Bank (supra), the claim ought to have been filed within the statutory limit for filing such claims by way of civil suits, i.e., three years. In the Corporation Banks case (supra). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court examined the facts of the case in detail and thereafter observed that the claim involved in that case was essentially for money. In this view of the matter, the Court observed that the period of three years is the reasonable time to raise a claim in a matter of this nature. This is also in consonance with the provisions of the Limitation Act.
29. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court aptly observed in the Corporation Bank case (supra), that even when the Legislature has not specified any statutory time limit, the claim has to be filed within reasonable time. The Court further held what is reasonable time to lay claim depends upon the facts of each cage. In the Legislative wisdom three years period has been prescribed to lay a claim for money. The Court observed that the period of three years is reasonable time to raise a claim in a matter of this nature. The claim which has been sought by the petitioner is in the nature of a money claim and on the analogy of Corporation Banks case (supra), the claim ought to have been filed within statutory period of three years. The Commission has correctly appreciated the ratio of the Corporation Bank."
20. In my opinion none of the three judgments of the Supreme Court and the one rendered by the Delhi High Court can be relied upon for accepting the plea of the respondents that the complaint filed on 11.7.2007 is barred by time. Ignoring the explanation given by the complainants, who have categorically stated that after having realized that they have been deceived by the respondents, attempts were made to recover the excess price along with damages. The averments made in this regard have been substantiated by the oral testimony of CW 1, CW 2 and CW 3 who have concurrently stated repeated attempts were made to impress Respondent No. 2 to return the excess price and pay damages. In the written statement, the respondents have not disputed the fact that the complainants had met Respondent No. 2 and demanded refund of the alleged excess charges and damages. Although the respondents have repeatedly pleaded that the claim made by the complainants for refund of the alleged excess price was untenable, there is no denial that the complainants had met Respondent No. 2 to protest against the quality of goods sold to them and demanded refund of the excess price. It is also not in dispute that the complainants had lodged police complaint, served legal notice upon the respondents and filed complaint only when they found that Respondent No. 2 was not responding. In this scenario, it cannot be said that the complainants have been lax, in pursuing their remedy or that the explanation given by them for delay in filing of the complaint is not plausible.
21. As a corollary to the above discussion, I hold that the complaint is not barred by time and the objection taken by the respondents is liable to be rejected.
22. The next question which merits consideration is whether the complainants had purchased various items mentioned in paragraph 5 of the complaint and the respondents had charged price in excess of the market rates entitling the complainants to seek refund.
23. In paragraph 5 of the complaint, the complainants have given minute details of the purchases made by them and pleaded that the respondents had charged price far in excess of the market rate. For substantiating their assertion about purchase of laminates, Zircon commercial Board, Zircon Ply, Q.A.B. brand one side Teak, Ivory Coast Teak Wood and other articles, the complainants have filed affidavits of Ms. Anuradha Lall (Complainant No. 3), (Retd.) Wing Commander Satya Prakash and Captain Amar Malli. In her affidavit Complainant No. 3 has given details of various purchases made by the complainants. She has disclosed the types of the articles and their total quantity. She has also given the price paid for each of the articles. In paragraph 35 of her affidavit, she has made a statement that the respondents have cheated the complainants by a sum of Rs. 1,52,149. In paragraph 38 of the affidavit, Complainant No. 3 has made the following statement:
"I say that, the total cost of all raw materials purchased from Respondents during the period March, 2004 to July, 2004 was about Rs. 3,05,000 (Rupees three lakh five thousand) and, Respondents by indulging in unfair trade practice cheated me and my family and caused a loss of nearly 40 - 50% of Rs. 1,50,000 (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand). That, however, the actual loss caused to us far exceeds this amount, as we were deceived into using inferior/substandard quality material and paid for labour to the contractor. Construction of House is a once-in-a-lifetime project and, which we paid for through our hard earned savings and expensive home loans. Raw materials once used cannot be removed or replaced without causing further damage and incurring further labour charges and loss of man-days. That, for instance, I had asked for and wanted to use BWP ply and 0.8 mm thickness white laminates for pasting inside the cupboards. Respondents by resorting to unfair trade practices sold inferior quality ply and 0.6 mm laminates. Therefore the final product would not have the superior quality which my family wanted, though we were made to pay for it both in terms of price, time, labour and effort."
