S.K. Mahajan, J.

1. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate having taken cognizance of the offence punishable under Sections 120-B read with Section 195/469/ 471, IPC against the petitioners and Mr. K.L. Verma and Larry J. Kolp, directed the issuance of non-bailable warrants against them, returnable after execution on or before the 14th October, 1996. On a petition having been filed by the petitioners, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao and Mr. K.K. Tiwari, for the grant of anticipatory bail pursuant to such non-bailable warrants having been issued by the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, this Court by order dated 9th October, 1996 had directed that in the event of their arrest on the basis of the non-bailable warrants issued by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, the petitioners in each of the said cases will be admitted to bail on their furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000 each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Arresting Officer/Superior Officer. Duration of this bail was only upto 14th October, 1996. Sh. K.L. Verma, one of the accused in the said case, filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court of India and by order dated 13th October, 1996 the Apex Court directed that the anticipatory bail will enure till the Regular Court decided the question of grant of bail and for a week thereafter. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate by order dated 5th November, 1996 held that the accused persons were not entitled to bail and subject to the orders of the superior Court/Courts they were directed to surrender before the Court on or before 13th November, 1996. Accused Sh. Chandraswami and Sh. K.N. Aggarwal were already in custody and their bail application having been rejected, they were directed to be produced before the Court on the same date. Being aggrieved by the said order, all the petitioners have filed these petitions for the grant of bail.

2. The contention of Mr. R.K. Anand, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, is that the allegations against Mr. Rao are false. All that has been done by Mr. Rao is that he has attested the signatures of one George D. Mclean and it is not the case of the prosecution that the signatures of Mr. George D. Mclean on the said documents were forged. According to him, therefore, there was no case made out against Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao. Mr. Anand has referred to me the charge sheet filed in the Court to contend that the only allegation against Mr. Rao was that on a copy of the statement of accounts in First Trust Corporation Limited (FTCL), St. Kitts allegedly in the name of Mr. Ajeya Singh S/o. Mr. V.P. Singh, signatures of Mr. George D. Mclean were attested by Mr. R.K. Rai, the then Consul General of India, New York at the instance of Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao; that it is nobodys case that signatures of Mr. George D. Mclein were forged on the said documents. All that has been said is that the copy of statement of accounts and other related bank documents were forged and the signatures of Mr. Mclean having been attested on these documents by Mr. Rai at the instance of Mr. Rao, shows that Mr. Rao was a part of the conspiracy to defame Mr. V.P. Singh and to have him convicted for an offence under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and/or Prevention of Corruption Act. It is submitted by Mr. Anand that no offence under Section 195, IPC has been made out and even in the original FIR, the only offence which is alleged to have been committed by Mr. Rao was under Section 193, IPC and it was only with a view to harm Mr. Rao that Section, 195 has been added in the charge sheet filed on 26th September, 1996, as Section, 195 is non-bailable where as Section 193 is bailable. It is also his submission that the investigation in the case is over; the case is more man seven years old and nothing is to be recovered now from the petitioner and as such he is entitled to be released on bail. He has also referred to the statements of some of the witnesses recorded by the Central Bureau of Investigation during investigation to contend that none of the said witnesses has in his statement stated that Mr. Rao was a part of the conspiracy to have Mr. Ajeya Singh and Mr. V.P. Singh convicted for an offence under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Even Mr. V.P. Singh in his statement recorded before the Central Bureau of Investigation on 4th June, 1996 has stated that as I was in opposition, all these forged documents were fabricated for the sole purpose of harming my reputation and the reputation of my son before the general elections in 1989 and for the same purpose these were got published in the newspapers and even placed in the Parliament by Mr. Edward Fleiro, the then Minister of State (Finance). Mr. Ajeya Singh also in his statement recorded on 23rd December, 1993 has stated that the documents given by him (George D. Mclean) are total forgeries to harm me and my fathers reputation. Mr. Ajeya Singh was given a notice only under Section 33(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and while an enquiry under Section 40 of theis judicial in nature, an enquiry under Section 33(2) is not judicial and, therefore, it could not be said that the documents alleged to have been forged at the instance of Mr. Rao were intended to be used in some judicial proceedings with a view to convict Mr. V.P. Singh for offences under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act.

3. Mr. Vijay Bahuguna, Sr. Advocate, appearing for Mr. K.K. Tiwari, has argued almost on the same lines. It is submitted by him that Mr. Tiwari was a Minister of State for External Affairs only from August, 1988 to April, 1989 whereas the documents which have been alleged to have been collected by Mr. Tiwari were faxed only on 5th October, 1989. It is submitted by him that even the personal staff of Mr. Tiwari was not interrogated and no averment has been made that he had ever seen the passport of Mr. Ajeya Singh from where his signatures were alleged to have been forged on the documents with the First Trust Corporation Limited.

4. The main contention of the Counsel for both Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao and Mr. K.K. Tiwari, is that as the trial is based mostly upon documents and the investigation being over, there cannot be any apprehension of the petitioners tampering with evidence or fleeing from justice.

5. It is now well settled that the over-riding considerations in granting bail are the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardising his own life being faced with grim prospects of possible conviction in the case; of tampering with witnesses, the history of the case as well as of its investigation. But the two paramount considerations which the Court has to take into consideration at the time of grant of bail are the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and his tampering with prosecution evidence which relate to ensuring a fair trial of the case in the course of justice. Due and proper weight should be bestowed on these two factors apart from others. There cannot be a set formula in the matter of granting bail and the facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling the bail.

6. Mr. K.N. Bhatt, Additional Solicitor General of India, appearing on behalf of the Central Bureau of Investigation, has not denied that investigation in the case is over and the case is almost entirely based upon the documentary evidence. On the other hand, he has submitted that some of the observations made by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in his order rejecting bail were wholly unwarranted and he wants the same to be expunged. He has further submitted that he will not even like to argue the matter and if this Court grants bail to the petitioners, the Central Bureau of Investigation can at any time make an application for cancellation of bail, in case it is brought to its notice that any of the accused is tampering with evidence.

7. It has not been brought to my notice by the Central Bureau of Investigation as to what evidence can be tampered with by any of the petitioners. The considerations which weigh in the mind of the Court at the time of granting bail have been enumerated in the case reported as Gurcharan Singh v. State, AIR 1978 SC179. The Supreme Court in the said case has held that in non-bailable cases other than ones where the person has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the Court will exercise its discretion in favour of granting bail subject to Sub-section 3 of Section 437 of the Code, if it deems necessary to deal under it. Unless exceptional circumstances are brought to the notice of the Court which may defeat proper investigation and a fair trial, the Court will not decline to grant bail to the person who is not accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The over-riding considerations in granting bail, as already mentioned above, are the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence was committed, the position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice, of repeating the offence, of jeopardising his own life being faced with grim prospects of possible conviction in the case, of tampering with witnesses, the history of the case as well as of its investigation and other relevant grounds.

8. The two paramount considerations, therefore, which have to be taken into consideration by the Court at the time of grant of bail are the seriousness of the offence and whether the accused would be readily available for trial and whether he is likely to use the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence. As already mentioned above by me, it has not been pointed out to me by the Central Bureau of Investigation as to what is there on record to show that the petitioners are likely to tamper with evidence, in case they are released on bail.

9. In Criminal Appeal No. 2068/96, Chandraswami & Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation, decided by the Supreme Court on 7th November, 1996, it has been held that ordinarily a person who is suspected of having committed an offence under Section 120-B read with Section 420, IPC would be entitled to bail; of course the paramount consideration would always be to ensure that the enlargement of such persons on bail will not jeopardise the prosecutions case. The facts in the said case were that the complaint related to an offence alleged to have been committed by the appellant nearly 16 years ago and not much progress had taken place in the proceedings. The appellants in that case were in custody since 2nd May, 1996 and the only reason given by the Trial Court as well as by the High Court for not releasing them on bail was that there was an apprehension that they were likely to influence the witnesses or tamper with evidence. On these facts, it was held by the Supreme Court as under:

Section 437(1) provides that when any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is brought before a Court, he may be released on bail unless his case falls in Clauses (i) or (ii) thereof. The present case is not covered by the said two clauses. Therefore, ordinarily, a person who is suspected of having committed an offence under Section 120B read with Section 420 IPC would be entitled to bail; of course the paramount consideration would always be to ensure that the enlargement of such persons on bail will not jeopardise the prosecution case. Any such likelihood is not shown by the learned Additional Solicitor General. Moreover, the learned Counsel for the C.B.I, had admitted before the High Court that there was nothing to indicate any attempt of tampering by the accused in India or abroad during the long period available to them earlier. There is no reasonable basis for such an apprehension now at this stage and in the existing circumstances.

10. The Supreme Court, therefore, released the appellants in that case on bail subject to certain conditions.

11. In State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, 1977(4) SCC 308, it was held by the Supreme Court that the basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences, intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. Bail should normally not be withheld as a punishment if, after taking into consideration other factors, the accused is entitled to the grant of bail. At the stage of considering the application for the grant of bail, the Court is not required to go into the detailed examination of evidence and pre-judge the case and for that exhaustive exploitation of the merits of the case are not required in the order.

12. Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao has been a former Prime Minister of India. He is always under the protection of the Special Protection Group (SPG) and his movements are known to everybody. He and his family members are residing in India. He is also suffering from serious medical problems like coronary artery disease, non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, essential hypertension, cerebro-vascular disease, etc. He has also undergone coronary artery bypass surgery for unstable angina and triple vessel disease in July, 1990. He has been periodically screened with exercise thallium studies latest of which was performed in February, 1992 which revealed normal exercise tolerance and abnormal thallium-201 image consistent with exercise induced ischemia in the inferior wall region. He is under constant medical attention from consultants in diabetes, cardiology and neurology. I, therefore, do not see any reason for him to flee from justice.

13. The allegations as against Mr. K.K. Tiwari in the charge sheet are that signatures of Mr. Ajeya Singh, as contained in his application for the years 1977-78 for renewal of passport at London, which were obtained from the office of High Commission of India, London at the instance of Mr. K.K. Tiwari were used as a model for forging the signatures of Mr. Ajeya Singh on the Numbered Account Agreement (NAA) and Safe Keeping Agreement (SKA). It is alleged that Mr. K.K. Tiwari, the then Minister of State for External Affairs verbally instructed Mr. Shashank, the then Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, in the last week of November or early December, 1988 to collect the passport particulars of the sons of Mr. V.P. Singh. Mr. Tiwari further instructed Mr. Shashank to collect these particulars through telephonic instructions only without putting anything in writing. Accordingly, the passport papers of Mr. Abhay Singh and Mr. Ajeya Singh were collected from the Regional Passport Office, Lucknow and High Commission of India, London respectively and put up/discussed by Mr. Shashank with Mr. K.K. Tiwari. The original passport papers of Mr. Abhay Singhs passport were returned to the Regional Passport Office, Lucknow after retaining copies of the same. The passport papers received from High Commission of India, London confined in the Ministry till 15th April, 1989. It is contended by Mr. Bahuguna that neither the then personal staff of Mr. K.K. Tiwari has been interrogated nor it has been disclosed anywhere in the charge sheet that he had actually seen the passport of the sons of Mr. V.P. Singh. On the basis of this material on record, it is the contention of Mr. Bahuguna, no case of alleged conspiracy to forge the documents for conviction of Mr. V.P. Singh for offences punishable under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and Prevention of Corruption Act has been made out. As already mentioned above by me, at this stage of considering the application for the grant of bail, the Court is not required to go into the detailed examination of evidence and pre-judge the case. Mr. K.K. Tiwari has also been a former Minister in the Union Cabinet. He has roots in the society and nothing has been pointed out by the Central Bureau of Investigation as to what evidence can be tampered with by him, in case he is released on bail.

14. Taking into consideration the statements of Mr. V.P. Singh and Mr. Ajeya Singh recorded during investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation and taking into consideration the fact that the case is almost seven years old and is mostly based upon documents and investigation in the case is over. I feel that in case Mr. P.V. Narsimha Rao and Mr. K.K. Tewari are released on bail, there appears to be no apprehension at this stage of their fleeing from justice or tampering with evidence.

15. It has been argued by Mr. Dinesh Mathur, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of Mr. K.N. Aggarwal and Mr. Ashok Arora, Advocate appearing on behalf of Mr. Chandraswami, that there being on bail pursuant to the orders of anticipatory bail passed by this Court, the only course open for the Central Bureau of Investigation to arrest them was to apply for cancellation of bail and non-bailable warrants could not be issued for their arrest. Besides other arguments which have been advanced by Mr. R.K. Anand and Mr. Vijay Bahuguna, it is the contention of Mr. Dinesh Mathur that the anticipatory bail granted by this Court to Mr. K.N. Aggarwal was not for a limited duration but was to enure upto the end of the trial and consequently the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has erred not only in issuing non-bailable warrants for his arrest but he has also erred in refusing to admit him to bail.

16. Mr. Ashok Arora, learned Counsel appearing for Mr. Chandraswami has also argued almost on the same lines as Mr. Dinesh Mathur has argued for Mr. K.N. Aggarwal. Both Mr. Chandraswamy and Mr. K.N. Aggarwal were on bail since 1990 and nothing has been brought to my notice about their having either tampered with evidence or having not co-operated with Investigating Agency. Even now advancing arguments, the CBI has not been able to point out any evidence or document which may be tampered with by them in case they are released on bail.

17. At the bar, number of judgments have been cited by learned Counsel for the petitioners. However, I am not referring, to any of the judgments as, for the reason given above, I am of the view that each of the petitioners is entitled to be admitted to bail. Though it is the argument of Mr. Mathur as well as Mr. Arora that the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate could not refuse to admit them to bail on account of their being already granted anticipatory bail by the High Court but I do not propose to examine this question as I have examined the plea for the grant of bail by looking at the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case at this stage.

18. In view of the foregoing, without in any manner expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and taking into consideration the allegations made in the FIR and the nature of offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioners, I direct the petitioner in each of the above cases to be released on bail, unless required to be detained in any other case, on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. This order will, however, be subject to the following conditions:

1. the petitioner will surrender his passports, if not already surrendered, to the Investigating Agency;

2. the petitioner will not leave the country without prior permission of the Court concerned;

3. the petitioner will not make any attempt to contact any of the prosecution witnesses, directly or through any other person, or in any other way try to tamper with the evidence or influence any witness in this case or any other case against them or any other crime under investigation by any Government Agency;

4. if the petitioners Mr. Chandraswami and Mr. K.N. Aggarwal desire to go out of Delhi, they shall give prior information to the C.B.I, about their programme, including the places and addresses where they can be contacted during that period;

5. the petitioner shall co-operate in the early completion of the trial and shall attend the hearings unless exempted;

6. the petitioner shall intimate the place of his residence and shall not change the same without prior intimation to the respondent of their intention to shift elsewhere;

7. the petitioners will appear before the concerned officer of the C.B.I, or any other Government Agency whenever required in connection with any crime or matter under investigation.

With these observations, the petitions stand disposed of.