THANGAMANI J.

The petitioners are the accused in C.C. No. 1069 of 1992, on the file of the XVIIIth Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Saidapet. The first accused is a public limited company while the second and the third accused are its managing director and joint managing director respectively. The respondent herein, Aiyswarya Chemicals, had preferred the complaint against the petitioners alleging that in part settlement of the amount due to the complainant, accused 2 and 3 in. their capacity as managing director and joint managing director, respectively, issued these cheques on behalf of the first accused :

1. A cheque for Rs. 20, 000, dated September 19, 1991.

2. A cheque for Rs. 5, 000, dated October 1, 1991.

3. A cheque for Rs. 10, 000, dated September 15, 1991.

4. A cheque for Rs. 10, 000, dated September 30, 1991.

When they were presented for payment on December 14, 1991, they were returned with the endorsements " excess arrangement " " insufficient funds ". Thereupon, the complainant issued a notice contemplated under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act calling upon them to pay the sum of Rs. 45, 000 covered by the four cheques referred to above. The notices were received by the accused on December 22, 1991. On December 30, 1991, they sent a reply pleading that as per the understanding between them, the cheques should not have been presented for payment without clearance from them. However, there was no such arrangement. On account of the non-payment within the time prescribed, the accused have committed an offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

In the present application, the accused seek an order to call for the records in C.C. No. 1069 of 1992 and quash the same.

The only argument of learned counsel for the quash petitioners is that the non-payment of the amount due within 15 days from the receipt of notice as contemplated under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for every cheque constitutes a distinct and separate cause of action. Under section 219 of the Criminal Procedure Code, only three offences of the same kind within a year can be charged together. Since the present complaint takes in four charges committed within the course of one year, it is violative of section 219 of the Criminal Procedure Code and hence it has to be quashed by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This contention of the quash petitioners is untenable. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act contemplates the issuance of A notice on the part of the holder making a demand for the payment of the amount covered by the cheque to the drawer within 15 days of the receipt of information from the bank. In case the drawer of the cheque fails to make payment of the said amount within 15 days from the receipt of the notice, the holder can launch prosecution against the drawer within the next one month. No doubt, the cause of action for each cheque is distinct and separate. However, there is no warrant for the proposition of the petitioner that all the instances of dishonour of the cheque could not find a place in one complaint. It is significant to note that what section 219 of the Criminal Procedure Code contemplates is only the joinder of charges. The section itself appears under the head " joinder of charges ". Only at the stage of framing of charges the requirements of section 219 of the Criminal Procedure Code are to be considered. Evidently, section 219 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot stand in the way of the court taking on file the present complaint and proceeding further. The inclusion of four instances of dishonour of cheques in one complaint cannot be a ground to quash the same by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In any event this cannot be the reason to quash the entire proceedings. The very object of section 219 is to prevent miscarriage of justice by clubbing together a number of offences and making it impossible for the accused to defend them. Quashing of the complaint for the reason urged by learned counsel for the petitioners would only lead to abuse of the process of the court.I, therefore, find no merit in this petition. Hence, it is dismissed.