1. The petitioner/accused has filed the Criminal Petition, as per Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking anticipatory bail concerning Crime No.59 of 2024, registered at the Karampudi Police Station of Palnadu District.

2. A case has been registered against the petitioner/A.24 and others for the offences punishable under Section 143, 147, 307, 332, 435, 427 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC). Subsequently, an alteration memo was filed, including Section 436 IPC, on 15.05.2024 at 16:00 hours.

3. In brief, the prosecution case is that this is a case of forming into unlawful assembly, voluntarily causing hurt, arson, mischief, attempt to murder and voluntarily causing hurt to the public servant in the discharge of his duties. On 14.05.2024, at 5:00 PM, after completing his duties at the Karampudi Office, the defacto complainant, who serves as the Village Revenue Officer in Petasannigandla Village, Karampudi Mandal, was on his way home. As he passed by the YSR statue, he encountered A.1 and several other accused, who had gathered and allegedly planned to create chaos in the city. Their purported intention was to target sympathizers of the TDP party and innocent individuals, intending to kill any sympathizer with sticks and rods. They proceeded towards TDP party sympathizers, explicitly targeting "Thanda Jani," who managed to escape. Subsequently, the Circle Inspector and Sub- Inspector of Police received information about an attack involving YSRCP party activists. Upon arrival at the scene, a YSRCP party activist reportedly threw stones at the house of TDP party sympathizers, one of which hit the Circle Inspector, causing him to sustain injuries. The situation escalated as YSRCP activists allegedly poured petrol on a blue car near the Check Post, creating panic in the city. They loudly proclaimed, "Evaro okarini champithe kani, mana joliki rakunda untaru". Further chaos ensued as they vandalized shops, houses belonging to TDP party sympathizers, and TDP party offices. Additionally, they destroyed bikes parked at various locations in Karampudi village.

4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner/A.24 contends that the police added the petitioner's name as an accused in compliance with a Memo dated May 23, 2024. This addition allegedly occurred based on confession statements from A.21, A.22, and two other witnesses. The learned Counsel further contends that if the petitioner had participated in the offence, his name would have been mentioned in the original FIR; the petitioner is well-known as a Member of the Legislative Assembly since 2009 and is currently contesting as an MLA from the Macherla Constituency under the YSR Congress party. The learned Counsel suggests that multiple FIRs were filed for the same incident in an attempt to target the petitioner, allegedly orchestrated by the police to comply with directives from the Election Commission of India. It is clear from the FIR, the learned Counsel asserts that there is no evidence placing the petitioner at the scene of the incident. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the Station House Officer is actively pursuing the petitioner's arrest to prevent him from organizing agents for vote counting and briefing them on procedures.

5. The Respondent-State has submitted a counter, refuting all the allegations presented in the petition. The contentions outlined in the Counter need not be reiterated, as they essentially mirror the report's content dated 15.05.2024. Additionally, the Counter asserts that during the investigation, the Investigating Officer arrested A.5, A.11 to A.20 on 16.05.2024, and they were subsequently remanded to judicial custody. It further states that L.W.10, Inspector of Police, testified that the petitioner allegedly instigated his followers, leading to a mob that hurled stones at him and assaulted him, resulting in a bleeding head injury. Emphasizing the petitioner's status as a Member of the Legislative Assembly and alleged involvement in violent activities, the Counter argues that granting anticipatory bail could potentially lead to further criminal activities. The Counter also highlights that the petitioner is implicated in 12 cases, underscoring concerns about his potential to engage in additional unlawful activities if released.

6. Heard Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Rama Lakshmana Reddy Sanepalli, learned counsel, for the Petitioner/A.24, and Sri N. Ashwani Kumar, learned Special Counsel, representing the Respondent-State (vide G.O.Rt.No.577, dt.12.06.2024). Both sides reiterated their submissions on par with the contentions presented in the petition and Counter. Consequently, the contentions raised by learned counsel need not be reproduced.

