Henry Thoby Princep, J.

1. The plaintiff granted a lease of Samuria Purana for tenyears to Nowrong Behari and Ramanand Singh, and on 30th December 1887 obtaineda decree against them for arrears of rent for 1291-1294F. (1884-1887).

2. In execution he attached certain properties. Objectionwas raised by various members of the family of Ramanand Singh, thejudgment-debtor, who claimed a portion of these properties, alleging, also,that they had separated from Ramanand Singh. The objection was allowed. TheSubordinate Judge observed that the decree was a personal decree againstRamanand, which the decree-holder cannot extend in execution. He also found onthe evidence before him that it was not proved that the objectors were separatefrom the judgment-debtor, Ramanand Singh, and he accordingly declared that onlythe participable rights or the right to partition of the joint-property held byRamanand could be sold.

3. The landlord-plaintiff has now sued to get this order setaside so as to bring to sale the right, title and interest of the objectors,who are defendants, together with the judgment-debtor Ramanand Singh, inexecution of the decree obtained against Ramanand alone. He asks that "itmay be held that all the defendants as members of a joint family were benefitedfrom the leasehold property; that therefore the shares of all the defendantsare liable for payment of the decretal money; that the attached properties arefit to be sold by auction; and that orders may be passed for their sale."

4. The Subordinate Judge has found that of the defendants"Shamlal was directly interested in, nay benefited by, the ticca inquestion," and that therefore his properties released are liable to saleunder the decree obtained by the plaintiff for ticca rent. He has not foundwhether the family was joint or separate, but apparently his opinion is againstthe plaintiffs allegation that the defendants form a joint family, for hedescribes the evidence as "vague conflicting, and unsatisfactory,"and he has accordingly declared that the shares of Shamlal Roys sons in theproperty released shall be liable to sale under the rent decree. The suit asagainst the other defendants has been dismissed.

5. Against this decree the plaintiff and Shamlal with hissons have preferred separate appeals, so that the entire case is before us, andit is convenient, therefore, that both these appeals should be tried together.

6. I may first of all state that the evidence in regard tothe state of the family has been rightly described by the Subordinate Judge.

7. It is first objected that any claim on account of rent isnow barred by limitation. That, however, is not the object of the present suit,which is to have it declared that the decree against Ramanand was not apersonal decree against him only, but a decree under which all the defendantsare liable, not because they joined with him in the lease, for there is noevidence of this, and that is not the plaintiffs case as tried in the lowerCourt, or placed before us in appeal, but because they have participated withhim in the enjoyment of the village leased. It is, in other words, sought tomake them liable for a decree in a suit to which they were no parties, andwhich the Subordinate Judge, who passed the decree, describes as a personaldecree against Ramanand only.

8. This case is very different from the cases in whichmembers of a joint family have been made liable under a mortgage executed byonly one of them on which a decree has been given against the mortgagor in asuit against him alone, the debt being proved to be one for which they are allequally liable. Here it is not shown that the defendants took the lease withRamanand. Indeed, from the nature of the first suit, and the evidence before usin these appeals, it seems clear that the lease was given to Ramanand, andNowrong Behari, who is not concerned in this case, and the plaintiffs lessorhad no idea of associating others in it. It seems to me, therefore, that he canlook to the lessees alone for payment of the rent, and he acknowledged this bythe form of his former suit against the lessees only.

9. Two cases have been especially relied upon by theappellants : the case of Nobin Chandra Roy v. Magantara Dassya I.L.R. Cal. 924and Sitanath Koer v. Land Mortgage Bank of India I.L.R. Cal. 888.

10. In my opinion the cases of Nuthoo Lall Choedhry v.Shoukee Lall 10 B.L.R. 200 : 18 W.R. 458 and Sitanath Koer v. Land MortgageBank of India I.L.R. Cal. 888 cannot properly be distinguished. In both casesthere was an adverse order under Section 280 of the Code in execution of thedecree passed releasing the right, title and interest of the defendants fromliability to that decree, and both the suits were brought to avoid that orderby making the defendants liable to the decree under execution. COUCH, C.J., indelivering the judgment of the Court in the first case, argues from the conductof the plaintiff in suing only certain persons on the contract, and obtaininga decree against them alone, whereas if he intended to make them all liable, heshould have framed his suit differently, and he dismissed the second suit asbrought on the same cause of action as in the former suit. Still this suit wasbrought in consequence of the release of the right, title and interest of thedefendants in the property under attachment in which admittedly the twojudgment-debtors as members of a joint Hindu family had shares. These factswere exactly those of the second case in which the father and son, &c, hadjoined in a mortgage by which certain property had been hypothecated, and inexecution of the decree obtained against those two persons certain property hadbeen attached but released from attachment so far as the right, title andinterest of five other persons who had not joined in the mortgage and were noparties to that decree.

