Gautam Kumar Choudhary, J.

1. Appellant is the plaintiff and the appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree of reversal passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Seraikella in Title Appeal No. 11 of 1999 by which the plaintiff's suit has been dismissed.

2. The plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession, in the alternative recovery of possession and for grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit property as detailed in Schedule-C of the plaint. A further prayer has been made for declaration that survey entries in the record of Rights made in the year 1964 and of 1983 with respect of the suit properties were wrong.

3. The suit land measuring was previously under the ownership and management of Saraikela Raj Estate and in the year 1945 Maharaja Aditya Pratap Singh Dev was the ruling chief of this Estate and he used to settle the land for the purpose of cultivation and for various development works by grant of Agya Patra. On 27.5.1945, he settled the suit land for agriculture to Raghu Nath Das by Agya Patra. The settlee reclaimed the land and made it fit for going various crops and also constructed a house in a portion of the land. Raghu Nath Das was the devotee of the plaintiff and by virtue of a Deed of Trust dedicated the suit land to the plaintiff vide Deed No. 8859 Dated 10.12.1969. For better management of the plaintiffs' land the trustees were:-

I. Chaman Singh

II. Swaroop Singh

III. Makhan Singh

IV. General Secretary of Radha Soami Satsang

4. According to the instrument of accession the estate of Saraikela was made part of the District of Singhbhum of the State of Bihar. After the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Hereinafter called BLR Act) came into operation the proprietary interest of Raja of Saraikela vested in the state government except the agricultural Raiyati land settled by the Maharaja.

5. During the survey settlement operation of 1959, the suit land was also surveyed and the portion of it were recorded under Khata No. 44 in Kyami right of mouza-Kuluptanga, Survey Khata No. 130, Plot No. 577 having an area of 0.82 acres with respect to the aforesaid land, the rent was assessed in the Rent Fixation Case No. 71/72, u/s. 85 of the CNT Act and rent was fixed. The land of Raghu Nath Das under Khata No. 81, Plot No. 598, Gora 2, having an area of 6.21 acres was wrongly recorded in the Khata of Anabad Bihar Sarkar in the possession of Makhan Singh showing illegal possession since 1946. He had made a false representation and got the said Plot No. 598 recorded under Khata No. 81 in the survey settlement of 1952-59, finally published on 13th December, 1961 in his forcible possession since 1946. R.S. Plot No. 573,598,579 and portion of Plot No. 576 having total area of 18.30 acres have been carved out from the old C.S. Abdul (1925-27) survey Plot Nos. 195 and 214 and not from Plot No. 157. It is averred that the said Makhan Singh in collusion with the survey settlement staffs collusively got Khata 152 recorded in his name and his brother without having any right title interest and possession therein against which the plaintiff has filed a title suit. Similarly other lands were recorded in the name of State of Bihar and in the illegal possession of Raghu Nath Das since 1946. R.S. Plot Nos. 573, 598, 579 having an area of 1.74 acres, 3.42 acres and 2.52 acres were wrongly recorded in the name of the State of Bihar and Khata No. 81 wrongly shown be in the illegal possession of Raghunath Das. Similarly 18.30 acres carved out of the plot 576 was also included in the name of Khata No. 81 in the State of Bihar.

6. The sum and substance of the plaintiff's case is that the predecessor in interest was in possession of the suit land and wrong entries were made in the Record of Rights published after survey in the year 1964 and 1983 in the name of State of Bihar which is claimed to be that of the plaintiff.

7. On 08.08.1997, the Circle Officer attempted to demolish the boundary wall of the Satsang. It was this act where the plaintiff was threatened to be dispossessed that the present suit has been filed.

8. The case of the defendants is that the suit lands were never settled in favour of Raghu Nath Das and the said Agyan Patra dated 27.05.1945 was a forged and fabricated document and Raghu Nath Das never possessed the suit land in any manner. It is admitted that the Raja during 1945 used to settle small area of lands for housing purpose after observing various formalities and the delivery of possession was effected only after payment of salami and rents and that too under certain terms and conditions mere granting of Agyan Patra without the aforesaid formalities can never be regarded as a settlement. Raghu Nath Das was a minor of 14 years during 1945 which will be evident from the Judgment in C/2 (B) Case No. 72/1966 passed by Munsif Magistrate, Saraikela dated 29.04.1967 wherein he was an accused aged about 35 years. The said claim on the basis of settlement and the subsequent trust deed was intended to grab government land. The land belongs to the State of Bihar and has been recorded as such in revisional survey operation and NAC survey. In order to create evidence of possession, the plaintiff started giving boundary wall which the villagers constituting the Gram Seva Samiti moved the Honorable Court in C.W.J.C. No. 3683/96 (R). The High Court ordered spot enquiry by the L.R.D.C. in which it was found that plaintiff had started illegal construction of boundary wall not only over the lands of the State of Bihar but also over the lands of aboriginals of the village blocking public road, for which a case under B.P.L.E. Act had been initiated against the plaintiff and the present suit has been filed to evade this encroachment case. The plaintiff had sufficient knowledge about the final publication of record of rights consequent upon land survey conducted in the year 1964 and 1983 and therefore, the plea that they came to know about the said entries in 1997 is false.

9. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the following main issues were framed:

IV. Is the suit barred by limitation

V. Has the plaintiff got any cause of action to file the suit against the State of Bihar

VI. Was the suit land previously under Seraikella Raj Estate

VII Has the Raja of Seraikella issued Agyan Patra in favour of Raghu Nath Das in the year 1945

VIII. Has Raghu Nath Das and thereafter the plaintiff got any right, title, interest and possession over suit lands on the strength of the trust deed executed by Raghu Nath Das in favour of Board of trustees of Radha Swami Satsang

10. The learned Trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff by holding that defendant State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) did not acquire any title by virtue of entry in the finally published revisional survey record of rights in 1964 Survey as well as in N.A.C. survey of 1983. Suit was decreed mainly on the ground that Raghu Nath Das came in the exclusive possession of the suit land by virtue of the Agya Patra dated 27.5.19 45 (Ext-1) of the erstwhile ruler of Seraikella Raj. As he was in exclusive possession of the suit lands, a portion of the said land had been recorded in his name in 1964 survey and the rest had been erroneously recorded in the name of State of Bihar. No document had been filed to show that lands of CS Khata No. 94 of CS plot No. 195/A and CS Plot No. 214/A did vest with the State of Bihar under the provisions of B.L.R. Act 1950. On the other hand, the plaintiff filed the original Agyan Patra Ext. 1 issued by the ruler of Seraikella which was an authentic document as it was more than 30 years old. Further the claim of the plaintiff had been recognised by Halka Karamchari (DW-1). In B.P.L.E. Case No. 6/97-98 (Exhibit 6) the possessory note of the plaintiff has been admitted.

11. The learned Appellate Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff on the ground that by the said Agyan Patra the land was not settled to Raghu Nath Das, rather, he was only permitted to reclaim the same within five years. The rent was to be fixed thereafter. There was no evidence to show that rent of any portion of the land mentioned in Ext-1 was fixed in the name of said Raghu Nath Das or he paid 'salami'. The revisional survey took place in the year 1958 to 1963 and the khatian was finally published in the year 1963 which has been adduced into evidence on behalf of the defendant and marked as Ext. C, in which RS Plot No. 576 was recorded in the name of Anabad Bihar Sarkar. This entry was never challenged by Raghu Nath Das who had full knowledge about the said entry. In page 4 of the certified copy of the trust deed (Ext. 7), it has been stated that land had been reclaimed by Raghu Nath Das and had been wrongly recorded in the name of Anawad Bihar Sarkar. The details of the lands given in trust have been mentioned which shows that an area of 18.30 acres out of Plot No. 576(A) Don II was given. From perusal of Exhibit-C, the RS Khatian of Plot No. 576, the total area of the plot is 24.50 acres. It is not mentioned in the deed which portion of RS Plot No. 576(A) had been given as there was no such plot, which was a creation of the plaintiff. In the possessory column of NAC record of rights of Khata No. 285 (Ext 4/A) illegal possession of trustee Radha Swami Satsang has been recorded since 1965. An objection was filed against the said entry u/s. 90 of the CNT Act, in the court of Assistant Survey Settlement officer Jamshedpur which was rejected by order dated 11.01.1989 with respect to the suit land. This order was never challenged in any superior court. Regarding the finding of the trial Court of admission of plaintiffs possession in view of BPLE Case No. 83 being dropped, has been observed that such an inference was unwarranted as this case had been dropped not on the said ground but because BPLE case No. 3 of 1964-65 was decided in favour of the plaintiff, but the judgment of those cases were not brought on record.

12. The appeal has been admitted to be heard on following substantial questions of law:

"whether the court of appeal below has erred in law reversing the finding of the trial court on the issue of title and possession ignoring the most important documents including the order passed in a series of land encroachment proceedings initiated since 1963 - 64 and particularly when those encroachment proceedings were disposed of or dropped after recording possession of the plaintiff/appellant."

13. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that by Agyan Patra (Ext-1) 64 Bighas, 5 kathas of land out of Abdul Survey Plot Nos. 195 and 214 were granted to Raghu Nath Das for clearing these jungle land within five years. It was further stipulated that the land which was cleared and made cultivable within a period of five years would be deemed to be settled. There was no clause that it would be reverted back to the estate. No part of the land was reverted after coming into force of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. The trial Court's finding on is genuineness was binding. The return filed by the Seraikella Estate before the State of Bihar has not been adduced into evidence on behalf of the defendant. Thus, adverse inference has to be drawn against the respondents on this count. There was no basis for entry of the land in the name of state of Bihar in the khatian of 1946 (Ext-4) and there was no document filed to show that the land had vested in the State of Bihar. Possession of the plaintiff has been recorded both in the revisional survey record of rights 1964 and in the NAC survey of 1983. BPLE Case No. 43 of 1981 - 82 was withdrawn vide order dated 29.11.1981 (Ext-5) and BPLE Case No. 6 of 1997 - 98 (Ext. 6) was also dropped. In view of the continuous possession, the presumption of title was in favour of the plaintiff in view of Section 110 of the Evidence Act. The defendant State has not discharged the burden of proof to rebut the presumption of ownership. Reliance has been placed on  (2003) 3 SCC 472; Chief Conservator of Forests, Government of A.P. Vs. Collector & Others (para 18-21). Even if it was assumed that the possession of Raghu Nath Das was illegal since the time of vesting of Estates, his possession ripened into title by the principle of deemed settlement. This principle has been enunciated in Suraj Ahir vs. Prithvi Nath Singh : AIR 1963 SC 454. The person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by the due process of law and once 12 years has elapsed even the onus to right to eject him is lost and the possession acquires right title and interest. The proposition of law is supported by the judgment of Hon'ble the Apex court rendered in Ravinder Kaur Grewal Vs. Manjit Kaur Civil Appeal No. 7764 of 2014. On the point of limitation reliance is placed on Daya Singh Vs. Gurudeo Singh  (2010) 2 SCC 194 wherein it has been held that:

"mere existence of a wrong entry in the revenue records does not give rise to a cause of action within the meaning of Article 58 of the. In any case the record of rights does not create any title."

14. The learned additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State has argued that the claim of title on the basis of adverse possession is misplaced to the core. The onus was on the plaintiff to prove the basic ingredients of adverse possession. Mere dropping of an encroachment proceeding cannot be an evidence of adverse possession. Reliance has been placed on Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah, (2010) 2 SCC 461 wherein it has been held:

"46. In our considered view, the approach adopted by the High Court was ex facie erroneous because the absence of final order in the proceedings initiated under the Encroachment Act cannot lead to an inference that the authority concerned had recognised the possession of Gonda Mallaiah over the schedule land. That apart, even if this Court was to presume that the proceedings initiated against Gonda Mallaiah under the Encroachment Act had been dropped, the said presumption cannot be overstretched for entertaining the respondents' claim that their possession was open and hostile qua the true owner i.e. the Government. The payment of land revenue by Gonda Mallaiah and/or the respondents and making of applications by them to the Government for assignment of the schedule land or regularisation of their possession, completely demolish their case that their possession was open and hostile and they have acquired title by adverse possession.

In this context, it is necessary to remember that it is well-nigh impossible for the State and its instrumentalities including the local authorities to keep everyday vigilance/watch over vast tracts of open land owned by them or of which they are the public trustees. No amount of vigil can stop encroachments and unauthorised occupation of public land by unscrupulous elements, who act like vultures to grab such land, raise illegal constructions and, at times, succeeded in manipulating the State apparatus for getting their occupation/possession and construction regularised. It is our considered view that where an encroacher, illegal occupant or land grabber of public property raises a plea that he has perfected title by adverse possession, the Court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, care and circumspection. Any laxity in this regard may result in destruction of right/title of the State to immovable property and give an upper hand to the encroachers, un-authorised occupants or land grabbers".

15. It is argued on behalf of the State that the learned trial Court was in error to cast the burden of proof on the defendant. Case was brought on behalf of the plaintiff and in terms of Sections 101 to 103 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proof was on it to lead to prove its case. Reliance has been placed on Union of India & Others Vs. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited & Others  (2014) 2 SCC 269 wherein it has been held:

"In a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out an established case for granting such declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set by defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff. The legal position, therefore, is clear that the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and possession could succeed only on the strength of its own title and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus on it. Even if the title set up by the defendants is found against them, in the absence of establishment of plaintiffs own title, plaintiff must be non-suited".

