DALIP K. KAPUR, J.
( 1 ) THE question which we are called upon to answer in the reference has been
framed by the Tribunal in the following terms:-"whether, on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, the sale of Electrical Undertaking to the Punjab
Government falls in the assessment year 1955-56 when the Undertaking was taken
over by the Punjab Government by virtue of an option which was exercised in terms
of the licence or whether it falls in the assessment year 1963-64 when the balance
of the sale price was received by the assessee "
( 2 ) THE Panipat Electric Supply Co. Ltd. , which is the assessee in this case,
obtained a licence to generate and distribute electricity in Panipat on 20th July,
1934. The licence was for fifteen years but was renewed for a period of five years.
In terms of clause 9 of the licence the Government of Punjab had an option to
purchase the Electrical Undertaking belonging to the assessee at the expiry of the
period of the licence under the provisions of Section 7 (1) of the Indian Electricity
Act, 1910 on giving the requisite notice. Such a notice was given on 4th July, 1952,
and the Government took possession of the Undertaking on the midnight of 16th
July, 1954. The assessee-company being aggrieved filed a suit for the recovery of
Rs. 13,88,371. 25. This suit was eventually compromised and the assessee agreed
to accept a sum of Rs. 2,50,000. 00 in full and final settlement of its claim against
the Government. One of the terms of the compromise was that the Punjab State
Electricity Board would pay a sum of Rs. 1,35,033. 00 to the Punjab State
Government in addition to the amount of Rs. 2,50,000. 00, on behalf of the
assessee-company on account of the balance of the loan advanced by the
Government to the assesee, which was outstanding on the date of the take-over.
This compromise was effected on 7th April, 1962. At the time of making the
assessment for the assessment year 1963-64, the Income Tax Officer added a sum
of Rs. 1,81,772. 00 as profit under Section 41 (2) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, as
representing the difference between the sale price of the assets of the assessee and
the depreciated value of the said assets.
( 3 ) THE assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who rejected
the appeal. A further appeal was taken to the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal which
partly succeeded. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the assets which were
taken over by the Government included stores of the value of Rs. 24,000. 00 which
had not been subjected to depreciation and the assessee was also entitled to get a
deduction for the legal expenses incurred to get a better price for its assets. These
expenses were calculated to be Rs. 31,875. 00 and the Tribunal allowed this
deduction on the basis of the Supreme Courts decision in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.
v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, 63, 1. T. R. 207, (1 ). After allowing these
two deductions the Tribunal estimated the profit chargeable to tax under Section 41
(2) of the Act as being Rs. 1,25,892. 00. The assessee-company then sought a
reference to this Court which has been made by the Tribunal under Section 256 (1)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
( 4 ) IN deciding the appeal, the Tribunal found that although the assessee companys
assets were acquired by the Punjab Government in 1954, the sale could
not be said to have been completed till the sale price was finally fixed. The
assessees contention was that the sale took place on 16th July, 1954 when the
Government acquired the companys assets and hence the amount in question could
only have been taxed in the assessment year 1955-56. This was refuted by the
Departmental representative who claimed that litigation was going on and it was
only after the compromise in 1964 that the amount was ascertained and paid to the
company and, hence the amount in question was properly subjected to tax in this
assessment year. This latter argument was accepted by the Tribunal.
( 5 ) ON an examination of the question before us, it appears that the matter has
not to be decided on the basis of the date of the sale as that is not the real question
involved in this case, but on a determination of the previous year in which the
amount in question has to be included for the purpose of taxation. Even if the sale
took place in 1954 and the amount in question was received in 1963 the question
still would be whether the receipt in question was to be subjected to tax in the
previous year relating to the date of sale or the date of receipt. When this position
was put to counsel for the parties, they agreed that the real controversy in this case
was, as to whether the amount in question could be charged to tax in the previous
year relating to the assessment year 1963-64 and not as to whether the sale took
place in 1954. The difference between the two propositions becomes more obvious
by reference to Section 41 (2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The said sub-sec- tion
reads as here under:-"where any building, machinery, plant or furniture which is
owned by the assessee and which was or has been used for the purposes of
business or profession is sold, discarded, demolished or destroyed and the moneys
payable in respect of such building, machinery, plant or furniture, as the case may
be, together with the amount of scrap value, if any, exceed the written down value,
so much of the excess as does not exceed the difference between the actual cost
and the written down value, shall be chargeable to income-tax as income of the
business or profession of the previous year in which the moneys payable for the
building, machinery, plant or furniture became due. Provided that where the building
sold, discarded, demolished or destroyed is a building to which Explanation 5 to
Section 43 applies, and the moneys payable in respect of such building, together
with the amount of scrap value, if any, exceed the actual cost as determined under
that Explanation, so much of the excess as does not exceed the difference between
the actual cost so determined and the written down value shall be chargeable to
income-tax as income of the business or profession of such previous year.
Explanation.-Where the moneys payable in respect of the building, machinery plant
or furniture REFERRED TO to in this sub-section become due in the previous year in
which the business or profession for the purpose of which the building, machinery,
plant or furniture was being used is no longer inexistence, the provisions of this
subsection shall apply as if the business or profession is in existence in that previous
year. "
( 6 ) IT will be seen from this provision that the amount in question is not to be
charged to tax according to the date of the sale of the assets nor in accordance with
the date of the receipt of the consideration, but on the basis of the date when the
consideration became due. This terminology has led to some interesting arguments
before us. Before I proceed to deal with the contentions advanced on behalf of the
parties, I may say that the parties have agreed that the question REFERRED TO
should be reframed in the following terms:-"whether on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case the Tribunal was right in law in treating the sum of Rs.
l,25,892. 00 as income chargeable to tax under Section 41 (2) of the Income Tax
Act, 1961 for the assessment year 1963-64 "under Section 10 (2) (vii) which was
the corresponding provision under the Act of 1922, it was provided as follows:"in
respect of any such building, machinery or plant which has been sold or discarded or
demolished or destroyed, the amount by which the written down value thereof
exceeds the amount for which the building, machinery or plant, as the case may be,
is actually sold or its scrap value: Provided that such amount is actually written off in
the books of the assessee: Provided further that where the amount for which any
such building, machinery or plant is sold, whether during the continuance of the
business or after the cessation thereof, exceeds the written down value, so much of
the excess as does not exceed the difference between the original cost and the
written down value shall be deemed to be profits of the previous year in which the
sale took place : Provided further that where any insurance, salvage or"
compensation moneys are received in respect of any such building, machinery or
plant which has been discarded or demolished or destroyed, and the amount of such
moneys does not exceed the written down value, the amount allowable under this
clause shall be the amount, if any, by which the difference between the written
down value and the scrap value exceeds the amount of such moneys: Provided
further that where any insurance, salvage or compensation moneys are received in
respect of any building, machinery or plant as aforesaid, and the amount of such
moneys exceeds the difference between the written down value and the scrap value
no amount shall be allowable under this clause and so much of the excess as does
not exceed the difference between the original cost and the written down value less
the scrap value shall be deemed to be profits of the previous year in which such
moneys were received: Provided further that for the purposes of this clause, the
original cost of a budding, the written down value of which is determined in
accordance with the first proviso to sub-section (5), shall be deemed to be the
written down value so determined as at the date of being brought into use for the
purposes of the business, profession or vocation,"
( 7 ) THE second proviso reproduced above shows that if building, machinery or
plant was sold and the price exceeded the written down value the difference (or part
of it) was to be taxed in the previous year in which the sale took place. An
application of this proviso if it was applicable, would mean that under the Act of
1922, the amount in question would have been taxed in the assessment year 1955-
56 if the sale took place on 16th July, 1954. However, order the fourth proviso it is
stated that if compensation is received in respect of such assets which exceeds the
written down value the amount shall be taxed in the year in which the moneys are
received. Assuming that this proviso "was applicable to the present case and was
still in force, this would make the amount in question taxable on the date of the
receipt of the amount It is note-worthy that in the Act of 1961 the words which
occurred in the second proviso just REFERRED TO to above relating to the point of
time at which, the amount in question has to be taxed is not the previous year in
which the sale took place, nor the previous year in which the money was received,
but the previous year in which the money became due. It is this difference of
terminology as regards the point of time at which the amount in question has to be
taxed which has led to the major controversy in this case.
( 8 ) MR. K. K. Jain, learned counsel for the assessee-company contends that the
right to obtain compensation accrued on the date of the sale. He has REFERRED TO
to the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 as it stood on the date when
possession of the Undertaking was taken by the Government of Punjab. He has
pointed out that there can be a dispute about the amount of the purchase price
payable for acquiring the Undertaking, which may be the subject-matter of
arbitration. According to him, this does not mean that the sale of the Undertaking
took place on the date on which the arbitration between the parties might settle the
price. Thus, it is submitted that in the present case the sale of the Undertaking
belonging to the assessee took place in July, 1954, and the later settlement of the
price which was the subject matter of litigation, did not alter the date of the sale. He
has also cited Fazilka Electric Supply Co. Ltd. V. Commissioner of Income-Tax,
(1962) 46,. T. R. 127 0, which is a decision of the Supreme court concerned with
the acquisition of a similar Undertaking on-23rd July, 1949. In that case an amount
of Rs. 77,000. 00 was estimated by the Income-tax Officer as being the amount
subject to tax under Section 10 (2) (vii) of the Act of 1922. It was held by the
Supreme Court that there was a sale within the meaning of the second proviso to
Section 10 (2) (vii ). On analysis of the facts of the case, it appears that in that case
the High Court found that the price had been fixed in accordance with the licence
and thus the compulsory acquisition under Section 7 (1) of the Indian Electricity Act,
1910 was a sale within the meaning of Section 10 (2) (vii ). It was held by the
Supreme Court as follows:--"on behalf of the appellant it has been contended,
somewhat faintly, that all the elements necessary to constitute a contract are not
present here. We are unable to agree. There was an undertaking on the part of the
applicant for the licence to sell the undertaking to the local authority or Government
upon certain terms set out in the licence, and the time at which the option was to be
exercised and the price which was to be paid for the property were specified. There
was consideration for the contract as the licence was granted on those terms.
Therefore, all the elements necessary for a contract were present, and the sale in
pursuance thereof was not a compulsory purchase or acquisition (See Sakalaguna
Nayudu V. Chinna Manaswami Nayakar A. 1. R. (1928) P. C. 174 ). (3 ).
( 9 ) WE are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court correctly answered the
question referred to it. There was a sale in the present case of the building,
machinery and plant within the meaning of clause (Vii) of section 10 (2) of the
Income-Tax Act. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to deal with a
somewhat larger question which was canvassed before us on behalf of the
respondent that Section 10 (2) (vii) of the Income-tax Act is attracted even to a
compulsory sale. Nor do we consider it necessary to examine the decisions bearing
upon the question whether compulsory transfer to and vesting of property in
Government, constitute a sale within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the
Indian or English statute. It is sufficient to point out that Calcutta Electric Supply
Corporation Ltd. V. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1951) 19,. T. R. 406 related to a
transaction by which Government acquired the plant etc. and it was held that such
acquisition could not be regarded as a sale within the meaning of section 10 (2) (vii)
of the Income-Tax Act".
( 10 ) IT is note-worthy that the said case was decided on the basis that on the
particular facts of that case the acquisition of the Undertaking was a sale. The
Supreme Court particularly left open the larger question whether Section 10 (2) (vii)
was attracted to a compulsory sale. At the end of the judgment, there is a reference
to the decision in the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. V. Commissioner of
Income-tax, (1951) 19,. T. R. 406 (4), wherein it was held that an acquisition like
the one in question was not a sale within the meaning of Section 10 (2) (vii) of the
Income-tax Act. It is difficult to come to the conclusion that the said judgment of
the Supreme Court is applicable to the present case. Thus, it cannot be held that the
second proviso to Section 10 (2) (vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 made the
acquisition in the present case taxable in the assessment year 1955-56.
( 11 ) THE next question that needs consideration is, as to whether the amount in
question is taxable in the assessment year 1963-64 as held by the Tribunal. This
depends on the meaning to be given to the words became due occurring at the end
of Section 41 (2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The rival contentions of the parties
on this point are that the counsel for the assessee contends that the amount
became due in July, 1954 though the exact liability was unascertained, on the date
of the acquisition by the Government of Punjab. On the other hand, counsel for the
Revenue contends that the amount cannot be said to have become due till the
amount was ascertained. He contends that it was only after the compromise in the
suit that the amount could be said to be due.
( 12 ) IN support of the contention that the amount became payable on the date of
the sale within the meaning of Secion 41 (2) of the Act, Mr. K. K. Jain has
REFERRED TO to. the decision of the Supreme Court in E. D. Sassoon and Company Ltd. and others, V. Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay, (1954) 26, 1. T. R. 27, (5), and relied on certain passages therein. He contends that the policy of the Act is to make income taxable when it is received, accrues or arises. These three are
distinctive terms. Lord Justice Frys judgment in Colquhoun V. . Brooks (1988 ). 21,
Q. B. D. 52 at p. 59 (6), cited in the Supreme Courts judgment has been REFERRED
TO to by him, which runs as under:-"in the first place, I would observe that the tax
is in respect of profits or gains arising or accruing. I cannot read those words as
meaning received by. If the enactment were limited to profits and gains received by
the person to be charged, that limitation would apply as much to all Her Majestys
subjects as to foreigners residing in this country. The result would be that no
income-tax would be payable upon profits which accrued but which were not
actually received, although profits might have been earned in the kingdom and
might have accrued in the kingdom. I think, therefore, that the words arising or
accruing are general words descriptive of a right to receive profits".
( 13 ) LATER on, the following passage occurs in the Supreme Courts judgment:-"it
is clear therefore that income may accrue to an assessee without the actual receipt
of the same. If the assessee acquires right to receive the income, the income can be
said to have accrued to him though it may be received later on its being
ascertained. The basic conception is that he must have acquired a right to receive
the income. There must be a debt owed to him by somebody. "
( 14 ) RELYING on these passages, Mr. Jain contends that as soon as the
Undertaking was acquired by the Government of Punjab, the assessee got a right to
get compensation for the same. This compensation did not necessarily have to be
ascertained on the date of the sale. Something was owed to the assessee as soon as
the property was taken over. Hence, the amount in question had accrued in the
sense mentioned above to the assessee on the date of the sale and hence could be
said to be payable and due on that date.
( 15 ) MR. Jain has also REFERRED TO to the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Gujarat V. Ashokbhai Chimanbhai, (1965) 56,. T. R.
42 O. In that case it was held -"in our judgment, income becomes taxable on the
footing of accrual only after the right of the taxpayer to the income accrues or
arises,and in the case of an agreement which makes profits receiveable at or on the
happening of the contingency, the fact that the profits are the result of transactions
spread over a period which covers a period preceding the happening of that
contingency would not make the receipt liable to be paid to persons other than
those who are entitled to receive it on the date on which it is actually received or
became receivable. "
( 16 ) THE judgment in E. D. Sassoon and Company Ltd. s case already REFERRED TO was also REFERRED TO to in this judgment, and it was pointed out that the test for ascertaining whether profits had accrued or arisen was whether the person who was entitled thereto had a right to claim such profits. Mr. Jain contends that in View of this decision of the Supreme Court, the right to get compensation for the
acquisition accrued to the assessee on the date of the sale and the computation of
the actual amount did not delay their liability of the amount to the date of
ascertainment. In other words, his contention is that the amount to be taxed under
Section 41 (2) of the Act accrued to the assessee on the date of the taking over of
the Undertaking on 16th July, 1954 and was always a liability of the Punjab
Government, inspite of the fact that the actual amount was not ascertained till the
compromise in April, 1962.
( 17 ) MR. Jain has also REFERRED TO to the judgment in The Commissioners of
Inland Revenue V. Newcastle Breweries, Ltd. 12, Tax Cases, 927 (8 ). In that case a
large stock of rum belonging to the assessee was taken possession by the Admiralty
acting under the Defence of the Realm Regulations and an amount of 10,315 was
offered by the Admiralty to the Company. The company lodged a claim for 18256
before the War Compensation Court which held that it was entitled to an additional
sum of 5,309, which was paid to the assessee by the Admiralty in January, 1922. It
was held that the amount in question had to be subjected to excess profit tax by an
additional assessment for the accounting year ending on 30th October, 1918. The
decision, therefore, was that though the amount in question was received in 1922
and credited into the accounts of the company in that year, it was asseassable in
the year 1918, in the year corresponding to the date when the sum was taken over.
The judgment of Rowlatt. which was eventually upheld up to the House of Lords
proceeded thus:-"the sums were not received in respect of goods which were to be
delivered-and so a price only became payable-after the year, but work was done in
the year and the remuneration for it was left open; something was paid on account,
but it was left open; perhaps it was going to be more, perhaps less, or perhaps it
was going to be the same, but it was left open. Therefore, those accounts could not
properly be closed in that year; there was not the material to close them. There was
only to be a payment on account, and some money might have to be paid back, or
something more might have to come. Under those circumstances I said you have "to
treat the account as kept open until that amount is fixed, and then the amount has
to be brought in. "
( 18 ) THE judgment proceeded on the basis that the amount which was eventually
received by the assessee in that case was an additional profit or an addition to the
price which had already been received. There was no doubt that the income in
question was the price of goods which had been compulsorily acquired. The goods
which were acquired were clearly the goods ordinarily offered for sale by the
Brewery. e. , rum. Hence, the price accruing from such a transaction must
necessarily be profits which accrued to the assessee on the date when the goods
were sold. At first sight there would be little to distinguish this decision from the
present case. However, there are two material differences. One is that the goods
which were acquired were not capital assets and, secondly some amount was
received at the time of sale, which was certainly not the final amount receivable by
the assessee. In this sense, the actual profit remained unascertained till the final
decision of the War Compensation Court in November, 1921, which led to the
payment of the balance of the price to the assessee in January, 1922.
( 19 ) MR. G. C. Sharma, learned counsel for the Revenue has submitted that
concepts relating to the ordinary income should not be applied in construing Section
41 (2) of the Act. He pointed out that this is a special provision which has as its
object the inclusion of certain sums which are not ordinarily income in the taxable
income of an assessee. When the capital assets of an assessee have been subjected
to depreciation over a number of years, an assessee enjoys the benefit of
deductions under the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act, viz. . Section 10 (2)
(vi) of the Act of 1922 and Section 32 of the Act of 1961. Having enjoyed this
benefit he is subjected to tax under Section 10 (2) (vii) or Section 41 of the two
Acts, if he eventually obtains more than the depreciated value of the assets at a
later date. On the other hand, he gets an additional benefit if the property is
disposed of at a price below the depreciated or written down value. The object of
Section 41 (2) is to bring to charge as deemed income, the additional value
received by the assessee when he disposes of the depreciated assets or the same
are demolished, discarded or destroyed. In construing such a provision, Mr. Sharma
contends that the terminology of the Section should properly be construed in the
light of the provisions allowing the deduction. He has for this purpose REFERRED TO
to Section 32 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. He first REFERRED TO to Section 32 (1)
(iii> which states that the depreciation to be allowed in the case of a building,
machinery, plant or furniture which is sold, discarded, demolished or destroyed, is
as follows :-"in the case of any building, machinery, plant or furniture which is sold,
discarded, demolished or destroyed in the previous year (other than the previous
year in which it is first brought into use), the amount by which the moneys payable
in respect of such building, machinery, plant of furniture, together with the amount
of scrap value, if any fall short of the written down value thereof:- Provided that
such deficiency is actually written off in the books of the assessee. Explanation.-For
the purposes of this clause,- 8-2 H. G. Delhi/72 (1) "moneys payable" in respect of
any building, machinery, plant or furniture includes- (a) any insurance, salvage or
compensation moneys payable in respect thereof; (b) where the building,
machinery, planter furniture is sold, the price for which it is sold, (2) "sold" included
a transfer by way of exchange or a compulsory acquisition under any law for the
time being in force:"
( 20 ) IN the Explanation to this proviso, it is provided that "moneys payable" means
in the case of a building, machinery, etc. , the price for which it is sold and "sold"
includes a transfer by compulsory acquisition. His contention is that if the assets
now in controversy had been sold for a value less than the written down value then
the assessee would have been entitled to a further deduction under Section 32 (1)
(iii) but the same could not be determined till the amount in question was actually
ascertained. It, therefore, follows that if the amount received exceeds the written
down value, the excess in question cannot be said to be money payable to the
assessee before it is ascertained.
( 21 ) IT seems that Mr. Sharmas contention is well-founded. When the Section now
in question,. e. . Section 41 (2) is analysed it merely states that when a building,
machinery, plant is sold and the price received for the same is more than its written
down value, the excess becomes chargeable to income-tax. In case this excess
exceeds the difference between the actual cost and the written down value that part
of the excess has to be disregarded, but the remaining excess has to be charged as
income pertaining to the previous year in which the money payable. e. , price,
became due. The words that need to be construed here are: became due. The
question to be asked is: When did the price become due On applying Mr. Jains
contention based on the parallel of accrued income, the price became due when the
property was taken over by the Government. According to Mr. Sharma, the price
cannot become due till it becomes ascertained.
( 22 ) IN applying a provision like the present, we have to make a reasonable
construction based on the practical method by which the assessee can claim a
deduction. If the property is compulsorily acquired for less than its written down
value, the asgessee has to get a deduction under Section 32 (1) (iii) of the Act. If
the price exceeds the written down value the assessee has to be taxed on the
excess, or, at least that part of the excess which does not exceed the difference
between the actual cost and the written down value. There must be some point of
time at which the assessee can say that the amount is now payable. He cannot say
that the amount is payable on the date of the sale in the present case, because he
does not know what the amount is. He cannot say that there is an excess or a
deficit. He cannot, therefore, make an entry in his books of account showing the
amount. Similarly, if he wishes to make a deduction under Section 31 (1) (iii) he
cannot claim any deduction merely on the ground that the price may be less than
the written down value. He does not know whether to ask for a deduction or
whether he is liable to tax till the amount is actually ascertained. An amount can be
said to be payable when a definite amount is ascertainable as being due. In the
instant case, the suit filed by the company claimed an amount of over 13 lakhs but
the final payment received after the compromise was much less. No amount could
be said to be due till it had become ascertained. This seems to be the only
reasonable construction that can be made on the words becam due occuring in the
provision we are called upon to construe.
( 23 ) THUS, the amount that was due to the assessee remained incohate and unknown, till it was actually ascertained as a result of the compromise between the
parties. As soon as it was deter mined it became payable and, therefore, due. When
the amount was ascertained the assessee was able to say that the amount to be
paid exceeded the written down value. If the amount had been less than the written
down value the assessee could then have said that he was entitled to a deduction
under Section 32 (1) (iii) of the Act.
( 24 ) IF we view the acquisition of the Undertaking by the Government of Punjab as
a sale the rights and obligations of the buyer and the seller have to be ascertained
by reference to Sections 54 and 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A sale is
defined in Section 54 as "a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or
promised or part-paid and part-promised". A sale, therefore, requires a price which
may be paid or promised or part-paid or part-promised. The parties in the present
case were never ad idem about the price till the compromise between the parties.
The provision of law by which the Government of Punjab acquired the Undertaking
was somewhat different from the ordinary law contained in the Transfer of Property
Act, and hence it came about that the Government took possession of the
Undertaking even before any price was settled. It may be that his taking over of
possession vested the Undertaking in the Government without a price being settled,
but it is impossible to say that the sale as contemplated by the Transfer of Property
Act took place without the price being settled. The transaction only becomes such a
sale when the price has been settled. It was only after this price had been settled
that the same became due to the assessee. Hence, it can properly be said on this
reasoning that the price became due to the assessee after the compromise and
hence the amount in question was to be assesed to tax in the assessment year
1963-64.
( 25 ) IN view of the aforementioned conclusions the answer to the question under
consideration as aforementioned is, that the amount became due in the previous
year corresponding to the assessment year 1963-64 and hence the answer to this
question would be in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. Respondents will
have their costs. Counsels fee Rs. 250. 00.