11. As I understand Section 283, and Sections 280, 281 and282 to which it refers, the suit contemplated by it is a suit to establish aright which the plaintiff claims to the property in dispute by reason of anorder passed under either of those sections. Section 278 describes theprocedure on a claim preferred or objection made to the attachment of anyproperty in execution of a decree on the ground that such property is notliable to such attachment. Section 279 declares that the claimant or objectormust adduce evidence to show that at the date of the attachment he had someinterest in, or was possessed of, the property attached. Section 280 requiresthe Court to release, either wholly or in part, the property under attachment,if it finds that that property was not in the possession of thejudgment-debtor, &c; and Section 281, which is the converse of Section 280,directs the Court to disallow the claim if it finds such possession with thejudgment-debtor. Section 282 does not concern the matter before us, as itrelates to the right of a mortgagee to the property under attachment. Section283 gives the right of suit to avoid an order passed under any of the sectionsjust mentioned, by establishing the right claimed to the property in dispute.

12. Now it seems to me that all these sections contemplatethe liability or non-liability of the property attached to the decree underexecution, because it is the property of the judgment-debtor or liable to thedecree passed against him as sued in a representative capacity so as to bindthe parties who have objected to the execution. They do not contemplate a suitto establish liability of third persons to satisfy the decree by the sale oftheir right, title and interest in that property. That is a suit of anotherdescription. As I understand the judgment of Couch, C.J., in the case of NuthooLall Chowdhry v. Shoukee Lall 10 B.L.R. 200 : 18 W.R. 458, he adopts the sameview of the law, for he regards the suit as one to make the defendants liableunder the contract which formed the subject of the former suit, and he holdsthat such a suit will not lie. Mitter, J., in the case of Sitanath Koer v. LandMortgage Bank of India I.L.R. Cal. 888 gets over the difficulty by regarding itas a suit within the terms of Section 283 of the Code to set aside an orderunder one of the previous sections releasing the property of the defendants forattachment, and by doing so he distinguishes between that case and Nuthoo LallChowdhrys case; but the facts in that case were precisely one and the same asin the case decided by Mitter, J.

13. So far, therefore, I cannot regard the case of SitanathKoer v. Land Mortgage Bank of India I.L.R. Cal. 888 as an authority which I ambound to follow. With all deference to the learned Judges 1 am of opinion thatit has proceeded on a misconception of Nuthoo Lall Chowdhrys case. Then wehave been referred to the case of Nobin Chandra Roy v. Magantara Dassya I.L.R.Cal. 924, in regard to which I may observe that it does not appear from thereport that either of those cases was cited or considered. That was a case inwhich a mortgage was executed by the managing member of a Hindu family formoney advanced to carry on the business of that family, and a decree was passedagainst the debtor, and on attachment of the mortgage property in execution ofthat decree, an objection was made by the mother of the judgment-debtorclaiming under inheritance from her deceased brother. The share so claimed wasreleased from attachment, on the ground that the claimant was not a party tothe decree. The suit was accordingly brought by the mortgagee to declare thatthe claimant as a member of the joint Hindu family was liable for a debtincurred on her behalf to carry on business in which she was a partner. TheCourt of First Instance dismissed the suit as res judicata, but on appealGarth, C. J., and Beverley, J., set aside the order. It was held that theobject of the suit was not to charge the defendant with the same liability as ifshe had been made a party to the former suit, but to declare that the propertymortgaged which had been attached in execution was liable to satisfy thatdecree, and that if the mortgagee could establish his allegation that she was apartner in the business carried on by the judgment-debtor, or that not being apartner she had expressly or impliedly consented to the mortgage, she would beliable. The suit was remanded to the Court of First Instance to determine theseissues.

