P.c. Gulati v. The Commissioner Of Income Tax, New Delhi

P.c. Gulati v. The Commissioner Of Income Tax, New Delhi

(High Court Of Delhi)

Income Tax Reference No. 27 Of 1968 | 17-04-1972

DALIP K. KAPUR, J.

( 1 ) THE question which we are called upon to answer in the reference has been

framed by the Tribunal in the following terms:-"whether, on the facts and in the

circumstances of the case, the sale of Electrical Undertaking to the Punjab

Government falls in the assessment year 1955-56 when the Undertaking was taken

over by the Punjab Government by virtue of an option which was exercised in terms

of the licence or whether it falls in the assessment year 1963-64 when the balance

of the sale price was received by the assessee "

( 2 ) THE Panipat Electric Supply Co. Ltd. , which is the assessee in this case,

obtained a licence to generate and distribute electricity in Panipat on 20th July,

1934. The licence was for fifteen years but was renewed for a period of five years.

In terms of clause 9 of the licence the Government of Punjab had an option to

purchase the Electrical Undertaking belonging to the assessee at the expiry of the

period of the licence under the provisions of Section 7 (1) of the Indian Electricity

Act, 1910 on giving the requisite notice. Such a notice was given on 4th July, 1952,

and the Government took possession of the Undertaking on the midnight of 16th

July, 1954. The assessee-company being aggrieved filed a suit for the recovery of

Rs. 13,88,371. 25. This suit was eventually compromised and the assessee agreed

to accept a sum of Rs. 2,50,000. 00 in full and final settlement of its claim against

the Government. One of the terms of the compromise was that the Punjab State

Electricity Board would pay a sum of Rs. 1,35,033. 00 to the Punjab State

Government in addition to the amount of Rs. 2,50,000. 00, on behalf of the

assessee-company on account of the balance of the loan advanced by the

Government to the assesee, which was outstanding on the date of the take-over.

This compromise was effected on 7th April, 1962. At the time of making the

assessment for the assessment year 1963-64, the Income Tax Officer added a sum

of Rs. 1,81,772. 00 as profit under Section 41 (2) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, as

representing the difference between the sale price of the assets of the assessee and

the depreciated value of the said assets.

( 3 ) THE assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who rejected

the appeal. A further appeal was taken to the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal which

partly succeeded. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the assets which were

taken over by the Government included stores of the value of Rs. 24,000. 00 which

had not been subjected to depreciation and the assessee was also entitled to get a

deduction for the legal expenses incurred to get a better price for its assets. These

expenses were calculated to be Rs. 31,875. 00 and the Tribunal allowed this

deduction on the basis of the Supreme Courts decision in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.

v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, 63, 1. T. R. 207, (1 ). After allowing these

two deductions the Tribunal estimated the profit chargeable to tax under Section 41

(2) of the Act as being Rs. 1,25,892. 00. The assessee-company then sought a

reference to this Court which has been made by the Tribunal under Section 256 (1)

of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

( 4 ) IN deciding the appeal, the Tribunal found that although the assessee companys

assets were acquired by the Punjab Government in 1954, the sale could

not be said to have been completed till the sale price was finally fixed. The

assessees contention was that the sale took place on 16th July, 1954 when the

Government acquired the companys assets and hence the amount in question could

only have been taxed in the assessment year 1955-56. This was refuted by the

Departmental representative who claimed that litigation was going on and it was

only after the compromise in 1964 that the amount was ascertained and paid to the

company and, hence the amount in question was properly subjected to tax in this

assessment year. This latter argument was accepted by the Tribunal.

( 5 ) ON an examination of the question before us, it appears that the matter has

not to be decided on the basis of the date of the sale as that is not the real question

involved in this case, but on a determination of the previous year in which the

amount in question has to be included for the purpose of taxation. Even if the sale

took place in 1954 and the amount in question was received in 1963 the question

still would be whether the receipt in question was to be subjected to tax in the

previous year relating to the date of sale or the date of receipt. When this position

was put to counsel for the parties, they agreed that the real controversy in this case

was, as to whether the amount in question could be charged to tax in the previous

year relating to the assessment year 1963-64 and not as to whether the sale took

place in 1954. The difference between the two propositions becomes more obvious

by reference to Section 41 (2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The said sub-sec- tion

reads as here under:-"where any building, machinery, plant or furniture which is

owned by the assessee and which was or has been used for the purposes of

business or profession is sold, discarded, demolished or destroyed and the moneys

payable in respect of such building, machinery, plant or furniture, as the case may

be, together with the amount of scrap value, if any, exceed the written down value,

so much of the excess as does not exceed the difference between the actual cost

and the written down value, shall be chargeable to income-tax as income of the

business or profession of the previous year in which the moneys payable for the

building, machinery, plant or furniture became due. Provided that where the building

sold, discarded, demolished or destroyed is a building to which Explanation 5 to

Section 43 applies, and the moneys payable in respect of such building, together

with the amount of scrap value, if any, exceed the actual cost as determined under

that Explanation, so much of the excess as does not exceed the difference between

the actual cost so determined and the written down value shall be chargeable to

income-tax as income of the business or profession of such previous year.

Explanation.-Where the moneys payable in respect of the building, machinery plant

or furniture REFERRED TO to in this sub-section become due in the previous year in

which the business or profession for the purpose of which the building, machinery,

plant or furniture was being used is no longer inexistence, the provisions of this

subsection shall apply as if the business or profession is in existence in that previous

year. "

( 6 ) IT will be seen from this provision that the amount in question is not to be

charged to tax according to the date of the sale of the assets nor in accordance with

the date of the receipt of the consideration, but on the basis of the date when the

consideration became due. This terminology has led to some interesting arguments

before us. Before I proceed to deal with the contentions advanced on behalf of the

parties, I may say that the parties have agreed that the question REFERRED TO

should be reframed in the following terms:-"whether on the facts and in the

circumstances of the case the Tribunal was right in law in treating the sum of Rs.

l,25,892. 00 as income chargeable to tax under Section 41 (2) of the Income Tax

Act, 1961 for the assessment year 1963-64 "under Section 10 (2) (vii) which was

the corresponding provision under the Act of 1922, it was provided as follows:"in

respect of any such building, machinery or plant which has been sold or discarded or

demolished or destroyed, the amount by which the written down value thereof

exceeds the amount for which the building, machinery or plant, as the case may be,

is actually sold or its scrap value: Provided that such amount is actually written off in

the books of the assessee: Provided further that where the amount for which any

such building, machinery or plant is sold, whether during the continuance of the

business or after the cessation thereof, exceeds the written down value, so much of

the excess as does not exceed the difference between the original cost and the

written down value shall be deemed to be profits of the previous year in which the

sale took place : Provided further that where any insurance, salvage or"

compensation moneys are received in respect of any such building, machinery or

plant which has been discarded or demolished or destroyed, and the amount of such

moneys does not exceed the written down value, the amount allowable under this

clause shall be the amount, if any, by which the difference between the written

down value and the scrap value exceeds the amount of such moneys: Provided

further that where any insurance, salvage or compensation moneys are received in

respect of any building, machinery or plant as aforesaid, and the amount of such

moneys exceeds the difference between the written down value and the scrap value

no amount shall be allowable under this clause and so much of the excess as does

not exceed the difference between the original cost and the written down value less

the scrap value shall be deemed to be profits of the previous year in which such

moneys were received: Provided further that for the purposes of this clause, the

original cost of a budding, the written down value of which is determined in

accordance with the first proviso to sub-section (5), shall be deemed to be the

written down value so determined as at the date of being brought into use for the

purposes of the business, profession or vocation,"

( 7 ) THE second proviso reproduced above shows that if building, machinery or

plant was sold and the price exceeded the written down value the difference (or part

of it) was to be taxed in the previous year in which the sale took place. An

application of this proviso if it was applicable, would mean that under the Act of

1922, the amount in question would have been taxed in the assessment year 1955-

56 if the sale took place on 16th July, 1954. However, order the fourth proviso it is

stated that if compensation is received in respect of such assets which exceeds the

written down value the amount shall be taxed in the year in which the moneys are

received. Assuming that this proviso "was applicable to the present case and was

still in force, this would make the amount in question taxable on the date of the

receipt of the amount It is note-worthy that in the Act of 1961 the words which

occurred in the second proviso just REFERRED TO to above relating to the point of

time at which, the amount in question has to be taxed is not the previous year in

which the sale took place, nor the previous year in which the money was received,

but the previous year in which the money became due. It is this difference of

terminology as regards the point of time at which the amount in question has to be

taxed which has led to the major controversy in this case.

( 8 ) MR. K. K. Jain, learned counsel for the assessee-company contends that the

right to obtain compensation accrued on the date of the sale. He has REFERRED TO

to the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 as it stood on the date when

possession of the Undertaking was taken by the Government of Punjab. He has

pointed out that there can be a dispute about the amount of the purchase price

payable for acquiring the Undertaking, which may be the subject-matter of

arbitration. According to him, this does not mean that the sale of the Undertaking

took place on the date on which the arbitration between the parties might settle the

price. Thus, it is submitted that in the present case the sale of the Undertaking

belonging to the assessee took place in July, 1954, and the later settlement of the

price which was the subject matter of litigation, did not alter the date of the sale. He

has also cited Fazilka Electric Supply Co. Ltd. V. Commissioner of Income-Tax,

(1962) 46,. T. R. 127 0, which is a decision of the Supreme court concerned with

the acquisition of a similar Undertaking on-23rd July, 1949. In that case an amount

of Rs. 77,000. 00 was estimated by the Income-tax Officer as being the amount

subject to tax under Section 10 (2) (vii) of the Act of 1922. It was held by the

Supreme Court that there was a sale within the meaning of the second proviso to

Section 10 (2) (vii ). On analysis of the facts of the case, it appears that in that case

the High Court found that the price had been fixed in accordance with the licence

and thus the compulsory acquisition under Section 7 (1) of the Indian Electricity Act,

1910 was a sale within the meaning of Section 10 (2) (vii ). It was held by the

Supreme Court as follows:--"on behalf of the appellant it has been contended,

somewhat faintly, that all the elements necessary to constitute a contract are not

present here. We are unable to agree. There was an undertaking on the part of the

applicant for the licence to sell the undertaking to the local authority or Government

upon certain terms set out in the licence, and the time at which the option was to be

exercised and the price which was to be paid for the property were specified. There

was consideration for the contract as the licence was granted on those terms.

Therefore, all the elements necessary for a contract were present, and the sale in

pursuance thereof was not a compulsory purchase or acquisition (See Sakalaguna

Nayudu V. Chinna Manaswami Nayakar A. 1. R. (1928) P. C. 174 ). (3 ).

( 9 ) WE are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court correctly answered the

question referred to it. There was a sale in the present case of the building,

machinery and plant within the meaning of clause (Vii) of section 10 (2) of the

Income-Tax Act. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to deal with a

somewhat larger question which was canvassed before us on behalf of the

respondent that Section 10 (2) (vii) of the Income-tax Act is attracted even to a

compulsory sale. Nor do we consider it necessary to examine the decisions bearing

upon the question whether compulsory transfer to and vesting of property in

Government, constitute a sale within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the

Indian or English statute. It is sufficient to point out that Calcutta Electric Supply

Corporation Ltd. V. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1951) 19,. T. R. 406 related to a

transaction by which Government acquired the plant etc. and it was held that such

acquisition could not be regarded as a sale within the meaning of section 10 (2) (vii)

of the Income-Tax Act".

( 10 ) IT is note-worthy that the said case was decided on the basis that on the

particular facts of that case the acquisition of the Undertaking was a sale. The

Supreme Court particularly left open the larger question whether Section 10 (2) (vii)

was attracted to a compulsory sale. At the end of the judgment, there is a reference

to the decision in the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. V. Commissioner of

Income-tax, (1951) 19,. T. R. 406 (4), wherein it was held that an acquisition like

the one in question was not a sale within the meaning of Section 10 (2) (vii) of the

Income-tax Act. It is difficult to come to the conclusion that the said judgment of

the Supreme Court is applicable to the present case. Thus, it cannot be held that the

second proviso to Section 10 (2) (vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 made the

acquisition in the present case taxable in the assessment year 1955-56.

( 11 ) THE next question that needs consideration is, as to whether the amount in

question is taxable in the assessment year 1963-64 as held by the Tribunal. This

depends on the meaning to be given to the words became due occurring at the end

of Section 41 (2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The rival contentions of the parties

on this point are that the counsel for the assessee contends that the amount

became due in July, 1954 though the exact liability was unascertained, on the date

of the acquisition by the Government of Punjab. On the other hand, counsel for the

Revenue contends that the amount cannot be said to have become due till the

amount was ascertained. He contends that it was only after the compromise in the

suit that the amount could be said to be due.

( 12 ) IN support of the contention that the amount became payable on the date of

the sale within the meaning of Secion 41 (2) of the Act, Mr. K. K. Jain has

REFERRED TO to. the decision of the Supreme Court in E. D. Sassoon and Company Ltd. and others, V. Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay, (1954) 26, 1. T. R. 27, (5), and relied on certain passages therein. He contends that the policy of the Act is to make income taxable when it is received, accrues or arises. These three are

distinctive terms. Lord Justice Frys judgment in Colquhoun V. . Brooks (1988 ). 21,

Q. B. D. 52 at p. 59 (6), cited in the Supreme Courts judgment has been REFERRED

TO to by him, which runs as under:-"in the first place, I would observe that the tax

is in respect of profits or gains arising or accruing. I cannot read those words as

meaning received by. If the enactment were limited to profits and gains received by

the person to be charged, that limitation would apply as much to all Her Majestys

subjects as to foreigners residing in this country. The result would be that no

income-tax would be payable upon profits which accrued but which were not

actually received, although profits might have been earned in the kingdom and

might have accrued in the kingdom. I think, therefore, that the words arising or

accruing are general words descriptive of a right to receive profits".

( 13 ) LATER on, the following passage occurs in the Supreme Courts judgment:-"it

is clear therefore that income may accrue to an assessee without the actual receipt

of the same. If the assessee acquires right to receive the income, the income can be

said to have accrued to him though it may be received later on its being

ascertained. The basic conception is that he must have acquired a right to receive

the income. There must be a debt owed to him by somebody. "

( 14 ) RELYING on these passages, Mr. Jain contends that as soon as the

Undertaking was acquired by the Government of Punjab, the assessee got a right to

get compensation for the same. This compensation did not necessarily have to be

ascertained on the date of the sale. Something was owed to the assessee as soon as

the property was taken over. Hence, the amount in question had accrued in the

sense mentioned above to the assessee on the date of the sale and hence could be

said to be payable and due on that date.

( 15 ) MR. Jain has also REFERRED TO to the judgment of the Supreme Court in

Commissioner of Income-Tax, Gujarat V. Ashokbhai Chimanbhai, (1965) 56,. T. R.

42 O. In that case it was held -"in our judgment, income becomes taxable on the

footing of accrual only after the right of the taxpayer to the income accrues or

arises,and in the case of an agreement which makes profits receiveable at or on the

happening of the contingency, the fact that the profits are the result of transactions

spread over a period which covers a period preceding the happening of that

contingency would not make the receipt liable to be paid to persons other than

those who are entitled to receive it on the date on which it is actually received or

became receivable. "

( 16 ) THE judgment in E. D. Sassoon and Company Ltd. s case already REFERRED TO was also REFERRED TO to in this judgment, and it was pointed out that the test for ascertaining whether profits had accrued or arisen was whether the person who was entitled thereto had a right to claim such profits. Mr. Jain contends that in View of this decision of the Supreme Court, the right to get compensation for the

acquisition accrued to the assessee on the date of the sale and the computation of

the actual amount did not delay their liability of the amount to the date of

ascertainment. In other words, his contention is that the amount to be taxed under

Section 41 (2) of the Act accrued to the assessee on the date of the taking over of

the Undertaking on 16th July, 1954 and was always a liability of the Punjab

Government, inspite of the fact that the actual amount was not ascertained till the

compromise in April, 1962.

( 17 ) MR. Jain has also REFERRED TO to the judgment in The Commissioners of

Inland Revenue V. Newcastle Breweries, Ltd. 12, Tax Cases, 927 (8 ). In that case a

large stock of rum belonging to the assessee was taken possession by the Admiralty

acting under the Defence of the Realm Regulations and an amount of 10,315 was

offered by the Admiralty to the Company. The company lodged a claim for 18256

before the War Compensation Court which held that it was entitled to an additional

sum of 5,309, which was paid to the assessee by the Admiralty in January, 1922. It

was held that the amount in question had to be subjected to excess profit tax by an

additional assessment for the accounting year ending on 30th October, 1918. The

decision, therefore, was that though the amount in question was received in 1922

and credited into the accounts of the company in that year, it was asseassable in

the year 1918, in the year corresponding to the date when the sum was taken over.

The judgment of Rowlatt. which was eventually upheld up to the House of Lords

proceeded thus:-"the sums were not received in respect of goods which were to be

delivered-and so a price only became payable-after the year, but work was done in

the year and the remuneration for it was left open; something was paid on account,

but it was left open; perhaps it was going to be more, perhaps less, or perhaps it

was going to be the same, but it was left open. Therefore, those accounts could not

properly be closed in that year; there was not the material to close them. There was

only to be a payment on account, and some money might have to be paid back, or

something more might have to come. Under those circumstances I said you have "to

treat the account as kept open until that amount is fixed, and then the amount has

to be brought in. "

( 18 ) THE judgment proceeded on the basis that the amount which was eventually

received by the assessee in that case was an additional profit or an addition to the

price which had already been received. There was no doubt that the income in

question was the price of goods which had been compulsorily acquired. The goods

which were acquired were clearly the goods ordinarily offered for sale by the

Brewery. e. , rum. Hence, the price accruing from such a transaction must

necessarily be profits which accrued to the assessee on the date when the goods

were sold. At first sight there would be little to distinguish this decision from the

present case. However, there are two material differences. One is that the goods

which were acquired were not capital assets and, secondly some amount was

received at the time of sale, which was certainly not the final amount receivable by

the assessee. In this sense, the actual profit remained unascertained till the final

decision of the War Compensation Court in November, 1921, which led to the

payment of the balance of the price to the assessee in January, 1922.

( 19 ) MR. G. C. Sharma, learned counsel for the Revenue has submitted that

concepts relating to the ordinary income should not be applied in construing Section

41 (2) of the Act. He pointed out that this is a special provision which has as its

object the inclusion of certain sums which are not ordinarily income in the taxable

income of an assessee. When the capital assets of an assessee have been subjected

to depreciation over a number of years, an assessee enjoys the benefit of

deductions under the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act, viz. . Section 10 (2)

(vi) of the Act of 1922 and Section 32 of the Act of 1961. Having enjoyed this

benefit he is subjected to tax under Section 10 (2) (vii) or Section 41 of the two

Acts, if he eventually obtains more than the depreciated value of the assets at a

later date. On the other hand, he gets an additional benefit if the property is

disposed of at a price below the depreciated or written down value. The object of

Section 41 (2) is to bring to charge as deemed income, the additional value

received by the assessee when he disposes of the depreciated assets or the same

are demolished, discarded or destroyed. In construing such a provision, Mr. Sharma

contends that the terminology of the Section should properly be construed in the

light of the provisions allowing the deduction. He has for this purpose REFERRED TO

to Section 32 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. He first REFERRED TO to Section 32 (1)

(iii> which states that the depreciation to be allowed in the case of a building,

machinery, plant or furniture which is sold, discarded, demolished or destroyed, is

as follows :-"in the case of any building, machinery, plant or furniture which is sold,

discarded, demolished or destroyed in the previous year (other than the previous

year in which it is first brought into use), the amount by which the moneys payable

in respect of such building, machinery, plant of furniture, together with the amount

of scrap value, if any fall short of the written down value thereof:- Provided that

such deficiency is actually written off in the books of the assessee. Explanation.-For

the purposes of this clause,- 8-2 H. G. Delhi/72 (1) "moneys payable" in respect of

any building, machinery, plant or furniture includes- (a) any insurance, salvage or

compensation moneys payable in respect thereof; (b) where the building,

machinery, planter furniture is sold, the price for which it is sold, (2) "sold" included

a transfer by way of exchange or a compulsory acquisition under any law for the

time being in force:"

( 20 ) IN the Explanation to this proviso, it is provided that "moneys payable" means

in the case of a building, machinery, etc. , the price for which it is sold and "sold"

includes a transfer by compulsory acquisition. His contention is that if the assets

now in controversy had been sold for a value less than the written down value then

the assessee would have been entitled to a further deduction under Section 32 (1)

(iii) but the same could not be determined till the amount in question was actually

ascertained. It, therefore, follows that if the amount received exceeds the written

down value, the excess in question cannot be said to be money payable to the

assessee before it is ascertained.

( 21 ) IT seems that Mr. Sharmas contention is well-founded. When the Section now

in question,. e. . Section 41 (2) is analysed it merely states that when a building,

machinery, plant is sold and the price received for the same is more than its written

down value, the excess becomes chargeable to income-tax. In case this excess

exceeds the difference between the actual cost and the written down value that part

of the excess has to be disregarded, but the remaining excess has to be charged as

income pertaining to the previous year in which the money payable. e. , price,

became due. The words that need to be construed here are: became due. The

question to be asked is: When did the price become due On applying Mr. Jains

contention based on the parallel of accrued income, the price became due when the

property was taken over by the Government. According to Mr. Sharma, the price

cannot become due till it becomes ascertained.

( 22 ) IN applying a provision like the present, we have to make a reasonable

construction based on the practical method by which the assessee can claim a

deduction. If the property is compulsorily acquired for less than its written down

value, the asgessee has to get a deduction under Section 32 (1) (iii) of the Act. If

the price exceeds the written down value the assessee has to be taxed on the

excess, or, at least that part of the excess which does not exceed the difference

between the actual cost and the written down value. There must be some point of

time at which the assessee can say that the amount is now payable. He cannot say

that the amount is payable on the date of the sale in the present case, because he

does not know what the amount is. He cannot say that there is an excess or a

deficit. He cannot, therefore, make an entry in his books of account showing the

amount. Similarly, if he wishes to make a deduction under Section 31 (1) (iii) he

cannot claim any deduction merely on the ground that the price may be less than

the written down value. He does not know whether to ask for a deduction or

whether he is liable to tax till the amount is actually ascertained. An amount can be

said to be payable when a definite amount is ascertainable as being due. In the

instant case, the suit filed by the company claimed an amount of over 13 lakhs but

the final payment received after the compromise was much less. No amount could

be said to be due till it had become ascertained. This seems to be the only

reasonable construction that can be made on the words becam due occuring in the

provision we are called upon to construe.

( 23 ) THUS, the amount that was due to the assessee remained incohate and unknown, till it was actually ascertained as a result of the compromise between the

parties. As soon as it was deter mined it became payable and, therefore, due. When

the amount was ascertained the assessee was able to say that the amount to be

paid exceeded the written down value. If the amount had been less than the written

down value the assessee could then have said that he was entitled to a deduction

under Section 32 (1) (iii) of the Act.

( 24 ) IF we view the acquisition of the Undertaking by the Government of Punjab as

a sale the rights and obligations of the buyer and the seller have to be ascertained

by reference to Sections 54 and 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A sale is

defined in Section 54 as "a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or

promised or part-paid and part-promised". A sale, therefore, requires a price which

may be paid or promised or part-paid or part-promised. The parties in the present

case were never ad idem about the price till the compromise between the parties.

The provision of law by which the Government of Punjab acquired the Undertaking

was somewhat different from the ordinary law contained in the Transfer of Property

Act, and hence it came about that the Government took possession of the

Undertaking even before any price was settled. It may be that his taking over of

possession vested the Undertaking in the Government without a price being settled,

but it is impossible to say that the sale as contemplated by the Transfer of Property

Act took place without the price being settled. The transaction only becomes such a

sale when the price has been settled. It was only after this price had been settled

that the same became due to the assessee. Hence, it can properly be said on this

reasoning that the price became due to the assessee after the compromise and

hence the amount in question was to be assesed to tax in the assessment year

1963-64.

( 25 ) IN view of the aforementioned conclusions the answer to the question under

consideration as aforementioned is, that the amount became due in the previous

year corresponding to the assessment year 1963-64 and hence the answer to this

question would be in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. Respondents will

have their costs. Counsels fee Rs. 250. 00.

Advocate List
Bench
  • HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.N. ANDLEY
  • HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D.K. KAPUR
Eq Citations
  • [1972] 86 ITR 501 (DEL)
  • (1972) ILR 2 DELHI 569
  • LQ/DelHC/1972/123
Head Note

TAXATION — Income from sale of capital assets — Excess amount received over written down value — Taxability of — When does price become due — Computation of income — When amount received is more than written down value — Excess amount received over written down value, when chargeable to tax — Income Tax Act, 1961, S. 41 (2).