Manjula Chellur, C.J.

1. This public interest litigation is filed seeking the following reliefs:

“i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ order or direction, calling for the originals of Ext.P21 by which reinstating the 1st respondent and to quash the same;

ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction, directing respondents 2 to 4 to act upon the recommendation as evident from Ext.P20;

iii) Declare that the 1st respondent is not eligible to be appointed in the post of Additional Legal Advisor of Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau;

iv) Issue such other reliefs which may deem fit and proper on the facts and circumstances of the case; and

v) Allow this Writ Petition with costs.”

Several aspects regarding conduct of the first respondent herein are pointed out to substantiate the contentions raised in the writ petition. The main challenge is regarding reinstatement of first respondent in service as Additional Legal Advisor, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau, Thrissur, who was earlier recommended to be terminated from services by the Director of Vigilance.

2. When the matter came up for hearing, the main argument was with regard to maintainability of the writ petition since it pertains to subject of “service”, as the challenge is against reinstatement of the first respondent.

3. In brief, facts are necessarily to be narrated to understand the background in which the present petition is filed. Alleging conspiracy between the accused persons of vigilance cases related to a public sector undertaking cement company (Malabar Cements) and the first respondent a complaint was filed by the petitioner. It is alleged that first respondent made several calls from his mobile to accused persons and negotiated for Rupees Fifteen lakhs to write a favourable opinion exonerating all the accused in the case of Malabar Cements including the former Managing Director. Subsequently, on the opinion of the senior Government Pleader of Vigilance, High Court of Kerala Sri.P.N.Sukumaran, charge sheets were filed against all the accused persons by initiating prosecution proceedings. Petitioner claims to be a public spirited person whose ambition in life is to expose corrupt activities of Government officers and public servants.

4. On a complaint of the petitioner, FIR came to be registered against the first respondent. Based on the legal opinion of the Chief Legal Advisor, VACB, Thiruvananthapuram, first respondent was suspended from service. The allegation was amassment of wealth disproportionate to the known source of income. Petitioner also narrates other aspects of the matter. Earlier he approached this Court seeking police protection when alleged threats were made to him by the first respondent. A writ petition came to be filed challenging suspension of the first respondent and Exhibits P16 and P17 are the interim orders in the writ petition. The said writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn when he was under suspension. First respondent got a provisional appointment subject to the result of the writ petition. According to the petitioner, when the writ petition was withdrawn, by suppressing the material facts from the court, he was able to get a favourable direction that if there is vacancy he could be considered for the same. In spite of the recommendation by the Director of Vigilance as per Exhibit P20 to terminate the services of the first respondent, he was reinstated as Additional Legal Advisor, VACB, Thrissur as per Exhibit P21.

5. First respondent was represented by senior counsel Mr.O.V.Radhakrishnan. Detailed counter affidavits along with several documents are filed by first and second respondents.

6. As against this, party respondent, who is arrayed as first respondent, places on record several facts describing them as reasons for filing this public interest litigation with ulterior motive. He also seriously challenges the maintainability of the very writ petition contending that it touches the service issue of the first respondent which cannot be entertained in a public interest litigation. He submits that present case has been set up by a former Government Pleader of the High Court, Sri.K.P.Somarajan, former Director of Vigilance and by one Somasundaram, petitioner in W.P.(C)No.4879/2009. To substantiate this contention he places on record several messages said to have been sent from the Mobile No.9048204999 belonging to advocate Akbar to the first respondent and according to the first respondent, contents of these messages clearly indicate the vindictive mind of the said person against him and also reveals the nexus between the above said persons in conspiring to file present writ petition against the respondent herein.

7. First respondent brings the details of Crl.M.P. No.876/2009 filed by the petitioner before Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thrissur at the instance of Sri.V.M.Radhakrishnan, the accused in Malabar Cement case, against whom first respondent has given legal opinion and also Mr.Akbar. He also questions how petitioner could obtain copy of the report sent by the former Director Sri.Somarajan making allegations against him. He brings on record certain facts based on Exhibit P10 report of the third respondent, Government had dropped all further proceedings against him only with a warning.