14. There can be no doubt regarding the law thus expressed.And now to apply this law to the case before us. The decree passed was apersonal decree against Ramanand. This appears from the decree itself, but inaddition to this the Subordinate Judge who passed that decree has himself statedthat it was a personal decree when releasing from attachment in execution ofthat decree the share of the property attached which was claimed by thedefendants in this suit. The object of this suit is stated to be to make thedefendants liable to that decree, though they were no parties to it, and thoughit has been declared to be a personal decree, that is a decree against Ramanandalone. He was sued for rent alone under a lease, and he was declared to beliable as lessee for that rent and not as representing others, viz., thedefendants. The property attached, 1 may here state, is not the land covered bythe lease, but other property. It was not until this property was attached andthe defendants claimed a right, title and interest, and to have it exemptedfrom attachment as not liable to a decree passed against Ramanand, that thelessors sought to make them liable. No doubt in this plaint he has stated that,"though the ticca pottah and kabuliyat were through cunning and aprecautionary measure caused by the defendants to be executed in the name ofRamanand Singh, one of the members of the family, yet in reality all thedefendants as members of a joint Hindu family were co-sharers in the leaseholdproperty, and all the defendants benefited from the leasehold property."As I understand from this it is intended to state that the lease was granted tothe entire family. If this were so the suit for rent should have been broughtagainst them all and not against the lessees only, and the plaintiff should nothave rested satisfied with a decree against Ramanand. Then again no attempt hasbeen made to show that they all joined in the lease, and this is not even putto us on appeal. The only point pressed on us is that contained in the lastparagraph of the portion of the plaint just quoted, that as the defendants havebenefited from the leasehold property they are liable for the rents. But evenif the defendants do form a joint family, and this is by no means clear, theyhave several of them separate property. No presumption can therefore arise thatRamanand acted on their behalf. Nor is there any evidence that he is themanaging member so as to have been authorized to take the lease for them all.There is no doubt some evidence that some of the defendants collected, rentsfrom rayats apparently under the lease, but that would not be sufficient byitself to show that the lease was taken by Ramanand for them all, and toexplain away the plaintiffs own conduct in suing Ramanand alone and obtaininga decree only against him.

15. For these reasons I cannot hold that the decree againstRamanand was a decree binding on the other defendants who were no parties tothat decree.

16. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed, but, under thecircumstances of the case, without costs, the decree of the Subordinate Judgeagainst Shamlal and his sons being set aside.

S.C. Ghose, J.

17. These appeals arise out of a suit instituted by theMaharaja of Doomraon. The facts are shortly these:

On the 5th Kartic 1285 F.S., the Maharaja of Doomraonexecuted a ticca lease of the village Sumaria Purana for a term of ten yearsfrom 1285 to 1294 F.S., in favour of Nowrong Behari and Ramanand Singh. Thesetwo persons belonged to two different families. Ramanand, however, is a memberof a family composed of several individuals; and one of the matters in disputein this case is whether the family was, during the term of the ticca, joint orseparate.

18. On the 31st December 1887, the Maharaja obtained adecree for arrears of rent on account of the ticca for the years 1291 to 1294(1884-1887) against Nowrong Behari and Ramanand, the ticcadars; and inexecution of this decree he attached certain properties which belonged toRamanand and the other members of his family. Upon this, a claim was preferredby Saligram Singh, Sugaram Singh, Radha Charan Singh, Ramkhelawan Singh,Shamlal Singh and Mussamat Mussila, widow of Rajaram Singh, on the ground thatthey were separate in estate from Ramanand, and that they were in separatepossession of the attached properties according to their respective shares. Itwas however contended by the decree-holder that the objectors and Ramanand weremembers of a joint family, and that they jointly took the ticca in the name ofRamanand and were therefore bound to satisfy the decree. The Subordinate Judge(the execution Court) was of opinion that the decree was a personal decreeagainst Ramanand, and it could not, therefore, be expanded in execution; andthat, although the family was in joint and not in separate possession of theproperties, still the decree-holder could not be entitled to sell, inexecution, anything more than the participable rights of Ramanand, and that theinterest of the other members of the family should be released from attachment.This order was passed on the 3rd June 1890.

19. The present suit was instituted on the 1st of June 1891,upon the ground that all the members were joint in mess and estate, and thoughthe ticca was, through cunning and as a precautionary measure," taken inthe name of Ramanand alone, yet "all the defendants, as members of a jointHindu family, were co-sharers in the leasehold property," and that theyall "benefited" from that property; and the plaint asked to have itdeclared that the other members of the family were joint with Ramanand andparticipated in the leasehold property, and were, therefore, liable to pay theamount covered by the decree, and that the properties which had been attachedwere liable to be sold in , satisfaction of that decree.

20. The genealogy of the family is set out in page 11 of theprinted paper-book; and it will be observed that the, defendants in this suitare Shamlal Singh and Saligram Singh, two brothers, Ramkhelawan Singh,RadhaCharan Singh, Ramanand Singh (one of the parties to the lease) and SugaramSingh, nephews of Shamlal and Saligram, and also the sons of these individuals.

21. The suit was defended by the defendants other thanRamanand, upon the ground that the family was a separated family; that they hadno interest in the ticca; and that the claim for arrears of rent for 1291 to1294 (covered by the decree), which was then sought to be enforced, was barredby limitation.

22. The Subordinate Judge has held that, so far as theplaintiff seeks to make the defendants personally liable for the decretalamount, the claim is barred by limitation, but that it is"maintainable" only for the purpose of having it declared that theattached properties are liable to be sold for satisfaction of the decree, andthen, addressing himself to the question, whether the family was joint orseparate, and whether the defendants other than Ramanand were interested in theticca, he is of opinion that the evidence as to the family being joint is"vague, conflicting and unsatisfactory," and that save and exceptShamlal the other members of the family were not interested or participated inthe ticca: He has accordingly given the plaintiff a partial decree declaringthat the share of Shamlal Singh and his sons in the properties released fromattachment shall be liable to be sold in execution of the rent decree obtainedby the plaintiff.

23. Against this judgment, the two appeals before us havebeen preferred. The appeal No. 261 is by the plaintiff, and the other appealNo. 304 is by Shamlal.

24. We have had considerable discussion upon the questionwhether such a suit against parties who were not defendants in the previoussuit, and against whom no decree was consequently obtained, is at allmaintainable; it being contended by the defendants that the cause of actionagainst the defendants Ramanand and the other members of the family was but oneand the same, and that that cause of action had been exhausted in the previoussuit, and that the orders of the execution Court under Section 280 of theProcedure Code would not give the plaintiff a fresh cause of action. Thequestion, I must say, is by no means free from difficulty; it has, however,been considered by this Court in cases to which I shall presently refer.

25. In the case of Sitanath Koer v. Land Mortgage Bank ofIndia I.L.R. 9 Cal. 888, it appears that the Land Mortgage Bank had advancedmoney to a Mitakshara father upon mortgage of ancestral property, one only ofhis six sons joining in the mortgage. A decree was obtained upon this mortgageagainst the father and that son; but when the Bank sought in execution to sellthe mortgaged properties, the other sons objected, and the objection wasallowed. Thereupon, the Bank sued all the sons to establish their right to sellthe mortgaged property, upon the ground, among others, that the debt covered bythe mortgage bond and the decree was a valid debt, for which the father wascompetent to pledge the property. This Court held that the claim of theobjectors having been dealt with and allowed under Section 280 of the CivilProcedure Code, the subsequent suit was maintainable under Section 283 of theCode. They distinguished the case from the case of Nuthoo Lall Chowdry (10B.L.R. 200 :18 W.R. 458) and another unreported case that wore quoted beforethem; and observed as follows:

It was not the sole object of this suit to make theappellants before us liable on the original cause of action.

26. In the case of Nobin Chandra Boy v. Magantara DassyaI.L.R. Cal. 924, a member of a joint Hindu family executed a mortgage forraising money for the purpose of the joint business, and the creditor obtaineda decree against the obligor only. When he sought to sell the mortgagedproperty, he was met by an objection on the part of another member of thefamily, upon the ground that she was entitled to a moiety of the property, andthe claim was allowed. Thereupon the creditor brought a suit for the purpose ofenforcing his decree against the share of the property claimed by the objector.The Court of First Instance held that the suit was barred by the provisions ofSections 13 and 43 of the Procedure Code. This Court, however, came to adifferent conclusion, and, among other matters, they observed as follows:

It is true that if the only object of the suit had been tocharge the defendant No. 1 with the same liability as was charged upon thedefendant No. 2 by the former decree, it would have been open to the objectionupon which the case of Kendall v. Hamilton ILR. App. Cas. 504 and the othercases which were cited during the argument were decided. But it was by no meansthe only object of the suit to fix the defendant No. 1 with that liability.That undoubtedly is the subject of the first prayer in the plaint. But thesecond prayer is that the order of the 3rd of May 1881 (in the executionproceedings) may be set aside, and that the whole of the mortgaged property maybe declared liable to be sold in execution of the former decree obtainedagainst the defendant No. 2. This claim (except so far as it seeks to set asidethe order of the 3rd of May) is a perfectly legitimate one and is not open tothe objection, which is fatal to the first claim.

27. And lower down they observe:

But, as a matter of law, there seems no objection to theclaim thus made by the plaintiff. It is one of a totally different nature fromthat which is made in the first prayer : and it is in fact the only means opento the plaintiff of correcting the error, if it is one, which has been made inthe execution proceedings. It is clear that if two out of three parties aresued for a debt due from the partnership and a decree is obtained against thosetwo and execution issues against the partnership property, if the third partnershould apply successfully in the execution proceedings to have his share in theproperty released the plaintiffs only remedy would be a regular suit, not forthe purpose of making the third partner personally liable for the debt, but forthe purpose of making the share of the third partner available to satisfy thecase.

28. The principle which underlies these two cases is, Ithink, applicable to this case, though the cases themselves may bedistinguished by the fact that in both of them there was a mortgage and thedecree-holder sought in the subsequent suit to have the shares of the other membersof the family in: the mortgaged property declared liable. The correctness ofthese rulings, however, was impeached before us by the learned vakil for thedefendants, and he relied on the case of Nuthoo Lall Chowdhry (10 B.L.R. 200:18 W.R. 458), already referred to, and the case of Hemendro Coomar Mulliok v.Rajendro Lall Moonshee I.L.R. Cal. 353.

29. So far as the case of Nuthoo hall Chowdhry is concerned,the report does not clearly show what was the true relief asked for in thesubsequent suit, and what was the cause of action for such suit. And COUCH,C.J., seems to have regarded that suit as based upon the original contract andupon the same cause of action viz., the non-payment of the money which gaverise to the previous suit. In the case of Hemendro Coomar Mullick, it wouldappear that a decree had been obtained against one of several joint makers of apromissory note, but failing to obtain satisfaction from him the creditorbrought a subsequent suit for recovery of the amount against the other makersof the promissory note. And it was held, upon the authority of the case of Kingv. Hoare 13 M. & W. 494 and some other cases, that the suit would not liebecause, as stated by Garth, C.J., the cause of action for the injured party inthe case of either a joint contract or joint tort is but one, and that cause ofaction is exhausted by a judgment being obtained against any one of them. TheChief Justice also referred to the case of Nuthoo Lall Chowdhry in support ofthe view he adopted.

30. No doubt if the plaintiff in this case had sought tomake the other members of the family personally liable for the money covered bythe decree in the previous suit, there can be no doubt that this relief couldnot be granted, the cause of action in both the suits being but one and thesame, and that cause of action having been exhausted in the previous suit. Butthe question is, whether the suit is not maintainable so far as it seeks for adeclaration that the property released from attachment is liable to be sold forsatisfaction of the decree.

31. Garth, C.J., who decided the case of Hemendro CoumarMullick was also one of the Judges who decided the later case of Nobin ChandraBoy, and the distinction that was pointed out on that occasion between the casewhere a creditor seeks to make a third party personally liable for the debt,and that in which he asks that the share of his property be declared liable tosatisfy the decree, would equally apply in the present case.

32. The principle which ought to determine the question wehave been called upon to decide may perhaps be well deduced from certain othercases to which I shall presently refer.

33. In the case of Bissessur Lull Sahoo v. Luchmessur SinghILR. IndAp 233 : 5 C.L.R. 477 it would appear that one Nath Dass had a sonRamanatb, and the latter had two sons, Masaheb and Chumun. A property,Muddenpore, had been purchased in the name of Ramanath when he was joint withNath Dass, and there were two other properties, Ramnuggur and Rudder-pore,which were leaseholds, one in the name of Nath Dass and the other in the namesof Nath and Ramanath. The zemindar obtained two decrees for rent on account ofRudderpore and Ramnugger, one against the guardian of Masaheb and Chumun andthe other against Masaheb as heir of Nath Dass. And there was a third decreeobtained against Masaheb for rent of Rudderpore. In execution of these threedecrees the property Muddenpore was sold, and the question that arose in thesuit was whether Muddenpore could be sold in execution of those decrees andwhat might be their true character. It was found that the family was joint, andit was held that Muddenpore must be taken to have been purchased by Ramanathfor the family; that the lease of Ramnuggur must be assumed to have been takenon behalf of the family by Nath Dass, and that the debt was a joint familydebt; that Masaheb must be taken to have been sued in his representativecapacity, and therefore all the three decrees could be properly executedagainst the joint family property, as having been obtained against therespective defendants in their representative capacity.

34. In Jeo Lal Singh v. Gunga Pershad I.L.R. Cal. 996 thefacts were that a joint Hindu family, consisting of three brothers, held atenure which stood in the zemindars sherista in the name of one of them, GuptaLall, who was the manager of the family. There were two zemindars, each owninga moiety of the estate. One of them obtained a decree for his share of the rentagainst the recorded tenure-holder, and in execution thereof the right, titleand interest of that individual was sold under Section 64 of Bengal Act VIII of1869 and purchased by the defendant, who, under that sale, obtained possessionof the whole tenure. Upon this, the two brothers of Gupta Lall brought a suitto recover their share of the joint property, and the claim was disallowed.

35. It was held that the judgment-debtor Gupta Lall had beensued as representing the ownership of the whole tenure, and therefore thedecree and sale bound the interest of the other members of the family. Garth,C.J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, among other matters, observed asfollows:

Now, in the present case, Gupta Lall, the defendant No. 4,was not only the manager but the sole registered owner of the tenure, andAdhikari Koer, in claiming against him the entirety of her share of the rent,took the ordinary and proper course of suing the tenant, who in the zemindarssherista represented the entire tenure. Moreover, when she had obtained herdecree, she was unable, as she only owned a share in the zamindari interest, tosell the whole tenure under Section 59. She could only obtain her execution inthe way in which she proceeded to enforce it, namely, by selling the right andinterest of the judgment-debtor, under Section 64. But as between her and thepersons interested in the tenure she had a right to treat Gupta Lall as thesole owner of the tenure, and when she sold his right and interest for the rentdue, she was, in our opinion, selling the tenure itself. As his name wasregistered as the sole owner of the tenure, he represented his brothersinterest in it as well as his own. The rent was due from them all, though healone was sued for it, and as they were equitably liable to pay the amount ofthe decree, it was only just that their interest as well as his should be soldto satisfy it.

36. It seems to me that, if in either of the cases ofBissessur Lall Sahoo and Jeo Lall, the other members of the family to whom theproperty belonged had objected to the sale in the course of theexecution-proceedings taken out by the decree-holder, and their objection hadbeen allowed, upon the ground that, not being parties to the suit in which thedecree was obtained, their share could not be sold, a suit could be maintainedfor the purpose of obtaining a declaration that the decree was one which hadbeen obtained against the judgment-debtor in his representative capacity, andtherefore the whole family property was liable to be sold in execution of thatdecree.

37. Having in view the principle which underlies these twocases, as also the cases of Sitanath Koer v. Land Mortgage Bank of India I.L.R.Cal. 888 and Nobin Chandra Boy v. Magantara Dassya I.L.R. Cal. 924 I am unableto say for the appellant that the present suit does not lie, for it may well beregarded as a suit for declaration that the decree was obtained againstRamanand in his representative capacity, and that, therefore, the shares of theother members of the family in the properties attached are equally liable tosatisfy that decree. But whether the plaintiff is entitled upon the facts ofthis case to the declaration that he has asked for is wholly a differentquestion.

38. As regards the contention that the claim is barred bylimitation, I need only say that, if the suit be regarded in the light I havejust expressed, and if the order of the execution Court gave the plaintiff acause of action, it is obvious that the plea of limitation is not tenable,notwithstanding the expiry of three years from the time when the rent for whichthe decree was obtained actually fell due.

39. I now proceed to consider the question whether, forsatisfaction of the decree in question, the plaintiff is entitled to sell theproperty of the defendants other than Ramanand, or, in other words, whether thedecree, though obtained against Ramanand, is binding upon the other members ofthe family.

40. Bearing in mind the principle upon which the cases ofBissessur Lall Sahoo and Jeo Lal were decided, it seems to me that the successof the plaintiffs suit depends upon proof that the defendants Were members ofa joint undivided family with Ramanand and that the decree was obtained againstRamanand in his representative capacity. [His Lordship then went into theevidence and concluded as follows:] Upon all these grounds I am unable to saythat the decree obtained by the Maharaja against Ramanand was in the lattersrepresentative character, and that for satisfaction of that decree the propertyof the other defendants is liable to be sold.

41. The result is that the appeal No. 261 is dismissed, andthe appeal No. 304 allowed, but, under the circumstances, without any costs.

.

Radha Pershad Singh Bahadur vs. Ramkhelawan Singh and Ors.(09.09.1895 - CALHC)