1. Petitioner was enrolled in Central Reserve Police Force (for short the Force), on 02.07.1973 under Force No. 830764613 and in the course of time was promoted to the rank of HC/GO and posted in 158 Bn. Which was stationed at a place called Kadarpur in State of Haryana.

2. This writ petition by the petitioner is directed against order No. P-VIII-2/2005-EC-II dated 08.09.2005 issued by the Commandant, 158 Bn. (respondent No.3) whereby, pursuant to departmental inquiry and Inquiry Officers report dated 08.04.2005, punishment of Compulsory Retirement from service in terms of section 11(1) of the Central Reverse Police Force Act, 1949 (for short the Act) read with Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1955 (for short the Rules) has been imposed upon the petitioner. Besides, petitioner has also assailed order dated 18.08.2006 passed in appeal by Additional Director General of the Force, order dated 17.05.2007 passed by the respondent No.2 in the second appeal and order dated 29.11.2007 passed by respondent No.1 in a representation submitted by the petitioner. Petitioner, thus, seeks writ of certiorari setting aside and quashing order dated 08.09.2005, order dated 18.06.2006 and the order passed in the application seeking revision of the said orders. Further, he has sought direction commanding the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service of the Force with effect from 08.09.2005, with all consequential reliefs.

3. Respondents have opposed the writ petition by filing objections supported by an affidavit sworn in by one S. R. Panthi, DIGP, Group Centre CRPF, Bantalab, Jammu.

4. Heard, I have perused the record.

5. Facts relevant for disposal of this writ petition may be stated, briefly:

6. Petitioner on his transfer from 121 Bn. was posted as Head Constable in B. Coy. Of 158 Bn. of the Force at Kadarpur, Haryana. He left his place of duty without leave and permission on 30.07.2004 at 8.30 in the morning and remained absent without leave up to 25.12.2004, He did not join during this period despite communications having been issued from the Battalion at his available address. He reported for duty on 25.12.2004. After his joining he was served with a MEMORANDUM and Articles of charges by the Commandant of the Battalion for holding a departmental inquiry against him. Articles of charge served upon him were as follows:

Article-I: That the Said No.830764613 HC/GD P.P. Singh of B/158 Bn CRPF Kadarpur while functioning as a Head Constable at B/158 BN CRPF Kadarpur has conducted misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force u/S. 11(1) of CRPF Act-1949 in that he deserted from line on 30/7/04 at about 08:30 hours which is prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the force he serve and punishable under Rule 27 of CRPF Rule, 1955.

Article-II: That the Said No.830764613 HC/GD P.P. Singh of B/158 Bn CRPF Kadarpur while functioning as a HC/GD at B/158 BN CRPF Kadarpur has conducted grave misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force u/S. 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 in that after deserting from Camp/duty, he remained absent from line on 30/7/04 to 25/12/04 without any prior approval from competent authority, which is prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the force they serve and punishable under Rule 27 of CRPF Rule, 1955.

Article-III: That the Said No.830764613 HC/GD P.P. Singh of B/158 Bn CRPF Kadarpur while functioning as a HC/GD at B/158 BN CRPF Kadarpur has conducted misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force u/S. 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 in that after deserting from Camp/duty, he remained absent from 30/7/04 to 25/12/04 without any prior approval from competent authority, in that he failed to obey the law full orders issued to him vide letter No.D.II-I/04-B/158 dated 2/8/04 and 20/8/04 and letter No.P.VIII-I/04-EC-II-158 dated 7/12/04 in which he was ordered to report back in this unit which is prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the force and punishable under Rule 27 of CRPF Rule, 1955.

7. Mr. B. S. Rawat, Assistant Commandant of the Battalion, was appointed as Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry and submitted his report dated 08.04.2005. He concluded in his report that charges levelled against the delinquent (petitioner) in Articles I and II stand fully proved and that in Article III stand partially proved. Pursuant to and consequent upon the report of the Inquiry Officer, Commandant/respondent No. 3 issued impugned termination order No. P-VIII-2/2005-EC-II dated 08.09.2005. The concluding para of this order reads:-

I have carefully gone through the DE proceedings and report of EO and found no reasons to keep such person in service who has deserted for nearly five months and stated false about his sons death. Keeping in view of his young age and liabilities a lenient view has been taken by the undersigned on gravity of the offence and keeping all pros and cons I, in exercise of the power vested upon me under section 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 of CRPF Rules, 1955, award him punishment of Compulsory Retirement from Service with immediate effect. His OSL period w.e.f. 30/7/04 to 25/12/04 is also regularized as such.