8. Crl.R.P.No.1822/2011 was filed by the respondent challenging arraying him as an accused. High Court directed the respondent to file an application for discharge before the Judicial Magistrate, Chalakkudy. The Director General of Prosecution, Kerala recorded that there was no sufficient materials to hold that first respondent as a Prosecutor has committed any serious professional misconduct or misused his official position. The Director General of Prosecution only cautioned that first respondent should be more restraint while dealing with the aggressor inside the residence of this respondents relative. Report of the Vigilance Director was also produced in the writ petition. According to him, all the documents relied upon by the petitioner are found to be false after a thorough enquiry by the responsible officers or by the court of law when challenged before court.

9. The writ petition challenging appointment of the first respondent is filed by one Somasundaram, whose name is also found in one of the messages sent by Mr.Akbar. According to him, there was no necessity for him to continue the writ petition filed by him as by the time this respondent got appointment though on a provisional basis, the question of seniority was left open. Even without the writ petition he could have been appointed as he was otherwise eligible for appointment to the post of Additional Legal Advisor. The writ petition was filed when three more vacancies were filled from the same rank list by appointing candidates below the rank of the first respondent. When the writ petition was withdrawn reserving liberty to the first respondent to agitate the issue regarding seniority, Exhibit P20 recommendation was rightly rejected by the Government after proper application of mind. When there was no necessity to continue the respondents suspension, Exhibit P21 order reinstating him came to be passed, which is the subject matter of challenge in this writ petition. 10. Second respondent Under Secretary to Government, Vigilance Department has also placed counter affidavit narrating their stand. The main challenge is regarding the locus standi of the petitioner to maintain a public interest litigation challenging the order reinstating the first respondent. In the absence of petitioner being a member of service under the State, he has no right to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings against the first respondent, as it is a matter between Government servant and Government. It is further contended that on account of personal grievance, the present public interest litigation is initiated. Private grievance emanated from the fight between the petitioner and the contesting respondent cannot be a ground to entertain the writ petition.

11. When petitioner filed C.M.P.No.876/2009, quick verification was ordered by the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thrissur and serious lapses on the part of the contesting respondent were noticed, therefore, vigilance enquiry was ordered against the first respondent and he was kept under suspension by order dated 17.10.2010. A complaint is also filed by advocate Sri.Akbar before the Enquiry Commissioner which was forwarded to the Deputy Superintendent of Police for investigation and submission of report. After examining the report of the Director of Vigilance a severe warning was given to the first respondent.

12. The contesting respondent was in regular service as Additional Public Prosecutor at the time of appointment. The conduct and antecedents of the respondent need not be verified since he was already in regular service of the Department. The allegation of registration of two vigilance cases against the contesting respondent is incorrect. One case VC 23/10/TCR is pending investigation and another vigilance case is pending enquiry. He places on record the details of the writ petition filed by the first respondent and the result of the same. According to the second respondent, after keeping the first respondent under suspension for six months, on the request made by the contesting respondent for reinstatement in service, based on the report of the Director of Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau recommending reinstatement of the respondent, he was reinstated. Cancellation of suspension is governed by Rule 10(6) of Kerala Service Rules. Hence, Exhibit P21 order is neither illegal nor irregular. With these averments they sought for dismissal of the writ petition.

13. Reply affidavits are filed by the petitioner to the counter affidavits filed by respondents 1 and 2. The stand of the petitioner in the reply affidavit is, suspension of the first respondent is on the ground of arbitrariness exercised by the first respondent during his probation period and the fact of extending the period of probation cannot be ignored. Regularisation of the first respondent as Additional Legal Advisor will be against public interest, therefore he ought not be regularised. According to him, in the light of arbitrariness in passing the order of reinstatement, any public is entitled to bring it to the notice of the court. Having regard to the serious nature of allegations against the first respondent, court has to interfere with the same. All the allegations made against the petitioner are only to tarnish his credential. He also places on record the material facts pertaining to official documents and explains how he secured documents from Mr.Somasundaram. The documents were secured under the provisions of Right to Information Act. Explaining the source of documents he has sought for allowing the writ petition.

14. Senior counsel Sri.O.V.Radhakrishnan arguing for contesting respondent places reliance on several decisions and unreported decision apart from certain documents pertaining to C.M.P.No.191/2011. The decision Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. ((2004) 3 SCC 34) is relied upon to explain what exactly is the meaning of public interest and public interest litigation. He refers to paragraphs 11, 12, 15 and 16 of the judgment to contend that care must be taken by the court to see what exactly is the intention behind the so called public interest litigation. He also places reliance on Hari Bansh Lal v. Sahodar Prasad Mahto ((2010) 9 SCC 655 [LQ/SC/2010/899] ) regarding maintainability of public interest litigation in service matters. Several earlier decisions of the Apex Court are discussed in the above said judgment. He also places reliance on Girijesh Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh ((2010) 10 SCC 707 [LQ/SC/2010/1148] ) regarding public interest litigation in a service matter. The decision Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra and others (2012 KHC 4653) was relied upon to substantiate the contention of locus standi of the petitioner who has not suffered any legal injury to file a public interest litigation. According to the learned senior counsel, validity of the appointment or otherwise of the first respondent cannot be the subject matter in a public interest litigation.

15. Copy of the complaint in C.M.P.No.191/2011 before the Court of Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thrissur is also produced. Reliance is placed on State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and others ((2010) 3 SCC 402 [LQ/SC/2010/92] ) to point out the guidelines relating to public interest litigation. He also places on record copy of the order dated 21.03.2012 extending the term of probation of Sri.P.K.Muralikrishnan, Additional Legal Advisor, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau.

16. Learned Government Pleader also relies upon various following decisions in support of his contentions. He places reliance on Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab and others ((2005) 5 SCC 136 [LQ/SC/2005/641] ) to contend that courts must be careful and circumspect while entertaining a public interest litigation and should reject at the outset petitions especially involving service matters which in the guise public interest litigations are really intended to settle personal scores or to gain cheap popularity and should impose exemplary costs on a petitioner who seeks to waste the precious time of court by presenting frivolous petitions.

17. He also places reliance on Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala and others ((2008) 3 SCC 542 [LQ/SC/2008/657] ) to contend that while entertaining public interest litigation, courts have to see bona fides of the litigant in approaching the court and must consider the maintainability of the writ petition at the threshold.

18. He places reliance on Neetu v. State of Punjab and others ((2007) 10 SCC 614 [LQ/SC/2007/22] ) to contend that public interest litigations intended to unleash a private vendetta, personal grouse or some other mala fide object, should not be entertained as it is not maintainable. He also places reliance on Seshadri v. Mangati Gopal Reddy (2011 (2) KLT SN 23 (C.No.31) SC) to stress upon the care and caution to be exercised by courts while entertaining public interest litigation and should not encourage litigants to achieve oblique motives on the basis of wild and reckless allegations made by individuals and busy bodies.

19. Sri.Sathyanatha Menon, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner places reliance on State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok and others ((2013) 5 SCC 1 [LQ/SC/2013/193] ) to substantiate his contention that public interest litigation could be filed even in a case, in which conditions of service are concerned, where only aggrieved party has locus standi to initiate legal action in court of law. Whenever a matter affecting interest of the general public arises, any member of the public can espouse such cause so long as his bona fides are not in doubt. Therefore, learned counsel contends that present petition is maintainable.

