1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order, the present petition is filed by the petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following prayers:-

(A) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned letter dated 20.11.2009 at Annexure 'A'.

(B) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other writ, order or direction, directing the respondents to refer the Industrial Dispute raised by the petitioner for adjudication forthwith.

(C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to refer the industrial dispute involved in this case for necessary adjudication to the appropriate Forum, in the interest of justice.

(D) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to pass such other or further order or relief in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.

2. Brief facts of the present case is that the petitioner - Union vide letter dated 24.07.2007 raised a demand on behalf of its members through Shri Ashwin C. Patel and others casual / contingent / contract employees of the Oil & natural Gas Corporation Ltd., who had completed 240 days of work together with all consequential benefits as per the provisions of the Standing Orders. In response to the above letter, the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Central, Vadodara, vide its letter dated 14.07.2008 informed the petitioner - Union that it can place the matter by raising an industrial dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Central at Vadodara. Accordingly, vide letter dated 24.07.2008, the petitioner - Union submitted the dispute before the petitioner - Union submitted the dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Central at Vadodara. 2.1 The concerned Ministry, accordingly, consider the dispute raised by the petitioner - Union. However, the same was dismissed on account of that "the dispute has been raised after a lapse of 17 years. The dispute is, therefore, belated an stale." Aggrieved from this decision, the petitioner - Union has preferred the present petition.

3. Heard Mr.Rajesh Mankad, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.Ankit shah, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr.Rajni Mehta, learned counsel for respondent No.2 through video conferencing.

4. Mr.Rajesh Mankad, learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently submitted that in the present case, the appropriate Government is the Central Government. He has submitted that while passing the impugned order of rejection on the ground of delay of 17 years, no detailed reasons has been assigned.

According to him, in absence of such reasons, the impugned order dated 20.11.2009 at Annexure - A issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour is not just, legal and valid. While inviting the attention of this court regarding the entire chain of the events from page nos.26 to 36 dated 24.07.2007, he has submitted that the workers who, represented by the present petitioner - Union, were left out by the management. According to him, the reasons for raising industrial dispute is specifically reflected in para-10 of the claim. He has also submitted that the persons who are left out by the ONGC have been reflected in the statement of demand, who have completed 240 days of service as per the Standing Order and as the said prayer was not granted to them, they have approached the Central Authority, however, it has rejected the same only on the ground of delay of 17 years.

4.1 Mr.Mankad, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that there are Standing Orders of the ONGC for regularization of the service of the workmen, however, this fact has not been considered by the competent authority of the Central Government. He has submitted that the Assistant Labour Commissioner vide its communication dated 14.07.2008 has made communication to the Working President intimating the Present of the Union that if the grievances are not heard by the management, then, it can raise an industrial dispute submitting demand in six copies thereof. While inviting attention of the Court regarding the claim of demand at Annexure - D, he has submitted that in response to the letter of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Central, Vadodara, the petitioner herein has raised an industrial dispute as their demand has not been considered by the ONGC.

4.2 According to Mr.Mankad, learned counsel, the ONGC has not heard the Union and yet the appropriate Government has permitted the ONGC to file its reply which is not in consonance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter be referred to as the "I.D. Act").

4.3 Mr.Mankad, learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the ONGC has, vide its letter dated 12.09.2008 put forward it's defence against the demand raised by the petitioner - Union; wherein one of the ground is regarding lapse of considerable long span which has resulted into claim being time barred. He has submitted that it has also contended therein that earlier, the Industrial Tribunal has rejected the demand on technical ground and, therefore, the same cannot be raised as there cannot be application of maxim of res judicata since 13 persons were left out by the ONGC. He has also invited the attention of this Court regarding the written submission made by the Union vide its letter dated 09.02.2009 and has submitted that the Union has specifically narrated everything which has not been considered by the competent authority. He has submitted that so far as the Special Leave Petition is concerned, the workmen were not members of the other Union. He has also submitted that the cause of action for raising the demand by the present Union has arisen in the year 2007 and, therefore, it cannot be treated as delayed demand. While inviting the order of the Central Government regarding rejection of the prayer to refer to an industrial dispute for adjudication, he has submitted that the order is not reasoned one and the appropriate Government cannot decide the same. According to him, only Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court has authority to decide the dispute. He has submitted that there is need of interference in the order of the competent authority. While relying upon the following decisions, he has prayed to allow the present petition and to direct the competent authority to refer the dispute raised by the present Union to the concerned Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court for adjudication.

