K.M. Joseph, J.

1. Petitioner is the wife of a person who has been detained under the provisions of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Ext.P1 is the order of detention. It is dated 26.12.2012. Ext.P1(a) purports to be the grounds of detention. Ext.P6 is the order of approval by the Government of Kerala. Ext.P8 is the order by which the Government has rejected the representation.

2. We heard Shri K. Ramakumar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Shri T. Asaf Ali, learned Director General of Prosecution.

3. The contentions of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner are as follows:

It is contended that under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, the grounds of detention must be supplied to the detenu. It is pointed out that Section 7(2) of the Act also mandates that the grounds of detention specifying the instances of the offences with copies of relevant documents as far as practicable on the basis of which he is considered as a "known goonda" or "known rowdy" and giving such materials relating to his activities on the basis of which his detention has been found necessary, shall be furnished to him as soon as possible, nevertheless, in any case, within five days of detention and he shall also be informed in writing, under acknowledgment, of his right to represent to the Government and before the Advisory Board against the arrest and detention. He would contend that this is a case where the detenu is detained on the basis that he is a known rowdy. It is complained that, however, in Ext.P1(a) grounds of detention, there is no mention of vital particulars. He drew our attention to Section 2(p) of the Act. He would contend that this is a case where clauses (i) and (ii) would not apply.

4. The case of the respondents is based on Section 2(p)(iii) of the Act. Section 2(p)(iii) of the Act reads as follows:

"2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:-

(p) `Known Rowdy' means any person, who had been, by reason of acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the order imposing any restriction or detention under this Act;

(iii) found, on investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer or other authority, on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in three separate instances not forming part of the same transaction to have committed any offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2."

It is, no doubt, followed by a proviso excluding various cases from the purview of the definition of the word "known rowdy". He would contend that in the grounds of detention, there is no mention that the cases have been generated on the basis of complaints initiated by persons other than police officers. He would submit that this is transparent violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 7(2) of the Act. He would also submit that neither in the order, nor in the grounds of detention, particulars are given of the persons who have filed complaints leading to the cases which formed the premise for his detention. He would also submit that there is a well known distinction between law and order and public order. Preventive detention which has the effect of taking away the most precious right of all, namely liberty, is permissible only in cases affecting public order. He would next contend that the District Magistrate who passed the order of detention has not referred to the period of detention. He would draw our attention to the Judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in A. K. Roy v. Union of India and Another (AIR 1982 SC 710 [LQ/SC/1981/462] ) wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 78 held as follows:

"The fact that a person can be detained for the maximum period of 12 months does not place upon the detaining authority the obligation to direct that he shall be detained for the maximum period. The detaining authority can always exercise its discretion regarding the length of the period of detention."

According to him, it is not necessary that a person should be detained for the maximum period. The maximum period prescribed under Section 12 of the Act is six months. The non-mentioning of the period of detention affects the order, it is submitted. However, he also draws our attention to the Judgment of a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in T. Devaki v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others (1990 (2) SCC 456 [LQ/SC/1990/141] ) which has overruled the two Judges Bench decision in Commissioner of Police & Another v. Gurbux Anandram Bhiryani (1988 (Suppl) SCC 568). He would next contend that the date of the last anti-social activity alleged is on 02.9.2012. But, the order was passed on on 26.12.2012. Therefore, this is a case where the link has snapped and on that ground also, the detention is bad.

5. Learned senior counsel would emphatically contend that in matters of preventive detention which involve deprivation of liberty of a person, the Court must take serious note of non- mentioning of the details in the grounds. He would also rely on the decisions in Smt. Angoori Devi for Ram Ratan v. Union of India and Others (1989 (1) SCC 385 [LQ/SC/1988/595] ), Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India and Others (1995 (4) SCC 51 [LQ/SC/1995/516] ) and Febam Ningol Mikoi Devi v. State of Manipur and Others(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ).

6. Per contra, the learned Director General of Prosecution would point out that this is a case where in Ext.P1 order of detention, the detaining authority has specifically stated that the cases which were considered were cases which have been initiated on the basis of complaint by police officers. He would submit that while personal liberty of a person is important, a threat to public order or the lives of the individuals constituting the society, is an equally important factor. He would point out that the mere fact that it is not mentioned in the grounds, would not avail the petitioner, as the order of detention itself is an elaborate order and in fact, capable of being treated as an order of detention containing the grounds of detention. He would submit that the Court must not be oblivious to the purpose for which the grounds of detention are to be supplied to the detenu both under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 7(2) of the Act. He would submit that the purpose is to enable the detenu to represent against his detention before the concerned authorities. It is a safeguard against arbitrary orders of detention. In this case, at any rate, he would submit, having regard to the fact that the order of detention specifically shows that the detaining authority has mentioned abut the cases being initiated on the basis of complaints by persons other than police officers, no prejudice is caused to the detenu. As far as the delay is concerned, he would refer us to the pleadings and the delay is explained. He would also point out the cases to contend that the cases clearly affect public order, as the offences are alleged to have been committed in public places. The use of sword by the detenu as alleged is also pressed before us. He would also contend that in view of the Judgment of the Apex Court in T. Devaki v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others (1990 (2) SCC 456 [LQ/SC/1990/141] ), it is clear that the detaining authority need not mention about the period of detention. He would also point that the order or detention is passed by the delegate of the Government, namely the District Magistrate. The order of detention is capable of being revoked at any time by the Government.

7. Learned senior counsel would submit that the case of the learned Director General of Prosecution that since the order of detention contains the statement that the cases have been initiated not on the basis of complaints by police officers and no prejudice is caused, cannot be countenanced at all. He would submit that the Constitution accords importance to the grounds of detention. Being a matter relating to the liberty of a person who is detained without any trial, the Court must interfere in a case where the constitutional requirements have been breached. The statutory mandate also is violated. The Court need not further probe into the facts as to what the detenu could have done with the information provided in the order of detention which is not provided in the grounds of detention. He would also submit that the stand of the Government is that such information need not be provided in the Affidavit. This is insupportable. He would also reiterate that the details of the persons who are the alleged complainants have not been mentioned in the grounds of detention. He would remind the Court that the petitioner has a case that the police officer was harboring malafides.

8. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner would contend that "complaint" is defined under Section 2(d) of the Cr. P.C. as follows:

"2. Definitions.- In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires.-

(d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.

Explanation.- A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant."

Therefore, as the word "complaint" is used in the Act and the absence of any other definition given for the word "complaint", the meaning ascribed to the word "complaint" in Cr. P. C. must prevail. He would point out that the mere giving a statement (first information statement) cannot be treated as the complaint as such. No doubt, if a person gives a document styling it as a complaint, it may suffice. No doubt, he fairly points that this contention has not been found acceptable by a Division Bench of this Court in Beji v. State of Kerala & Others (2012 (3) KHC 363 [LQ/KerHC/2012/1072] ).

9. Articles 22(5) of the Constitution of India reads as follows:

"22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.-(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order."

This is a case where the District Magistrate has relied on six casesfor treating the detenu as a known rowdy. They read as follows:

"3. Cr.No.267/07 u/s.308, 452 IPC of Pulpally Police Station:

This case was reported from Pallithazhe, Sasimala in Pulpally Station limit. The case was occurred on 19.10.07 and was reported on 20.10.2007. In this case the respondent Shiju trespassed into the house of the complainant Swaroop and chopped him with a long sword and the complainant sustained injuries. Now the case is pending trial at Adhoc II Court Kalpetta as SC 66/09.

4. Cr.No.23/08 u/s.506(ii), 341, 323, 308 r/w.34 IPC of Kenichira Police Station:"

The case is reported from Papalasery, Irulam Amsom. In this case the respondent Shiju chopped the complainant Shibu with a long sword and thereby caused serious injuries. Now the case is pending trial at Sessions Court Kalpetta as SC 78/09.

5. Cr.No.75/12 u/s.468, 384, 342, 506(i) r/w.34 IPC of Kenichira PS.

Brief of the case is that after 06.02.2012 in a resort at Irulam the respondent Shiju and his co- accused wrongfully detained the complainant and had taken away his vehicle KL 12 F 4943 forcefully and registered the vehicle to the respondent's name and threatened to kill him etc. facts. The case is under investigation.

6. Cr.No.259/12 u/s.143, 147, 341, 323 r/w.149 IPC of Kenichira Police Station:

Brief of the case is that in a toddy shop at Irulam on 02.09.2012 the respondent and his co-accused were assaulted the complainant's friend for not providing facility in the toddy shop for consuming foreign liquor etc facts. The case is under investigation.

7. Cr.No.213/12 u/s.143, 147, 451, 294(b), 506 (i) r/w. 149 IPC of Kalpetta Police Station.

Brief of the case is that on 15.03.2012 the respondent and his co-accused were unlawfully assembled and trespassed into the office of Dhanakody Chits at Kalpetta and threatened to kill the complainant etc facts. Charge sheet has been submitted before the Court. CC No.not assigned so far.

8. Cr.No.235/12 u/s.342, 506, 323, 294(b) IPC of S. Bathery Police Station.

Brief of the case is that on 05.02.2012 at bathery the respondent detained the complainant in a room at Chakkalakal Tourist home and slapped on the face of the complainant and also attempted to cut with a sword etc facts. The case is under investigation."

"Known Rowdy" is defined in Section 2(p) of the Act. Section 3 of the Act authorises the competent person to issue orders of detention. The authority must be satisfied objectively that a person is either a "known goonda" or "known rowdy". Both expressions are elaborately defined in the Act. Besides the same, the authority must entertain subjective satisfaction that there is a genuine need to detain a person under the Act. An order of detention necessarily in writing must be passed. Pursuant to the same, the authority is obliged to execute the order at the earliest as the very premise of passing an order of detention is the urgent need to apprehend the person and to detain, so that societal concerns are immediately addressed. Section 7 of the Act deals with the procedure on detention. Section 7(1) proclaims that upon arresting the person in pursuance of the order of detention, the officer has to read out the order of detention and to serve a copy on the detenu. It is thereafter that Section 7(2) of the Act apparently in keeping with Article 22(5) of the Constitution mandates that the grounds of detention specifying the instances of offences with copies of relevant documents as far as practicable on the basis of which he is considered as a known goonda or known rowdy, inter alia, must be furnished to the detenu. It is to be done at the earliest. The outer limit is fixed as five days from the date on which he is detained. Besides the aforesaid materials which we would think pertain to the objective satisfaction, the authority must also give materials relating to his activities on the basis of which detention is considered necessary. We must also not overlook the final part of sub-section(2) which is that the authority must inform in writing under acknowledgment his right to represent before the Government and the Advisory Board against the detention. Therefore, the supply of various pieces of information and documents are to be made, so that the right of the detenu to represent against the detention is facilitated. This is the inevitable effect of the words contained in Article 22(5) of the Constitution also, which provides for communication of the grounds on which the order of detention is made and to afford him earliest opportunity for making a representation against the order. Therefore, the supply of the information has a functional need or purpose, that is to say, it is a safeguard engrafted on the power of detention intended to secure to the detenu the necessary means for his premature release from detention by representing both to the Advisory Board and the government. This safeguard would also be a guarantee against the possible misuse of the power of detention. Imagine a situation where there is no right to make representation and there is no power to revoke the order of detention. It would impact liberty impermissibly. The Constitution gives right to make a representation. This right to make a representation would be a mere teasing illusion, if it were not in the context of the detenu being supplied with all relevant information with reference to which he can impugn his detention in the appropriate forum.

10. We must examine the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner about the non supply of the grounds of detention in this context. Admittedly, in the grounds of detention, there is no mention of the fact that the six cases which are the premise for the order of detention have been generated by complaints not initiated by the police officers. At the same time, this is a case where admittedly in the order of detention, it has been specifically recited by the detaining authority that the complaints have not been initiated by police officers. What we further notice that in regard to Crime No.173/07 of Puthuppally Police Station which is one of the cases which is referred to but which is not considered for the purpose of detention, it is stated to be a case where the complaint was by the police officers (suo motu case registered by the police officers). This shows that the detaining authority was aware of the requirement of Section 2(p) of the Act. He has referred and eschewed a case which was in the teeth of the prohibition contained in Section 2(p)(iii) of the Act and expressly referred to the other cases as cases which are initiated on the complaints initiated by persons other than police officers. Admittedly, the order of detention was served on the detenu. He had also served the grounds of detention. There is no complaint that the detenu has not received the various other documents in the form of first information report, etc.

11. We may also examine as to the object of excluding cases of complaints initiated by persons other than police officers. The objective of excluding the complaints apparently is to prevent misuse of the provisions of the Act by police offices themselves suo motu registering crimes and booking persons and detaining them under the Act.

12. In this context, we may notice that the learned Director General of Prosecution has a case that this is a case where the order of detention itself can be treated as containing the grounds of detention. While there is some merit in the said contention, we would not like to rest our decision on the said basis. In our view, in the facts of this case, we are not inclined to accept the complaint of the petitioner that there is a transgression of Article 22(5) of the Constitution or Section 7(2) of the Act. We would think that having regard to the purpose of providing the details relating to the cases on the basis of which the objective satisfaction is entertained that a person is a known goonda or known rowdy, the mere fact that the said information is furnished to him in the order of detention and that it is not furnished to him in the grounds of detention itself will not fatally affect the detention order. The detenu stands informed on a reading of the order of detention along with the grounds of detention, that he is reckoned to be a known rowdy by virtue of his involvement found in six cases and the detention order expressly says that those cases are on the basis of complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, as required under Section 2(p)(iii) of the Act. There could be cases where the order of detention is laconic, wherein in substance, the order of detention alone is discernible and no details are given and the grounds of detention also are found wanting in supply of information as required. It may have to be viewed differently. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to the Judgment of this Court in Sailaja & Others v. State of Kerala (2010 (1) KHC 457) to contend that there are similarities between the acts which would attract the definition of the word "known goonda" or "known rowdy) and, therefore, understanding of the category in which the person would fall is imperative if he is to meaningfully exercise his right to represent against the detention. This is a case where we cannot ignore the fact that even in Ext.P1 (a) grounds of detention the detenu has been classified as known rowdy. Section 2(p) is referred to. We also do not find much merit in the complaint of the petitioner that the grounds of detention do not give the details of the persons who have alleged made the complaints. He would submit that the order of detention is no better in this regard. We would think that apart from mentioning in the order of detention that the cases mentioned the complaints have been initiated by persons other than police officers, the detenu has been supplied with documents which include the first information report. Counter Affidavit has been filed giving details of the alleged names of the complainants also. Therefore, this is a case where it could not be said that the statement that complaints have been initiated by persons other than police officers, is without any basis. We make this observation also in the light of the argument which is sought to be raised that the order was vitiated by malafides, and that the allegations of malafides are not rebutted. The allegation of malafides is sought to be made on the basis of the statement in Ground C that the order of detention is vitiated by malafides, in that, the third respondent was inimical towards the detenu for months together. It is also stated that he has been threatening the detenu that he will be dealt with accordingly, and that the enmity has grown into the report which is obvious from the contentions of the order. Admittedly, in all these six cases the detenu has been charge-sheeted. The names of the complainants are forthcoming in the Affidavit and also apparently they have given statements which can be treated as complaints given by the affected parties which resulted in investigation and in this case also, the filing of the final reports. We are not satisfied that there is a case of malafides established.

13. We agree with the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that furnishing grounds of detention is mandatory. We are of the view that in this case, when we read the order of detention along with the grounds of detention, we cannot hold that there is a breach of Article 22(5) of the Constitution or Section 7 (2) of the Act.

14. We also do not see any merit on the contention based on the decision in Smt. Angoori Devi for Ram Ratan v. Union of India and Others (1989 (1) SCC 385 [LQ/SC/1988/595] ). Apparently, the contention was that this is also a case of a law and order which can be dealt with under the general law of the land, and not by recourse to draconian law relating to preventive detention. We do not think that a case is established for contending that it did not pertain to public order.

15. As far as the decision in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India And Others (1995 (4) SCC 51 [LQ/SC/1995/516] ) is concerned, the question which actually arose was whether when an order of preventive detention is passed by an officer specially empowered by the Central Government or State Government, is the officer required to consider the representation submitted by the detenu. Transgression of the duty to consider the representation as found was sufficient to deal with the plea raised on behalf of the Government that some of the detenus were found indulging in illicit smuggling of NDPS on a large scale, otherwise involved in other anti-social activities which was very harmful to the national economy. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that liberty is to be preserved and the statutory safeguards are to be adhered to. That was a case where it was found that there was failure to consider the representation on a misconception of law. As far as the decision in Febam Ningol Mikoi Devi v. State of Manipur And Others (2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ">(2010 (9) SCC 618 [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] [LQ/SC/2010/1035 ;] ) is concerned, that was a case where, no doubt, the Court took the view that the Court was entitled to scrutinize material as to whether there was any objective basis for objective satisfaction. We have already noticed that there were six cases which otherwise satisfied the requirements of Section 2(p) read with Section 2(t) of the Act and there cannot be any basis to contend that the objective satisfaction has been arrived at without reference to any material.

16. The next question is whether the order of detention is vitiated by reason of the delay in passing the order of detention. The last incident is alleged to have been taken place on 02.9.2012. It is true that the order of detention was passed on 26.12.2012. But, the respondents have the following explanation:

"14. The grounds alleged in B of the writ petition are fully baseless. The procedure for the detention order was started on 07.09.2012 just 5 days after the detenu commits his last offence i.e. on 02.09.2012. The report of the Sub Inspector of Police, Pulpally addressed to the District Police Chief, Wayanad about the detenu and his anti social activities was submitted through proper channel on 07.09.2012. The Inspector of Police, Pulpally and the Deputy Supdt. of Police, Mananthavady were perused the report thoroughly and enquiry was conducted and investigate the matter in detail and send report to the District Police Office on 15.09.2012. The District Police Chief, after careful evaluation and study, submitted the proposal to the 2nd respondent on 12.10.2012. Thereafter Ext.P2 report on Malayalam and Ext.P4 present stages of the cases of detenu were submitted to the 2nd respondent on 09.11.12 and 13.12.12 respectively as per the phone conversation of the 2nd and 3rd respondents. The delay occurred to the authorities only because of the full application of mind in the evaluation and study of the matter for passing of the detention order. Therefore there is no snapping of the live link between the alleged last prejudicial act and the order of detention. The intention of the State is clear that the detenu will be prevented from further antisocial activities which are harmful for the existence of a peaceful society."

17. We do not think that in view of the explanation offered, we should accept the contention that the delay vitiates the order of detention. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to the unreported decision in W.P.(Crl).No.474/12. Therein, the Court took the view that no satisfactory explanation was given for the delay either in the detention order or in the Counter Affidavits and the delay was 4 = months. We have already found that the delay has been explained in this case.

18. In view of the Judgment of the Apex Court in T. Devaki v. Government of Tamil Nadu And Others (1990 (2) SCC 456 [LQ/SC/1990/141] ), the non-mentioning of the period of detention in the order of detention cannot be held to vitiate the order of detention.

19. We see no grounds at all to interfere with the order of detention. There is no merit in the Writ Petition and the Writ Petition will stand dismissed.