20. The point that would arise for consideration is whether present public interest litigation is maintainable as the subject pertains to service matter and whether petitioner is really espousing cause of the public as a responsible person. From the above material facts, it is clear that petitioner is not a Government servant and he has nothing to do with the Department in which first respondent is working. According to the first respondent, present petition is filed at the instance of three persons who are against him, i.e. Sri.Somarajan, Sri.Somasundaran and Sri.Akbar. It is also borne on record, on 07.02.2011 a complaint came to be lodged before the Court of Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge (Vigilance), Thrissur in C.M.P.No.191/2011 against three persons, i.e., Sri.K.P.Somarajan, Director, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau, Thiruvananthapuram, Sri.A.Surendran, I.G. Of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau, Thiruvananthapuram and Sri.R.S.Jyothi, Legal Advisor, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau, Thiruvananthapuram. The complaint contains several allegations against those persons indicating alleged corrupt activities which ultimately led to the first respondent herein face a vigilance case and vigilance enquiry which paved way for his suspension.

21. According to first respondent, subsequent to this complaint, Exhibit P24 dated 14.10.2011 has come out. It is the recommendation from Sri.Somarajan, Director, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau, Thiruvananthapuram wherein it is clearly indicated that after reinstatement of the first respondent, between 08.08.2011 and 25.08.2011, recommendation was to the effect that on account of serious misconduct he must be discharged from service reverting him to the full time member in the post of Additional Public Prosecutor. It is also pointed out that probation period of Sri.Muralikrishnan has elapsed, etc. This clearly shows, during the pendency of this petition, which came to be presented on 12.08.2011, within the Department itself, people were not happy with the continuance of first respondent in the Department. We need not go into those allegations.

22. Several counter affidavits are filed by the first respondent while asking for early posting of the above matter to hear on maintainability. Third respondent Director, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau, Headquarters, Vikas Bhavan P.O., Thiruvananthapuram has also filed detailed counter affidavit. As per the counter affidavit of the third respondent filed in June 2013, the Department concerning the subject matter clarifies the position what exactly was the situation so far as controversies levelled against first respondent. According to him, the allegations leveled against the first respondent in VC 23/10/TCR is a vigilance case pertaining to Malabar Cement Scam case, which was investigated and it was revealed that there was no sufficient evidence for a successful prosecution against the first respondent. Therefore, a Tribunal enquiry was recommended after closing the vigilance case. When the matter was sent to the Director by the Investigating Officer, the Director issued a direction to further probe into the matter by collecting materials. Therefore, investigation was not closed while a closure report was given by the Director and VC 23/10/TCR is still under investigation. Another vigilance enquiry VE 5/11/SCE was also initiated against first respondent to enquire into the alleged amassment of wealth disproportionate to the known source of income by misusing his official capacity. The allegations remain as allegations without there being a concrete or cogent proof for a successful prosecution. Therefore, the Deputy Superintendent of Police in charge of investigation closed the said enquiry. Later, a petition filed by one advocate Akbar, who was one of the close friends of the first respondent (later became enemies), was numbered as C.M.P.No.679/2010. Crime No.998/2009 is filed against advocate Akbar, Muhammed Ali and one Anand, a lawyer. While referring to the said criminal case the complainant has sought for vigilance enquiry. During quick verification, it was revealed that in respect of the allegations raised by the advocate against first respondent Crime No.171/2006 was registered against Muralikrishnan. Second crime was Crime No.111/2002. Third crime was Crime No.4/2010. After going through the said allegations made in the complaint, it was revealed that all the above three matters were covered by vigilance enquiry in connection with VC 23/10/TCR regarding amassment of wealth. There is a direction to further investigate into the matter. So far as VE 5/11, Superintendent of Police to whom the investigating officer has submitted a report sought permission of Government for further investigation, as the matter was investigated and closed. The matter is pending consideration before the Director of Vigilance. In the above circumstances, stand of the third respondent is to the effect that none of the crimes registered against the first respondent not being properly investigated or enquired into, is incorrect and false. Therefore, apprehension of the petitioner, according to the third respondent, is baseless.