(Emphasis supplied)

8. In assailing the order of compulsory retirement and the other orders, petitioner has contended that his family was residing at Sudh Mahadev, Mantlai, District, Udhampur, Jammu & Kashmir. His son fell seriously sick there and died on 21.07.2004, On receiving information about the sickness and death of his son, he applied for leave on 30.07.2004 to join his family to take care of his ailing son. The concerned officials of the B.Coy. did not forward his application to the Battalion. He received information that his wife was also sick so he let the unit/Battalion on an assurance of Batalion Hawaldar Major that his leave is being sanctioned by the Company Commander. He reached his house and himself fell sick which is evidence from certificate dated 22.12.2004 issued by the Medical Officer of the Primary Health Centre, Sudh Mahadev. Petitioner has contended further that during the period of his stay at his house he sent telegrams for extension of leave to his Battalion against postal receipts dated 07.08.2004, 13.08.2004, 11.09.2004 and 09.12.2004. On regaining medical fitness, he reported back to his Battalion on 24.12.2004 and was allowed to rejoin on 25.12.2004, Petitioner has thus contended that his absence from the Battalion was due to the reasons beyond his control and having been caused due to his emergent family circumstances and health condition. He never intended to abandon his service, he had been asking for leave and rejoined his duty in the Battalion voluntarily so he cannot be accused of desertion.

9. In assailing the order of the compulsory retirement and the subsequent orders, petitioner has primarily questioned the legality of the Articles of Charges framed against and served upon him. Mr. Vikas Mangotra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, sought to demonstrate that it was a simple case of absence without leave falling under section 10(m) of the Act calling for punishment provided for less heinous offences under section 10. Mr. Mangotra would say further that neither the petitioner had deserted the Force nor he could have been treated as deserter as he had no animus deserendi to desert so he could not have been accused of the offence of desertion. Mr. Mangotra urged, contextually, that neither the petitioner could have been accused of desertion nor a charge of desertion under section 9(f) of the Act was framed against him so order of compulsory retirement could not have been passed and petitioner could not have been held guilty for offence under section 11(1) of the Act read with Rule 27 of the Rules.

10. Dilating his point in this behalf, Mr. Mangotra submitted that it was not a case of desertion as provided under section 9(f) of the Act. In support, he relied upon Virendra Kumar v. Chief of the Army Staff New Delhi, AIR 1986 SC 1060 [LQ/SC/1986/36] . He submitted that it apparently was case of absence without leave covered under section 10(m) of the Act. He thus sought to demonstrate that charge was framed neither under section 9(f) nor under section 10(m) so imposing punishment under section 11(1) read with Rule 27 was illegal. In this context, Mr. Mangotra sought to demonstrate further that provisions contained in section 11(1) of the Act and Rule 27 of the Rules are enabling provisions for inflicting punishment prescribed under the Act and does not define any substantive offence, which stand defined under sections 9 and 10. It has been so contended in para-4(d) of the petition.

11. As regards the desertion of the Force the petitioner, it has been urged on behalf of the respondents that petitioner had deserted the camp without prior sanction of the competent authority, FIR in this regard was registered at P.S. Badshahpur, District Gurgaon, Haryana. Search parties were dispatched for searching him. The Commanding Officer vide is letter dated 02.08.2004 had directed him to report to his duty at an earliest. Neither the petitioner reported back nor any communication from him was received so on a complaint lodged by the Commanding Officer warrant for his arrest was issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Commandant which was sent to the Superintendent of Police, District Tajgir Chhagta, Chatisgarh, which was his available address in the Battalion, The Superintendent of Police, however, had reported that though the petitioner was a permanent resident of village, Garhala, Bhilai of that district but had abandoned residence of that place. It is contended further that on 17.12.2004, a letter was received from petitioner informing about his illness in which he had given his address as village, Sudh Mahadev in District, Udhampur and he was again directed to report to his duty immediately by writing letters to him. He was also directed to report at Base Hospital, CRPF, Jammu. It was on 25.12.2004 that he reported back to his duty. It is also contended that in the meantime petitioner was declared deserter in terms of Rule 31 of the Rules.

