1. This is, an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Justice Coxe,who has set aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court and restored that ofthe first Court with costs.

2. The suit is brought for khas possession of certain lands,and the facts with regard to those lands that have been established in theevidence are these. The plaintiffs title to them is by virtue of a transfer in1907, but at that time the defendant 1st party was in possession of the landsand had paid the purchase-money for them to the plaintiffs vendor, thatpayment having been made prior to the purchase by the plaintiff. In thesecircumstances, can the plaintiffs claim prevail I think not. To begin with,the plaintiff, apart from such notice as would be imputed to him of thedefendants right to the land by virtue of his possession, is found as a factby the lower Appellate Court to have known of the previous sale to thedefendant, and it is further found by the learned Judge of the lower Court ofAppeal, that he is unable to accept the suggestion that the vendor may haveperpetrated an act of bad faith without any collusion on the part of theplaintiff. He distinctly comes to the conclusion that there was complicitybetween the plaintiff and the vendor, and that can only mean a deliberatedesign to defraud the defendants of such rights as had not been fully completedby reason of failure to comply with all the formal requirements of the law. Sowe have the position that the defendant 1st party was in possession of thelands under a contract for sale under which the purchase-money had been paidprior to the transfer to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was well awareof that position. I cannot see how in these circumstances the plaintiff canpossibly recover the lands from the defendants 1st, party.

3. There are cases, of which Walsh v. Lonsdale 21 Ch.D. 9 :52 L.J. Ch. 2, 46 L.T. 858 : 31 W.R. 109 is a type, winch establish theprotection to which in a Court of Equity a person in the position of thedefendants is entitled. It is quite true that the question whether thedefendants 1st party were entitled to bring a suit for specific performance invindication of their rights was not debated before the lower Appellate Court,but there is no matter brought to our notice which can throw any serious doubtupon the defendants right to complete their right by such a suit. On thesegrounds. I think that the suit must fail. There is no invasion or evasion of theRegistration Act it is merely securing is a party those rights to which he isentitled apart from the Act--rights to which he has a good title in Courts towhich the abiding direction has been given to proceed in all cases according toequity and good conscience. Rights of this class can in ordinary course only beenforced against a third party such as the plaintiff here is, where that partyhas notice of those rights, so that I fuel in no way embarrassed by thesuggestion that there is anything in the policy of the Registration Act whichstands in the way of the ultimate result at which the District Judge arrived.In the view that I take, it is unnecessary to elaborate the position of thedefendants, but I may point out that if carried to its full extent the doctrinefor which the plaintiff contends would deprive a purchaser of his lien forpurchase money paid by him, even at the instance of one who took with notice.

4. The result is that the judgment of Mr. Justice Coxe isset aside, and the decree of the lower Appellate Court restored. The appellantsare entitled to their costs throughout.

5. This decree relates only to the 14 bighas which areclaimed by the defendants. To the jest of the land in suit, the defendants havenot made any claim and they are not in possession of it. In regard to that,therefore, there is no cause of action.

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Puchha Lal vs. KunjBehary Lal (09.07.1913 - CALHC)