"(1) Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 (3) SCC 271;

(2) Jagdamba Prasad Mishra Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 1989 (2) LLN 569;

(3) Dhanbad Colliery Karamchari Sangh Vs. Union of India, 1991 (Suppl.) SCC 10;

(4) Sapan Kumar Pandit Vs. U. P. State Electricity Board and others, (2001) 6 SCC 222 [LQ/SC/2001/1481] ;

(5) ITC Agro Tech Ltd. And others Vs. Commercial Tax Officer and others, (2001) 6 SCC 228 [LQ/SC/2001/1508] ;

(6) Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha Vs. Union of India and others in Special Civil Application No.16207 of 2006, judgment and order dated 29.09.2006 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court (Coram: Hon'ble Ms.Justice R. M. Doshit);

(7) Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd Vs. Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha and others, 2009 (1) LLJ 646 (Gujarat);

(8) Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director Sericulture Department, (2015) 15 SCC 1 [LQ/SC/2015/1170] ;"

5. Per contra, Mr.Ankit Shah, learned counsel for respondent No.1 has vehemently submitted that the action taken on the part of the appropriate Government in refusing to refer to the alleged industrial dispute to the authority under the I.D. Act is just and proper. According to him, the demand raised by the Union is filed after almost 17 years and, therefore, there is delay and demand is stale one. According to him, it is within the purview of the appropriate Government either to refer to the industrial dispute to the competent authority under the I.D. Act or it may refuse to do so. He has submitted that no illegality has been committed by the appropriate Government in passing the impugned order. He has prayed to dismiss the present petition.

6. Mr.Rajni Mehta, learned counsel for respondent No.2 has vehemently submitted that earlier Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993 was filed and it was decided by the Tribunal way back on 07.01.2002. While referring to the award passed in Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993 in Reference (ITC) No.6 of 1991 (page No.52 to 53), he has submitted that similar situated workmen have raised the similar issue which came to be rejected by the Industrial Tribunal (Central). According to him, since the dispute is concluded by the Industrial Tribunal and it is binding to both the sides, the appropriate Government has rightly not referred to the alleged demand of the present petitioner - Union and there is no illegality committed by the appropriate Government. He has submitted that the order of the Industrial Tribunal dated 07.01.2002 passed in Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993 has not been challenged by the Union and, therefore, that fact itself suggests that there is no dispute alive. According to him, the present Union has no right to re-agitate the same demand. He has submitted that as the Industrial Tribunal (Central) has also decided issue in question, appropriate Government has rightly not referred to the alleged demand raised by the present Union. He has submitted that in earlier Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993, it has filed written statement wherein it is stated that there are various work centre from Surat in Gujarat and Jodhpur in Rajasthan and the complainant has not indicated the centre where they have worked. According to him, in the present case also, this fact has been considered by the Tribunal while deciding the Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993.

6.1 Mr.Mehta, learned counsel has also submitted that the workmen are not appointed as per the Rules of the ONGC and they are not permanent workers. While referring to the memo of petition, he has submitted that the correct fact has not been narrated by the petitioner and the order passed by the appropriate Government is reasoned one and there is no need of any interference or issuance of any direction. While referring to the claim at Annexure - B dated 24.07.2007 especially para-3 thereof, he has submitted that the petitioner has admitted the fact that earlier there was decision rendered in Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993 and the petitioner - Union has knowledge regarding the dismissal of that application. According to him, since the dispute has already been decided by the Industrial Tribunal there is no existence of any dispute and there is no dispute alive. He has supported the impugned order passed by the authority. 6.2 Regarding various decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr.Mehta, learned counsel for respondent No.2 has submitted that those decisions are not applicable to the factual aspects of this petition. He has prayed to dismiss the present petition.

6.3 Mr.Mehta, learned counsel for respondent No.2 has invited the attention of the Court regarding the Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993 in Reference (ITC) No.6 of 1991, copy of which has been placed with the affidavit-in-reply at Annexure - R/II and has submitted that Shri Ashwin C. Patel, who was one of the petitioners therein, came to be dismissed. He has also submitted that same benefits of claim has been claimed in the demand. According to him, since the Tribunal has earlier decided the demand, which is similar prayed in the present petition, the order of the learned Industrial Tribunal would be res judicata in this case.