In paragraph 40, Complainant No. 3 has given details of the payments paid to the respondents. In paragraphs 42 and 43 she has mentioned that (Retd.) Wing Commander Satya Prakash, CW 2 and Captain Amar Malli, CW 3 had accompanied her to the shop of Respondent No. 2. She also produced various bills and vouchers issued by Respondent No. 1, some of which have been described as rough estimate.
24. Although, Complainant No. 3 was cross-examined at length, nothing could be elicited from her which may detract from her assertion that quality of the goods sold by the respondent was inferior and they had charged price higher than the market rates. In reply to the last question asked on 25.10.2013, CW 1 categorically stated that hand written vouchers were issued by the respondent company and all the payments were made through cheques. This part of the cross-examination is reproduced below:
"Q. I put it to you that in reference to para 14 of your affidavit the handwritten documents filed at pages 6 and 7 (pages 198 and 199) (CW 1/7 and CW 1/8) does not pertain to the respondent company as the same does not bear the signature of respondent and does not bear the name of the respondent company.
Ans. It is incorrect that the documents referred to above are not of the respondent company. In fact, the handwriting in the above documents is identical to the documents at pages 192 and 193 (CW 1/3, CW 1/4) and CW 1/2 at page 204 written by the same person and issued by the respondent company. All payments with respect to these documents/invoices were made through cheques."
In the second cross-examination held on 17.2.2014, Ms. Anuradha Lall stated that purchases were made by her on behalf of the entire family and the cheques were encashed by the representative of Respondent No. 1. The relevant portions of that cross-examination are extracted below:
"Q. I put it to you that all the averments contained in paras 35 to 38 of CW 1/A are false and that you have not purchased any goods from the Respondent as mentioned in the aforesaid paras and hence, the reason why you have not supported your claim with any documents like bills, vouchers, etc.
Ans. It is incorrect and the claims are supported by the documents/bills.
It is true that the payments mentioned in para-39 of CW 1/A were not made from my personal bank account.
It is correct that Mrs. Nidhi Lall and the Complainant No. 2 namely, Shri Anil Lall did not visit the shop of the Respondent.
It is incorrect to say that Mrs. Nidhi Lall and Mr. Anil Lall did not purchase the material from the Respondents shop, (Vol.) Because the purchase was made by me on behalf of the entire family.
It is incorrect to say that the figures mentioned in para 40 of CW 1/A are false and incorrect and that they have been made to support my false allegations in the complaint.
It is incorrect to say that Shri Suresh Kumar and Shri Kashyap had never encashed bearer cheques on behalf of the Respondent as stated by me in para 41 of CW/A.
It is incorrect to say that the two persons referred to in para 41 of CW 1/A are my own men acting on my behalf.
It is incorrect to say that the persons referred to in paras 42 and 43 of CW 1/A are interested witnesses and that they are acting on my behalf and that they have deposed falsely on my behalf.
It is incorrect to say that the Respondent No. 2 had never promised to refund the excess charge as stated by me in para 43 of CW 1/A."
In her further cross-examination held on 20.1.2014, CW 1 made the following statement:
".... .... .... ....
Q. I put it to you that you have not produced any bills to substantiate your claim made in paras 16 and 17 of CW 1/A and you have only filed estimates to show the bills of purchases
A. It is incorrect that there are no bills to substantiate the purchases mentioned in paras 16 and 17 of CW 1/A and the documents filed are not estimates but bills issued by the Respondents.
Q. Can you show the bills to the Court
A. The bills are Exbt. CW 1/4 r/w CW 1/3, CW 1/7 and CW 1/1 and also the total payment made under these bills match the debits from the ICICI Bank joint A/c of Complainant No. 2 and his wife encashed by the Respondents.
.... .... .... ....