7. In the common Order of I.A.No.1 of 2024 in Crl.P.Nos.3788, 3789, 3790 of 2024 and I.A.No.1 of 2024 in Crl.P.No.3775 of 2024, this Court granted interim protection to the Petitioner, ensuring no coercive steps and no arrest until 06.06.2024 under specified conditions. Dissatisfied with the Court's Order in Crl.P.Nos.3775 and 3788 of 2024, a Special Leave Petition (criminal) Diary No(s).25204 of 2024 and 25512 of 2024 were filed before the Hon’ble Apex Court. After hearing arguments from the learned counsel representing both parties, the Hon’ble Apex Court passed an order prohibiting the Petitioner from entering the counting station at Macherla Assembly Constituency on 04.04.2024. Additionally, the Hon’ble Apex Court requested this Court to expeditiously dispose of the pending petitions based solely on their merits without being uninfluenced by the Apex Court's Order.

8. The parameters for granting anticipatory bail have been succinctly laid down in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre V. State of Maharashtra (2011) 1 SCC 694, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as follows:

“112. The following factors and parameters can be taken into consideration while dealing with anticipatory bail:

“(i) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made;

(ii) The antecedents of the applicant, including the fact as to whether the accused has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a court in respect of any cognizable offence;

(iii) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice;

(iv) The possibility of the accused's likelihood to repeat similar or other offences;

(v) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her;

(vi) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in cases of large magnitude affecting a very large number of people;

(vii) The courts must evaluate the entire available material against the accused very carefully. The Court must also clearly comprehend the exact role of the accused in the case. The cases in which the accused is implicated with the help of Sections 34 and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860, the Court should consider with even more excellent care and caution because over-implication in the cases is a matter of common knowledge and concern;

(viii) While considering the prayer for the grant of anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors, namely, no prejudice should be caused to the free, fair and full investigation, and there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the accused;

(ix) The Court to consider reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant;

(x) Frivolity in Prosecution should always be considered; it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the Prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail."

9. In Rakesh Baban Borhade V. State of Maharashtra and another 2015 SAR (Criminal) 156, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that;

“Anticipatory bail not to be granted as a matter of rule but should be granted only when a case is made out and the Court is convinced that the accused would not misuse his liberty”.

10. The learned counsel for the Petitioner relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sushila Aggarwal V. State (N.C.T. of Delhi) (2020) 5 S.C.C. 1, wherein it held that:

“91.1. ………….. it should enure in favour of the accused without any restriction on time. Normal conditions under Section 437(3) read with Section 438(2) should be imposed; if there are specific facts or features in regard to any offence, it is open for the court to impose any appropriate condition (including fixed nature of relief, or its being tied to an event), etc.

91.2. ………….. it is held that the life or duration of an anticipatory bail order does not end normally at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the court or when charges are framed but can continue till the end of the trial. Again, if there are any special or peculiar features necessitating the court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open for it to do so.”

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision reported in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others vs. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that:

“4. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, did not contain any specific provision corresponding to the present Section 438. Under the old Code, there was a sharp difference of opinion amongst the various High Courts on the question as to whether courts had the inherent power to pass an order of bail in anticipation of arrest, the preponderance of view being that it did not have such power. The need for extensive amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure was felt for a long time, and various suggestions were made in different quarters in order to make the Code more effective and comprehensive. The Law Commission of India, in its 41st Report dated September 24, 1969, pointed out the necessity of introducing a provision in the Code enabling the High Court and the Court of Session to grant "anticipatory bail". It observed in para 39.9 of its report (Volume I):

“The suggestion for directing the release of a person on bail prior to his arrest (commonly known as “anticipatory bail”) was carefully considered by us. Though there is a conflict of judicial opinion about the power of a court to grant anticipatory bail, the majority view is that there is no such power under the existing provisions of the Code. The necessity for granting anticipatory bail arises mainly because sometimes influential persons try to implicate their rivals in false cases for the purpose of disgracing them or for other purposes by getting them detained in jail for some days. In recent times, with the accentuation of political rivalry, this tendency is showing signs of steady increase. Apart from false cases, where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail, there seems no justification to require him first to submit to custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for bail.”

12. In Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat (2016) 1 SCC 152, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down certain guidelines in respect to applications for anticipatory bail. In paragraph 25.10, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

“25.10. We all also reproduce para 112 of the judgment in the Siddaram Satingappa case, where the Court delineated the following factors and parameters that need to be taken into consideration while dealing with anticipatory bail:

(a) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made;

(b) The antecedents of the applicant, including the fact as to whether the accused has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence;

(c) The possibility of the applicant of fleeing from justice;

(d) The possibility of the accused's likelihood to repeat similar or other offence;

(e) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting them;

(f) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in cases of large magnitude affecting a vast number of people;

(g) The Courts must carefully evaluate the available material against the accused. The Court must also clearly comprehend the exact role of the accused in the case. The cases in which the accused is implicated with the help of Sections 34 and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860, the Court should consider with even greater care and caution because over-implication in the case is a matter of common knowledge and concern;

(h) While considering the prayer for the grant of anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors, namely, no prejudice should be caused to a free, fair and full investigation, and there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the accused;

(i) The Court should consider reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant.

