Chatterji, J.This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor 1 against an order rejecting her objection u/s 47, Civil P.C. She was defendant 1 in the original suit. Defendant 2 was her husband, a lunatic represented by her as his guardian. The suit was brought for recovery of money said to have been advanced by the plaintiff for the maintenance and other necessary expenses of defendant 2. In the plaint it was alleged that defendant 1 had pledged with the plaintiff some of her ornaments when on one occasion she borrowed Rs. 400 in cash from the plaintiff. The plaintiff prayed for a decree against both the defendants. There was also a prayer for recovery of the amount by selling the pledged ornaments which were set forth in Schedule C of the plaint and the balance from the income of the estate of defendant 2.
2. One of the pleas taken by defendant 1 in her defence was that the ornaments, being her personal property, were not liable to be sold, as prayed for by the plaintiff. With reference to this plea the following issue was" framed: "4. Is plaintiff entitled to sell the ornaments of defendant 1 which are her personal property" On this issue the finding was that the ornaments constituted the personal property of defendant 1 and the plaintiff had no right to recover his dues by selling them. The issue was thus answered in the negative. The suit however was decreed in the following terms:
Hence it is ordered that the suit be decreed in part and plaintiff do recover Rs. 2346-13-6 from defendants. He do recover costs according to success besides future interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum. Pleaders fee 5 per cent.
3. The plaintiff proceeded to execute his decree and in execution he prayed, for sale of the very ornaments with regard to which relief was sought but refused in the original suit. Judgment-debtor 1 raised the objection that the ornaments, being her personal property, were not liable to be sold in execution of the decree. The learned Subordinate Judge rejected the objection and directed that the decree-holder might bring the ornaments to sale by attaching them as prayed for. Against this order judgment-debtor 1 has preferred this appeal. The main contention on behalf of the appellant is that the plaintiff having specifically prayed in the original suit for recovery of his dues by sale of the ornaments in question and that prayer having been refused, the Court executing the decree has no power to sell those properties. In substance the contention is that the matter is res judicata. In my opinion this contention must prevail. The Court executing the decree is bound by the decision in the original suit. There being a distinct issue raised on the point in the suit and that issue having been decided against the plaintiff, it is not open to him to obtain by execution what was expressly denied to him by the decision in the original suit.
4. Mr. S. Mahanty on behalf of the respondent contends that the decree as it stands is quite unambiguous and makes both the defendants personally liable. The decree nowever shows that the claim was "for recovery of money incurred on account of maintenance of lunatic Jagadischandra Das, defendant 2." This suggests that the money was payable by defendant 2. On the face of the decree therefore there is some ambiguity. Apart from this, it is always open to a Court executing the decree to interpret it with reference to the judgment. Reading the judgment in the present case, there appears to be no doubt that it was decided that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover his dues by selling the ornaments in question.
5. In this view the objection of judgment-debtor 1 must be allowed. I would accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Court below and direct that the ornaments in question be exempted from attachment. The appellant is entitled to costs in both the Courts; hearing fee two gold mohurs in this Court and one gold mohur in the Court below.
Dhavle, J.
6. I agree. The learned Subordinate Judge seems to have been under some curious misapprehension regarding the powers of the executing Court. He began with the proposition that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree, arid he apparently took this to mean that it was not open to him to look into the judgment. He proceeded to observe that even if he was permitted to look into the judgment, he did not think (sic) how it could help the objector. He reproduced in full the finding of the trial Court on the issue whether the plaintiff was "entitled to sell the ornaments of defendant 1 which are her personal property." He then added:
As for myself, I do not fully understand what the learned Subordinate Judge meant. When the ornaments, whether they are pledged or not, constitute defendant ls personal property, I cannot understand how the plaintiff cannot have any right to recover his dues by selling them when a decree has been passed against both of them personally in a suit to which both of them were parties.
7. Having regard to the issue definitely framed and found against the plaintiff by the trial Court, it was not open to the executing Court to consider how far the finding of the trial Court was correct. If the learned Judge below had carefully looked into the decree, he would have seen that on the face of it there was an ambiguity which could only be resolved by a reference to the whole judgment. As a matter of fact, the learned advocate for the respondent decree-holder has invited us to look into the plaint as well. We have done so, and the plaint makes it perfecty clear how the very particular issue arose and arose at the instance of the plaintiff. The finding on that issue against the plaintiff, though his claim was decreed in part, must be treated as res judicata, not having been appealed against and it is impossible to go behind it in execution proceedings.