R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.

Heard the learned advocate for the petitioners and the learned A.P.P. Perused the records.

2.Complaining about failure on the part of the respondents to protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, in relation to the son of the petitioner no.1, namely Suresh, the petitioners seek direction for investigation through Central Bureau of Investigation regarding the whereabouts of her son Suresh, as well as for grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/- to the petitioner no.1.

3.It is the case of the petitioners that the petitioner no.1 is a widow and Suresh was her eldest son amongst four children, viz. two sons and two daughters. Said Suresh was a student of Vikas Vidyalaya, Shankarapur. While he was in 12th standard, on the basis of a false complaint lodged by Smt. Mamta Dilip Dange, the Police Out Post at Shankarapur arrested Suresh in exercise of powers under Sections 151(1), 107 and 116(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for taking punitive action. He was produced before Naib Tahsildar of Chimur, district Chandrapur and was ordered to be detained in custody in Central Jail, Chandrapur, on 29.9.93. With the help of petitioner no.2 who is a neighbour of the petitioner no.1, she was able to secure order for release of Suresh from custody on 2.3.94. However, when the petitioner approached the Jail Authorities with the release order, they were informed that Suresh was not in jail on the said day. In spite of all efforts on the part of the petitioners, they were unable to find trace of Suresh and, therefore, the petitioners made various representations to the various authorities including National Human Rights Commission but without any fruitful result. Hence the petitioners are compelled to approach this Court for necessary redress in writ jurisdiction.

4.On issuance of a notice to the respondents, an affidavit-in-reply on behalf of the respondent no.3 came to be filed, disclosing that Prisoner No.3675 namely Suresh Bhaurao Gaikwad came to be admitted in the Central Prison Chandrapur on 29.9.93 in view of the order passed by the Executive Magistrate Chimur, district Chandrapur, under Sections 151(1), 107 and 116(3) of Cr.P.C. and his name came to be entered in the Register No.11 (Gate Register) at page 23. As per the said order dated 29.9.93, Suresh was ordered to be confined in the jail for a specified term i.e. from 29.9.93 to 4.10.93 and his name came to be entered in the register no.2 i.e. the register meant for convicted prisoners along with all necessary information recorded in Column Nos.1 to 27. Copies of register No.11 as well as of register No.2 with relevant entries have already been placed on the record along with the said affidavit. It is further disclosed that Prisoner Suresh was released on 4.10.93 and necessary entry relating to his release has been entered in the register No.4 i.e. release diary maintained as per the provision of Maharashtra Accounts Manual. It is the case of the respondent no.3 that Suresh was released on completion of period of confinement for which he was ordered to be detained. It is their further case that his release is also reflected at page 10 of register no.11 i.e. the Gate Register for 4th October, 93, the entry having been made at 12.20 hours. It has been further disclosed that the Chandrapur District Prison is a very small prison meant for accommodation of 153 prisoners though the average prisoners population has always been above 500 prisoners. The prison being meant mostly for undertrial prisoners, everyday 25 to 30 prisoners are admitted and almost same number of prisoners are released from the prison.

5.The statement of the respondent about release of Suresh on 4.10.93 is sought to be disputed on the basis of letter dated 18.3.94 by Executive Magistrate Chimur, addressed to the Superintendent of Chandrapur District Prison, Chandrapur, contending that the jail authorities could not have released Suresh on 4.10.93 without specific order in that regard by the Executive Magistrate on whose direction Suresh was detained in the custody.

6.Upon hearing the learned advocates for the parties and the perusal of the records, the following questions arise for determination.