12. Mrs. Deepika Mahajan, learned Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondents, while not denying that unauthorized absence of a member of a Force is covered under section 9(f) of the Act and desertion is covered under section 10(m) submitted that for the said offences Commandant is empowered to proceed and impose punishment as provided under section 11(1) read with Rule 27.

13. The first question, thus, raised by the petitioner is, whether he could have been charged with offence of desertion under section 9(f) of the Act. Point raised is that petitioner did not have animus deserendi as he was constrained due to his domestic problems to leave the battalion on 30.07.2004 and similarly rendered unable to join till 24.12.2004. Reliance has been placed on Virendra Kumars case (AIR 1986 SC 1060 [LQ/SC/1986/36] ) (supra). Point raised also is that it was a simple case of absence without leave and charge of desertion was illegal.

14. Virendra Kumars case (AIR 1986 SC 1060 [LQ/SC/1986/36] ) was one under the Army Act, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that case have observed that absence without leave may be desertion if accompanied by the necessary animus deserendi or deemed to be desertion if the Court of Inquiry makes the declaration of absence prescribed by section 106 after following the procedure laid down and the person declared absent had neither surrendered nor been arrested. The Military Authorities in that case appeared to have treated the officer as a deserter and Supreme Court observed further that:

.... Whether, in the instant case, the authorities were justified in concluding that Capt. Virendra Kumar had no intention of resuming duty, is not a matter upon which we are entitled to express any opinion. The position would be otherwise if the decision of the authorities could he shown to be mala fide. On the material available, we are not in a position to say that the decision was mala fide.

15. The case in hand is one under the Act. As under the Army Act, neither desertion nor deserter has been defined under the Act. However, Rule 31 of the Rules provide for inquiry to be conducted when a person inter alia becomes liable for offence under section 9(f) of 10(m) and declaring the absentee as a deserter. In their counter-affidavit respondents have stated that the petitioner was declared deserter under the provisions of Rule 31 of the Rules. It is, thus, clear that before putting the petitioner to departmental inquiry under section 11(1) of the Act read with Rule 27 of the Rules for charge of desertion and absence without leave, he was declared deserter by a procedure prescribed under section 31 of the Rules. Correctness or justification of this declaration cannot be looked into by this Court in this writ petition inasmuch as neither any mala fide in this regard has been alleged nor mala fide is evident from the material on record. No illegality, therefore, can be attributed to framing of charge for desertion as provided under section 9(f) of the Act.

16. The other question raised by petitioner is that inquiry under section 11(1) of the Act read with Rule 27 of the Rules was illegal because the offence committed by the petitioner was only one under section 10(m), which falls in the category of less heinous offences but no charge under that section was framed. Mr. Mangotra, learned counsel for petitioner, has sought to raise a point that ail the three articles of charge were under section 11(1) of the Act and none was under Section 9(f) or 10(m) so entire charge-sheet as well as inquiry were illegal.

17. Point sought to be canvassed on behalf of the petitioner seems slightly misconceived. Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Act, need to be read in juxtaposition and not in isolation. Section 9, while providing a list of more heinous offences by a member of the Force, provides for the punishment therefore. Offence of desertion is mentioned at clause (f) of section 9. Section 10 provides a list of less heinous offences and punishment for these offences. Absence without leave or over-staying leave is mentioned at clause (m) of the section 10. Punishments provided under both these sections are of penal nature. Under section 9, maximum punishment is imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years and under section 10 imprisonment may extend up to one year. Section 11 of the Act, on the other hand, empowers the Commandant or any other prescribed officer to inflict punishments provided thereunder including suspension or dismissal to any member of the Force whom he considers to be guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty or remissness in the discharge of any duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force.

18. It clearly emerges from combined reading of sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Act that, whereas a member of the Force may be liable for an offence and can be punished with a major or minor punishment under sections 9 and 10 of the Act for the same offence/misconduct a departmental action can be taken against him under section 11.

19. In Union of India & others v. Ghulam Mohd. Bhat, AIR 2005 SC 4289 [LQ/SC/2005/1069] : (2005 Lab IC 3629) respondent was a Constable in the Force (CRPF). He overstayed sanctioned leave by 315 days without prior permission or sanction from competent authority. Competent authority passed order of his removal from service on the basis of report of Inquiry Officer. A learned single Judge of this Court by the order dated 05.08.1997 held that since the respondent was proceeded against in terms of section 10(m) of the Act read with Rule 27 of the Rules, the order of removal is without jurisdiction. It was observed that section 10(m) only provides for minor punishment and did not provide for punishment of removal from service. The order of removal was thus quashed. However, liberty was given to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Act of the Rules. Order passed by this Court came to be assailed before the Supreme Court.

20. Section 11 of the Act and Rule 27 of the Rules, came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in that case. Their Lorships held:

5. A bare perusal of Section 11 shows that it deals with minor punishment as compared to the major punishments prescribed in the preceding section. It lays down that the Commandant or any other authority or officer, as may be prescribed, may, subject to any rules made under the Act, award any one or more of the punishments to any, member of the force who is found guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty, remissness in the discharge of his duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the force. According to the High Court the only punishments which can be awarded under this Section are reduction in rank, fine, confinement to quarters and removal from any office of distinction or special emolument in the force. In our opinion, the interpretation is not correct, because the section says that these punishments may be awarded in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal.

6. The use of words in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal, appearing in sub-section (1) of Section 11 before clauses (a) to (e) shows that the authorities mentioned therein are empowered to award punishment of dismissal or suspension to the member of force who is found guilty and in addition to, or in lieu thereof, the punishment mentioned in clause (a) to (e) may also be awarded.

7. It may be noted that Section 9 of the Act mentions serious or heinous offences and also prescribes penalty which may be awarded for them. Section 10 deals with less heinous offences and clause (m) thereof shows that absence of a member of the force without leave or without sufficient cause or overstay without sufficient cause, is also mentioned as less heinous offence and for that also a sentence of imprisonment is provided. It is, therefore, clear that Section 11 deals with only those minor punishments which may be awarded in a departmental inquiry and a plain reading thereof makes it quite clear that a punishment of dismissal can certainly be awarded thereunder even if the delinquent is not prosecuted for an offence under Section 9 or Section 10.

21. In view of the law laid down by their Lordships in Ghulam Mohd. Bhats case, (2005 Lab IC 3629) petitioners contention that there was any defect in Articles of charges served upon him or that the inquiry, therefore, was illegal cannot sustain. It is admitted that petitioner left the station without sanctioned leave and had remained absent without leave for a pretty long period ranging from 31.07.2004 up to 25.12.2004. He clearly had committed offence provided under section 10(m). In the meantime he was declared deserter and accordingly became liable for offence provided under section 9(f). For both these offences he, besides punishment under the respective sections, could have been dealt within departmental proceedings and punished under section 11(1). Viewed thus, neither the Articles of Charges nor the departmental proceedings under section 11(1) read with Rule 27 can be held as illegal.

22. Impugned order of compulsory retirement and the subsequent orders have also been challenged on the grounds of mala fides and disproportionate punishment having been imposed. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that order is mala fide, arbitrary and discriminatory and the petitioner has been penalized for having complained against some officials of the force of financial impropriety. Those officers had earlier accused him of roaming in the unit under influence of liquor but the allegation was found to be concocted in the Court of Inquiry. It is also urged that, while imposing penalty, his unblemished service record right from 1973 to 29.04.2004 was not taken into consideration and the inquiry was held in a biased manner inasmuch as petitioner was not allowed to call material witnesses from his native place.

23. Before taking up this aspect of the case, it would be apt to be reminded and refreshed about the scope of judicial review of the departmental proceedings and actions. It would be useful to refer to a recent decision of Supreme Court in Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (2013) 4 SCC 301 [LQ/SC/2013/307] : (2013 Lab IC 2113). Their lordships after referring to State of Tamil Nadu v. S. Subramaniam, (1996) 7 SCC 509 [LQ/SC/1996/192] : (1996 Lab IC 1046), R. S. Saini v. State of Punjab, (1999) 8 SCC 90 [LQ/SC/1999/838] : (AIR 1999 SC 3579 [LQ/SC/1999/838] ), Govt. of A. P. v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2 SCC 373 [LQ/SC/2006/78] : (AIR 2006 SC 1214 [LQ/SC/2006/78] ) and Zora Singh v. J. M. Tandon, (1971) 3 SCC 834 [LQ/SC/1970/349] : (AIR 1971 SC 1537 [LQ/SC/1970/349] ) have observed:

24. The decisions referred to hereinabove highlight clearly, the parameter of the Courts power of judicial review of administrative action or decision. An order can be set aside if it is based on extraneous grounds, or when there are no grounds at all for passing it or when the grounds are such that, no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion. The Court does not sit as a Court of appeal but, it merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. The Court will not normally exercise its power of judicial review unless it is found that formation of belief by the statutory authority suffers from mala fides, dishonest/corrupt practice. In other words, the authority must act in good faith. Neither the question as to whether there was sufficient evidence before the authority can be raised/examined, nor the question of reappreciating the evidence to examine the correctness of the order under challenge. If there are sufficient grounds for passing an order, then even if one of them is found to be correct, and on its basis the order impugned can be passed, there is no occasion for the Court to interfere. The jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice, This apart, even when some defect is found in the decision making process, the Court must exercise its discretionary power with great caution keeping in mind the larger public interest and only when it comes to the conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the Court should intervene.

24. I have carefully scrutinized the record on the inquiry file in light of the procedure for conducting the inquiry provided under Rule 27(c) of the Rules, Having done so, I find that procedure up to the stage of recording statement of the petitioner (delinquent) after conclusion of evidence against him under sub-rule (4) of Rule 27(c) has been duly, rather meticulously followed. To that extent, I do not see any scope of intervention by this Court given the limited scope of judicial review in departmental actions.

25. Nonetheless, the Inquiry Officer obviously has faulted at later stage and so has faulted the disciplinary authority and this fault in my considered view has adversely influenced the question of imposing punishment by the disciplinary authority. In this context before pointing out the fault, I may first point out that section 11(1) of the Act provides for multiple punishments. This section deals with punishments other than those provided in the two preceding sections, it also provides for lesser punishments like reduction in rank, fine, and confinement to quarter guard etc. without mandating as to what punishment would be imposed for a particular act of misconduct. Selection of punishment is left to the discretion of the disciplinary authority. Imposition of punishment, therefore, will depend upon and certainly be influenced by facts and circumstances in which a particular act of misconduct was committed and may differ from case to case.

26. As per the procedure for conducting departmental inquiry, sub-rule (4) of Rule 27(c) provides for examination and recording of the statement of the accused (delinquent) after completion of recording the evidence against him. It further provides that, if the accused pleads guilty and does not challenge the evidence, proceedings shall be closed for orders. However, if he pleads not guilty he shall be required to file a written statement and a list of such witnesses as he wishes to cite in his defence within such period, which shall in any case be not less than a fortnight.

27. Minutes recorded in the inquiry file would show that the evidence against the petitioner was completed on 08.03.2005 and on the same day inquiry officer issued a letter to the petitioner informing him that departmental inquiry has been completed and now, if he so desires, he may produce defence witnesses and documents within fifteen days before the inquiry officer. He was also informed that his written statement should also reach the inquiry officer by 23.03.2005. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of the letter verbatim in English vernacular:

Attah Vibhagye Janch ki karwahie poori ho chuki hay. Is liye abhi aapko agar apney bachao me koi Defence witnesses oar Defence exhibits prastut karney hay tou aap prastut kar saktey ho. Aap apney Defence witnesses oar Defence exhibits 15 din key andar janch adhikari ke samaxch prastut kar saktey ho.

........

.........

Sd. 8.3.2005

Inquiry Officer

28. Minutes would further show that the matter was taken up on 24.03.2005 by the Inquiry Officer, on that day the petitioner submitted death certificate about his son along with an application in which he made a compassionate appeal for giving him a mercy chance saying that due to repeated phone calls he had lost mental strength and committed the mistake. His statement was also recorded by the Inquiry Officer and this followed the inquiry report dated 08.04.2005.