Q. The bills Exbt. CW 1/1 and CW 1/3 are on the letter head of the Respondents Company whereas Exbt. CW 1/4, CW 1/5 and CW 1/7 are not issued by the Respondents and the same are not on the letter head of the Respondents and have also not been signed by any authorized person of the Respondents
A. Exbt. CW 1/4 is a continuation of CW 1/3 and Exbts. CW 1/5 and CW 1/7 are all on the stationery of the Respondents.
Q. On what basis you are claiming that it is one the stationery of the Respondents Is there any particular trade mark of the Respondents on the said paper
A. CW 1/4, 5 and 7 were issued in my presence and the handwriting is the same as in CW 1/3 and CW 1/2.
.... .... .... ....
Q. Why did not you insist for the bill/invoice on the same day when you had allegedly made the purchases from the Respondents
A. I had between March - July, 2004 made several purchases, from the Respondents and sometimes the bill was given a day or two later."
25. In their affidavits Wing Commander Satya Prakash (Retd.) (CW 2) and Captain Amar Malli (CW 3) supported the allegations made by the Complainants. In paragraphs 5, 8 to 17 of his affidavit, CW 2 made the following statements:
"5. I say that, I met Complainant No. 3 in the first week of July, 2004 at her house and she showed me the original invoices issued by Respondents against purchase of various wood materials being Bill No. 552 dated March 9, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/3), Bill dated March, 9, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/4), Bill dated March 21, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/5), Bill dated April, 3, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/6), Bill dated May 28, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/7), Bill dated June 2, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/8), and Bill dated July 8, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/9) to the Complaint.
8. I say that, when I met the Complainants before visiting the shop of Respondent No. 2, Complainant No. 3 showed me the quotations of Goyal-Ply-N-Wood dated July 5, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/10), Woodpeckers India (P) Limited (undated) (annexed as CW 1/11), and Siddharth Plywood dated July 8, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/12), to the Complaint.
9. I say that, Complainant No. 3 had requested one of her friends, Mr. Susmit Sen, who is a lead guitarist of famous India rock group "Indian Ocean" to act as a decoy customer who had visited the shop of Respondent No. 2 sometime in first week of July 2004 in order to make a sham purchase of one 19 mm board of ZIRCON brand.
10. I say that, when Complainant No. 3 met me in July 2004, she showed me the invoice No. 129 (annexed as CW 1/2) obtained by the decoy customer, which showed that Respondent No. 2 had sold the same 19 mm ZIRCON board for Rs. 28 per sq. feet to the decoy customer, but overcharged the Complainants by selling the identical product for Rs. 38 per sq. ft.
11. I say that, I and the complainants agreed that we should visit the shop of Respondent No. 2 and question him on various issues related to the price and quality of the products. Thus, I along with Complainant Nos. 1, 3 and Captain Amar Malli, (who is a Pilot and family friend of Complainants) met Respondent No. 2 at his shop, Build Aids Timber in Gurgaon on two occasions i.e. July 9, 2004 and July 11, 2004.
12. I say that, when we entered the shop of Respondent No. 2 on July 9, 2004 he was sitting with some of his staff. Complainant No. 3 then confronted him with the evidence/quotations she had gathered from the survey of timber market in Gurgaon and also the invoice of the decoy customer No. 129. Complainant No. 3 explained in detail about the various items of teak-wood, laminates, boards etc. that she had purchased from Respondents, and how they were inferior in quality and how Respondent No. 2 had heavily over-charged her on each of those items.
13. I say that, Respondent No. 2 got flustered and kept fumbling for words. Respondent No. 2 did not deny the sale transactions and had a look at the invoices, including the invoice No. 129 of decoy customer. After having a look, he apologized saying that his staff made such mistakes in billing at times and that Complainant No. 3 should let him know what was the total amount of overcharge and he would refund the same. Complainant No. 3 however, reminded Respondent No. 2 that all billing was done under his supervision and scrutiny and it was questionable how his staff, made such mistakes repeatedly.
14. I say that Complainant No. 3 specifically asked him why the decoy customer had been charged only Rs. 28 per sq. ft. for ZIRCON 19 mm board, and they had been charged Rs. 10 extra, i.e. Rs. 38 per sq. ft. In response, respondent No. 2 stated that the decoy customer must have been supplied with inferior quality board.