23. According to first respondent, petitioner has no locus standi to challenge Exhibit P21 ordering reinstatement into service. According to him, Crime No. 2332/2011 is registered against the petitioner for offences under the Indian Penal Code and also under Information Technology Act apart from Kerala Police Act. Statements of Shajahan, none other than the brother of Akbar and one Mr.Shaju, bother-in-law of Akbar, came to be recorded, which clearly disclose the motive of the petitioner to file public interest litigation. He further narrates the details pertaining to his extension of probation, suspension, subsistence allowance, etc. The statement of Shajahan, younger brother of Sri.Akbar, indicates how he came to know first respondent Muralikrishnan. He also narrates that Jaleel, the petitioner herein, filed a petition at the instance of one Sri.Akbar. The statement of Sri.Shaju indicates Shajahan is the brother of wife of Sri.Shaju. Present petitioner is the relative of both Shajahan and Shaju. According to him, during several visits to the fruit shop of Jaleel, he discussed the cases filed against the present respondent by the petitioner at the instance of Akbar. He also refers to first respondent informing so. Statements of both these persons reveal that these two persons came to know first respondent through Akbar.

24. The above facts placed on record need not be further probed by us in order to know genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made against each other. The fact remains, even as per the counter affidavit of the third respondent, though first respondent and Sri.Akbar were friends, later something went wrong and now they are not friends. In the above background, we have to understand whether petitioner has locus standi to initiate this public interest litigation to espouse the so called cause of general public.

25. Law of public interest litigation is admittedly developed to the present status where courts are required to see whether petitioner is genuinely espousing the real cause which touches upon the interest of public. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, we have to see whether present public interest litigation is maintainable as it touches upon the service of the first respondent, i.e., reinstatement of the first respondent. The challenge is not regarding the appointment of the first respondent as Additional Legal Advisor, but his reinstatement. It is also further revealed that two vigilance enquiries are still pending consideration and first respondent is not having a honourable exoneration as on today. It is also made clear from the counter affidavit filed by second respondent, under what circumstance first respondent was reinstated. After lapse of period of suspension for six months, he was reinstated. Therefore, the Department and Government, so far as the case of the first respondent, have to take a final call once the Tribunal enquiry and other enquiries are complete depending upon the positive or negative report against the first respondent. Therefore, the challenge made against Exhibit P21 is purely a matter pertaining to the service of first respondent and it is not with reference to his appointment and further, there is no allegation of first respondent being appointed to the post of Additional Legal Advisor in violation of the statutory rules or regulations.

26. With the above materials at our command, we have to now see the law declared by the Apex Court on the subject matter.

27. The gist of the decisions relied upon by Sri.O.V.Radhakrishnan arguing for the first respondent is as under: Public interest is a matter of public or general interest does not mean that whichever matter is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement, but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. The expression litigation as declared in the case of Janata Dal by the Apex Court means a legal action including all proceedings therein, initiated in a court of law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, public interest litigation means a legal action initiated in a court of law seeking enforcement of public interest or general interest in which public or a class of community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are impaired. The locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory because legal capacity of the private party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold. It is much more so in a public interest litigation where normally the petitioner who initiates public interest case with a statement that he has no personal interest in the subject matter. It was further observed in the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey (supra) that on account of initiation of trumpery proceedings in the guise of public interest litigation before courts, innumerable days of courts are wasted which otherwise could have been spent for disposal of cases of genuine litigants. It was further observed that when huge number of civil cases involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death and facing gallows under untold agony, are waiting apart from the cases where undue delay is appearing in service matters, but courts are flooded with litigations filed by busy bodies, meddlesome interpolers, wayfarers or officious interveners absolutely having no public interest except personal gain or private profit either for themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation. Therefore, whenever public interest litigation is used as a weapon, the courts must act with great care and circumspection and see whether behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest or publicity is not lurking. The brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. Unless a body of persons or a member of the public who approaches the court is acting bona fide, court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique motives.

28. Whenever unwholly litigation is initiated or whenever a purpose behind the veil of public interest litigation is disclosed as personal vendetta, such frivolous applications have to be dismissed at the threshold imposing exemplary costs. In the case of State of Uttaranchal (supra), their Lordships have given eight guidelines at paragraph 181 of the judgment which reads as under so as to preserve the purity and sanctity of the public interest litigation.