i) What is the scope of powers of the Magistrate under Section 116(3) of Cr.P.C. in the matter of detention in custody of a person facing inquiry under Section 116(1) of the Code What is the maximum period for which such a person can be ordered to be so detained in the custody at a time and for a total period When can a person detained in custody under Section 116(3) of Cr.P.C. be released by jail authorities Whether the release of the petitioner no.1s son Suresh from such custody was lawful or not

ii) Whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity is available to the Government in India Whether the suit for compensation arising out of malicious act on the part of public officers or authority is governed by Articles 72 and 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963

iii) Whether the petition suffers from delay and laches

7.Chapter VIII of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 deals with the matters relating to the security for keeping the peace and for good behaviour. The object of the Chapter is the prevention and not the punishment for offences and the provisions thereunder are aimed at the persons who are danger to the public either by reason of commission of certain offences by them or because of likelihood of commission of wrongful act leading to breach of peace. The provisions of Section 106 thereunder apply when the conviction of a person for his past conduct leads to apprehension for the future whereas Section 107 Cr.P.C. applies where the Magistrate on information is of the opinion that unless prevented from so acting, a person is likely to act to the detriment of the public peace and tranquility. This is well settled and a clear decision on this aspect by the Apex Court is in the matter of Madhu Limaye vs. S.D.M. Mongyr reported in A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2486.

8.Indeed Section 107 apparently discloses that it is essentially preventive and not punitive provisions of law. It has been clearly held by the Apex Court in Ramnarain Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar reported in A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2225 that since the liberty of the citizen not guilty of an offence is affected, or sought to be curtailed, it is essential that the powers should be exercised strictly in accordance with law. The powers vested in the Executive Magistrate under Sections 107 to 110 of Cr.P.C. have to be exercised only in the case of serious nature and not in cases involving trivial quarrels and not to be used as vehicle for private vendetta, nor should be allowed to be exploited to settle the score in politics. The proceedings under Section 107 are not to be understood as regular trial of a case for commission of offence. It is always to be borne in mind that the initiation of proceedings under Section 107 is not on accusation of an offence having been committed but on account of the fact that the Magistrate being satisfied that there is sufficient ground for apprehension of breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquillity, either at the instance of such person or on account of probable wrongful act by him. Section 111 of Cr.P.C. clearly requires that the Magistrate acting under Section 107 of Cr.P.C. should pass an order in writing, setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force, and the number, character and class of sureties, if any, required. On issuance of such an order under Section 111 of Cr.P.C. the person to whom the said order is issued, either appears, or is brought before the Magistrate, then in terms of Section 116 of Cr.P.C., "the Magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary".

Sub-section (2) thereof provides that such inquiry shall be made, as nearly as may be practicable, in the manner prescribed for conducting trial and recording evidence in summons case. Sub-section (3) of Section 116 provides that after the commencement, and before the completion of the inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate, if he considers that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of a breach of the peace or disturbance of the public tranquillity or the commission of any offences or for the public safety, may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the person in respect of whom the order under section 111 has been made to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace or maintaining good behaviour until the conclusion of the inquiry, and may detain him in custody until such bond is executed or, in default of execution, until the inquiry is completed, provided that no person against whom proceedings are not being taken under Section 108, Section 109, or Section 110 shall be directed to execute a bond for maintaining good behaviour and the conditions of such bond, whether as to the amount thereof or as to the provisions of sureties or the number thereof or the pecuniary extent of their liability, shall not be more onerous than those specified in the order under Section 111. Sub-sections 4 and 5 are not relevant for the decision in the matter. Sub-section 6 provides that the inquiry under that section shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement, and if such inquiry is not so completed, the proceedings under the Chapter shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs, provided further that where any person has been kept in detention pending such inquiry, the proceeding against that person, unless terminated earlier, shall stand terminated on the expiry of a period of six months of such detention.

9.Perusal of the provisions of law contained in Section 116, therefore, would disclose that the Magistrate is empowered to direct a person in respect of whom an order under Section 111 has been made and an inquiry under Section 116(1) has commenced, to execute an interim bond, either with or without sureties, for assuring peace or maintenance of good behaviour, till the conclusion of such inquiry. It further empowers the Magistrate to detain such person in custody until such bond is executed. At the same time, such inquiry is necessarily to be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement, unless the Magistrate has special reasons to direct continuation of inquiry beyond such period and that such reasons are recorded in writing.

10.However, in case where the person against whom such inquiry is in progress and during such inquiry he is detained in custody, then such inquiry unless terminated earlier has to come to an end on expiry of the period of six months of such detention. In other words, though the first part of sub-section (6) empowers the Magistrate to continue with the inquiry even beyond the period of six months for the special reasons to be recorded in writing, such continuation of inquiry is not permissible, for whatever reason, in cases where the person against whom such inquiry had commenced is detained in custody during the pendency of inquiry, and the period of six months gets expired from the date of detention of such person.

11.Sub-section (3) specifically provides that power to order execution of interim bond can be exercised "after the commencement and before completion of inquiry under sub-section (1)". Obviously, therefore, question of exercise of powers under sub-section (3) of Section 116 of Cr.P.C. can arise only after commencement of inquiry under sub-section (1) of Section 116 of Cr.P.C. and not prior to the said stage. Our High Court in Dwarkanath Ramchandra vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1977 Cri.L.J. 120 has clearly held that the inquiry under sub-section (1) of Section 116 of Cr.P.C. must be deemed to have been commenced against a person against whom an order under Section 111 of Cr.P.C. has been passed on the very day his presence is secured on the date fixed by the Court. Being so, in case the person appears in answer to order under Section 111 or is summoned or brought under warrant issued in terms of Section 113 of Cr.P.C. before the Court and he is read over and if so desires the substance of the order under Section 111 is explained to him, the inquiry under Section 116 would stand commenced. Obviously, therefore, the period of six months is to be counted from such date. Undoubtedly as far as termination of inquiry on completion of six months of detention in terms of proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 116 of Cr.P.C. will be from the date of detention of such person in terms of order under sub-section (3) of Section 116 of Cr.P.C. This is apparent from the bare reading of sub-section (6) itself. While the main body of sub-section (6) refers to the period of six months from the date of its commencement, the proviso to sub-section (6) speaks of termination of inquiry on expiry of period of six months of such detention. It is also to be noted that the main body of sub-section (6) permits continuation of inquiry even beyond six months "for special reasons to be recorded in writing" by the Magistrate. However, no such power is given to the Magistrate under proviso to said sub-section. Apparently the Legislature in its wisdom has given some discretion to the Magistrate to extend the period of inquiry while the person against whom such inquiry is conducted is not in detention, no such discretion is given to the Magistrate in cases where the person against whom the inquiry is conducted is in detention during such inquiry. The limit of six months is the ultimate limit prescribed for detention of the person facing inquiry under Section 116 and failure to execute the interim bond and to give necessary sureties if required, whereas there is no such absolute mandate prescribed in other cases for conclusion of the inquiry within the specified period. The Magistrate in such other cases has been empowered to extend the period of inquiry for special reasons to be recorded in writing by him, provided that the person against whom the inquiry is conducted is not in detention.

12.It is also to be noted that an order for interim bond under sub-section (3) of Section 116 of Cr.P.C. is not a ritual to be performed on appearance of the person before the Magistrate pursuant to the order under Section 111 of Cr.P.C. Apart from commencement of inquiry under Section 116 thereof, it cannot be passed as a matter of course. Such an order besides satisfying the requirement of Sections 111 and 116(1) of the Cr.P.C. has to disclose that the Magistrate considers that immediate measures are necessary for prevention of breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquillity or commission of any offence or for public safety, for the reasons to be recorded in writing. Mere order under Section 111 of the Code cannot substitute the order under Section 116(3) of the Code. The Apex Court in Madhu Limayes case has clearly ruled that where the Magistrate makes no efforts to inquire into the truth of allegations and adjourns the case from day to day, he cannot ask for any interim bond and detain the person in custody in default thereof. Apparently order under sub-section (3) cannot be passed mechanically and without being satisfied by the Magistrate about the emergent need for action under the said provision, apart from the fact that the occasion for invoking powers under sub-section cannot arise without due compliance of the provisions of Section 111 and Section 116(1) of the Code. There must be occasion for exercise of such powers by the Magistrate and it should be disclosed from the reasons given by the Magistrate in the order passed under sub-section (3) itself.

13.The Orissa High Court in Budhu Ram and Ors. Vs. State of Orissa reported in 1982 Cri.L.J. 497 has held that before passing an interim order, the Magistrate must make some inquiry and satisfy himself about the prima facie truth of information and his order must show that he has applied the mind and has been satisfied about the prima facie case. We are in respectful agreement with the said decision of the Orissa High Court.

14.As already submitted above, there cannot be any dispute about the fact that on account of failure to execute the interim bond or to furnish required surety or sureties, the person against whom the inquiry has been commended, can be detained for a maximum period of six months unless the inquiry is concluded earlier. However, it cannot be forgotten that such a detention is not for commission of any offence nor it is by way of any punishment as such. At the same time it will be worthwhile to note the powers of the Criminal Courts to remand the accused to custody during the trial or its investigation. In that regard, provisions of Sections 57, 167 and 309 of Cr.P.C. are very relevant.

15.In terms of Section 57, a person arrested without warrant cannot be detained in custody for a longer period than under all the circumstances of the case is reasonable and such period shall not, in the absence of a special order of the Magistrate under Section 167 be allowed to exceed twenty-four hours exclusive of the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrates Court. Apparently the intention of Legislature is to get the accused produced before the Magistrate with as little delay as possible. The detention of a person in custody of Police is not only viewed with disfavour but the provisions of law indeed discourage the same, to a greatest extent and this is apparent from the provisions of law contained in Section 167 of Cr.P.C. Undoubtedly the main object of requiring the accused to be produced before the Magistrate under Section 167 is to enable the Magistrate to see that the remand is necessary as also to enable the accused to make any representation he desires to make to the Magistrate. What is further to be noted in Section 167 is sub-section (2) thereof. It provides that the Magistrate to whom the accused person is forwarded, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole. Proviso to sub-section (2) empowers the Magistrate to authorise the detention of the accused persons beyond the period of fifteen days, otherwise than in the custody of the Police, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate can authorise the detention of the accused persons in custody for total period exceeding ninety days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years and for sixty days where the investigation relates to any other offence. It further provides that on expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be, the accused shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. Apparently, maximum limit for detention of a person in custody is prescribed as 90 days in case of major offences which are punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for not less than ten years and in other cases to the maximum period of 60 days. There is further limit prescribed for detention of the accused in police custody the same being of 15 days.

16.Section 309 of Cr.P.C. which is attracted during the trial or the proceedings before the Court primarily speaks of the power of the Court to postpone or adjourn the proceeding and simultaneously regarding the powers of the Court to remand the accused to custody during such inquiry or trial. Sub-section (2) thereof provides that if the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone or adjourn any inquiry or trial, it may from time to time for the reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such term as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody. However, the first proviso to said sub-section clearly provides a limit in relation to the period for which the accused can be remanded to custody under the said provision of law and it speaks thus "provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time". Apparently, irrespective of the fact that the accused is already in custody, when the hearing of a case is postponed, the Magistrate is empowered to remand the accused to the maximum period of 15 days at a time.

17. Reference to the above provisions would give an answer to the queries sought to be raised as to the powers of the Executive Magistrate to the maximum period for which a person can be ordered to be detained at a time while allowing the detention for a total period of six months in terms of proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 116 of the Code. A person who is accused of commission of offence, and against whom either the investigation is pending or the trial is proceeded against and even if such person is already in custody, he cannot be remanded to the custody for a period more than fifteen days at a time. If it is so, a person who is neither convicted nor brought before the Court because of commission of any offence, but merely on apprehension of breach of peace at his instance, can he be ordered to be detained in custody continuously for a period of six months at a time Undoubtedly the maximum period of detention referred to for such person in sub-section (6) is six months but would it by itself empower the Magistrate to order the detention of such person continuously for six months Bearing in mind that the proceedings under Chapter VIII are merely for preventive proposes and not for punishment of offence and the purpose of detention of such person is not by way of punishment to him but only to avoid breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquillity, certainly by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the Magistrate exercising powers under Section 116(3) can order detention of such person for a period exceeding fifteen days at a time. The limit prescribed for conclusion of the inquiry commenced under Section 116 and that being also for six months, also lends support to the view that we are taking in the matter. The Legislature in its wisdom has said that the inquiry under Section 116(1) has to be concluded within the period of six months. Mere discretion given to the Magistrate to extend such period that itself would not empower the Magistrate to exercise such power and to extend such inquiry in each and every case. Invariably, therefore, the inquiry will have to be concluded in each and every case within six months and only in exceptional cases it can be extended for the reasons to be recorded in writing by the Magistrate. In no circumstances, detention can exceed six months. Being so, bearing in mind the necessity of expeditious disposal of inquiry and within specified period and further restriction for maximum period of detention, leaves no room for doubt that any given point of time, in case the inquiry is to be adjourned and the Magistrate wants to exercise the powers under sub-section (3) of Section 116, the detention of such a person can be ordered to the maximum period of 15 days at a time and not beyond the said period.

18. In the case in hand undoubtedly the Magistrate has directed detention of Suresh in custody on account of failure to execute the bond and to furnish the sureties. He was directed to be detained in custody upto 4.10.1993. Letter dated 8.3.1994 by the Superintendent of Chandrapur District Jail addressed to the Executive Magistrate Chimur, copy of which is placed on record by the petitioner, reveals that Suresh was admitted in the jail on 29.9.93 pursuant to the order of the same date issued by the Executive Magistrate directing the detention of the prisoner till 4.10.93. It is also pertinent to note that letter apparently discloses that the warrant under which Suresh was ordered to be detained nowhere required the jail authorities to produce Suresh again before the Executive Magistrate on expiry of the period of detention on 4.10.93 or any time prior to that or thereafter. In that regard it is sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioner that there was no specific order by the Executive Magistrate for release of Suresh form the jail and, therefore, merely because the warrant discloses direction to the jail authorities for detention of Suresh from 29.9.93 to 4.10.93 that itself was no justification for release of Suresh from jail on 4.10.93. However, it is to be noted that the jail authorities are not empowered to detain any person in custody unless there is a specific direction by the Court or the Magistrate to detain such person in custody. In fact the mandate of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India ensures the liberty to the citizens unless it is curtailed by due process of law. Being so, in the absence of specific order being passed by the competent authority empowered to curtail the liberty of the citizen by way of his or her detention in the prison, the jail authorities would not be entitled to detain any person in the custody. As the law stands, in fact the jail authorities cannot admit any person in the jail premises for detention unless there is specific direction to the jail authorities by the competent authority in that regard. Being so, when the warrant specifically specified that a detention of Suresh was for a specific period from 29.9.93 to 4.10.93, it was not permissible for the jail authorities to detain Suresh beyond the said period prescribed under the said warrant for his detention in the jail. At the same time in the absence of specific direction to the jail to produce such person before the Court or the competent authority either before or after expiry of the said period, there was no occasion for the jail authorities to insist for production of Suresh before the Executive Magistrate.

The law in that regard is well settled by the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Narayan Singh vs. State of Delhi and others reported in A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 277. The same is followed subsequently in the decision of Khatri and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 928 as well as in the matter of Raghavendra Singh vs. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in 1976 Cri.L.J. 1782. The detention in the prison in the absence of specific direction in that regard being illegal, no fault can be found with the jail authorities releasing Suresh on 4.10.93 as the warrant under which he was admitted to the jail authorised the jail authorities to detain Suresh till 4.10.93. In the circumstances, the letter of Executive Magistrate, Chimur, dated 18.3.1994 besides being without any basis, was thoroughly unwarranted and also does not give rise to any right to the petitioners to seek the relief claimed for. The contention of the petitioners that Suresh was illegally released from the custody on 4.10.93 is, therefore, without any substance and is to rejected.

19. As far as the availability or non-availability of defence of sovereign immunity to the Government as also applicability or non-applicability of Articles 72 and 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the suits for compensation arising out of malicious act on the part of public officer or authority, these questions are no more res integra and are well settled pursuant to the decision of the Apex Court in State of A.P. Vs. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy and others reported in (2000) 5 S.C.C. 712, the decision sought to be relied upon by the petitioners. Therein the respondent before the Apex Court apprehending danger to his life as well as that of his father had complained to the police and had requested for adequate police guards being deployed at the jail, but their requests were not heeded to and true to their apprehension, a bomb was thrown at them which caused the death of the respondents father and injuries to the respondents. In the process one of the three persons, who was sleeping near the jail, was also killed. The Police Sub Inspector was part of the conspiracy and it was for that reason that inspite of their requests, adequate security guards were not provided. Even the normal strength of the guards who should be on duty at night was not provided and only two constables, instead of nine, were put on duty. Since the Sub Inspector of Police himself was in the conspiracy, the act in not providing adequate security at the jail was not treated to be an act or omission in pursuance of a statutory duty, moreover the action was wholly held to be mala fide. The Apex Court, therefore, held that Articles 72 and 113 are applicable to different situations. These articles would be attracted to meet the situation where the public officer or public authority or, for that matter, a private person does an act under the power conferred or deemed to be conferred by an Act of the Legislature by which injury is caused to another person who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court to claim compensation for that act. Thus, where a public officer acting bona fide under or in pursuance of an Act of the Legislature commits a tort, the action complained of would be governed by the said article which, however, would not protect a public officer acting mala fide under colour of his office. The article, as worded, does not speak of "bona fide" or "mala fide" but it is obvious that the shorter period of limitation, provided by the article, cannot be claimed in respect of an act which was malicious in nature and which the public officer or authority could not have committed in the belief that the act was justifiable under any enactment. It was further ruled that the maxim that the king can do no wrong or that the Crown is not answerable in tort has no place in Indian jurisprudence where the power vests, not in the Crown, but in the people who elect their representatives to run the Government, which has to act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and would be answerable to the people for any violation thereof. The question regarding the applicability of doctrine of sovereign immunity and the applicability about the Articles 72 and 113 of the Limitation Act being fully answered by the Apex Court in the said decision, no more warrants further discussion by this Court in this case.

20. As regards the last point pertaining to the objection on the part of the respondent to the maintainability of the petition on the ground of delay and laches, it is apparent that Suresh was released from the custody on 4.10.93. It is also a matter of record that by order dated 2.3.94 the proceedings under Section 116 were ordered to be concluded and Suresh was ordered to be released if not required in any other matter, consequent to the execution of the bond. It is also a matter of record that the petitioners had approached the National Human Rights Commission making grievance in the matter. It appears that the complaint in that regard was made in February, 1998. Some representations also appeared to have been made by the petitioners to the Police Authorities and Home Minister in the year 2003. However, the petitioner no. 1 has not been able to place on record any material disclosing any grievance having been made by the petitioners about the disappearance of Suresh during the period from March 1994 to 1998 till the complaint to the Human Rights Commission as also thereafter till 2003 i.e. till the representation being made to the Police Authorities and the Home Minister. Silence on the part of the petitioners in making any efforts in that regard cannot be just ignored. It is neither the case nor could be one that there was any torture of Suresh while he was in custody nor there is any negligence on the part of the authorities while Suresh was in custody regarding security or safety to the person of Suresh. Record apparently discloses that Suresh was released on 4.10.93 from the District Jail at Chandrapur. It is not understood why the petitioners did not make any grievance about disappearance of Suresh from that day. It is also surprising that no such grievance was made even after March 1994 till 1998. In the circumstances, the respondents are justified in contending that there is no explanation for laches on the part of the petitioners in approaching the Court. The decision of the Apex Court in Challa Ramkrishna Reddys case is of no help to the petitioners to contend that in the absence of any period of limitation being applicable, the respondents are not entitled to claim absolute immunity in relation to the alleged malicious act on the part of the authorities. At the out set it must be pointed out that no malicious acts on the part of the respondents have been disclosed in the matter in hand. Besides this is not a suit but a writ petition. Undoubtedly provisions of Limitation Act may not strictly apply to such proceedings. However, in case of laches or delay in approaching the Court, it is necessary for the petitioners to explain the same to the satisfaction of the Court. The respondents are not claiming any immunity as such as regards their acts in the matter but the point raised is of absence of explanation for delay in approaching the Court. Considering the fact that there is absolutely no explanation tendered by the petitioners for delay in approaching the Court, certainly on that count also the petition is liable to be rejected.

21. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs.