S.P. Bharucha, J.

1. This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the Additional Judge, Rohtak, being the Designated Court under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short `T.A.D.A. Act, 1987) whereby the appellant was convicted of an offence punishable under Section 5 thereof and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 200 or, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months.

2. The appellant was apprehended by Sub-Inspector Rohtak Singh and Head Constable Ram Krishan near the Hilton factory on G.T. Road in the State of Haryana on 7th April, 1988 on suspicion. In the envelope of wax paper that the appellant was carrying was found a.12 bore country made pistol for which he had no licence or permit. After the necessary formalities, sanction was issued on 26th April, 1988 by the District Magistrate, Sonepat, for prosecuting the appellant for an offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. On 7th December, 1989, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sonepat, before whom the appellant was being prosecuted for the said offence, passed the following order :-

"Present A.P.P. for the State.

Accused on bail.

At this stage it has come to my notice that this case should have been tried by the learned Designated Court under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. Consequently this case is sent to learned Designated Court (Shri B.R. Gupta, learned Addl. Sessions Judge), Sonepat. Accused is directed to appear in that Court at 12.00 noon today itself. File completed in all respects be sent immediately.

Sd/-

J.M.I.C., Sonepat

Announced

7.12.1989."

3. The appellant was them tried by the said Additional Judge under Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987. The judgment under appeal noted that the appellant was charged on 18th December, 1989 by the said Additional Judge for the offence punishable under Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty. Upon the evidence led, the said Additional Judge found that the prosecution had brought home the offence to the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.

4. The appellant has in his grounds of appeal taken, inter alia, the plea that the prosecution itself had not considered the case against him to be a fit case to frame a charge and proceed under the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 and that it was, therefore, not proper that he should have been tried and convicted thereunder. In the counter filed by Khajan Singh, Sub-Inspector, Police Station, Rai, it is submitted in reply that the prosecution had considered this to be a fit case to frame a charge and proceed against the appellant under Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 and had requested the learned Magistrate to transfer the case to the Designated Court for trial.

5. It is not in dispute that the provisions of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 had been extended to cover the whole of the State of Haryana by a notification dated 18th November, 1987.

6. This Court in the judgment in the judgment in Jaloba v. State of Haryana, 1989 Supp(2) SCC 197 considered the submission that the Designated Court had no jurisdiction to try the appellant Jaloba because he had not been charged with having committed any offence under the T.A.D.A. Act, 1985. He had been charged under Section 25 of the Arms Act. This Court rejected the submission noting Sections 6 and 9 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1985 (equivalent to Sections 5 and 11 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987). Section 6 laid down that if in any area notified by the State Government under the T.A.D.A. Act, 1985, a person contravened any provision or rule made, inter alia, under the Arms Act, the he was liable to the enhanced punishment provide for in the Section. Section 9 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1985 laid down that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, every offence punishable under that Act or a rule made thereunder was triable only by the Designated Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. It, therefore, followed that though the offence committed by the appellant was in contravention of Section 25 of the Arms Act, it became exclusively triable by the Designated Court because of the notification made by the State Government and the operation of Section 6 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1985. It was, therefore, futile for the appellant to contend that the Designated Court did not have jurisdiction to try him for the offence for which he stood charged.

7. Upon the authority of the judgment in jalobas case (1989 Supp.(2) SCC 197) it must be held that the appellant before us was rightly tried by the Designated Court under the provisions of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987.

8. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that, in any event, the provisions of Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act did not apply to the appellant. These provisions applied where "any person is in possession of any arms ammunition specified in.......Category III(a) of Schedule I to the Arms Rules, 1962, unauthorisedly in a notified area". Category III(A) of Schedule I to the Arms Rules reads thus :-

"III Firearms other than those in categories I, II and IV, namely

Ammunition for fire-arms other than those in categories I, II and IV, namely.

(a) Revolvers and pistols

Ammunition for firearms of category III(a)"

9. It was pointed out that the appellant was found to be carrying a country-made pistol and submitted that a country-made pistol fell outside the ambit of the said Category III(a). That category speaks inbroad terms of "revolvers and pistols" and there is no reason to exclude a country-made revolver or pistol therefrom :

10. It was then argued, and, we think, with substance, that Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 applied only when a person was in possession of "arms and ammunition" and that the appellant, while he had been found in possession of a country-made pistol, had not been found in possession of any ammunition. We think that the words "arms and ammunition" in Section 5 should be read conjuctively. This is not merely a matter of correct grammar but also subserves the object of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987. A person in possession of the both a firearm and the ammunition therefor is capable of terrorist and disrutive but not one who has a firearm but not the ammunition for it or vice versa. It, therefore, our view that the provisions of Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 could not have been applied to the appellant.

11. This is not to say that the appellant should necessarily have been acquitted. Section 12 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 empowers the Designated Court to convict a person of any offence under any other law if he is found to have been guilty of the same during the course of a trial under that Act and to punish appropriately.

12. It was submitted that the evidence against the appellant did not establish that he was guilty of an offence under Section 25(IB)(a) of the Arms Act, namely, of having in his possession an unlicensed firearms. We have examined the evidence and found no reason to question the conclusion of the Designated Court that the appellant was so guilty. That the evidence relied upon was of two police officials does not ipso facto give rise to doubt about its credibility. There is nothing on record to show that these police officials were hostile to the appellant and their evidence was not shown in cross-examination. That the private party who was called as a witness by the prosecution did not support it does not, in the circumstances, lead to the conclusion that the appellant was innocent.

13. The appellant bein guilty of an offence under Section 25(IB)(a) of the Arms Act is punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to three years and he is also liable to fine. In the circumstances of the case, we think that the appellant must undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year and pay a fine of Rs. 200/-.

14. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms. The appellant has already paid the fine of Rs. 200/- and has served a part of the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him. He is presently on bail, now stands cancelled and the appellant shall surrender to serve the balance of the sentence of imprisonment.

15. Appeal allowed.