1. Spens, C.J— Eight persons, including the four appellants before us, were tried under the provisions of Ordinance No. II of 1942, by the Special Judge for the Presidency town of Madras at Chingleput, on charges of criminal conspiracy to commit various offences and also on charges of substantive offences. The trial resulted in the conviction of the appellants, who were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment ranging from three to five years and of one Ramaratnam who was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years. The judgment of the Special Judge was pronounced on 11th May, 1943. The proceedings before the Special Judge were by virtue of the sentence passed on Ramaratnam, subject to review under S. 8(a) of the Ordinance. Before the review was completed, Ordinance No. XIX of 1943 came into force. We have held in Piare Dusadh and Others v. The King Emperor  that a case like this fell within the purview of S. 4 of that Ordinance, with the result that the proceedings had before the Special Judge must be treated as void and the case must be deemed to be transferred to the appropriate Court under that section for inquiry and trial in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.

 What actually happened in this case was that the convicted persons preferred appeals under S. 3(2) of Ordinance No. XIX to the Madras High Court^* with the result that Ramaratnam was acquitted and the appeals of the others were dismissed. The High Court granted a certificate under S. 205 of the Constitution Act and the case of the appellants is now before us on appeal.

2. It was urged on behalf of the Crown that S. 8(a) of Ordinance No. II of 1942 was applicable only to the case of Ramaratnam and that the cases of the appellants were governed not by S. 4 but by S. 3(2) of Ordinance No. XIX, and that we could accordingly entertain their appeals and dispose of them finally. It was contended that though the proceeding before the Special Judge in respect of all the eight accused persons was a single trial as soon as the convictions were recorded the proceeding with respect to each of them became in law a separate proceeding for the purposes of S. 8(a) of Ordinance No. II, and that a review was obligatory only in respect of the proceeding relating to Ramaratnam; the proceedings relating to the appellants not being subject to review at all. We are unable to accede to this contention. In our judgment the expression ‘proceedings’ in S. 8 comprises the whole of the proceedings before a Special Judge, so that where in any such proceedings any one of several convicted persons tried together is sentenced to death, or to transportation for life, or to imprisonment for a term of seven years or more, a review becomes obligatory under Cl. (a) of the section, not merely in respect of such convicted person, but in respect of the whole case.

3. If the contention advanced on behalf of the Crown were to be accepted, the result in this case would be that with regard to Ramaratnam the proceedings had before the Special Judge and the judgment of the High Court on appeal must be treated as void and his case must be deemed to be pending before the appropriate Court under S. 4 of Ordinance No. XIX, while the cases of the appellants must be disposed of finally by us. They were all tried together on charges of criminal conspiracy, and one of the contentions raised in the grounds of appeal on behalf of the appellants is that as the result of the acquittal of Ramaratnam by the High Court and the discharge or acquittal of three of the original eight accused by the Special Judge, vital links in the chain of the conspiracy have been knocked out, so that the charge of conspiracy against the appellants must fail on that ground alone. It is obvious that contention could not be finally disposed of by us so long as the matter of the guilt of Ramaratnam was still the subject of judicial determination. We mention this merely to reinforce our view that ‘proceedings’ in S. 8 of Ordinance No. II must be construed as meaning the whole case and not merely the case or cases of the convict or convicts sentenced to seven years' imprisonment or a severer punishment.

4. The result is that the appeal is allowed and it is declared that in place of the order of the High Court confirming the convictions, there shall be substituted an order directing further proceedings in the case to be taken in accordance with the provisions of S. 4 of Ordinance No. XIX of 1943.