Sankaran, J.

1. The revision petitioner/landlord leased out the petition schedule building on 1.3.1984 to the respondent, the Idukki district Wholesale Co-operative Consumer Stores Ltd., on a monthly rent of Rs.750/-. The building was taken by the tenant for the specific purpose of conducting a provision store under the name and style Priya Department Stores at Thodupuzha. The landlord alleged that rent was kept in arrears and that the tenant ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of three years since December 1991. Without any reasonable cause. It was contended that the building was not even opened by the tenant for any purpose and that it was not occupied by the tenant. The landlord also stated in the Rent Control Petition that the respondent Society ran into huge loss and that it was incapable of revival. On these allegations the Rent Control Petition was filed under Section 11(2) (b) and Section 11(4) (v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.

2. We are not concerned with the ground under Section 11(2) (b) in this revision since that ground was not pressed by the landlord at the time of hearing of the Rent Control Petition. The tenant contended in the counter statement that for a short period, the respondent was forced to stop running of the shop due to the strike of its employees. But the respondent has never ceased to occupy the premises. The shop room was being opened almost on all days. Due to financial problems, the respondent could not procure more stock. The respondent availed a loan of Rs.16.82 lakhs from the Government for the purpose of revitalizing the business carried on in the petition schedule building. Labour dispute was commenced in October 1991 and it ended on 19.3.1992. The shop was functioning thereafter and at the time of filing of the Rent Control Petition as well.

3. The Rent Control Court considered the evidence of PWs.1 to 3, RWs.1 and 2 and the documentary evidence consisting of Ext.A1 and B1 to B16 and held that the tenant ceased to occupy the building for the statutory period of six months under Section 11(4) (v) of the. It was also held that cessation of occupation was without any reasonable cause. On appeal by the tenant, the Appellate Authority reversed the order of the Rent Control Court and held that the landlord failed to establish the ground under Section 11(4) (v) of the.

4. It has come out in evidence that the respondent Society was running five branches in respect of its business under the Thodupuzha region. All except the one carried on in the petition schedule building were closed down. The employees of the respondent Society conducted a work-to-rule strike for the period from 5.8.1991 to 6.10.1991. Later from 7.10.1991 onwards there was a full-fledged strike by the employees and the dispute between the employees and the management were settled as per the settlement dated 19.3.1992, arrived at as per the mediation by the Honourable Minister for Co-operation and also the local Member of Legislative Assembly. Ext.B8 would prove that salary was paid to the employees from September, 1991 to August 1993. The muster roll for the years 1991 to August, 1993 was produced by the tenant and it was marked as Ext.B7. Exts.B9 to B14 are the statements regarding verification of stock. Ext.B15 is the daily sales statement from 1.1.1991 to 31.3.1992. The documentary evidence would disclose that the Officials from the Department concerned were periodically inspecting the premises and checking the stock and accounts. The evidence of RW2 would disclose that the staff were directed to be present on all days. It has also come out in evidence that the business of the respondent Society was running in loss from its inception and attempts were made to revive the business. Exts. B5 and B6, the Government Order and the order issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies respectively, would show that efforts were made by the respondent tenant to get a loan sanctioned from the Government. A sum of Rs.16.82 lakhs was sanctioned as loan for revitalization of the business and for payment of salary and benefits to the staff.

5. Section 11(4) (v) of thereads as follows:

"11. Eviction of tenants:

(4) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building,

-(v) if the tenant ceases to occupy the building continuously for six months without reasonable cause."

In order to pass an order of eviction under Section 11(4) (v), two ingredients are to be satisfied: (1) The tenant ceased to occupy the building continuously for six months; and (2) that such cessation of occupation was without reasonable cause. Justice K.T. Thomas (as His Lordship then was) in Abbas v. Sankaran Namboodiri (1993 (1) KLT 76) considered the scope of the expression occupation in Section 11(4) (v) of the. It was held therein as follows:

"Section 11(4) (v) of theuses the expression ceases to occupy the building". The word Occupation has not been defined in the though such word had been employed in other places of the also, e.g. Section 11(3) of thecontains the word occupation in relation to the ground of bona fide need of the landlord. S.11 (2) of the says that when a landlord obtained possession of the building pursuant to an order under sub-section (3) does not occupy it without reasonable cause... This would indicate that in the context possession is not precisely the same as occupation. Even if one is in possession of a place or a building, he need not necessarily occupy the same. Of course, occupation includes possession as a primary ingredient, for, there can be no occupation without possession. Supreme Court observed in R.P. Mehta v. I.A. Sheth (AIR 1964 S.C. 1676) that it is obvious that one cannot occupy unless one is able to possess. But, possession must combine with something more to make it occupation. Legal possession does not by itself constitute occupation."

6. In Ananthasubramania Iyer v. Sarada Amma (1978 KLT 338), after considering the scope of Section 11(4) (v) it was held as follows:

"S.11 (4) (v) of the Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 enables a landlord to evict a tenant if the tenant ceases to occupy the building continuously for six months without reasonable cause. Under this provision the tenant removing his physical presence from the building during intermittent periods less than six months in duration will not rouse the presumption of his occupation of the building and the provision, thus recognizes the fact that law does not expect that the tenant should be under the roof of his rented building all the 24 hours of the day and all the 365 days in the year. However, his physical absence there from continuously for six months will arouse the presumption that he has ceased to occupy the building and that he has abandoned it. Once this presumption arises the onus is on the tenant to dislodge the same by establishing his de facto intention to possess it for the purposes for which it is let to him and also, facts constituting outward expression of the intention of possession in fact, (for what maters so far as statutory tenancy is concerned is, in the words of Asquith L.J. in the Brown case, possession in fact and not possession in law) so that despite the physical absence of the tenant from the building continuously for six months or more, the Court is satisfied that he is occupying the building by retaining possession in fact thereof. This I suppose is the sense in which the expression: without reasonable cause. is used in S.11 (4) (v) of the. The burden of proving reasonable cause for non-occupation of the building continuously for six months is on the tenant, and reasonable cause would only be such cause as would enable the court to come to the conclusion that the tenant has not abandoned the premises and that he still retains de facto possession of the same though he is not physically present thereon."

7. In Ram Dass Vs. Davinder ((2004) 3 SCC 684 [LQ/SC/2004/428] ), the Supreme Court held while dealing with a case under section 13 (2) (v) of the Harayana Urban (control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, as follows:

"The availability of a reasonable cause for ceasing to occupy the premises would obviously be within the knowledge and, at times, within the exclusive knowledge of the tenant. Once the premises have been shown by evidence to be not in occupation of the tenant, the pleading of the landlord that such non-user is without reasonable cause has the effect of putting the tenant on notice to plead and prove the availability of reasonable cause for ceasing to occupy the tenancy premises."

8. In Santha Kumar Vs. Karthiyani (2004 (2) KLT 619 [LQ/KerHC/2004/203] ), this court held that inters dispute between the legal heirs of the original tenant is not a reasonable cause for non-user of the tenanted premises continuously for six months and that it could not be termed as a reasonable cause within the meaning of section 11 (4) (v) of the.

9. In Rajagopalan vs. Gopalan (2004 (1) KLT Short Notes Case No.70 at page 54), this court held that occupation in the context of section 11 (4) means only physical occupation. When it pertains to a residential building, it means occupation by residence and when it pertains to a commercial building, it means occupation by conduct of business. It was held that if it is seen that no business is being carried on in the premises and that the premises are remaining closed, there will be justification to presume that there has been cessation of occupation".

10. In Mathai Antony Vs. Abraham (2004 (3) KLT 169 [LQ/KerHC/2004/395] ), this court held:

"The word occupy" occurring in S.11 (4) (v) has got different meaning in different context. The meaning of the word occupy in the context of S.11 (4) (v) has to be understood in the light of the object and purpose of the Rent Control Act in mind. The rent control legislation is intended to give protection to the tenant, so that there will not be interference with the user of the tenanted premises during the currency of the tenancy. Landlord cannot disturb the possession and enjoyment of the tenanted premises. Legislature has guardedly used the expression occupy in S.11 (4) (V) instead of possession. Occupy in certain context actual enjoyment. Occupation includes possession as its primary element, and also includes enjoyment. The word occupy sometime indicates legal possession in the technical sense; at other times mere physical presence. We have to examine the question whether mere physical possession would satisfy the word occupy within the meaning of S.11 (4) (v) of the. In our view mere physical possession of premises would not satisfy the meaning of occupation under S.11 (4) (v). The word possession means holding of such possession, animus possidendi, means, the intention to exclude other persons. The word occupy has to be given a meaning so as to hold that the tenant is actually using the premises and not mere physical presence or possession..

11. In Cherian Vs. Jose (1980 KLT 661), this court considered the case where lease was granted for the specific purpose of conducting a Wine Store. The licence issued in favour of the tenant for conducting Wine Store expired on 1.4.1970. Due to the change in the policy of the Government, licence was not issued for about two years. The tenant took steps for starting a stationery business in the same building. But, before he could start the business, he died. His legal representatives took steps for furnishing the building and making alterations for conducting the business. This court held in that context that the non-occupation, if any, of the building by the tenant during the interval was not without reasonable cause. This court took note of the intention of the tenant and held:

"Evidently, this would indicate that the tenant had no intention of not using the building."

12. In Kurian Thomas Vs. Sreedharan Menon (2004 (3) KLT 326 [LQ/KerHC/2004/406] ), this court held:

"10. We are of the view Rent Control Court and appellate Authority have committed a grave error in taking the view that only if there is abandonment it could be said that there would be cessation of occupation. Rent Control Court and Appellate Authority used words which are not in the statute. Statute has not used the word abandonment. The word abandon means to give up to desert etc. tenant need not abandon the building so as to attract S.11 (4) (v) of the. Landlord is also not expected to establish that tenant has abandoned the building so as to attract S.11 (4) (v). Once landlord could establish that tenant has ceased to occupy the premises continuously for six months prior to the filing of the petition he is entitled to get order of eviction under that section. The word occupation must be understood to be not mere physical possession. Tenant should use the building. The word occupy means to cohabit with, to hold or have in possession. Tenanted premises must be in the state of being enjoyed and occupied. The word occupy used by the statute would show that tenanted premises be put to use. Tenant cannot be heard to contend that he is having physical possession of the premises though not in occupation"

13. In Achut Pandurang Kulkarni Vs. Sadashiv Ganesh Phulamburikar (AIR 1973 Bombay 210), the Bombay High Court held, while dealing with reasonable cause for non-user of the premises, thus:

"I do not propose to lay down that in every case where a Government servant is transferred and he goes on paying rent in respect of the premises, he had reasonable cause for not using the premises for the purpose for which they were let. The question will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The tenant must couple and clothe his inward intention to return, with some formal, outward and visible sign of it, as for instance by installing some caretaker or representative, be it a relative or not with the status of a licensee and with the function of preserving the premises for his own ultimate home-coming. It may also be that the same result can be secured by leaving on the premises, as a deliberate symbol of continued occupation, furniture. As stated by Asquith L.J., in Brown Vs. Brash and Ambrose, ((1948) 2 KB 247), the tenant must prove not only animus possidendi but a corpus possessionis".

This decision of the Bombay High Court was followed by this court in Karnarakutty Kurup Vs. Vivekanandan (1980 KLT 963).

14. Blacks Law Dictionary defines the word reasonable as follows:

"Reasonable. Fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the circumstances. Fit and appropriate to the end in view. Having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by reason; under the influence of reason; agreeable to reason. Thinking, speaking, or acting according to the dictates of reason. Not immoderate or excessive, being synonymous with rational, honest, equitable, fair, suitable, moderate, tolerable. Cass Vs. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R.208, 61 S.W.2d 500."

In the law lexicon (by P. Ramantha Aiyar - Reprint Edition) at page 1081, the word reasonable is defined as follows:

"Reasonable. It would be hard to give an exact definition of the word Reasonable. Reason varies in its conclusion according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic, sounds now like the jingling of a childs toy. But mankind must be satisfied with the reasonableness within reach and in cases not covered by authority, the verdict of a jury (or the decision of a judge) usually determines what is reasonable in each particular case; but frequently reasonableness belong to the knowledge of the law, and therefore to be decided by the courts".

It is also stated therein that an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word reasonable is trying to count what is not number, and measure what is not space".

15. The question whether the tenant ceases to occupy the building continuously for six months is primarily a question of fact to be determined with reference to the facts available in each case. The scope of occupation of the building depends on the purpose for which the building is let and the purpose for which it is used. The nature of the business and the requirement of the physical presence or otherwise of the tenant in the building for the conduct of the business is a relevant fact. No straight jacket formula can be evolved in the matter of proof of cessation of occupation within the meaning of Section 11 (4) (v) of the. The intention of the tenant, though not conclusive as such has also relevance in determining whether there was actual cessation of occupation within the meaning of Section 11 (4) (v). When it is proved by the landlord that the tenant ceased to occupy the building continuously for six months, the burden of proving that there was reasonable cause for such cessation is on the tenant. Reasonable cause is also a question of fact to be decided in the light of the facts proved in the case. No rigid formula can be evolved for proof of reasonable cause. The facts and circumstances of the case, the particular facts with reference to the business activities of the tenant, the nature of the business, the magnitude of the business, the circumstance which led to the cessation of occupation are all relevant in considering whether there was reasonable cause. If the cessation of occupation was due to circumstances beyond the control of the tenant, certainly the courts would be inclined to accept the case of the tenant that cessation occupation was not without reasonable cause. Financial constraint of the tenant by itself may not be a sufficient reason to hold that there was reasonable cause. But that is not completely irrelevant in considering the question. Whether the tenant is an individual or an organization controlled by the Government or a co-operative society may also be relevant in considering the question of reasonable cause. If there is a plausible explanation to the question why the business was not run in the premises continuously, it may well be a relevant fact in considering whether there was reasonable cause for cessation of occupation under section 11 (4) (v), depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the given set of facts and circumstances, if it can be concluded that an ordinary prudent man would act in the manner in which the tenant did, it can be safely said that the cessation of occupation was with reasonable cause.

16. The Appellate Authority on the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record held that there was only temporary stopping of the business and that it occurred only due to reasons beyond the control of the tenant. The Appellate Authority also noticed that the tenant could not as usual run the business due to insufficiency of funds, delay in procedural formalities to get released the funds from the Government and due to the strike of the employees. It was held by the Appellate Authority that such cessation of business cannot be interpreted as cessation of occupation under section 11 (4) (v) of the. The finding rendered by the Appellate Authority is a finding of fact and no grounds are made out for interference under section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Copies of pleadings, documents and depositions of witnesses were made available to us by the counsel for the parties and we have carefully perused them. We are convinced that the evidence adduced in the case would amply prove that the explanation offered by the tenant for not conducting the business in a full-fledged manner is plausible and acceptable. We are of the view that a conclusion different from that arrived at by the Appellate Authority would not be justified.

We, therefore, confirm the judgment of the Appellate Authority and dismiss the Civil Revision Petition.