7. In the case of Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh (supra), wherein the prayer of the Mazdoor Sangh to make reference of the disputes raised by it under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 came to be rejected by the State of Bihar which was challenged by the Union before Patna High Court which has also rejected the appeal filed by the Mazdoor Sangh. In that case, the appropriate Government also rejected the prayer of the Mazdoor Sangh to refer to the dispute. The Apex Court has held that "it is now well settled that, while exercising power under Section 10(1) of the Act, the function of the appropriate Government is an administrative function and not a judicial or quasi judicial function, and that in performing this administrative function the Government cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of the lis, which would certainly be in excess of the power conferred on it by Section 10 of the Act. The Apex Court has relied upon its own decision in the case of Ram Avtar Sharma Vs. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCR 686 [LQ/SC/1985/123] ; M. P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh Vs. State of M.P., (1985) 2 SCR 1019 [LQ/SC/1985/70] ; Shambu Nath Goyal Vs. Bank of Baroda, Jullundur, (1978) 2 SCR 793 [LQ/SC/1978/37] and allied matters.

8. In the case of Jagdamba Prasad Misra (supra), wherein State Government has passed non-speaking order rejecting the report of Conciliation Officer to make reference as an industrial dispute, the Allahabad High Court has observed that the Government ought to have given reasons for refusing the recommendation of the Conciliation Officer and ultimately, directed the State Government to refer to dispute to the concerned Labour Court.

9. In the case of Dhanbad Colliery Karamcharisangh (supra) wherein also the Government refused to refer the dispute on ground that appellant failed to establish that workmen were engaged in prohibited categories and workmen were engaged by contractor and there was no employer - employee relationship. The Apex Court has observed that the action of the Central Government in deciding the dispute is not permissible categorically and accordingly directed the Central Government to refer the dispute for adjudication to the appropriate Industrial Court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

10. In the case of Sapan Kumar Pandit (supra), the Apex Court has observed in paras-13, 14 and 15 as under:-

"13. Learned counsel for the Board invited our attention to a recent decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K. P. Madhavankutty, (2000) 2 SCC
455. No doubt in the said decision it is said that the power of the Government under Section 10 of the ID Act cannot be exercised at any point of time or for reviving the matters which have already been settled although law does not prescribe any time-limit. The crux of the observations in the said decision is the following : (SCC p. 460, para 6) "A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the (ID) Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case."

14. It is useful to refer to a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court as it related to the scope of the very same provision i.e. Section 4-K of the U.P. Act. In Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workers Union, (1970) 1 SCC 225 [LQ/SC/1970/4] learned Judges made the following observations: (SCC p. 231, para8) "Therefore, the expression 'at any time', though seemingly without any limits, is governed by the context in which it appears. Ordinarily, the question of making a reference would arise after conciliation proceedings have been gone through and the Conciliation Officer has made a failure report. But the Government need not wait until such a procedure has been completed. In an urgent case, it can 'at any time', i.e. even when such proceedings have not begun or are still pending, decide to refer the dispute for adjudication. The expression 'at any time' thus takes in such cases as where the Government decides to make a reference without waiting for conciliation proceedings to begin or to be completed. As already stated, the expression 'at any time' in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. No reference is contemplated by the section when the dispute is not an industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no longer exists or is not apprehended, for instance, where it is already adjourned or in respect of which there is an agreement or a settlement between the parties or where the industry in question is no longer in existence."

15. There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval, it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanised by the workmen or the union on account of other justified reasons, it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse........."

11. In the case Prabhakar (supra), the Apex Court has observed in paras-11 to 15 as under:-

11. The satisfaction of the existence of an industrial dispute or the satisfaction that an industrial dispute is apprehended is 'a condition precedent to the order of reference'. An order of reference cannot be made mechanically without forming an opinion. For formation of the necessary opinion, the 'appropriate Government' must also be satisfied that a person whose dispute is being referred for adjudication is a 'workman'. If the dispute is not between the employer and his workman, it is not an 'industrial dispute' and the Government can justifiably refuse to refer the dispute. From the material placed before it, the Government reaches an administrative decision whether there exists an existing or apprehended industrial dispute. In either event, it can exercise the power under this Section.

12. The adequacy or the sufficiency of the material on which the opinion was formed is beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. If the action of the Government in making the reference is impugned by a party, it would be open to such a party to show that what was referred was not an industrial dispute and that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. But if the dispute was an industrial dispute, its factual existence and the expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of a particular case are matters entirely for the Government to decide upon and it will not be competent for the Court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no material before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on those matters.

13. When the 'appropriate Government' makes a reference of an industrial dispute for adjudication, it does not decide any question of fact or law. The only condition, which the exercise of that power should satisfy, is that there should be the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute. When once the Government is satisfied about this question, it acquires jurisdiction to refer the dispute for adjudication. However, the condition precedent to the formation of such opinion, that there should be an existing or apprehended 'industrial dispute', is imperative and the recitals of the existence or apprehension of the industrial dispute cannot preclude the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and to determine whether, in fact, there was any material before the 'appropriate Government' and if there was; whether the Government applied its mind in coming to the conclusion that an industrial dispute was in existence or was apprehended and it was expedient to make the reference. Therefore, an order of reference is open to judicial review if it is shown that the appropriate Government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have taken into consideration.

14. Likewise, when the appropriate Government refuses to make reference, it is also amenable to judicial review if it is shown that the appropriate Government did not take into consideration the relevant material which could show existence or apprehension of industrial dispute or if it is shown that the reasons for refusing to make reference are irrelevant or not germane to the formation of opinion.

15. It has been held in catena of judgments that while performing this administrative function, the Government would not decide the dispute between the parties which may be termed as judicial function and such judicial function is to be discharged by the Labour Court / Industrial Tribunal only. In Ram Avtar Sharma & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr., (1985) 3 SCC 189 [LQ/SC/1985/123] this Court held that if the Government, while refusing to make reference delves into the merits of the dispute, it is not permissible under law and the appropriate course to make reference and such dispute are to be settled / decided by the Labour Court / Industrial Tribunal as an adjudicatory authority. Following observations of the Court are worth noting:

"Therefore the view that while exercising power under Section 10(1) the functions performed by the appropriate Government is an administrative function and not a judicial or quasi-judicial function is beyond the pale of controversy.

Now if the Government performs an administrative act while either making or refusing to make a reference under Section 10(1), it cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of lis. That would certainly be in excess of the power conferred by Section 10. Section 10 requires the appropriate Government to be satisfied that the industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. This may permit the appropriate Government to determine prima facie whether an industrial dispute exists or claim is frivolous or bogus or put forth extraneous and relevant reasons not for justice of industrial peace and harmony. Every administrative determination must be based on ground relevant and germane to the exercise of power. If the administrative determination is based on the relevant, extraneous or grounds not germane to the exercise of power, it is liable to be questioned in exercise of the power of judicial review."

11.1 In the aforesaid decisions, the Apex Court has observed that even when making a reference by the appropriate Government is an administrative act, before making such a reference it has to form an opinion as to whether any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. It is further observed therein that while forming this opinion, the appropriate Government is supposed to take all relevant facts into consideration touching upon this aspect. If the power is not exercised properly, it is amenably to judicial review. It is also observed therein that thus, where an industrial dispute exists or his apprehended, but the appropriate Government refuses to make reference, such a refusal can be challenged in the court of law. Conversely, which is equally true, if the reference is made even when no dispute exists or is apprehended, such a reference will also be subject to judicial review.

11.2 In the aforesaid decision, the Apex Court has observed in para-18 as under:-

"18. At this stage, it may be pointed out that admittedly the law of limitation does not apply to industrial disputes. Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and under the Industrial Disputes Act no period of limitation is prescribed. This is now well settled by series of judgments of this Court."

11.3 In the aforesaid decision, the Apex Court has, while referring to its earlier decisions, has summarized the position of law as under:-

"(i) the appropriate Government would not be justified in making a reference under Section 10 of the Act without satisfying itself on the facts and circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial dispute exists or apprehended and if such a reference is made it is desirable, wherever possible, for the Government to indicate the nature of dispute in the order of reference;

(ii) the order of the appropriate Government making a reference under Section 10 of the Act is an administrative order and not a judicial or quasi-judicial one and the Court, therefore, cannot canvass the order of the reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial order;

(iii) an order made by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of the Act being an administrative order no lis is involved, as such an order is made on the subjective satisfaction of the Government;

(iv) if it appears from the reasons given that the appropriate Government took into account any consideration irrelevant or foreign material, the Court may in a given case consider the case for a writ of mandamus and;

(v) it would, however, be open to a party to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the act."

11.4 Further, regarding application of law of limitation, the Apex Court has observed in para-26 as under:-

"26. The aforesaid case law depicts the following:

(a) Law of limitation does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

(b) The words 'at any time' used in Section 10 would support that there is no period of limitation in making an order of reference.

(c) At the same time, the appropriate Government has to keep in mind as to whether the dispute is still existing or live dispute and has not become a stale claim and if that is so, the reference can be refused.

(d) Whether dispute is alive or it has become stale / non- existent at the time when the workman approaches the appropriate Government is an aspect which would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and there cannot be any hard and fast rule regarding the time for making the order of reference."

12. The other decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are on the same line as referred to hereinabove.

13. Mr.Mehta, learned counsel for respondent No.2 has relied upon the decision in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K. P. Madhavankutty and others, (2000) 2 SCC 839 for his preposition that in spite of absence of a statutory limitation period, such power cannot be exercised to revive settled matters or to refer stale disputes as well as for preposition that every dispute raised by a workman is not an industrial dispute.

14. In the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd (supra), the Apex Court has observed in para-6 as under:-

"6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one........"

14.1 In the aforesaid decision, the Apex Court has observed in para-7 as under:-

"7....... Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become an industrial dispute and the appropriate Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming it as an industrial dispute. The Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under Section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment."

15. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of both the sides and considering the aforesaid decisions as well as materials placed on record and the impugned order of the appropriate Government, it appears that the petitioner - Union has moved the Executive Director, ONGC regarding total 13 workers, who were either casual / contingent / temporary employees of Western Region and/or have completed 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months, for considering for conversion as regular employees and to give them consequential benefits / rights of regular employees from the date of their initial engagement in ONGC as per Standing Order dated 24.07.2007 of the ONGC. It appears from the said representation that earlier there was a complaint filed against the ONGC being Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993 which came to be rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 07.01.2002 on the technical ground. It also appears that Reference (ITC) No.6 of 1991 was referred as per the demand raised by the Engineering Mazdoor Sangh, Vadodara as per the direction of the High Court. While referring to the prayer clause, it is averred in the said representation that the demand raised by the Engineering Mazdoor Sangh for all the workmen who have completed 240 days as casual / contingent / temporary workmen and it was not for the specific workmen.

According to the averments made in the said representation, the complainants of Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993 were concerned and connected with the dispute in Reference (ITC) No.6 of 1991 and 14 workmen have filed their statement of claim in Reference (ITC) No.6 of 1991. Further, in the said reference, the ONGC has considered service record of 269 workmen, but declined to submit the names of 14 workmen, who have completed 240 days as per the Statement Order No.2912 of the ONGC. According to it, though the ONGC has suppressed all these facts from the Tribunal, the Tribunal has not considered the case of 14 workmen and has also not considered the fact that 14 workmen were similarly situated workmen. While referring to the Standing Order of the ONGC, it was demanded that all 13 workmen may be considered for regular appointment. It is further averred that this demand has been raised on 24.07.2007.

16. It appears from the communication dated 14.07.2008 issued by the Ministry of Labour and Employment, Office of the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Vadodara addressed to the President of the petitioner - Union that if the grievance of the Union was not considered by the Management, then, it can raise an industrial dispute. In consonance with the said communication, the petitioner - Union has addressed a letter dated 24.07.2008 to the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Vadodara raising an industrial dispute regarding the demand. Further, it also appears that the Ministry of Labour and Employment, Office of the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Vadodara has addressed a letter dated 01.08.2008 to the Executive Director, ONGC, Western Regional regarding raising of demand by the petitioner - Union and fixing the date for conciliation. It also appears that in pursuance to the said communication of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, the ONGC has, vide its letter dated 12.09.2008, submitted its remarks wherein it is submitted that the Union has raised the claim after lapse of considerable lengthy span which has become time- barred. It is also contended therein that earlier application came to be rejected by the Tribunal and, therefore, the present demand may be dismissed on the maxim of the res judicata.

17. It appears from the record that the Union has submitted its detailed reply vide letter dated 09.02.2009 wherein it has raised points that it was made known to the applicant from some Trade Union Leaders that they need not raise an industrial dispute as this Court has passed an order/direction that the Tribunal's award would not be restricted to only whose names appears in the schedule to the affidavit filed by the ONGC before the Tribunal, but it will be available to all the employees who fulfilled the requirements of completion of 240 days. It is also submitted therein that 13 workmen have also moved the Industrial Tribunal for inclusion of their names in the complaint, which came to be rejected. It is further submitted therein that the claim was rejected on technical ground and not on merits and, therefore, it will not affect the demand of the petitioner - Union. It is also submitted therein that the limitation is not applicable to the claim. It also appears from the record that the Industrial Tribunal has passed an order in Reference (ITC) No.6 of 1991 whereby some relief was granted in favour of the workmen which came to be challenged by the Engineering Majdoor Sangh by filing Special Civil Application No.12850 of 1994, which came to be disposed of vide order dated 15.02.1999 and 16.02.1999 whereby the petition came to be partly allowed and the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal was modified. There was specific direction to the ONGC to take appropriate steps in accordance with the modified terms and for issuance of appropriate orders for all the employees who are covered by the terms of reference as earlyas possible, irrespective of whether their names are attached with the schedule or not Thus, this order of the Coordinate Bench (Coram: Hon'ble Mr.Justice M. R. Calla) is applicable not only to the persons whose names mentioned in the schedule attached therewith but all the persons who fulfilled the criteria of the Standing Orders. It appears from the record that the ONGC has filed Letters Patent Appeal No.759 of 1999 wherein the Division Bench of this Court has passed an interim order in Civil Application No.4795 of 1999 staying the order passed by the learned Single Judge except in so far as 156 persons are concerned. Thus, virtually the other persons whose names are not appeared in the schedule are not given any benefit. This fact supports the version of the petitioner - Union that they were left out.

18. It appears from the award passed in Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993 that it has been specifically observed therein that earlier order passed in Reference (ITC) No.6 of 1991 is regarding only 156 workmen. There is also observation made by the Tribunal that so far as the award passed in Reference (ITC) No.6 of 1991 is concerned, it only pertains to 156 workers and, therefore, the workmen are not affected. Thus, the Reference (ITC) No.6 of 991 came to be rejected only on the ground that the workmen are not affected workmen and they have no right to get benefit under order passed in Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993. It is pertinent to note that the said order has been passed in the year 2002 and, thereafter, the petitioner - Union has raised an industrial dispute so far as the present 13 workers are concerned. However, it appears from the paper-book submitted by the ONGC that one Shri Ashwin C. Patel was also party in Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993. However, if it so, then, he would have been given the benefit of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.12850 of 1994. So far as the other persons are concerned, there is no any materials placed on record to show that they were also parties to the earlier proceedings. Since the Industrial Tribunal has not considered the prayer of other workmen, who have not parties to the earlier proceedings i.e. Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993, remaining persons have every right to agitate the issue so far as their personal rights are concerned as they have not been given any benefit of the order passed in earlier proceedings i.e. Complaint (ITC) No.3 of 1993 which came to be modified by the Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.759 of 1999. The similarly situated persons ought to have been considered for conferment of the benefit, but no such benefit has been conferred, their personal right, cannot be defeated only on the ground that there was prior adjudication between certain sections of the workmen and the ONGC.

19. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer to the impugned order dated 20.11.2009 passed by the competent authority at Annexure - A. It is crystal clear that the reasons for non- reference of the dispute raised by the Union to the concerned authority is that it is filed after lapse of considerable lengthy span of 17 years and it is belated and stale. However, there is no reason worth the name assigned to in the said communication as to how the dispute is stale. The aforesaid factual aspects narrated hereinabove has not been even mentioned in the said communication. It is pertinent to note that the Union in its communication dated 09.02.2009 has specifically narrated the fact that the applicant was made known by the Trade Union Leaders that their case would be covered by the order passed by the High Court in Special Civil Application No.12850 of 1994. However, as stated earlier, the order of the learned Single Judge came to be stayed by the Division Bench and it was restricted to only 156 persons whose names were provided in the schedule thereof. Now, this version of the Union and the other points raised in the communication dated 09.02.2009 has not even been reflected in the communication dated 20.11.2009. Thus, in absence of reasoned order, the said communication of the appropriate Government is not sustainable in the eyes of law.

20. Now, it is well settled that while exercising the power under Section 10 of the I.D. Act, the function carried out by the appropriate Government is only administrative in nature. It cannot decide the dispute. The Adjudicating Authority is only competent authority under the provisions of the I.D. Act. Now, in the present case, without assigning any reasons regarding various points raised in the communication dated 09.02.2009, only on the ground of limitation, the competent authority has refused to refer the dispute under Section 10 of the I.D. Act to the Labour Court. In view of the various pronouncements as referred to hereinabove, it is crystal clear that in the present case the appropriate Government has exceeded its jurisdiction under the law and has adjudicated the issue itself. Therefore, the impugned communication needs to be quashed and set aside and the appropriate Government needs to be directed to refer to the dispute to the Competent Authority under the I. D. Act.

21. In view of the above, the impugned communication dated 20.11.2009 is hereby quashed and set aside. The appropriate Government is directed to make a reference under Section 10(1) of the I.D. Act of the dispute raised by the petitioner - Union to the Competent Authority under the I. D. Act as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within a period of two month from the date of receipt of the writ of this order.

22. With the aforesaid observations, the petition stands disposed of. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.