Alladi Kuppuswami, J. 1. The first accused in Sessions Case No. 53/76 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Machilipatnam is the appellant. The appellant and three others were charged with committing offences punishable under Section 302. I.P.C. read with Section 34 I.P.C. and under Section 302 I.P.C. read with Section 109 I.P.C. Accused 1 to 3 were charged with an offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. read with Section 34 I.P.C. and accused 4 under Section 302 I.P.C. read with Section 109 I.P.C. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted accused 2, 3 and 4 and convicted the first accused under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 2. The case of the prosecution briefly stated is that the deceased Gori-parthi Radhakrishna Murthy was a resident of Vijayawada and an active worker of the Communist Party. The accused was a close follower of one Vangaveeti Radhakrishna Murthy. There were ill-feeling between Vangaveeti Radhakrishna Murthy and his party men on one side and the members of the Communist Party of India at Vijayawada on the other. Vangaveeti Radhakrishna Murthy was one of the accused, being accused in a case of murder of one Chalasani Venkata Ratnam. Before the case came up for trial he was murdered. The deceased and some others were charge sheeted for that murder and the first accused was an eye witness in that case. The deceased Goriparthi Radhakrishna Murthy, was threatening the first accused with direct consequences if he deposed against him. Yet the first accused gave evidence. On the date of the murder the deceased gave evidence in a M.V.O.P. in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Krishna. He was examined as a witness till 3.30 P.M. and thereafter the left for Indra Bhavan, a hotel where he was staying. The accused also were on that day at Machilipatnam having gone to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Krishna to meet one Vangaveeti Mohana Ranga Rao. The deceased noticed the first accused in the Court and threatened that he would be done away with within 10 days. The first accused therefore became afraid and wanted to move first in the matter before Goriparthi Radhakrishna Murthy did any harm to him. He asked accused 2 and 3 to follow him and to attack the deceased. Having located Radhakrishna Murthy at Indra Bhavan they also sought the assistance of accused 4 who brought accused 2 and 3 to Indra Bhavan in the car of Mohana Ranga Rao. Accused 2 and 3 joined accused 1 and were waiting at the gate. As the deceased came out of the hotel at about 4 p.m. accused 1 chased him and the deceased ran into the hotel. Accused 1 pursued him and stabbed him in the abdomen with a knife and the deceased thereupon ran into the kitchen and fell on his face. Accused 1 and 3 stabbed him indiscriminately and inflicted 16 injuries resulting in his death. Accused I came out of the hotel, threw the knife with which he had stabbed the deceased near Delux hotel and ran some distance. He stopped a rickshaw carrying P.W. 8 and driven by P.W. 10 and made P.W. 8 get down and got into the rickshaw and asked the rickshaw driver to take him to Chilakalapudi Railway station from where he absconded. Meanwhile accused 2 escaped from the hotel through the rear gate of the residential house of the proprietor and accused 3 escaped by scaling the compound wall. They got into the car kept by accused 4. Accused 1 was arrested at Benz Company Centre, Vijayawada on 11-8-1975 and accused 3 and accused 4 subsequently surrendered themselves before the Court. 3. The learned Sessions Judge after considering the evidence in the case acquitted accused 2 to 4 but found accused 1 guilty of an offence under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced him to under go imprisonment for life. 4. The incident when the deceased was allegedly stabbed by accused 1 to 3 within the precincts of Indra Bhavan hotel was spoken to by P.W. 3, the Cashier, and P.W. 4 and P.W. 5 two cooks. Their evidence, however, does not disclose that the persons who stabbed the deceased with knives were the same persons as accused 1 to 3. Hence, these witnesses who say that they witnessed the actual incident are not of any help in coming to the conclusion as to who was the person responsible for the death of the deceased. A short time after the incident at about 5-30 p.m. a report was given by one Saripalli Jagapathi Raju to the Inspector of Police, PW 24 claiming that he was an eye witness and gave the names of the persons who according to him had committed the offence. In this the name of accused 4 alone among the present accused was found. Ultimately however, after investigation apparently because the prosecution was of the view that the persons mentioned thereunder had no part to play in the crime but that the offence was committed by accused 1 to 4 they charge sheeted accused 1 to 4. 5. The court below relied on the confession made by the first accused on 14 8-1975 before the Magistrate. The first accused however later retracted this confession stating that he was taken away by the police from his house and he was informed by the police that if the persons mentioned in the report Ex. P-48 were the accused in the present case the case relating Vangaveeti Radhakrishna Murthy would become weak and therefore the C.B.C.I.D. Inspector stated that if he admits this case his name would be got removed from the case. First he did not accept. For four or five days the Inspector persuaded him. Even then he did not accept. On 11th of August, 1975 he was brought to the sub-jail, Bandar and P.W. 25 forced him to admit the case. His mother and sisters were brought and he was beaten in their presence. They were also kept in custody. He was produced before the Court 2-8-1975. On that evening his relations were brought to the Sub Jail and he was told that unless he admits the offence they will not be released from custody. They also got his mother and sisters to prevail upon him to admit the case. Then his mother asked him to admit the case and as he could not bear the ill-treatment caused to his mother and sisters he admitted the case and as he could not bear the torture from the C.B.C.I.D. lie admitted the case. 6. The Court below was of the view that the confession made earlier was voluntary and true and as the statements made thereunder were corroborated in material particulars by the other evidence in the case the Court was entitled to act upon this confession and found the accused guilty. 7. It is seen from the facts stated above that except for the confession which has been retracted there is no other material which will sustain the conviction of the first accused. The Supreme Court as well as this Court and other High Courts have had to consider in innumerable cases the evidentiary value of a retracted confession and how far a conviction can be rested on such confession. In Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 S.C. 637 it was held that it is not only necessary that the confession should be voluntary but it must also be established that it is true and for the purpose of dealing with that question it would be necessary to examine the confession and compare it with the rest of the prosecution evidence and the probabilities of the case. In that particular case after comparing the confession with the rest of the prosecution evidence they came to the conclusion that material points mentioned in the confessional statement were not shown to be true. In Subramania Goundan v. State Of T.N., AIR 1958 S.C. 66 the Supreme Court observed that the question has very often arisen whether a retracted confession may form the basis of a conviction and said that the Court has to take into consideration not only the reasons given for making the confession or retracting it but the attending facts and circumstances surrounding the same. There can be no absolute rule that a retracted confession cannot be acted upon unless the same is corroborated materially. As a matter of prudence and caution which has sanctified itself into a rule of law a retracted confession cannot be made solely the basis of conviction unless the same is corroborated. It does not however necessarily mean that each and every circumstance mentioned in the confession regarding the complicity of the accused must be separately and independently corroborated nor is it essential that the corroboration must come from facts and circumstances discovered after the confession was made. It would be sufficient that the general trend of the confession is substantiated by some evidence which would tally with that is contained in the confession. In Satyanarayana v. State, 1958 A.L.T. 1125 an argument was advanced that the decision in Subramania Goundan v. State Of T.N., AIR 1958 S.C. 66 marked a departure from the earlier law laid down in regard to retracted confession and the earlier decisions must be deemed to have been impliedly over-ruled by the decision in Subramania Goundan v. State Of T.N., AIR 1958 S.C. 66. Umamaheswaram. J., observed that the principles governing the earlier cases were clearly and unequivocally laid down in Subramania Goundan v. State Of T.N., AIR 1958 S.C. 66 and added that it is settled law that in the case of an accomplices evidence the corroboration should be in material particulars. But in regard to the nature of corroboration required in the case of a retracted confession, there is divergence of opinion in the decisions of the Supreme Court. Even applying the stricter standard laid down in the earlier decisions he was of the view that there was a corroboration in material particulars and not merely general corroboration in that particular case. Krishna Rao, J., observed that a reading of the judgment in Subrahmania Goundan v. State Of T.N., AIR 1958 S.C. 66 shows that their Lordships did not intend to depart from law declared in any earlier decision of the Court. He was of the view that in the particular case even the broad story in the confession stood corroborated by independent evidence. According to him the point of contrast mentioned by Govinda Menon. in Subrahmania Goundan v. State Of T.N., AIR (1958) S.C. 66 between general corroboration and corroboration in material particulars seems to be that the latter expression required independent evidence which in some way reasonably connects or tends to connect the accused with the crime. In Pyare Lal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1094 [LQ/SC/1962/345] it was observed that a retracted confession may from the legal basis of conviction if the Court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made. The principle that a Court shall not base a conviction on such a confession without corroboration is not a rule of law but is only a rule of prudence. It may be laid down as a general rule of practise that it is unsafe to rely upon a confession, must less on a retracted confession, unless the Court is satisfied that the retracted confession is true and voluntarily made and has been corroborated in material particulars. In Bharat v. State of U.P., 1970 (1) S.C.W.R. 683 the Supreme Court observed that the Courts do not act upon the retracted confession without finding assurance from some other source as to the guilt of the accused. A true confession made voluntarily may be acted upon with slight evidence to corroborate it, but a retracted confession requires the general assurance that the retraction was an alter thought and that the earlier statement was true. It is significant to note that the decision in Subramania Goundan v. State Of T.N. AIR 1958 S.C. 66 was referred to with approval in this decision. In Abdul Ghani v. State of U.P., AIR 1973 S.C. 264 it was reiterated that a retracted confession can also legally form the basis of a conviction, though as a matter of prudence the courts try to look for corroboration from some independent source so as to satisfy their conscience that the confession is true. In that particular case the Court considering a confession in the background of the attending circumstances came to the conclusion that it was voluntary and true and the circumstantial evidence was also complete and convincing so as to leave no scope for any reasonable ground of the innocence of the accused of the case, and the evidence amply corroborated in material particulars the confession. It is true as pointed out by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that this is a case of an extra judicial confession. But we do not see any difference in principal between a case of a confession before a Magistrate and an extra judicial confession so far as this aspect is concerned. We may summarise the law as laid down by the above decisions of the Supreme Court as follows. Though a retracted confession may itself from the basis of a conviction it is unwise and imprudent on the part of the Courts to base a conviction on such retracted confession unless the general trend of the confession is substantiated by some evidence which would tally with what is contained in the confession. In using the expression general corroboration the Supreme Court did not, in our view, intend to go against the well established principles that the corroboration must be in respect of such particulars as would connect the accused with the crime. 8. Following these principles in mind let us now examine whether there is corroboration of the retracted confession made by the accused. Before doing so we may however state that we are not prepared to act upon the statement of the accused that he was forced to make the confession under the circumstances referred to by him in his examination under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In Hemraj v. State of Ajmer, AIR. 1954 S.C. 462 it was observed that it is well settled that in order that evidence of a confession may be admissible such confession must be free and voluntary and not preceded by any inducement to the prisoner to make a statement held out by a person in authority. But a mere bald assertion by the prisoner that he was threatened, tutored or that inducement was offered to him, cannot be accepted as true without more. In this connection the mother and sisters who were supposed to have been in custody and who were also illtreated as a consequence of which the accused, unable to bear their illtreatment, made a confessional statement have not been examined. On the other hand the Magistrate has given evidence as P.W. 20. He deposed that he warned the accused that the statement to be made by the accused would be used against him and it would not be obligatory to make any such confession. After precautions as laid down by law were taken by him he was satisfied that it was made voluntarily. We have no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the Magistrate. 9. Still the question remains as to whether the retracted confession can be acted upon. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor drew our attention to the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 4, 5, 8 and 10 in order to satisfy us that there is corroboration of the confession in material particulars. The confession is marked as Ex. P. 29. In this the accused stated inter alia that the deceased was threatening him and others that he would kill them if they deposed against him. On the day of the occurrence the deceased came to Court and deposed in the Motor Vehicles O.P. and he and the other accused were also in Court to meet Mr. Mohana Ranga Rao who had come there in connection with another case. The deceased left the Court after deposing in the O.P. Accused 1 then called accused 2 and 3 and told them that the deceased was going out and that was the fit time to kill him and they cannot find another convenient time. Thinking that the deceased would be at Indra Bhavan hotel the appellant went to the hotel and stayed on the left side. Accused 2 and 3 saw him and came there. Accused 3 went into the hotel and returned saying that the deceased was coming out after taking coffee. When the deceased came out accused 1 took his knife and ran towards him. After seeing him the deceased ran inside and thinking that he himself would be stabbed with a knife accused 1 stabbed the deceased in the stomach. The deceased cried "Ammo Ammo" and ran into the kitchen room and fell there on his face. After hearing the cries accused 2 and 3 came there and all of them stabbed him with knives on his back and killed him. He also stated that he drew away his knife at Delux Hotel and ran to a short distance. From there when a person was coming on a rickshaw he threatened him and made him get down. He sat on the rickshaw and went to Chilakalapudi Railway Station and got down there. He further stated that he went to Pedana the next-day and after taking tiffin and coffee caught the bus for Gudivada and stayed in Lakshmi Lodging there for about 4 or 5 days. Afterwards he took a room in Rekha Lodge changing his name as one Satyanarayana, Business, Guntur. 10. The evidence of P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5 who are alleged to have witnessed the occurrence have already been referred to. P.W. 8 deposed that on the day in question he was coming in a rickshaw. A person came running and asked him to get down from the rickshaw. He got down from the rickshaw and the other person got into the rickshaw. Later he identified that person before the Magistrate as accused 1. He further stated that he could not identify that person in the Court. He was there upon treated as a hostile witness and was permitted to be cross-examined by the Prosecution. In the cross-examination by the first accused it was suggested to him that he was made to identify accused 1 before the Magistrate at the instance of one Sreehari Rao who is the Secretary of the Bandar Town Communist Party. But he denied that suggestion. He also stated that the police showed him (the accused 1) as the person who dislodged him and there upon he identified him before the Magistrate. 11. P.W. 10 is a rickshaw driver. He deposed that he was carrying P.W. 8 in his rickshaw when a person came running from a lane and caught hold of the shirt of the passenger and made him get down from the rickshaw. He identified that person in the identification parade held by the Magistrate as accused 1. But during the course of his deposition he stated that he was not then in the Court. There upon the Additional Public Prosecutor requested permission to treat him as a hostile witness and to cross-examine him. He persisted in saying that it is not true to say that the person who got into the rickshaw dislodging the passenger was accused 1. 12. P.W. 13 deposed that he was working as a watchman in Rekha Lodge, Gudivada. He identified accused 1 as the person who came to the lodge on three occasions about one year and 5 months prior to the date of deposition, P.W. 15 is the Proprietor of Rekha Lodge. He deposed that on 20-7-75 a person by name Satyanarayana occupied room No. 5 and again on 22-7-75 he occupied room No. 2 and on 26-7-75 he occupied room No. 4. He however stated that he had nothing to do with the customers and he would only collect the money and he was deposing to these facts from the registers Exs. P-21 and P-22. 13. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the confession of the accused Ex.P-29 is corroborated in material particulars by the evidence of all these witnesses. He submitted that P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5 spoke to the deceased having been murdered within the precincts of Indra Bhavan by four persons. P.W. 8 spoke to the fact that a person came running soon after the incident and after dislodging him from the rickshaw got into it. P.W. 10, the rickshaw driver also spoke to the same effect. Thus the evidence of these two witnesses corroborated the statement of the accused that immediately after the occurrence he accorded the rickshaw driver, threatened the passenger and got into the rickshaw and went to the Chilakalapudi Railway Station. Similarly the evidence of P.Ws, 13 and 15 would corroborate the version in Ex. P-29 that the accused had stayed in Rekha Lodge the in Gudivada some time after the occurrence. He also drew our attention to the fact that knife was recovered from Delux Hotel, which is clear from the Panchanama, Ex.P-20. There was the further fact that at the identification parade P.Ws. 8, 10 and 13 identified the accused. Though P.Ws. 8 and 10 did not identify the accused in Court P.W. 13 identified accused 1 in Court also. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the entire evidence referred to above is sufficient corroboration of material particulars stated in the confession Ex.P-29. we are unable to agree with this submission. As we have pointed out the corroboration even though it may be of the general trend of the confession if must still be one connecting the accused with the crime. In this case there is no whisper in the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5 that the persons who committed the crime were the same as accused 1 to 4. P.Ws. 8 and 10 asserted before the Court that accused I was not the same person as the person who made P.W. 8 get down from the rickshaw and got into the rickshaw. There is nothing to connect the knife found at the Delux Hotel with the accused. The evidence of P.Ws. 13 and 15 at the most shows that the accused stayed at Rekha Lodge on the 20th, 22nd and 26th of July, 1975, nearly one month after the occurrence. His stay at Gudivada under an assumed name is not sufficient to connect the accused with the crime. For all these reasons we are of the view that there is no sufficient corroboration in material particulars of the confession by other evidence in the case. It is unfortunate that a cold-blooded murder committed in broad day light in the precincts of a hotel in the heart of a big town like Machilipatnam should go unpunished and the real criminals should escape, but in the circumstances we have no option but to hold that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction of the accused is set aside and the appellant is acquitted. The bail bond may be cancelled. In the result the appeal is allowed. CRP. Allowed.