1. In this revision petition Mr. T.P. Mathai, learned counsel for the plaintiff petitioner, challenges the decree of the learned Additional Munsiff, Alleppey, dismissing his suit S.C.S. No. 320 of 1961 as having been instituted out of time. The learned Munsiff, in the view that she took that the suit was barred by limitation, did not go into the various other points in controversy between the parties.

2. It will be seen that the plaintiff originally instituted the suit in the Shertalai Munsiff s Court on 26-6-1961; and it is accepted that that was the last day on which the suit, on the basis of the transaction relied upon by the plaintiff, should have been instituted in any court so that it could be considered to have been filed within the period of limitation. Whether objection was taken or not, it is ultimately seen that an order was passed by the learned Principal Munsiff of Shertalai on 21st November 1961, directing the return of the plaint for presentation before the proper court. So far as the direction is concerned, there can be no controversy that it is well within the jurisdiction of the court, once it finds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in question. Then there is a further direction to the effect: "time for re-presentation, one month."

3. On the basis of the said order of the Principal Munsiff of Shertalai, there is again no controversy, that the plaintiff presented the plaint in question before the learned Additional Munsiff of Alleppey, only on 20th December 1961. No doubt, if the learned Munsiff of Shertalai, who passed the order on 21st November 1961 giving the plaintiff time for representation, namely one month, had jurisdiction to give that time, and by that order the plaintiff in law would have an extended period of limitation, then it can certainly be held that the presentation of the plaint before the Alleppey Court must be considered to have been within time. But objection was taken by the defendant that notwithstanding the direction given in the order of the learned Munsiff of Shertalai, giving one months time for re-presentation of the plaint, that order is absolutely one without jurisdiction and that the said court had no power to enlarge the period of limitation. On the other hand, objection appears to have been taken that the plaintiff, in order to save his plaint from the bar of limitation, should be able to satisfy the court that he has come within the time provided for in S.14(1) read with Explanation I of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.

4. The learned Munsiff, in the judgment which is under attack in this revision petition, is of the view that the learned Munsiff of Shertalai had no jurisdiction to give one months time, as he has purported to do, in his order dated 21st November 1961, and therefore, inasmuch as the suit itself has been filed in her court out of time, it will have to be dismissed as barred by limitation, even on the basis of the allegations contained in the plaint itself. Therefore, holding that the suit is barred by limitation, the learned Munsiff did not go into the other points arising for decision on merits. Ultimately the learned Munsiff has dismissed the suit, as barred by limitation.

5. Mr. Mathai, learned counsel for the petitioner, challenges the dismissal of the plaintiffs suit as having been barred by limitation by the learned Munsiff of Alleppey. According to the learned counsel, the Shertalai court has certainly got jurisdiction, having due regard to the provisions of S.14(1) read with Explanation I of the Indian Limitation Act, when once it is satisfied that the court where the suit has been instituted suffers from lack of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, and as such is unable to entertain it, to give a reasonable time to the plaintiff to represent the plaint in the proper court. The learned counsel further urged that his client has re-presented the plaint before the Alleppey court within the time allowed by the learned Munsiff of Shertalai in his order dated 21st November 1961.

6. In this connection, the learned counsel for the plaintiff petitioner placed considerable reliance upon a very early decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Nibaran Chandra v. S.C. Mukherjee (1910) 6

Indian Cases 637. If that decision still holds good and continues to be good law, then, if I may say so with respect, there can be no controversy that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, in this case, will have to be accepted, and the institution of the suit before the learned Munsiff of Alleppey must be held to be within time. But the correctness of that decision has been very strenuously challenged by Mr. P. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, learned counsel appearing for the defendant respondent in these proceedings.

7. No doubt, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Nibaran Chandra v. S.C. Mukherjee (1910)6 Indian Cases 637), having due regard to the provisions of S.14 of the Limitation Act, has come to the conclusion that it is open to a court, when it returns a plaint on the grounds mentioned in S.14 of the Act, to give a reasonable time to the plaintiff for the purpose of re-presentation of the plaint in the proper court. As to what will be the reasonable time the learned judges have held, is entirely a matter for the court which gives that direction to decide. If it is only a question as to whether the time given by the learned Munsiff of Shertalai, namely, one month, is reasonable or not I would have had considerable reluctance to interfere with such a discretion exercised by the court. But, the jurisdiction of the court itself to grant that time, is in serious controversy, as mentioned earlier, in these proceedings.

8. Mr. P. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, learned counsel for the defendant respondent, has drawn my attention to the observations of the Privy Council in the decision reported in Ramdutt v. E.D. Sassoon & Co., (AIR. 1929 PC. 103) at page 107, wherein Their Lordships have stated that "It is quite clear that where a suit has been instituted in a court which is found to have no jurisdiction and it is found necessary to raise a second suit in a court of proper jurisdiction, the second suit cannot be regarded as a continuation of the first, even though the subject-matter and the parties to the suits were identical". These observations were relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant respondent in support of his contention that the plaint filed before the learned Munsiff of Alleppey, must be considered to be institution of a suit for the first time, and inasmuch as the plaintiff has not been able to satisfy the court that the conditions prescribed in S.14(1) read with Explanation I of the Limitation Act are fulfilled the rejection of the suit, on the ground of its being barred by limitation, must be sustained by this court. The learned counsel also drew my attention to two later decisions of the Calcutta High Court, namely those reported in Haridas Roy v. Sarat Chandra Dey (1913) 18 Indian Cases 121) and Ganga v. Akhil (AIR. 1917 Calcutta 794). Both these decisions are again of the Calcutta High Court; and it will be particularly seen that in the decision reported in Haridas Roy v. Sarat Chandra Dey (1913) 18 Indian Cases 121), a Division Bench of the same High Court has adverted to its earlier decision reported in Nibaran Chandra v. S.C. Mukherjee (1910) 6 Indian Cases 637) relied upon before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned judges of the Calcutta High Court in the later decision expressly dissent from the earlier decision of the Court in Nibaran Chandra v. S.C. Mukherjee (1910) 6 Indian Cases 637). That is why when we come to the still later decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ganga v. Akhil (AIR. 1917 Cal. 794) which again is a judgment of a Division Bench, there is no further reference to the earliest decision of the Calcutta High Court, namely Nibaran Chandra v. S.C. Mukherjee (1910) 6 Indian Cases 637). On the other hand, the learned judges, who are parties to the decision in Ganga v. Akhil (AIR. 1917 Calcutta 794) specifically follow the earlier decision reported in Haridas Roy v. Sarat Chandra Dey (1913) 18 Indian Cases 121), wherein, as I have already stated, there is a specific dissent from the earlier decision reported in Nibaran Chandra v. S. C. Mukherjee (1910; 6 Indian Cases 637). A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the decision reported in Firm Jiwan Ram Ramchandra v. Jagernath Sahu (AIR. 1937 Patna 495) has also taken the same view as in Haridas Roy v. Sarat Chandra Dey (1913) 18 Indian Cases 121) and Ganga v. Akhil (AIR. 1917 Cal. 794).

9. I respectfully adopt the reasoning of the learned judges of the Calcutta High Court in the decisions reported in Haridas Roy v. Sarat Chandra Dey (1913) 18 Indian Cases 121) and Ganga v. Akhil (AIR. 1917 Calcutta 794), as well as in the decision of the Patna High Court in Firm Jiwan Ram Ramachandra v. Jagernath Sahu (AIR. 1937 Patna 495) and hold, in the circumstances of the case, that the view of the learned Munsiff of Alleppey that the suit of the plaintiff has to be dismissed on the ground of its being barred by limitation, will have to be sustained. As I have already stated, in view of the fact that I am accepting the rejection of the plaintiffs suit on the ground of limitation, no other question arises for consideration at all. Therefore, it follows that the revision petition fails and is dismissed. But parties will bear their own costs.

Dismissed.