(j) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered, and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail,"

13. As stated in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre (supra), the nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused are the prime factors that must be considered while granting or refusing to grant anticipatory bail to the accused.

14. The Petitioner contends that as a contestant for MLA in the Macherla Constituency, he has raised objections regarding the biased conduct of police officers. He asserts that the allegations against him have been fabricated with malicious intent.

15. According to the prosecution case, the crime was first reported on 15.05.2024 at 00:30 hours, although the incident occurred on 14.05.2024 at 17:00 hours. The person in charge of VRO-II of Karampudi Village complained about the offence. As per the prosecution's case, on 14.05.2024, around 5:00 PM, after finishing his duties at the Karampudi Office, the complainant, who serves as the Village Revenue Officer in Petasannigandla Village, Karampudi Mandal, was on his way home. As he passed by the YSR statue, he encountered individuals identified as A.1 to A.3, along with other supporters of the YSRCP party, who had unlawfully assembled with the shared objective and pre-planned intent to harm TDP followers. They were armed with sticks and rods and attempted to attack Thanda Jani with the intention of killing him. Upon receiving this information, the concerned Inspector of Police and Sub- Inspector of Police promptly arrived at the scene. Amidst the chaos, a member of the mob threw a stone at the house of TDP party supporters, inadvertently hitting the head of the Inspector of Police and causing injury. Additionally, they vandalized shops, houses, and properties affiliated with the TDP. It is further alleged that the MLA of Macherla and his followers arrived in Karampudi in 20 cars, where the MLA purportedly assured them that they would handle any consequences and allegedly incited them to attack TDP supporters.

16. The prosecution contends that during these events, when Pamidimalla Adisankar, the owner of Sai Veera Venkata Lakshmi Hotel, began filming the incident, he was assaulted by the group with sticks and iron rods. They also damaged his hotel property and set fire to his house after pouring petrol. Thus, the prosecution argues that the accused, who are supporters of the YSRCP party, caused public panic, damaged the houses and shops of TDP supporters, and inflicted significant destruction. After recording the statements of witnesses, the Investigation Officer included the petitioner's name as A.24.

17. The learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner contends that, in his capacity as a candidate for MLA in the Macherla Constituency, objections have been raised regarding biased behaviour exhibited by police officers. He asserts that the accusations levelled against him are baseless fabrications. Furthermore, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner emphasizes that the prosecution has not produced a Wound Certificate detailing the alleged injuries the complainant sustained. Additionally, there is no evidence presented to show that the petitioner received medical treatment at a hospital. Moreover, it remains uncertain whether the complainant got medical treatment at a hospital for any injuries claimed to have been inflicted.

18. The prosecution produced statements of witnesses that were recorded during their investigation. Despite claims that the Inspector of Police sustained injuries during the incident, the petitioner argues that the prosecution has not produced a Wound Certificate nor provided reasons for its absence. The petitioner questions whether the elements of Section 307 IPC, which deals with attempted murder, genuinely apply to the circumstances of the case. The petitioner contends that if the prosecution asserts the Inspector of Police sustained injuries and received medical treatment, they should have presented this evidence in court without hesitation. However, statements recorded during the investigation support the prosecution's claim regarding the injuries sustained by the Inspector of Police. Notably, based on witness statements gathered during the investigation, it is challenging to definitively conclude at this stage that the essential elements of Section 307 IPC are not applicable prima facie.

19. The learned Senior Counsel representing the Petitioner argues that the ingredients outlined in Section 307 of IPC do not apply to the circumstances of the case due to the absence of a wound certificate. In Vasant Vithu Jadhav V. State of Maharashtra (2004) 9 SCC 31, where the Hon’ble Apex Court held that:

"9. In the aforesaid factual scenario, it has to be seen whether Section 307 has application. Section 307 IPC reads as follows:

“307. Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.”

10. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if an intent is present coupled with some overt act in the execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section distinguishes between the accused's act and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under the circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, it is not correct to acquit an accused of the charge under Section 307 IPC merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were like a simple hurt."

20. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision reported in Parasuram Pandey and others vs. State of Bihar 2004 CRLLJ 4978, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that:

“14. To constitute an offence under Section 307, two ingredients of the offence must be present:-

(a) An intention of or knowledge relating to the commission of murder; and

(b) The doing of an act towards it.

For the purpose of Section 307, what material is the intention or the knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done to carry out the intention The section clearly contemplates an act which is done with the intention of causing death but which fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. In the absence of intention or knowledge, which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307, there can be no offence 'of attempt to murder'."

21. Section 307 IPC reads as follows:

“307. Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.”

22. From a bare perusal of Section 307 of IPC, it is evident that the first part does not contemplate that receipt of any injury on the part of the Victims is a prerequisite for convicting an accused.

23. In adjudicating a case, the court's task is to ascertain whether an act, irrespective of its consequences, was executed with the intention or knowledge as delineated in the pertinent legal provision. The crucial inquiry revolves around whether there existed an intent to cause death or the awareness that death could result. This determination is inherently factual and hinges upon the unique circumstances presented in each individual case. It is also relevant to note that the crime has been registered against an accused person under Section 436 IPC, which is punishable with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.

24. Based on the observations made in the decision as mentioned earlier, this Court is of view that, at this stage, it cannot be concluded that section 307 of IPC has no application on the ground that the injuries said to have been sustained are simple. Although the nature of the injury caused may often assist in coming to a finding as to the accused's attention, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances.

25. Learned Special Counsel for the Respondent relied on a decision reported in Vipan Kumar Dhir vs. State of Punjab and another (2021) 15 SCC 518, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that:

“11. In addition to the caveat illustrated in the cited decision(s), bail can also be revoked where the court has considered irrelevant factors or has ignored relevant material available on record which renders the order granting bail legally untenable. The gravity of the offence, conduct of the accused and societal impact of an undue indulgence by Court when the investigation is at the threshold, are also amongst a few situations, where a Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail to prevent the miscarriage of justice and to bolster the administration of criminal justice system. This Court has repeatedly viewed that while granting bail, especially anticipatory bail which is per se extraordinary in nature, the possibility of the accused to influence prosecution witnesses, threatening the family members of the deceased, fleeing from justice or creating other impediments in the fair investigation, ought not to be overlooked.”

26. A perusal of the parameters for granting anticipatory bail laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court shows that the Court must consider the seriousness of the offence, the likelihood of the Petitioner's absconding from justice, the antecedents of the accused and chances of the Petitioner tampering with evidence or threatening the witnesses.

27. The learned counsel representing the Respondent-State asserts that the Petitioner is a habitual offender involved in 11 cases, including two similar offences. The Prosecution has provided details of these cases, which are outlined below:

28. The pendency of the aforesaid criminal cases demonstrates the petitioner's criminal antecedents.

29. As per the G.O.Rt.No.577 Home (Courts. A) Department, dt.12.06.2024, the Andhra Pradesh State Government has appointed Sri N. Aswani Kumar, learned counsel as Special Counsel to appear before the High Court in certain cases of Macherla Assembly Constituency incidents involving the serious and grave violation of Model Code of Conduct. The learned Senior Counsel representing the Petitioner made submissions regarding the appointment of Special Counsel in this case. It is not the case of the Petitioner that the Government is not empowered to appoint Special Counsel on behalf of the defacto complainant/State.

30. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a decision reported in Paras Kumar Jain and another vs. State of M.P. and others 2012(3) MPLJ, wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court, observed in Para 16, which reads as under:

“16. Thus the position in law is settled that while appointing a Special Public Prosecutor the State is required to apply its mind on the relevant aspects of the matter and see that only a fair and impartial advocate is appointed as Special Public Prosecutor. If an advocate has appeared on behalf of the complainant in earlier proceedings, then this aspect needs consideration by the State while appointing him as Special Public Prosecutor. The appointment of the Special Public Prosecutor cannot be made in a mechanical manner on mere asking by the complainant. It is the responsibility of the State to ensure the fair trial and see that the advocate appointed as Special Public Prosecutor, acts in non prejudicial manner.”