29. It needs to be noted that in his application, submitted on 24.03.2004 as also in his statement recorded by the inquiry officer on that day, petitioner had admitted his having left the station without due sanction of the leave as also having remained absent without leave after that. But at the same time he had also repeatedly stated the reasons that constrained him to leave the station without leave and remain absent without leave. Such a statement, therefore, could not have been taken as clear admission of guilt. It was rather an admission coupled with explanation. In face of such a statement of the petitioner, the Inquiry Officer, after recording the statement on 24.03.2005, was duty bound in terms of sub-rule (4) of Rule 27(c) to ask the petitioner to produce the witnesses and documents in support of his explanation. To be fair to the petitioner the Inquiry Officer would have done good by asking the petitioner to produce evidence in proof of his explanation and by assisting him in that regard. This he was duty bound in terms of sub-rule (4) of Rule 27(c) of the Rules after recording the statement of the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer having asked the petitioner to produce his defence prior to recording of his statement was not in consonance with sub-rule (4) and to that extent rule has been violated and inquiry vitiates. I may hasten to say here that absence without leave, reason notwithstanding, in itself constitutes offence/mis-conduct under section 10(m) of the Act and to declare him deserter under section 9(f) after following the procedure provided under Rule 31 of the Rules, which was duly done. Proof of his sons sudden death, in that view, might not have exonerated the petitioner of either of the two offences and accordingly liability under section 11(1) but should have been taken into consideration and might have weighed with the disciplinary authority while deciding the quantum of punishment to be imposed. It needs to be pointed out here that this aspect was certainly taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority but weighed against the petitioner because the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity to prove this fact and the inquiry officer on the basis of information collected by him took the view that the plea was false. This is obvious from the operative part of the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority reproduced above.

30. It appears, after the Inquiry Officer faulted in asking the petitioner, after recording his statement, to lead evidence in his defence, the disciplinary officer also did not act aptly to meet the situation. Record reveals that after receiving the Inquiry Officers report dated 08.04.2005, the disciplinary authority on 05.07.2005 had written a letter to the Sr. Superintendent of Police Udhampur. Copy of this letter could not be found on the record produced on behalf of the respondents but is reply is available. In his reply to this letter, the Sr. Supdt. of Police, Udhampur, vide his letter No. VB/OS/Misc./312 dated 11.08.2005 had intimated the disciplinary authority that as intimated by SHO Police Station Chennai, BP Singh has married with Ritu d/o Basantu R/o Sudh Mahadev. He has two sons and one daughter. No son of Ritu w/o BP Singh has expired at Sudh Mahadev.

31. It seems as it is obvious that the disciplinary authority on the basis of this intimation recorded a finding while imposing punishment that the petitioner made a false statement about his sons death. This finding of fact by the disciplinary authority seems to have weighed well in imposing punishment of premature retirement on the petitioner, The letter of Sr. Superintendent Police, Udhampur, dated 11.08.2005 (supra) on its bare look, in my view, did not provide sufficient material for making an important assumption that plea taken by the petitioner was false. Firstly, this letter refers to some BP Singh and not to PP Singh/Prithvi Pal Singh and secondly contains vague information that no son of Ritu, wife of BP Singh has expired at Sudh Mahadev without referring to any period which this information pertained to. The disciplinary authority in his anxiety to seek confirmation about death of son of the petitioner somewhere in the month of July, 2004 should better have send copy of the death certificate produced by him for its verification to the Sr. Superintendent of Police concerned, that is, Sr. Superintendent of Police, Udhampur, and that would have clinched the issue.

32. For all that said and discussed above, impugned order of compulsory retirement No. P-VIII-2/2005-EC-II dated 08.09.2005 passed by the disciplinary authority/respondent No. 1 is quashed to the extent of imposing punishment upon the petitioner. Respondent No. 3, however, is at liberty to take up the matter again and conclude the same after awarding petitioner sufficient opportunity, in accordance with sub-rule (4) of Rule 27 of the Rules, to lead evidence, in support of the plea/explanation tendered by him and pass fresh order, having regard to the evidence, if any, led by the petitioner.

33. Record be returned to Mrs. Deepika Mahanjan, learned GA, along with a copy of this order.

This judgment is pronounced by me at Jammu in terms of Rule 138(3) of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court Rules, 1999.

Order accordingly.