15. I say that the Complainant No. 3 then pointed out to Respondent No. 2 that there was nothing in the invoice No. 129 to show that the 19 mm ZIRCQN board supplied to the decoy customer was of second grade of inferior quality. The Complainant No. 3 told Respondent No. 2 that she had in fact paid for the board obtained by decoy customer and had it been delivered to her house later. On inspection, Complainant No. 3 found that the 19 mm ZIRCON boards sold to decoy customer was no different in quality to the 19 mm. ZIRCON boards supplied to her at the higher price of Rs. 38 per sq. ft. I say that, the Respondent No. 2 was silent and did not make any further comments.
16. I say that in the course of the meeting on July 9, 2004 Complainant No. 3 made several inquiries about the brands ZIRCON and GAB. Complainant No. 3 told Respondent No. 2 that none of the timber traders she had met in the Gurgaon sold or had heard of the brand, ZIRCON or G.A.B. and this had heightened her suspicions that Respondent No. 2 adopted unfair trade practices by sourcing low-grade products from local manufacturers and stamped them with his own trade mark ZIRCON and GAB. and represented to his gullible customers that these were high grade wood products manufactured by reputed companies. I say that Respondent No. 2 once again remained silent and did not give any information on the brands ZIRCON and GAB.
17. I say that, Respondent No. 2 then surprisingly and shamelessly tried to pass the blame to the Complainants carpenter by stating that, as is customary in their trade, carpenter had demanded an exorbitant commission from Respondent No. 2 in order to approve the natural teak wood and other materials. Respondent No. 2 stated that he had to load the costs of commission onto the price of the various wood products and keep the carpenter happy."
However, in his cross-examination CW-2 admitted that he did not accompany the Complainant at the time of purchasing the goods and that he does not know Shri Susmit Sen. At the same time he reiterated his version that Complainant No. 3 had discussed the issue of purchases made from Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and over charging by them.
26. In his affidavit CW 3, Captain Amar Malli stated that Complainant had discussed the issue of purchase of teak wood, etc. and the fact that Respondents had cheated her. Paragraphs 8 to 14 of the affidavit of CW 3 are extracted below:
"8. I say that the Complainant No. 3 and I met at her house on July 9, 2004 and showed me the original invoices issued by Respondents against purchase of various wood materials being Bill No. 552 dated March 9, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/3), Bill dated March 9, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/4), Bill dated March 21, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/5), Bill dated April 3, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/6), Bill dated May 28, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/7), Bill dated June 2, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/8), and Bill dated July 8, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/9) to the Complaint.
9. I say that Complainant No. 3 told me that she had met several timber traders in the Gurgaon and discussed about the specifications, quality and price of various wood materials and, also obtained written quotations of products, which were identical or similar to the ones sold by Respondents. Though, we had not heard of some of the brands like ZIRCON or G.A.B., Complainant was able to make some comparisons by questioning me about the various items of wood, my wife and I had purchased for our house.
10. I say that, the Complainant No. 3 also showed me on July 9, 2004 as stated above, the quotations of Goyal-Ply-N-Wood dated July 5, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/10), Woodpeckers India (P) Limited (undated) (annexed as CW 1/11), and Siddharth Plywood dated July 8, 2004 (annexed as CW 1/12), to the Complaint.
11. I say that Complainant No. 3 also told me that she had deployed one of her friends, Mr. Susmit Sen, to act as a decoy customer who had on her request purchased one 19 mm board of ZIRCON brand and the invoice obtained from Respondent No. 2 obtained showed that he had sold the same for Rs. 28 per sq. feet, whereas the same product was sold to her for Rs. 38 per sq. ft. This is evidenced by Bill No. 129 (annexed as CW 1/2) issued in the name of Sentieny Production Pvt. Ltd.
12. I say that Complainants thus requested me to accompany them for a meeting with Respondent No. 2 at his shop, so that they could confront him on this issue.
13. I say that I along with Complainant Nos. 1, 3 and (Retd.) Wing Commander Prakash, who was related to Complainants, met Respondent No. 2 at his shop, "Build Aids Timber" in Gurgaon, first on July 9, 2004 and then again on July 11, 2004.
14. I say that when Complainant Nos. 1 and 3 met Respondent No. 2 on July 9, 2004 Complainant No. 3 confronted Respondent No. 2 in my presence and that of Wing Commander Prakash, with the evidence/quotations she had gathered from the survey of timber market in Gurgaon and also the invoice No. 129 of the decoy customer. Complainant No. 3 complained in detail about the various items of teak-wood, laminates, boards, etc. that she had purchased from Respondents, and how they were inferior in quality and how Respondent No. 2 had heavily overcharged her on each of those items. She showed Respondent No. 2 the quotations obtained from other timber merchants in Gurgaon at the relevant time."
In his cross-examination, CW-3 admitted that he did not accompany the Complainants at the time of purchase of material, but reiterated that Complainant No. 3 had told him about the fact that she was cheated by the respondents.
27. Shri Susmit Sen who was sent by Complainant No. 3 as a decoy to purchase goods from the Respondents filed affidavit dated 24.9.2012. He supported the version of CW 1 by stating that he had visited the outlet of the Respondents in Sikanderpur in first week of July, 2004 and purchased Zircon Board of 8 x 4 x 19 mm @ Rs. 28 per sq. ft. In cross-examination, CW 4 reiterated that he is a friend of CW 1 and that he had purchased Zircon Board around July, 2004 @ Rs. 28 per sq. ft. He denied the suggestion that the salesman of Respondent No. 1 had offered three qualities of boards having different prices and that he had obtained the board having lowest price.
28. As mentioned earlier, the pleaded case of the Respondents is that the complainants had made only two purchases vide bills dated 9.3.2004 and 9.7.2004. They have also denied that Respondent No. 2 was known of the complainants. However, in cross-examination, Respondent No. 2 indirectly admitted that he knew Complainant No. 3. This is evident from the following portion of his cross-examination:
"....... I know Dr. Mrs. Brij Mohini Banta and she is my relative. Ms. Rachita is daughter of Mrs. Brij Mohini Banta. Ms. Rachita is married to Shri Rohit Lall. I dont know whether Shri Rohit Lall is the first cousin of Complainant Nos. 2 and 3. I had also attended the marriage of Shri Rohit Lall. I dont know whether Complainant Nos. 1 and 3 had attended the said wedding. I came to know later on that Complainants are related to Shri Rohit Lall. It was when the Complainants had purchased the goods from me they had told me about their relationship with Shri Rohit Lall. Before and after that, I had never met or seen them--
Q. A photograph of the wedding of Shri Rohit Lall to Ms. Rachita is shown to the witness. You are seen and present in the wedding which can be seen in the photograph (The question is objected on the ground that it goes beyond the pleadings. This is disputed by the Complainant on the ground that it is well within the pleadings.)
Ans. Yes. I was very much present at the wedding and I am seen in the photo also. (There is a request to take the document on record and mark it. The photo is taken on record and marked as RW 1/C21. In the photograph, RW 1 has been identified at point A)
Q. Another photograph of the wedding of Shri Rohit Lall to Ms. Rachita is shown to the witness. Can you identify the Complainant No. 3 in this photograph
Ans. Yes. But I did not meet her during the wedding. (There is a request to take the photograph on record and mark it. The photo is taken on record and marked as RW 1/C21. In the photograph, Complainant No. 3 has been identified at point B.)"
In further cross-examination, Respondent No. 2 stated that Shri Deepraj and Shri Girish were two employees and he was not in a position to recall the name of the third employee. He admitted that the bill marked CW 1/3 was signed by Shri Deepraj. However, in reply to most of the other questions, Respondent No. 2 either gave evasive answers or denied the suggestions made by the learned Counsel for the claimants. This is evident from the following portions of his cross-examination:
Q. CW 1/2 is shown the witness. I put it to you that this bill was issued by your company. Please identify the person who has prepared and signed the bill
Ans. I dont know since it is an undated bill. I dont know who made it and how it has come in the possession of the Complainant.
