CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.

1. The Judgment of this Court in Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddi v. Lakkireddy Lakshmama, ([1964] 2 S.C.R. 1 72.) that of the Privy Council in Rajani Kanta Pal & Ors. v. Joga Mohan Pal (50 I.A. 173.) and of the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Gift-tax, Delhi v. Munshi Lal (85 I.T.R. 129.) do not deal with the question whether a Hindu female, not being a coparcener, can blend her separate property with joint family property. The statement of law in Lakkireddi (supra) that property, separate or self-acquired, of a member of joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein is to be understood in the context that property devised under a will was alleged in the case to have been impressed with the character of joint family property, by the male members of the family. In Rajani Kanta Pal (supra) also, the blending was alleged to have been done by a male member of a joint family and the real controversy was whether the Mitakshara rule of blending applied in the case of brother s living together and forming a joint family governed by the Dayabhaga school of law. The Privy Council held that the rule of blending ex- tended to Dayabhaga families also. In the case decided by the Delhi High Court in Munshi Lal, (supra) it is t rue that one of the assessees was a female member of a Hindu undivided family and the contention was that she had impressed her separate property with the character of joint family property. It is, however clear from the judgment of the High Court that the question whether a female member of a joint Hindu family can blend her property with joint family property was not urged or considered in that case. The capacity or competency to blend was assumed both as, regards the ma le and the female assessee who were members of joint Hindu family. It was on that assumption that the question was referred to the High Court for its opinion under section 26(1) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958 whether the act of throwing the self- acquired property into the common hotchpotch amounted to a gift as defined in the Gift-tax Act. Following the decision of this Court in Goli Eswariah v. Commissioner of Gift-tax, (76 I.T.R. 675.) the Delhi High Court held that the transaction did not amount to a gift and, therefore, the gift-tax was not attracted. Thus, in none of these three cases cited by the appellant, was the competency of incorporation of separate property with joint family property in issue.The decision of the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Rani Prayag Kumari Debi (supra) is also not to the point. It was held therein that unless the power is excluded by statute or custom, the holder of a customary impartable estate, by a declaration of his intention, can incorporate with the estate his self-acquired immovable property, and thereupon the property accrues to the estate and is impressed with all its incidents, including the custom of descent by primogeniture. The appellant argues that if the holder of an impartable estate can blend his separate property with the estate of an impartible estate, there is no reason why a Hindu female should not have the right to blend her separate property with joint family property. The analog y is misconceived because the true rule of blending, as we have explained above, is that the right to blend is limited to coparceners.

2. Having considered the decisions cited at the bar, it m ay be useful to have a fresh look at the doctrine of blending. The theory of blending under the Hindu law involves the process of a wider sharing of ones own properties by permitting the members of ones joint family the privilege of common ownership and common enjoyment of such properties. But while introducing new sharers in ones exclusive property, one does not by the process of blending efface oneself by renouncing ones own interest in favour of others. To blend is to share along with others and not to surrender ones interest in favour of others to the exclusion of oneself. If a Hindu female, who is a member of an undivided family, impresses her absolute, exclusive property with the character o f joint family property, she creates new claimants to her property to the exclusion of herself because not being a coparcener, she has no right to demand a share in the joint family property by asking for a partition. She has no right of survivors hip and is entitled only to be maintained out of the joint family property. Her right to demand a share in the joint family property is contingent, inter alia, on partition taking place between her husband and his sons (see Mullas Hindu Law, 14th Ed. p. 403, para 315). Under section 3 (2) and (3) of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937 her right to demand a partition in the joint family property of the Mitakshara joint family. accrued on the death of her husband. Thus, the expression blending is inapposite in the case of a Hindu female who puts her separate property, be it her absolute property or limited estate, in the joint family stock.It is well settled that a Hindu coparcenary is a much narrower body than the joint family and it includes only those persons who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property. These are the three generations next to the holder in unbroken male descent (see Mullas Hindu Law, 14th Ed . p. 262, para 213). A Hindu female therefore is not a coparcener. Even the right to reunite is limited under the Hindu law to males (Mulla, p. 430, para 342). It does not therefore militate against the fundamental notions governing a Hindu joint family that a female member of the joint family cannot blend her separate property, even if she is an absolute owner thereof, with the joint family property.

3. In our opinion, therefore, the income of Rs. 21, 544 from Nishat Talkies was not assessable in the hands of the Hindu undivided family on the basis that the appellant had blended it with the joint family property.

4. As regards the second question on which this Court had called for a supplementary statement, there is no serious controversy that by the declaration dated September 1, 1961 the appellant must be deemed to have made a gift of the items mentioned therein to the undivided family of which she was a member. The Tribunals finding to that effect must, therefore, be confirmed. The income of the property gifted to the Hindu undivided family will be liable to be brought to tax consistently with this finding and in accordance with law.

5. In the result, the appeal fails in regard to the first question but will succeed in regard to the second. There will be no order as to costs.

6. Appeal allowed in part.