16. It has been rightly argued that proof of a document and evidential effect of a document are two different and distinct juristic aspects. While the proof of a document is dealt with in part II its effect has been discussed in part III of the Evidence Act. The effect of a document will depend on the nature of the document and title of the persons who transfers title through a particular instrument. Only because an instrument of conveyance has been formerly proved, shall not mean that it will in all cases convey title. It has been held in Gangamma v. Shivalingaiah, (2005) 9 SCC 359

"6. Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as under:

"90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old.--Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the court in the particular case considers proper, the court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested."

7. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision would clearly go to show that in terms thereof merely a presumption is raised to the effect that signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting and in case a document is executed or attested, the same was executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested.

8. Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act nowhere provides that in terms thereof the authenticity of the recitals contained in any document is presumed to be correct. The High Court, therefore, committed a manifest error of law in interpreting the provision of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act and, thus, fell into an error in formulating the substantial question of law. As the purported substantial question of law was formulated on a wrong reading of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. We may furthermore notice that even if a formal execution of a document is proved, the same by itself cannot lead to a presumption that the recitals contained therein are also correct. The mere execution of a document, in other words, does not lead to the conclusion that the recitals made therein are correct, and subject to the statutory provisions contained in Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, it is open to the parties to raise a plea contra thereto".

It has been held in Agnigundala Venkata Ranaga Rao Vs. Indukuru Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors.  2017 (3) PLJR 104 SC

"a person can transfer only those rights, which he has in the property thus when the appellant was prohibited to transfer any of his rights, title and interest in the suit land by virtue of provisions of the to any person, respondents too could not acquire any right, title and interest in the suit land through sale deed from appellant."

17. The test to determine the validity of any document is firstly, to look into its nature and secondly, to see whether it has been acted upon by subsequent events which followed the execution of the document. The subsequent events can be a good index to show whether the document was followed or it was only a sham paper transaction. List of subsequent dates and events in civil cases can be tool and guide to a Court grappling with the issue of veracity and effect of such document. If the document is a registered instrument of conveyance, there will be presumption in its favour, which is however rebut table.

18. The edifice of plaintiff's case for title and possession is raised on a document under the name agyan patra (Ext-1) purported to be issued by the ex-ruler in favour of one Raghu Nath Das. A bare perusal of this document will reveal its nature that it was executed for a period of five years for reclamation of the land on the condition of payment of rent. It can be called an agricultural lease like a deed of settlement which was necessarily required to be registered in terms of Section 17 of the Registration Act. Unregistered agricultural lease has been accepted in some cases to be valid when there is long standing evidence of possession following such settlement. It has been held in Mt. Tapesara Kuer v. Kalap Rajwar;  AIR 1957 Pat 92 at page 94

"20. Therefore, the long standing practice to treat a kabuliyat, executed by the lessee and accepted by the lessor, as the instrument creating a tenancy has not in any way been affected by the Transfer of Property Act. An agricultural lease may be made orally and if the subsequent acts and conduct of the parties disclose that the lease so created was acted upon the lease is a valid lease in law."
Mt. Ugni v. Chowa Mahto,AIR 1968 Pat 302 at page 307

"Patna High Court has, in several decisions, held that, if a person claims to have obtained raiyati interest by virtue of an unregistered document and further asserts that he came into actual possession of the same and has continued in such possession and that his payment of rent has been accepted by the landlord, his title to raiyati interest must be recognised, even though the unregistered lease is inadmissible as evidence of title.........The unregistered hukumnama, though inadmissible, could be looked into to show the nature and character of possession. Oral evidence of the terms of the lease will not be admissible; but, independent of the hukumnama, the rent receipts themselves indicate the rate of rent, the area and the nature of the right of the lessee."
It has been held in Mahadeo Oraon Vs. State of Bihar 2009 (3) JCR 340 that unregistered hukumnama is not admissible and cannot be considered as deed of title.

19. The principle that emerges from these authorities is that there is requirement of registration, like any other document conveying title, whether it is a hukumnama or a kabuliyat or agyan patra. This is all the more necessary to check malpractices of manufacturing of documents by antedating to stake claim of title on the basis of settlement of land purported to be made by ex-proprietors and ex-tenure holders. However, if there is evidence of unregistered deed of settlement followed by long and continuous possession by accepting rent and issuing rent receipts, then valid settlement can be inferred from subsequent conduct. Such documents then can be used for constructing the nature of possession. Whether such possession ripened into title will depend on facts of each case and will have to be answered accordingly.

20. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the suit land was recorded under the ex-ruler of Saraikela Estate. It has also not been disputed that the ex-ruler had a right of settlement. The matter of dispute is whether a settlement in perpetuity had been made in favour of Raghunath Das, or it was a sham document to evade the impending land reforms legislation at the twilight stage of independence of the country. This brings into fore the requirement of evidence of subsequent events as stated earlier. There is no evidence of possession except the illegal possession of Raghu Nath Das as recorded in the revisional survey record of rights published in the year published in the year 1964 and that of the plaintiff in N.A.C. survey of 1983.

21. If the land was settled in the name of Raghu Nath Das before vesting and he was in cultivating possession of the land, he should have been accepted as tenant, rent roll prepared in his name, rent accepted and rent receipt would have been issued in his name. There is no such evidence on record. On the contrary, the evidences are to the effect that the said land was never recorded in the name of Raghu Nath Das but in the name of anaabad Bihar Sarkar and the possession of Raghu Nath Das has been shown to be illegal. This continued in both the surveys of 1962-63 and 1983. Land encroachment proceedings were drawn against the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest. Dropping of any encroachment proceeding cannot be regarded as admission on the part of the State of acquiesce to adverse possession, as held in Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah (supra).

22. Plea of adverse possession has been taken on behalf of the appellant on the ground that illegal possession of the plaintiff and its predecessor-in-interest has been shown to be in remarks column. The plea is not sustainable for the reason that plaintiff's claim of title is based on agyan patra which by its very nature was an agricultural lease for five years on payment of rent. Possession given under a lease is a permissive possession and requires special action to turn hostile to the owner which is the requirement of adverse possession. Before the period of the lease ended, Saraikela which was a sovereign princely State under British suzerainty merged with the State of Bihar on 18th May 1948. As a historical fact on merger of the State in 1948, reversionary rights stood transferred from the princely State to the State of Bihar. Property which the plaintiff claims was earlier in the princely State of Seraikela and then came into state of Bihar and is presently is the district kharsawan-Seraikela, State of Jharkhand. The said land vested in the State of Bihar after coming into force of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. There is no evidence that the said lease was ever renewed or the permissive possession became hostile to the State. Principle is once a lessee always a lessee. The State consistently asserted its claim over the suit property and did not acquiesce in the illegal possession of the plaintiff over it and initiated land encroachment proceedings. Had there been any evidence that the plaintiff had been accepted as a tenant by the State then it could have been regarded as deemed settlement by the State. The authority relied upon by the appellant on the point of deemed settlement is with regard to the land in khas possession of the proprietor or tenure holder under Section 6 of the B.L.R. Act, 1950 and not in the context of lessee or settlee. It has been held in Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, (1994) 6 SCC 591 at page 594

"5. As regards adverse possession, it was not disputed even by the trial court that the appellant entered into possession over the land in dispute under a licence from the respondent for purposes of brick-kiln. The possession thus initially being permissive, the burden was heavy on the appellant to establish that it became adverse. A possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession. Apart from it, the appellate court has gone into detail and after considering the evidence on record found it as a fact that the possession of the appellant was not adverse."
While dwelling on the characteristic of adverse possession Hon'ble Supreme Court held in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59

"Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession".

Under the circumstance for the reasons discussed above, I do not find any infirmity in the finding of the appellate Court negating the claim of adverse possession of the plaintiff."

23. Reliance on Section 110 of the Evidence Act is equally misplaced. Such a presumption of ownership of title can be raised in favor of the party in possession, when none of the party is the title holder. This plea is not available against a party who is the real owner of the property.

"Section 110 of the Evidence Act, 1872 provides:

110. Burden of proof as to ownership.-- When the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not the owner.

It has been held in M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1 "1194. Several decisions of this Court have interpreted the provisions of Section 110. Section 110 is based on the principle that possession in and of itself may raise a presumption of title. But this applies when the facts disclose no title in either of the disputants in which case, as it is said, possession alone decides. Hence, on the other hand, it is also well settled that the presumption cannot arise when the facts are known".

24. This Court is of the view that the Trial Court was wrong in decreeing the suit and there is no infirmity in the finding and judgment of the appellate Court. I do not find any error in the Judgment of the appellate Court in reversing the finding of the trial Court. The substantial question of law is accordingly answered in favour of the defendant/respondent.

The appeal is dismissed. I.A. No. 1700 of 2003 is also disposed of.