R.P. Singh, J.

1. By means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the Petitioner has prayed quashing of an order passed by the XIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad dated 24th December, 1989 upholding the order passed by the Prescribed Authority allowing the application of the landlady Respondent No. 3 for the release of the disputed accommodation in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 her-in-after referred to as the Act.

2. The Petitioner is the tenant of the disputed accommodation house No. 416 Old Katra, Allahabad of which the Respondent No. 3 Smt. Savitri Devi is the landlady. Respondent No. 3 the landlady filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act inter alia on the ground that her family has grown resulting in need for additional accommodation and that her daughter-in-law is of quarrel some nature due to which strained relation between the Petitioner and her daughter-in-law has completely disturbed the mental peace of the members of the family and it has become necessary to provide a separate accommodation to her son and daughter-in-law and hence the Petitioners need for the disputed accommodation house No. 416 Old Katra Allahabad is bonafide and genuine and further that greater hardship would be caused if the accommodation is not released in her favour. The application moved by the landlady was contested by the Petitioner on the ground that the need of the Petitioner is not bonafide and genuine and that the tenanted house No. 336 Old Katra Allahabad in which the landlady is residing, is sufficient for the residence of the landlady and her family members and that greater hardship would be caused to the Petitioner in case the release application is allowed.

3. The Prescribed Authority on consideration of the evidence on record held that house No. 336 Old Katra Allahabad in which the landlady was residing as a tenant, was not sufficient for her family which consists of the landlady, her husband, one married son along with the daughter-in-law, one unmarried son apart from one unmarried daughter who is living along with the landlady and since there are in all three rooms in the disputed house which is not sufficient for the members of the family of the landlady and hence her need for the disputed accommodation is bonafide and genuine specially in view of the fact that the relationship of the landlady with her daughter-in-law is very strained and it has become necessary to provide her with a separate accommodation for her daughter-in-law and her son in order to maintain mental peace in the family. The Prescribed Authority further held that greater hardship would be caused if the accommodation in dispute is not released in favour of the landlady. Feeling aggrieved the Petitioner went up in appeal before the Additional District Judge who, however, observing that the Prescribed Authority has not recorded any finding that the need of the landlady for the disputed accommodation was bonafide and genuine, allowed the appeal without further applying his mind to the comparative hardship of the parties vide his order dated 31-10-87. Feeling aggrieved the landlady filed a writ petition before this Court which was allowed by this Court holding that the Prescribed Authority had applied his mind to the question of bonafide need of the landlady for the disputed accommodation and held that her need for the said accommodation was bonafide and genuine specially in view of the strained relations with her daughter-in-law which has necessitated to arrange for a separate accommodation for her daughter-in-law so that the family may live in peace and hence Additional District Judge has committed manifest error in holding that the Prescribed Authority has not applied his mind and has not recorded a finding on the question of bonafide need. Consequently, the order passed by the Additional District Judge was quashed and the case was remanded back to him to decide the case afresh applying his mind to the question of comparative hardship in accordance with law.

4. On remand of the case, the Additional District Judge on appraisal of the evidence on record held that the need of the landlady for the disputed accommodation was bonafide and genuine and that greater hardship would be caused to her in case the application for release is not allowed and after recording these findings dismissed the appeal. It is this order which is in challenge in the present writ petition.

5. Heard Sri S.K. Mehrotra learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Sri Radhey Shyam Dwivedi learned Counsel for the Respondent.

6. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the Additional District Judge Respondent No. 1 has not properly considered the question of comparative hardship and hence the finding recorded on the question of comparative hardship is liable to be set aside. Secondly, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that there are three rooms in the disputed accommodation in the house No. 416 Old Katra Allahabad and the Additional District Judge has not considered the question of part release of the accommodation as contemplated by Clause (d) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act, and it was incumbent on the Additional District Judge to consider whether the tenants need would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlords need would be served by releasing the other part but the Additional District Judge has not applied his mind to this aspect of the case.

7. The learned Counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, contended that the finding on the question of comparative hardship has been recorded by Respondent No. 1 after appraisal of the evidence on record and sitting in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court cannot reappreciate or reappraise the evidence on record specially when the finding has been arrived at on consideration of the evidence on record. The learned Counsel for the Respondent further contended that there are three rooms only in the disputed accommodation and in view of the paucity of accommodation and also in view of the fact that the rooms are inter-connected and there is only one latrine-cum-bath room which is approachable through the last room no part release of the accommodation is possible specially also in view of the fact that the parties are litigating and there are many criminal cases going on between the parties since 1984.

