Mullick, J.The judgment of the lower appellate Court is correct and must be affirmed.

2. It appears that the first application for the execution of the decree which is for a sum of Rs. 1,158 was filed on the 22nd August, 1917. On the 21st January, 1918, the decree-holder brought to sale the property described as lot No. 1 in the sale proclamation and purchased it himself for Rs. 400. Lot No. 2 was knocked down for a sum of Rs. 960 and was purchased by a third party. On the 20th April, 1918, the sale of lot No. 1 was confirmed, but the sale of lot No. 2 was set aside on the ground that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property. There was then an appeal against this order to the District Judge of Patna who on the 20th June, 1918, reversed the lower Courts order and confirmed the sale of lot No. 2. The judgment-debtor then took proceedings under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C., and finally on the 27th April, 1919, he succeeded in getting the sale of lot No. 2 set aside for irregularity. That order was affirmed in appeal by the District Judge on the 12th April, 1920.

3. The next execution case namely No. 231 of 1921 was registered on the 19th July, 1921, but was dismissed for default on the 7th September, 1921. The third execution case, out of which the present appeal arises and which was registered as No. 316 of 1921 on the 24th September, 1921, seeks to recover the whole judgment debt.

4. The reason for the decree-holders claiming to recover the whole amount of the judgment debt is this. It seems that one Firangi Lal brought a suit against the decree-holder (who was the auction-purchaser of lot No. 1) and against the judgment-debtor for a declaration of title to lot No. 1 and for possession, and on the 24th May, 1919, he obtained a decree the effect of which was to set aside the sale of the 21st January, 1918, in respect of that lot.

5. Now both the Courts below have held that this third application for execution is not barred by limitation. The judgment-debtor accordingly prefers this second appeal against the order of the District Judge, dated the 8th February, 1923.

6. Now the only point in the case is, whether Article 181 of schedule 2 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908 applies to the case. On behalf of the judgment-debtor a number of authorities have been cited to show that under the present CPC the auotion-purchaser cannot bring a suit to recover from the decree-holder the auction-purchase money on the ground that the judgment-debtor bad no saleable interest in the property and that the only remedy open to the auction purchaser is to apply under Order 21, Rule 91, C.P.O., to have the sale set aside. In support of this contention our attention has been drawn to Nannu Lal v. Bhagwan Das (1917) 39 All. 114, Juraru Muhammad v. Jathi Muhammad 22 C.W.N. 760 and Subbu Reddi v. Ponnambala Reddi (1918) M.W.M. 655.

7. Now these authorities have really no bearing on the question before us. Here the decree-holder himself is the auction-purchaser. There is no prayer for the refund of the auction-purchase money and the only question is, whether by reason of the litigation which took place after the sale and by reason of the decree in favour of Firangi Lal, the execution proceedings can be said to have been revived and the present execution case may be regarded as a continuation of the former execution proceedings. If Article 181 applies then the decree-holder can get time either from the date on which Firangi Lal got his decree, namely the 24th May, 1919, or on the date on which the sale of lot No. 2 was finally set saide, namely the 12th April, 1920. In either case the application will be within time and in my opinion there can be no doubt that this is a case to which Article 181 should apply. The effect of the decree in favour of Firangi Lal was to set aside the sale and no formal order to that the was required. The decree-bolder and the judgment-debtor were both parties the suit and therefore they are bound by the order. The argument that under the present CPC no sale can be set aside except by a resort to the procedure of Order 21 is in my opinion not well-founded; not is it necessary that the execution Court should formally cancel the order of satisfaction which was recorded after the sale of lot No. 1, before the decree-holder can proceed to recover the debt which has been revived in consequence of the decree declaring the sale of lot No. 1 to be invalid.

8. It is not necessary to cite many authorities in support of the proposition that the present case belongs to a class to which Article 181 is applicable; but the following oases are in point and will suffice: Keramat Ali v. Nagendra Kishore Roy 21 C.W.N. 571 and the decision of their Lirdships of the Privy Council in Maharaja Sir Rameshwar Singh v. Homeshwar Singh (1921) 48 I.A. 17.

9. The result is that the decree of the District Judge is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Bucknill, J.

10. I agree.