Q. I put it to you that this bill (CW 1/2) was prepared and signed by your employee Shri Gokul and the signature seen in both the bills (CW 1/1 and CW 1/2) are of Shri Gokul
Ans. But I dont authenticate this bill (CW 1/2) since it is undated. Shri Gokul must have prepared the bill (CWI/2) but I dont admit this bill because it is undated.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. I put it to you that your statement denying Ex. CW 1/2 is false, deliberate and an afterthought as you have already admitted the document during your admission/denial
Ans. I do not say that the bill does not belong to my company. I only denied the bill because the bill is undated and there is no practice in our company to issue undated bills.
Q. I put it to you that you have not disputed the genuineness of Ex. CW 1/2 and the product sold to the customer vide the said Exhibit in your reply dated 12th November, 2007 at page No. 65 (main folder) and that you have admitted to the said document. Now you are disputing the document only as an afterthought (The attention of the witness is drawn to the first sentence in page-5 of his reply dated 12th November, 2007 marked as C.) (The question is objected on the ground that it is a matter of record and that it is a matter to be addressed at the time of arguments.)
Ans. I agree that this bill (CW 1/2) belongs to my company but there is no practice in my company to issue undated bills.
Q. I put it to you that your statement that there is no practice to issue undated bills by your company is incorrect and is an improvement by you of your case and that there is no such defence taken in your reply dated 12th November, 2007 (The question is objected on the ground that it is a matter of record and that it is a matter to be addressed at the time of arguments.)
Ans. I did not raise such a contention in my reply as I had not seen the bill then. I am seeing the bill only now which has been put to me during the course of the cross-examination.
I have signed and verified my reply after reading and understanding the contents of the same. Sometimes, you overlook certain points which had not come to my knowledge at that time.
.... .... .... ....
Q. I put it to you that at the relevant time, that is, in March, 2004 to July, 2004 the price range of 1 mm., Green laminate was Rs. 600 per sheet, 0.8 mm. Green touch was approx. Rs. 425 per sheet and of 0.6 mm. Green gloss was @ Rs. 250 per sheet in the market
Ans. The company at that time had price list of all the laminates which was available at that time. I dont remember what was the actual price during that time.
Green brand was manufactured by Green Plywood Ltd. I was dealing in Green brand as Respondent Company was dealing in various brands, so Company could arrange any brand available at that time and for any sales the bills were being raised.
Q. I put it to you that Green touch of 0.8 mm. thickness were available in the market at the relevant time at the price range of Rs. 4,00 to Rs. 430 per sheet, lower grade Green gloss in the range of Rs. 250 to Rs. 280 per sheet. What you have to say
Ans. I dont remember exactly what was the exact rate during that time. Whatever was sold that attracts sales tax plus cartage and margin of profit.
Q. I put it to you that you had sold 22 sheets of Classic gold laminates of 1 mm. thickness, being tin sheets of colour 9207, 6 sheets of colours 9034 and 6 sheets of colour 6819 to the Complainants
Ans. Whatever we have sold we have raised the bill. If the bill is there, we agree that the transaction has taken place. Bill means printed bills of Respondent No. 1.
Q. I put it to you that laminates of colours 9207 and 9034 were sold by you at Rs. 900 per sheet and laminates of colours 6819 were sold at price Rs. 1,100 per sheet to the Complainants
Ans. We must have raised the printed bills for that which must be showing the rates and the quantity.
Q. I put it to you that at the relevant time, the prevailing rate in the market of the Classic Gold laminates was about Rs. 600 per sheet only
Ans. I dont remember what were the rates. Whatever we have charged must be on the bills which will attract sales tax, cartage and margin of profits.
Q. I put it to you that you had sold to Complainants 51 zircon commercial boards of 19 mm. thickness for Rs. 38 per sq. ft. on the advice given by you to the Complainants representing that the said brand is of the best quality
Ans. If we have sold 51 numbers of zircon commercial boards, we must have raised the printed bills of the Company also.
Q. I put it to you that out of the above said 51 zircon commercial boards, 30 zircon boards were of 8 ft. x 4 ft. x 19 mm., 20 zircon boards of 7 ft. x 4 ft. x 19 mm and one board of 8 ft. x 3 ft. x 19 mm. were sold to Complainants by you
Ans. If we have sold them this quantity must have raised authenticated bill as I have said earlier.
Q. I put it to you that Respondent Company had charged the Complainant of Rs. 58,672 for the sale of 51 zircon boards which the Complainants paid
Ans. If company has received this money then the Complainants must have issued the cheque for this amount and the bill should have been raised by the Respondent Company.
Q. I put it to you that board of Green, Duro and Century make were of between Rs. 38 to Rs. 42 per sq. ft. at the relevant time
Ans. These Companies used to make board of different kinds and quality and species. I dont remember the rates prevailing at that time.
Q. I put it to you that commercial boards of local brand of 19 mm. thickness were available in the market in the price range of Rs. 25 per sq. ft
Ans. No. This is not true. Rate depends on condition and the quality of the board.
Q. I put it to you that commercial board of Jupiter brand and Alpine brand are local brands
Ans. No. Jupiter brand is made in Assam and made by Birla Company which is closed now and no longer in the business of plywood. I dont remember what was the prevailing price of Alpine at that time and who was the manufacturer. I dont remember since when the Jupiter brand of commercial board is not available in the market.
Q. Whether zircon board of 19 mm commercial board were of ISI mark at the relevant time
Ans. Company used to manufacture various brands in the same factory and they were selling zircon board as ISI mark in the market.
Q. What was the ISI number and marking given to the zircon board of 19 mm which was sold to Complainants
Ans. I dont remember what the number allotted to ISI Company at that time. Whatever has been sold to the Complainant is against the printed voucher of the Respondent Company.
Q. I put it to you that the zircon boards sold to Complainants were not of ISI mark/brand
Ans. They should produce the documents of the zircon board and the quantity sold to them. Whatever has been sold as zircon was of ISI mark as we have been assured by the manufacturer that this brand carries an ISI mark.
Q. Is it correct that each ISI branded/approved product carries a distinctive number and marking
Ans. I dont remember what was the system available during that time for the Plywood industry. Of course, now it is mandatory required to print a number on each and every board.
Q. I put it to you that you had sold to Complainants 25 zircon BST BWP (Both side teak, boiling water proof plys) and out of that 5 plys were of 8 ft. x 4 ft. x 12 mm @ Rs. 34 per sq. ft., 10 plys of 7 ft. x 4 ft. x 6 mm Rs. 25 per sq. ft., 5 plys of 8 ft. x 4 ft. x 6 mm @ Rs. 25 per sq. ft. and 5 plys of 7 ft. x 3 ft. x 6 mm @ 25 per sq. ft. for total cost of Rs. 19,065 and which was paid to you.
Ans. As stated earlier, we must have raised the bill against this quantity. If the printed bill of the company is there, then the sale must have taken place.
.... .... .... ....
Q. I put it to you that the prevailing price range at the relevant time of the boiling water proof ply manufactured by Duro, Century and Green were of Rs. 38 per sq. ft. for 12 mm thickness and Rs. 24 mm for 6 mm thickness
Ans. I dont remember as of now what was the prevailing rate at that time.
.... .... .... ....
Q. I put it to you that price range of the ply of local brands like zircon of boiling water proof were in the range of Rs. 7 to Rs. 12 for 6 mm thickness and Rs. 15 to Rs. 20 for 12 mm thickness at the relevant time
Ans. I do not remember the rates this time after 10 years of the Complaint.
Q. I put it to you that you had sold 3 sheets of OST (1 side teak plys) of the brand GAB of the size 7 ft. x 4 ft. x 0.6 mm @ Rs. 33 per sq. ft. for a total of Rs. 2,772 and which was paid to you by the Complainant
Ans. If he sold this material then we must have raised the bill for the quantity as stated earlier.
Q. I put it to you that brand GAB is a local brand
Ans. It was manufactured in Yamuna Nagar and you can treat it as a local brand. I dont remember the name of the Company which manufactures CAB brand.
.... .... .... ....
Q. I put it to you that the prevailing price range of 0.6 mm. OST manufactured by Duro, Century, Green was between Rs. 33 and 37 per sq. ft. and local brand like GAB between Rs. 18 and Rs. 20 per sq. ft.