8. As regards the first submission of learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Additional District Judge has not considered the evidence on record while recording the finding on the question of comparative hardship I find no merit in this submission. The family of the landlady consists of herself, her husband, one married son with a daughter in-law, one unmarried son and one unmarried daughter. The total accommodation in the tenanted house of the landlord i.e. house No. 336, Katra is three rooms which, under the circumstances, has been held to be totally insufficient to accommodate the family members of the landlady. Moreover, strained relations between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law necessitating the need to provide a separate accommodation for the daughter-in-law in order to keep mental peace in the family has been held by this Court to be a sufficient need justifying the release of the independent accommodation for the daughter-in-law. Further it is undisputed that the Petitioner has already been evicted from the disputed premises in the year 1986 in pursuance of a decree of arrears of rent and ejectment and in the earlier writ petition No. 19976 of 1987, Savitri Devi v. IXth Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, the address of the Petitioner was given as l/l Katra Road, Madhav Kunj Allahabad City and while filing the counter affidavit the Petitioner appears to have not raised any objection to it. It is also contended by learned Counsel for the Respondent that the Petitioner in fact lives with his family members in house No. l/l Old Katra, Allahabad and is doing business of Kerosene oil and license to sell Kerosene oil has also been granted on his address 1/1 Old Katra Allahabad. Hence the Additional District Judge on consideration of evidence held that the Petitioner having been evicted as far back as 1986 had already arranged an accommodation. It is not in dispute that house No. 336 Old Katra in which the landlord is living as a tenant, has been purchased by Salig Ram who is trying to eject the landlady Savitri Devi Respondent No. 3 to this writ petition, in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. Thus after considering the evidence on record, and applying his mind to the same the Additional District Judge Respondent No. 1 in my opinion rightly held that in the circumstances of this case the landlady Respondent No. 3 Smt Savitri Devi would be put to greater hardship if her release application is not allowed. Thus the finding on the question of bonafide need and comparative hardship has been arrived at on consideration of the evidence on record and hence it cannot be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the case of Baga Bagum v. Abdul Ahad Khan : AIR 1979 SC 272 [LQ/SC/1978/295] , the Supreme Court observed that it is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree for eviction is passed but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and this by itself would not be a valid ground for refusing decree for eviction.

9. In the case of Suraj Prasad Sharma v. IInd Additional District Judge Mirzapur 1983 (1) ARC 427 it was observed:

It is a common placed fact that invariably when an application under Section 21 of the Act is allowed, the tenant has to quit and this involves discomfort but if this alone were sufficient to non-suit the landlord, no application for release could ever be allowed. Judging the comparative hardship is a matter of deeper import and it would be a lopsided order which dismisses landlords application for release merely with the plaiteted in our Observation that the tenant would be "thrown on the street". The physical dispossession of the tenant is the necessary concomitant of every release application of the landlord which is allowed. However well founded the application may be an element of inconvenience or discomfort is inherent in the very process of vacating an accommodation. A release application cannot be thrown out merely with the said observation that the tenant would suffer greater hardship.

10. Thus the Additional District Judge Respondent No. 1 has recorded a finding on the question of comparative hardship on the perusal of evidence on record and hence it does not call for any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Munni Lai v. Prescribed Authority : AIR 1978 SC 29 [LQ/SC/1976/339] the Supreme Court observed:

It is not for the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion which may be different from that reached by the District Judge or the Prescribed Authority.

In the case of Munna Lai v. IInd Additional District Judge 1986 (1) ARC 210 it was held that where a finding on bonafide need and comparative hardship were found to be based on evidence led by the parties, High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot reappreciate that evidence and cannot interfere in writ petition.

11. Coming to the next submission made by learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Addl. District Judge Respondent No. 1 has not applied his mind to the question of part release of the disputed accommodation as contemplated by Clause (d) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 16 of the Rules framed "under that Act it may be stated that this point is being raised for the first time in the present writ petition. However, it is true that even though this point was not raised in the Courts below, can (sic) raised in writ petition before this Court but in the circumstances of the present case I find that the part release of the accommodation is not possible in this case. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the Respondent that there are only three rooms in the house in dispute which are all inter-connected and there is only one latrine-cum-bath room which is approachable through the last room so that there is no separate entrance for the latrine and bath room. Moreover, the Petitioner and Respondent No. 3 and their family members are litigating since 1984 and they are not on good terms. There are number of criminal cases pending between the parties and it has been stated in paragraph 7 of the supplementary counter affidavit that there had been attempt to murder Sunil Kumar Jaiswal son of the landlady by the Petitioner and his brother Ram Chandra and on a complaint filed by the son of the landlady a case under Section 307 IPC was registered against them and they were on bail in that criminal case which was subsequently dropped. Another Criminal case in 1987 was started between the Petitioner and his son on the one hand and the husband of the landlady and her son on the other in proceedings under Section 107/117 Code of Criminal Procedure and it is further averred in the supplementary counter affidavit that another criminal litigation between the parties is going on in the Court of City Magistrate Allahabad in proceedings under Section 107/117/151 Code of Criminal Procedure in which now 19-4-89 has been fixed in the case. Thus it is quite obvious that the relations between the parties appear to be very strained and numbers of criminal cases are going on between the parties and hence also it is not possible to apply the provisions of part release of the accommodation as contemplated by Rule 16(I)(d) of the Rules framed under the Act. Thus both on account of the shortage of the accommodation in the house in dispute and also on account of the strained relations and criminal cases going on between the parties I see no merits in the submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that landlords need would have been served on releasing only a part of the accommodation and leaving the tenant in the remaining part of the said accommodation.

12. In the result, there are no merits in this case and the writ petition is dismissed. However, the parties will bear their own costs.