31. The learned Special Counsel for the Respondent relied on a decision reported in Sri Omprakash Baheti and others vs. The State of Maharashtra 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 82, wherein the High Court of Bombay held that:

“18. xxx The records disclose that there has been application of mind by respondent no. 1 before appointing Advocate Gupta as Special Public Prosecutor and therefore, it cannot be said that respondent no. 1 has appointed Advocate Gupta as Special Public Prosecutor mechanically at the request of the complainant.”

32. The petitioner does not argue that the State Government failed to follow proper procedures when appointing Sri N. Ashwani Kumar as Special Counsel, nor has the petitioner challenged these proceedings. Furthermore, the petitioner does not claim that the appointment of Sri N. Ashwani Kumar as Special Counsel has caused him any prejudice.

33. In light of these facts, this Court finds that the petitioner's submission regarding the appointment of Sri N. Ashwani Kumar as Special Counsel is not significantly relevant to the disposal of the current application.

34. The learned counsel for the Petitioner argues that custodial interrogation is unnecessary, citing the Prosecution's assertion that it has gathered all pertinent evidence demonstrating the Petitioner's involvement in the offence. Furthermore, the Prosecution has not argued for the necessity of the Petitioner's custodial interrogation.

35. In Ashok Kumar V. State of Union Territory Chandigarh 2024 S.C.C. OnLine SC 274 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that:

"12. There is no gainsaying that custodial interrogation is one of the effective modes of investigating the alleged crime. It is equally true that just because custodial interrogation is not required, it may also not be grounds for releasing an accused on anticipatory bail if the offences are of a severe nature. However, a mere assertion on the part of the State while opposing the plea for anticipatory bail that custodial interrogation is required would not be sufficient. The State would have to show or indicate more than prima facie why the custodial interrogation of the accused is required for investigation."

36. This Court views that the investigating officer deserves a free hand to take the investigation to its logical conclusion in a case containing severe allegations. The possibility of the investigation being affected once the Petitioner is released on bail is very much foreseen. With regard to the Prosecution's case, the investigation remains incomplete. Granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioner could hinder the ongoing investigation. There is a concern regarding threats to witnesses, and a prima facie case implicating the Petitioner in a serious offence exists. The allegations are severe, and the investigating agency has not yet been able to interrogate the Accused/Petitioner.

37. The established legal principle is that anticipatory bail is not granted as a matter of routine; it should only be provided when the Court is convinced that exceptional circumstances warrant such an extraordinary remedy.

38. The Prosecution is concerned that the Petitioner, having cultivated a strong grassroots following across every village and town over his four consecutive terms as MLA, poses a risk if released on bail. There is a severe apprehension that he may influence his followers and associates to seek retribution against the witnesses or the victim. The Petitioner is shown to be involved in multiple cases, making his antecedents a crucial factor to consider when deciding on an application for anticipatory bail. The investigation concerning the Petitioner is ongoing.

39. The learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner tendered copies of bail orders from Crl.M.P.No.228 of 2024, dated 04.06.2024, demonstrating that the learned Principal Sessions Judge of Guntur had granted anticipatory bail to Accused Nos. 1 to 4, 6 to 8, and 10. Additionally, copies of bail orders from Crl.M.Ps.No.223 & 224 of 2024, dated 04.06.2024, were submitted to show that the same Sessions Judge had granted anticipatory bail to Accused Nos. 26 to 31. In contrast, the learned Special Counsel representing the State appraised this Court of their applications seeking the cancellation of anticipatory bail, currently awaiting for adjudication. Given the gravity of the allegations levelled against the Petitioner and his antecedents, this court is disinclined to accord substantial credence to the aforementioned orders passed by the Sessions Judge.

40. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the gravity of the offence, and following the settled principle of law that the power to grant bail under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. should be sparingly exercised in extraordinary circumstances. No such circumstances having been made out in this case, the possibility of the petitioner repeating similar offences and the impact on the public if anticipatory bail is granted, as well as the potential prejudice to a free, fair, and thorough investigation, lead this Court to conclude that this is not a suitable case for granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioner/Accused.

41. As a result, the Petition is dismissed.

42. It is explicitly clarified that the observations made in this Order are preliminary and pertain solely to the decision on the present application without indicating a stance on the case's merits. The Investigating Agency is affirmed to have the freedom to investigate without being influenced by the observations in this Order.

43. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.