“181. We have carefully considered the facts of the present case. We have also examined the law declared by this court and other courts in a number of judgments. In order to preserve the purity and sanctity of the PIL, it has become imperative to issue the following directions:

(1) The Courts must encourage genuine and bona fide PIL and effectively discourage and curb the PIL filed for extraneous considerations.

(2) Instead of every individual Judge devising his own procedure for dealing with the public interest litigation, it would be appropriate for each High Court to properly formulate rules for encouraging the genuine PIL and discouraging the PIL filed with oblique motives. Consequently, we request that the High Courts who have not yet framed the rules, should frame the rules within three months. The Registrar General of each High Court is directed to ensure that a copy of the rules prepared by the High Court is sent to the Secretary General of this Court immediately thereafter.

(3) The Courts should prima facie verify the credentials of the petitioner before entertaining a PIL.

(4) The Courts should be prima facie satisfied regarding the correctness of the contents of the petition before entertaining a PIL.

(5) The Courts should be fully satisfied that substantial public interest is involved before entertaining the petition.

(6) The Courts should ensure that the petition which involves larger public interest, gravity and urgency must be given priority over other petitions.

(7) The Courts before entertaining the PIL should ensure that the PIL is aimed at redressal or genuine public harm or public injury. The Court should also ensure that there is no personal gain, private motive or oblique motive behind filing the public interest litigation.

(8) The Courts should also ensure that the petitions filed by busybodies for extraneous and ulterior motives must be discouraged by imposing exemplary costs or by adopting similar novel methods to curb frivolous petitions and the petitions filed for extraneous considerations.”

29. Then, coming to the issue of maintainability of a public interest litigation in service matters, the earliest case is Dr.Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra ((1998) 7 SCC 273 [LQ/SC/1998/826] ). In this case, a petition in the nature of public interest litigation at the instance of third parties came to be entertained by the Tribunal which was challenged before the Apex Court. Three Judges bench of the Apex Court held that if public interest litigations at the instance of strangers are allowed by the Tribunal, the very speedy disposal of service matters would get defeated. Later, in the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey (supra), their Lordships held that valuable judicial time should not be wasted in entertaining frivolous litigations in the garb of public interest litigation and the court should not be unmindful in entertaining a public interest litigation without realising the real intentions and objects of the same.

30. In Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra ((2005) 1 SCC 590 [LQ/SC/2004/1421] ) and Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab ((2005) 5 SCC 136 [LQ/SC/2005/641] ), it was made clear that except for a writ of quo warranto public interest litigation is not maintainable in service matters. Such writ of quo warranto also lies only when appointment is contrary to the statutory provisions. The court while exercising its jurisdiction in a public interest litigation is required to determine at the outset as to whether a case has been made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or a writ of quo warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a quo warranto is limited, wherein the court just makes a public declaration and nothing else and therefore, unlike writ of certiorari, writ of quo warranto can only be issued when appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. It is clear from the above decisions, suitability or otherwise of a candidate for appointment to a particular post is the function of the appointing authority and not of the court unless appointment is contrary to the statutory rules.

31. It is also clear from the case of Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra) that whenever strangers approach the court, the court must see whether complainant suffered any legal injury. Unless a person having judicially enforceable right available to him, for such enforcement comes to court, the courts should not invoke extraordinary jurisdiction to entertain the matter whenever a writ jurisdiction is resorted to. In service matters, a third party having no concern with the case at hand cannot claim to have any locus standi to raise any grievance whatsoever, especially in public interest litigations. Such grievance can be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, if the actual person aggrieved, because of ignorance, illiteracy, inarticulation or poverty, is unable to approach the court, and a person, who has no personal agenda, or object, in relation to which, he can grind his own axe, approaches the Court.