Ans. As stated earlier, I dont remember the rate prevailing at that time
(Emphasis added)
The remaining part of cross-examination of RW 2 contains denial of each and every question. However, as the same does not have any direct bearing on the issues arising in the complaint, I do not consider it necessary to reproduce the same.
29. The careful analysis of the pleadings and evidence shows that while the claimants have been able to prove that they had purchased various items from Respondent No. 1 between March - July, 2004 and paid for the same through cheques, which were duly encashed, the respondents have failed to controvert the case of the Claimants. The manner in which Respondent No. 2 has answered the questions put to him in cross-examination gives an impression he has tried to hide the truth.
30. An ancillary question which deserves to be considered is whether the respondents had charged prices higher than the market rates. The complainants case on the issue of excessive price is proved not only by the testimony CW 1 but more importantly by the evidence of CW 4 Shri Susmit Sen who had purchased Zircon Board from Respondent No. 1 at the asking of Complainant No. 3 and paid price @ Rs. 28 per sq.ft. as against Rs. 38 per sq. ft. charged from the complainants. In her statement, CW 1 categorically stated that the respondents had charged excessive price for various items. She has also mentioned that her friend Shri Susmit Sen was sent as a decoy for purchasing one of the articles from the respondents and he purchased Zircon Board of 19 mm @ Rs. 28 per sq. ft. This part of the statement of CW 1 is fully corroborated by the testimony of Shri Susmit Sen who stated that he had purchased Zircon Board from the respondents at the asking of Complainant No. 3 and paid Rs. 28 per sq. ft. In cross-examination, CW 4 denied the suggestion that the salesman of Respondent No. 1 had shown three types of boards and he had selected the board having the lowest price. Attempts were made on behalf of the respondents to discredit the testimony of CW 4 but they could not succeed. Therefore, the statement of CW 1 and CW 4 can be relied upon for recording a finding that the respondents had charged excessive price from the Complainants and they are guilty of indulging in unfair trade practice as defined under Section 36A of the Act.
31. I shall now consider the question whether the quality of goods sold by the respondents was inferior than the one projected by Respondent No. 2. In her affidavit CW 1 stated that she had taken her carpenter to the shop of Respondent No. 2 but she has not offered an explanation as to why the concerned carpenter was not examined to prove that the quality of goods sold by the respondents was inferior or sub-standard. It is neither the pleaded case of the complaints nor any evidence has been produced by them to show that the carpenter was not traceable or that he refuse to support their case. That apart the complainants did not examine any other expert to prove their allegation about the quality of the goods. Therefore it is not possible to record a tiding that the Respondents had sold goods of inferior quality to the complainants and this also amounts to unfair trade practices. In the result, the complaint is disposed of in the following terms:
(i) It is declared that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have indulged in unfair trade practice inasmuch as they charged excessive price in respect of the goods sold to the complainants.
(ii) The respondents should refund the excessive price i.e. Rs. 1,52,149 to the complainants with interest @ 12% per annum from 9.7.2004 till the date of actual payment.
(iii) The respondents shall pay the aforesaid amount to the complainants within three months from the date of receipt/service of copy of this order. If the needful is not done within 3 months then the respondent shall have to pay interest @ 18% per annum from 9.7.2004 till the date of actual payment and face other punitive consequences.
(iv) The complainants prayer for award of damages and/or compensation is rejected because they have failed to prove that the goods sold by the respondents were of inferior quality.
Radhika Lall And Ors v. Build Aids Timber Pvt. Ltd. And Ors
Radhika Lall And Ors v. Build Aids Timber Pvt. Ltd. And Ors
(Competition Appellate Tribunal. New Delhi)
UTPE No. 113 of 2007 | 03-07-2015
Advocate List
For Petitioner
- Om Prakash
- Advocate
For Respondent
- M. Dev Kamal
- Advocate
Bench
- G.S. Singhvi, J. (Chairman)
Eq Citations
- 2016 (1) CPJ 1 (TA)
Head Note
- Sale of property — By spouse — Without consent of other spouse — Void ab initio — Appellant, owner of flat in cooperative housing society — Flat sold by appellant's wife to respondent without appellant's knowledge or consent — Sale held void ab initio — Appellant entitled to possession of flat and damages for trespass — Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 41.
