Pushpa Rani v. Anokha Singh

B. C. MISRA, J.

( 1 ) APPELLANT Is husband on 1-7-63 at 10. 45 p. m. was driving his m/cycle on S.

Patel Road. A truck, whose driver was Respdt. 1 and owner Respdt. 2, was standing

on the road as its axle had broken. Though its front left wheel was on Kacha path its

near portion blocked most of the left half of the road. The deceased was carrying 2

children. M/cycle dashed against the truck and all the 3 died. Claim was filed u/s

110 of M. V. Act. Tribunal held that deceased was guilty of contributory negligence

and wag entitled to 1/3rd of the damages. Appellants appealed to High Court. ].

Para 7 onwards, Judgment is :

( 2 ) THE question that arises for consideration is whether the finding of the court

below that the deceased contributed to the neglience is correct. The Tribunal has

repelled the contention of the respondents before me that the deceased was drunk

at the time of accident. The Tribunal has found that there was not an iota of

evidence on the record before it to support this contention. The learned counsel for

the parties have failed to bring to my notice any evidence which has been ignored

by the Tribunal below, as such I endorse the finding that the deceased was at the

time of the accident not drunk. The Tribunal below has discussed the contributory

negligence of the deceased on two grounds; one is that the deceased was carrying

two children on the motor cycle, which was not permissible under section 85, but

the Tribunal has held that this has not in any way contributed to the causing of the

accident. It is true that the deceased could carry only one person on the pillion seat

and taking another child on the front seat was not permissible. But, this breach of

the law did not contribute to the accident, since it has not been suggested or proved

that the deceased had lost balance of the motor cycle or was unable to control it on

account of the excessive number of passengers. The view of the Tribunal below on

this point is correct.

( 3 ) THE other ground, which found favour with the Tribunal below was that a

person driving a motor cycle at night should drive it at such a speed that he can pull

it up within the limits of the vision ; and if he collided with the truck, either he was

driving negligently fast or he was not keeping good look out and in either event he

was also negligent. The Tribunal has rejected the statement of the Wing

Commander, Lefantane to the effect that the motor cycle of the deceased was being

driven at the speed of 15 miles per hour. On this basis the Tribunal has found the

contributory negligence of the deceased proved.

( 4 ) CONTRIBUTORY negligence was defined by the House of Lords in Swadling v.

Cooper, 1931 A. C. 1 at page 9, as the rule that although there may have been

negligence on the part of the plaintiff, yet unless he might, by the exercise of

ordinary care, have avoided the consequences of the defendants negligence, he

was entitled to recover ; but if by ordinary care he might have avoided them, he

was the author of his own wrong. Again in Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated

Collieries Limited, 1940 A. C. 152, at 85 and 186, the Judicial Committee observed

that strictly speaking the phrase contributory negligence was not a very happy

method of expressing an act of the employee which might relieve the employer from

liability. Probably the phrase negligence materially contributing to the injury would

be more accurate, but if the word contributory be regarded as expressing

something which was a direct cause of the accident either phrase was accurate

enough and the less accurate phrase was sanctioned by the long usage. In Nance v.

British Columbia Electric Railway Company Ltd. 1951 A. C. 651, at 611, the Judicial

committee observed that when negligence was alleged on the basis of an actionable

wrong, a necessary ingredient in the conception was the existence of a duty owed

by the defendant to the plaintiff to take due care, was of course, indubitably correct;

but when contributory negligence was set up as a defence, its existence did not

depend on any duty owed by the injured party to the party sued, and all that was

necessary to establish such a defence was to prove to the satisfaction of the jury

that the injured party did not in his own interest take reasonable care of himself and

contributed by this want of care, to his own injury; for when contributory negligence

was set up as a shield against the obligation to satisfy the whole of the plaintiffs

claim, the principle involved was that, where a man was part author of his own

injury, he could not call on the other party to compensate him in full.

( 5 ) IN Halsburys Laws of England, third edition, Volume 88, paragraph 92, on

pages 87 to 89, the rule has been laid down thus :"in an action for injuries arising

from negligence, it was a defence at common law if the defendant proved that the

plaintiff, by some negligence on his part, directly contributed to the injury in the

sense that his negligence formed a material part of the effective cause there of.

When this is proved the plaintiffs negligence is said to be contributory. It is now

enacted by the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945 that where any

person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of

any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage is not to be defeated

by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages

recoverable in respect thereof are to be reduced to such extent as the court thinks

just and equitable having regard to the claimants share in the responsibility for the

damage".

( 6 ) WITH regard to the application of the plea of contributory negligence the

statement of law in paragraph 93 is that where the defendant is negligent and the

plaintiff is alleged to have been guilty of contributory negligence, the test to be

applied is whether the defendants negligence was nevertheless a direct and

effective cause of the misfortune. The existence of contributory negligence does not

depend on any duty owed by the injured party to the party sued and all that is

necessary to establish a plea of contributory negligence is to prove that the injured

party did not in his own interest take reasonable care of himself and contributed by

his want of care to his own injury. The principle involved is that where a man is part

author of his own wrong, he cannot call on the other party to compensate him in

full. The standard of care depends upon foresee ability. Just as actionable negligence

requires the foresee ability of harm to others, so contributory negligence requires the

foresee ability of harm to oneself. A person is guilty of contributory negligence if he

ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonably prudent

man, he might hurt himself. The plaintiff is not usually bound to foresee that

another person may be negligent unless experience shows a particular form of

negligence to be common in the circumstances. If negligence on the part of the

defendant is proved and contributory negligence by the plaintiff is at best a matter

of doubt, the defendant alone is liable.

( 7 ) THE rule of law has succinctly been summed up in Halsbury Laws of England

and I shall apply it to the facts of the instant case. There is no doubt that if it were

found that the deceased had not taken reasonable care of himself in the

circumstances of the case, he would be guilty of contributory negligence causing the

accident and his estate would have to share the damages. The court below has,

however, entered upon the realm of conjectures in the case. The Tribunal has

observed that it was the duty of the deceased to stop his motor cycle within the

distance of his vision. This is not correct. In Morris v. Lutton Corporation, (1946) 1

K. B. 114, the Court of Appeal observed that there was no rule of law that a person

riding or driving in the dark must be held to be negligent if he was driving at such a

speed that he was not able to pull up within the limit of bis vision. The

excessiveness of the speed has to be determined as a question of fact in the

circumstances of each case on the evidence on the record. The only evidence in the

instant case consists of the statement of Wing Commander, Lefantane, who in

answer to question No. 18 stated that the motor cycle was travelling at about 15 m.

p. h. The court below has rejected it as being an estimate but in a matter like this

nothing but an estimate could reasonably be expected. This witness has generally

been believed by the Tribunal below. He has stated that he did not see the collision,

but he was standing outside his house and heard the motor cycle approaching and

striking into something and he reached the spot soon thereafter. There is no other

evidence of any witness or circumstances to the contrary to indicate that the

deceased was driving the motor cycle very fast. The permissible speed for driving

the motor vehicles within the Municipal Limits is 30 miles per hour and had the

vehicle been moving at the speed of 30 m. p. h when brakes were applied to it,

thinking time would cover a distance of 30 feet and breaking distance 45 feet, so it

would at least need 75 feet before the vehicle is brought to a stoppage. This is so in

the case of good weather, broad day light and a four wheeled vehicle. But if the

vehicle is two wheeled, it needs double the distance and in bad whether still more

(see Bingams Motor Claims Cases, 7th Edn. at pages 106 and 107) So the overall

stopping distance for two wheeled motor cycle in bad whether and dark night would

be at least double of 75 feet, viz. about 150 feet. Should the speed be 20 miles per

hour, then in case of motor car the stopping distance would be 40 feet and for

motor cycle 80 feet. It is, therefore, clear that the motor cycle of the deceased could

not be said to have been driven at an excessive speed, because had it been driven

at a speed of about 20 miles per hour, it would in any case need a distance of about

100 feet to come to a halt. Hence, the mere fact that the motor cycle of the

deceased struck the rear of the offending truck would not lead to the conclusion

that the motor cycle was being driven recklessly or negligently. Reporter. 52 (B. C.

Misra,.)

( 8 ) MOREOVER, in the claim petition the claimants stated that the night was dark,

the road leading from Palam to Delhi (Sardar Patel Marg) was without any lights, the

sky was overcast with clouds and it was very dark, and the deceased had to lead his

way with the help of his motor cycle light only ; that the deceased was confronted

on his way with the blazing lights of the oncoming cars and lorries which paled the

light of his motor cycle and that in order to avoid any collision, the deceased kept

well towards the left of the middle of the road. In reply, respondents 2 and 3 stated

in paragraph 22 that it was admitted that the night was dark and the road at the

relevant time was without any lights and the sky was overcast with clouds ; it was

also admitted that "the deceased must be confronted on his way with blazing lights

of the oncoming cars and lorries and the same must have paled the light of

motorcycle of the deceased. "they also admitted that the offending truck was

standing parked in an unworkable condition. This admission on the part of the

respondents 2 and 3 in the written statement finds support from the statement of

Wing Commander, Lafantane. In reply to question No. 20, he stated that there were

some cars passing on both directions, but he could not say whether any passed

immediately before the accident. He further stated in cross-interrogatories in

question No. 17 that it was a busy road and there was considerable traffic by day as

well as by night. He also stated that he had seen the light of the motor cycle moving

through the hedge surrounding his house and that the road was busy and there was

considerable traffic arid some cars were passing in both the directions. It is,

therefore, established that in the circumstances of the case, the light of the motor

cycle was enough to warn the deceased that obstacle of the offending truck existed

on the road before him. Again in a dark night with the sky overcast with clouds with

no street lighting. it was certainly the duty and prudent act on the part of the

deceased to leave right half of the road for the oncoming traffic and he had to keep

himself on the extreme left half of the road, but nine feet out of the total 12 feet

width of the said road was covered by the offending truck, which was parked

without any rear light or warning. There were oncoming cars and as admitted by the

respondents (and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we are entitled to

rely on the admission of the parties), the deceased was confornted with their blazing

lights which paled the motor cycle light. In this situation, the deceased could, by any

reasonable care short of miracle, not avoid the accident. Therefore, I hold that the

deceased was not guilty of any contributory negligence.

( 9 ) FURTHER, assuming contributory negligence for the sake of arguments, the

Tribunal has erred in apportionment. The House of Lords in Miraflores and the

Abadess Owners of the steam Tankers Miraflores v. Owners of the State Tanker

George Livsnos and others, (1967) 1 A. C. 672, at page 677, observed that if the

problem were merely a causation. . . . . . but the investigation was concerned with

fault which included blame worthiness as well as causation, and no true

apportionment could be reached unless both those factors were borne in mind. The

noble Lord thereafter proceeded to give instructive illustrations of the working of the

rule. However, a case very near to facts of the case in hand before me came up

before the court of appeal in Brown and another v. Thomson. (1968) 2 All E. R. 708.

The facts of that case were that the plaintiffs, consisting of the husband and wife,

were injured when the car in which they were traveling struck a stationary lorry

which was wholly unlighted at the rear and which had no reflectors; the accident

occurred at 2. 45 or 3. 00 p. m. on a stretch of road which ran along the fringes of

Epping Forest ; at the time there was thin coating of snow on the road, but snow

was not falling heavily. The plaintiffs husband was driving the car with dipped

headlights ; the last street lamp was some 280 feet away before the place of

accident; the husband had seen something looming up in front of him just before

the accident occurred, and his car had begun to turn out from the near side kerb

before it struck the back of the lorry. The plaintiffs brought an action for damages

against the owner of the lorry and the trial Judge awarded to the plaintiff wife 2500

general damages and the court apportioned 20% of the responsibility for the

accident to her husband. The defendant appealed against the apportionment of

damages and contended that 50% of the responsibility for the accident should have

been apportioned to the husband. The court of appeal dismissed the appeal. Lord

Justice Winn observed at page 709 that it was essential to compare the fault of each

with the fault of the other two and the emphasis is on fault, not solely on causation

or damage. There was no doubt whatever that the act of driving into the back of

stationary vehicle, the act of driving in such a manner that for one reason or

another the driver in this case failed to turn out (since there was no real need for

him to stop in order to avoid this lorry) was a high degree potently causative of the

collision and of the injuries suffered by the husband and the wife ; equally, of

course, it was potently causative of the collision tnat the lorry should have been left

there in the position with no light on it, which want very much further than saying

that if either of the vehicles had not been there, there would have been no collision.

Each of them potently contributed to the causation of the accident; but when one

looks at the question of blameworthiness, that it seemed quite plain that the fault of

the defendent was very much greater than the fault of the plaintiff husband having

regard to the element of blameworthiness was relatively really quite small. The

Court of Appeal however, declined to interfere with the apportionment of the

damages made by court of the first instance.

( 10 ) IN the instant case, in view of the discussion made above, I have found that

there was no contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. But, if mere

failure to pull up the motor cycle in time and avoid the collision be assumed to be

contributory negligence, I would relying on the aforesaid authority, call it a relatively

quite small blameworthiness and could not apportion the responsibility for the

damages against the deceased at more than 20%. The finding of the Tribunal

placing it at 2/3rd is clearly not sustainable in any event. As a result, I find that the

finding of the court below that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence is

not sustainable and is reversed. Consequently, the respondents are liable to pay the

whole of the damages that may be determined against them and no amount of

damages is to be reduced on account of any contributory negligence.

( 11 ) BEFORE proceeding to discuss the quantum of damages, I wish to consider

the objection, of Mr. Seth, counsel for the respondents. His first contention is that

the claim application was barred by time. The grounds on which he has based his

contention is that the claim petition as originally framed had arrayed Amarjit Siagh

only as respondent No, 2. Later on, it was found that the truck belonged to a

partnership firm known as Amarjit Singh Bhagat Singh, of which Amarjit Singh was

one of the partners. The claim petition was, therefore, amended and the firm was

impleaded as respondent No. 2. The counsel submits that the amendment had been

allowed after the period of limitation prescribed by section 110-A of the Act had

been expired. This has been discussed by the Tribunal below in answer to issue No.

9. It has held that Amarjit Singh had been impleaded earlier and later the firm

Amarjit Singh Bhagat Singh had been impleaded and this was only a case of

misdescription and so the petition was within time. Further, following a decision of

the Punjab High Court reported as Mehta Goods Carrier (P) Ltd. Delhi v. Darshan

Devi and others, AIR 1962 Punjab 425, the tribunal condoned the delay against

respondent No. 2 and held that the application was within time. It further found that

even if the applications were found to be barred by time, it would not make any

material difference, since the claim petition against the insurance company and the

driver was indisputably within time and the insurance company had insured the

vehicle not only against the insured owner, but also against the negligence of the

driver, as was clear from clause (3) of section 2 of the Insurance Policy and so the

insurance company was liable to indemnify the claim of the claimants against the

driver in any event, even without impleading the owner. Mr. Seth has contended

that the firm Amarjit Singh Bhagat Singh, which has now been arrayed as

respondent No. 2 was a separate legal entity from Amarjit Singh personally, who

had been impleaded earlier, I am unable to accept the submission. The partnership

firm is not a separate legal entity. It is only the compendious name tor the individual

partners (see Murli Dhar v. Chum Lal and others. 1970 RCJ 922 (SC ). Amarjit Singh,

therefore, remained liable in his individual capacity as well as in his capacity as

partner of the firm and the amendment in the description of the firm did not

introduce any separate legal entity (see Purushottam Umedbhai and Co. v. M/s

Manilal and Sons, AIR 1961 SC 325 [LQ/SC/1960/230] , and Jai Jai Ram Manoharlal v. National Building

Material Supply, AIR 1969 SC 1967 ). Moreover, I agree with the court below that

me substitution of the name was a correction of mis-description, as the claimants

had really intended to implead the owner of the vehicle, and Amarjit Singh was one

of the owners, while his partners in the firm were co-owners. Under section 21 of

the Limitation Act, if a suit or application has been filed against a defendant and

subsequently another defendant is added, it is open to the court to order that the

proceedings against the newly added defendant would be deemed to have been

commenced on the date of the original petition. Further, the Tribunal below had the

power to condone the delay under the proviso to sub-s. (3) of section 110-A of the

Act and it has exercised its discretion in the instant case according to the well

established principles and no grievance can be made against the same. Mr. Seth.

however, has contended that the Tribunal has condoned the delay without any

written application of the claimants, Neither section 5 of the Limitation Act, nor the

proviso to section 110-A (3) of the Act really requires a written application for the

purpose (see Sanwal Das v. Kanhya Lal, 1966 DLT 421, and Firm Kaura Mal Bishan

Dass v. Firm Mathura Dass Atma Ram, AIR 1959 Punjab 646 Para 10 ). Though

written applications are normally filed to move the court to exercise its power to

condone the delay, still, it does not debar the court from condoning the delay

without any such written application. The matter rested in the discretion of the

court, which has been exercised according to law. I do not find any legal infirmity in

this part of the order and reject the objection of the counsel for the respondent. I

also agree with the Tribunal below when it has held that the delay in correcting the

name of respondent No. 2 has not caused any prejudice, since the liability of the

insurance company was in terms of the policy still subsisting upon mere proof of

negligence of the driver even when only Amarjit Singh had been impleaded as

owner in place of the firm.

( 12 ) THE other objection raised by Mr. Seth is ingenious, but not sound. The

submission of the counsel is this: Under section 110-A it is provided than an

application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in

sub-section (1) of section 110 may be made by the persons mentioned therein and

sub-section (1) of section 110 provides that a State Government may. . . . . .

constitute. . . . . . Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals for such area as may be

specified in the notification. . . . . . for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for

compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to,

persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles (emphasis supplied ). The learned

counsels argument is that at the time of the accident, the offending motor vehicle

had broken down and was standing in an unworkable condition and the same was

not in use. The accident bad, according to the counsel, therefore, rot taken place

arising out of the use of the vehicle and as such the claim preferred by the appellants

was not covered by section 110 and section 110-A of the Act and so its

determination would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

( 13 ) THE contention of the learned counsel has been repelled by the court below

and in my opinion rightly. The word use occurring in section 110 of the Act has

been used in a wide sense. It covers all employments of the motor vehicle on the

public places including its driving, parking, keeping stationary, repairing, leaving

unattended on the road or for any other purpose. The driver of the offending vehicle

had certainly taken out the vehicle and had driven it on the public road and had

parked it as its axle had broken down and then left it without reasonable precaution.

If a vehicle is being driven and is stopped or parked for being repaired or otherwise,

then it cannot be said that the vehicle is not being used Supposing some driver

thinks fit to stop a vehicle in the middle of a busy road and to start repairing it or

decides to rest in the seat, it cannot be said that he can escape the liability by

pleading that at that time the vehicle was not being used.

( 14 ) THE counsel has taken me through the various provisions of the Act. where

the Act has used diverse expressions, like driving, parking, using, stopping,

retraining stationary, etc. , But, these expressions are employed when the

legislature intended to direct the attention to any particular use, but the expression

use occurring in section 110 is similar to the expression occurring in sections 94

and 95 where a mandate is laid down that no person will use a motor vehicle in

public place without a prescribed policy of insurance. Section 110 again employs the

same expression "arising out of the use of the vehicle. " The expression is,

therefore, employed in a wide sense and is practically synonymous with bring out a

motor vehicle in a public place, and using the public place for the motor vehicle. The

condition in which the motor vehicle arrives or is kept and the purpose for which it is

being driven or is being kept stationary is not a jurisdictional fact to determine the

jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide the claim, although these questions may or

may not have any bearing on the merits of the case. The word use of the motor

vehicles occurring in Chapter VIII under the heading insurance of Motor Vehicle

Against Third Party Risks, has a wider meaning of plying and not actually plying it

for profit. The expression is used in section 110-A in the same sense as it occurs in

sections 94 and 95 of the Act under Chapter. The use of the expression use in

other sections 123, etc. in Chapter VI relating to Control of Traffic and at other

places derive their meaning in the restricted or wider sense, as the case may be, a

cording to the context in which it is used and they do not control or limit the

connotation of the expression occurring in section 110 and 110-A of the Act. Mr.

Seth has cited the State of Mysore v. Syed Ibrahim, AIR 1967 SC 1424 [LQ/SC/1967/41] , State of

Uttar Pradesh v. Ramagya Sharma Vaidya, AIR 1966 SC 78 [LQ/SC/1965/57] , E. S. Ramakrishna Setty

v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 A. P. 420, In re T. V. Moidu and another. AIR

1960 Madras 265 and State of U. P. v. Bansraj, AIR 1959 SC 79 [LQ/SC/1958/127] , on the construction

of word use. I have gone through the said authorities. They deal with the

expression occurring in the particular context and do not throw any light on the

construction of the word occurring in section 110-A or 110 of the Act. I have no

hesitation in rejecting the contention of the learned counsel and affirming the view

of the Tribunal below.

( 15 ) WITH regard to quantum of damages, I endorse the finding of the court

below that the parents of the deceased were not dependent on the deceased and

they were not entitled to any damages. With regard to the damages payable to the

other claimants, I accept the evidence on behalf of the claimants as was accepted

by the Tribunal below on the basis of income-tax assessment orders that the income

of the deceased from the Tin Printing Factory was Rs. 6,000. 00 per annum. The

Tribunal below has reduced it by Rs. 3,000. 00 on the ground that after the death;

the widow continued to get the said income. In my opinion, the Tribunal has fallen

into an error. It was open to the court to find out the value of the assets left by the

deceased and deduct it from the dependency. But the income of the claimants after

the death of the deceased is due not only to the assets of the deceased, but also

due to the management of the business by the deceaseds wife with the help of

Inderjit Chopra, younger brother of the deceased, who stated that the factory was

running at the loss. The value of the capital, labour and risk employed by the legal

representatives on the work roust be excluded before proposing to reduce the

dependency. Income from the business of the factory cannot be equated with the

rental income from the realty, nor with fruits from the trees which may be readily

available without much labour and risk on the part of the legal representatives The

court below in arriving at the dependency ought to have given credit for the

personal contribution and efforts of the legal representatives in running the business

and earning income out of it. In the absence of any other material on record, I

would consider it fit to allow a sum of Rs. 1,000. 00 per annum on account of

labour, skill and risk of the business incurred by the legal representatives themselves

and would therefore, arrive at the dependency at Rs. 4,000. 00 per annum (instead

of Rs. 3,000. 00. As against this, in agreement with the Tribunal below, I would

exclude the amount of Rs. 75 and Rs. 80 per month (or Rs. 1,860. 00 per annum)

on account of expenditure by the deceased on himself and the deceased children,

thus yielding a total of Rs 2,140. 00 per annum as dependency. The deceased at the

time of his death was 45 years of age and the court below has applied the multiplier

of 12. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the deceased had a

history of longevity and his parents are still alive and he should, therefore, be

expected to live till the age of 65 years and the computation should have been made

for 20 years. But, unfortunately, no evidence has been produced at the trial with

regard to the family history and so I am unable to differ from the finding of the

Tribunal below and thus the multiplier must remain at 12. The dependency of Rs.

2140. 00 per annum multiplied by 12 gives the amount of compensation at Rs.

25,680. 00.

( 16 ) THE court below has allowed compensation on account of expectation of life

at Rs. 2,000. 00 on account of husband, Rs. 2,000. 00 for the deceased daughter

and Rs. 3,500. 00 for the deceased son. In my opinion, in the instant case the

claimants are not entitled to the aforesaid amounts. Moreover, the amount that is

being allowed by me on appeal and is being paid as lump-sum covers all heads of

compensation to which the claimants are entitled. The said items are, therefore,

disallowed. The Tribunal below awarded compensation for the death of two children.

I do not award it separately and it will be covered by the amount awarded.

( 17 ) THE appellants have received a sum of Rs. 2500. 00 from the insurance

company as claim on the life assurance policy of the deceased. The court below has

deducted whole of the said amount as accretion of estate. This could not be

deducted as the amount of insurance was payable to the legal representatives of the

deceased in any event and it does not constitute a benefit on account of his death.

Therefore, what is to be deducted on account of insurance is the acceleration of the

payment of the claim and not the whole claim. See Bhagwanti Devi v. Ish Kumar,

1975 ACJ 56 [LQ/DelHC/1974/175] -1975. RLR. 172. I value the acceleration at ten per cent. The

deducation on account of acceleration of insurance claim works out to Rs. 250. 00.

This makes out a net compensation of Rs. 25,430. 00, which will be payable to the

wife and the two children, appellants herein, in equal shares. The award of the

Tribunal below is enhanced to the aforesaid figure of Rs. 25,430. 00. The liability of

the insurance company will be limited to Rs. 20,000. 00 and the balance will be

payable by the remaining respondents.