32. The gist of the cases relied upon by the Government Pleader clearly indicates, under Articles 226 and 32 of Constitution of India courts should not encourage petitions filed for achieving oblique motives on the basis of wild and reckless allegations made by individuals and busy bodies in the attractive brand name of public interest litigation. The courts must take care and caution to see that under the guise of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest or cheap publicity is not being achieved. The courts also should take care to see whether the attack in the guise of a public interest litigation is really intended to achieve private vendetta or personal grouse or some other mala fide object. A public interest litigation can be entertained by the constitutional courts only at the instance of a bona fide litigant.

33. So far as scope of entertaining a public interest litigation and the locus standi of the petitioner, especially touching service matters of an employee, the courts have to be satisfied about the following things: (1) the credentials of the applicant, (2) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him and (3) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. The courts must strike balance between two conflicting interests, i.e., (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. Therefore, courts must take great care while entertaining a petition styled as public interest litigation where ugly private mala fide interest, vested interest/oblique motive to be achieved publically is the intention behind such public interest litigation.

34. As early as in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) represented by its Assistant General Secretary on behalf of the Asson. etc. v. Union of India and others (AIR 1981 SC 298 [LQ/SC/1980/468] ) their Lordships in paragraph 63 held as under:

“A technical point is taken in the counteraffidavit that the 1st petitioner is an unrecognized association and that, therefore, the petition to that extent, is not sustainable. It has to be overruled. Whether the petitioners belong to a recognised union or not, the fact remains that a large body of persons with a common grievance exists and they have approached this Court under Art.32. Our current processual jurisprudence is not of individualistic Anglo- Indian mould. It is broad-based and peopleoriented, and envisons access to justice through class actions, public interest litigation, and representative proceedings. Indeed, little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in courts through collective proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in our democracy. We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concept of cause of action and person aggrieved and individual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions. It must fairly be stated that the learned Attorney General has taken no objection to a non-recognised association maintaining the writ petitions.”

35. Learned counsel arguing for the petitioner places reliance in the case of State of Punjab (supra) to contend that public interest litigation is maintainable even in service matters other than a quo warranto. This was pertaining to the appointment of the Chairman and Members of Public Service Commission under Article 316 of the Constitution. It was held that even in the absence of any procedure laid down by the Governor for appointment of Chairman and Members of the Public Service commission, State Government has to select only persons with integrity and competence for appointment as Chairman of the Public Service Commission, because the discretion vested in the State Government under Article 316 of the Constitution is impliedly limited by the purposes for which the discretion is vested and the purposes are discernible from the functions of the Public Service Commissions enumerated in Article 320 of the Constitution. While referring to the maintainability of the public interest litigation, whether to issue a writ of quo warranto or writ of declaration or any other writ, their Lordships had to consider, in the absence of violation of statutory rules or procedure, for appointment of Chairman and Members of Public Service Commission, allegations touching the integrity and competence of the persons were made against the candidates. While dealing with the said matter, their Lordships held that power of the High Court is not confined only to writ of quo warranto under Article 226, but to other directions also. Therefore, their Lordships opined, in exercise of their powers under Article 226, High Court should not normally interfere with the discretion of the State Government in selecting and appointing the Chairman and Members of Public Service Commission, but in exceptional cases, if it is shown that relevant factors implied from the very nature of the duties entrusted to Public Service Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution have not been considered by the State Government in selecting and appointing the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission, the High Court can invoke its wide and extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.

36. While referring to the facts of the present case, we make it clear that the controversy raised before us is not with regard to the appointment of first respondent as Additional Legal Advisor, but it pertains to reinstatement of the first respondent under Exhibit P21 on the basis of the procedure contemplated. It is also borne on record that investigations are still pending. It is purely a service matter which cannot be entertained even by virtue of any other declaration. The issue raised before us is not with reference to any appointment where statutory rules are violated. The issue is with regard to reinstatement of first respondent. In the light of the settled law discussed above, we are of the opinion, the petition is not maintainable as prima facie materials indicate petitioner has no locus standi and public interest litigation cannot be entertained in service matters.

Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable.