1. By preferring this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 15.07.2010, passed by the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board, respondent No. 2 herein, whereby the registration of the school run by the petitioner Trust has been cancelled and the order dated 17.03.2011, passed by the first respondent State Government in appeal, confirming the order of the second respondent.

2. As per the narration in the petition, the petitioner Trust is running Achchala Chhariya Secondary School at Village Simaliya, Taluka Goghamba, District Panchmahals, for the last thirty years. The said school is situated in a forest area and mainly children from Adivasi families come to study there. According to the petitioner, there was no complaint against the school during the entire period of thirty years of its establishment. Trouble started brewing upon the appointment of one Shri Devendra Patel as Principal on 24.12.2004. As per the version of the petitioner, thereafter the result of the school began to deteriorate leading to the stoppage of the Government grant to it by the District Education Officer ("DEO" for short), the fourth respondent herein. Due to the poor administration of the school by the Principal, students and teachers stopped coming to the school regularly. It is stated in the petition that there was also an issue regarding the forging of the signature of the President of the petitioner Trust by the Principal on the option forms, which led to the filing of a police complaint by the petitioner. The Principal was suspended and permission to proceed against him under Section 36(1) of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, 1972 ("the Act" for short), was accorded by the fourth respondent. A Show-cause Notice was issued by the School Management to the Principal on 22.09.2009, for misappropriation of money and dereliction of duty, among other charges. It is the case of the petitioner that in order to protect his service, the Principal, in connivance with the Sarpanch of the village and other teachers, put a lock on the School and took, in writing, from some villagers whose children were not studying in the School, that they want to take over the management of the School. The Principal then issued School Leaving Certificates to all the children at the behest of respondent No. 4 who, according to the petitioner, was misled by letters from some parents, purportedly instigated by the Principal, without verifying the factual position. The students were accommodated in a nearby School.

3. The President of the petitioner Trust, upon coming to know of the issuance of School Leaving Certificates to the children, approached the parents who stated that they wanted their children to study in the petitioners School. These facts were brought to the notice of the fourth respondent. However, respondent No. 4 issued a Show-cause Notice to the petitioner as to why standards eight, nine and ten of the School should not be closed down, as there were no students. The petitioner replied to the Show-cause Notice but the fourth respondent passed an order dated 01.12.2009, closing down the School. Against this order, the petitioner filed an appeal on 16.12.2009 before the Commissioner of Schools, which was not decided. The petitioner, therefore, approached this Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 3277 of 2010 in which, by an order dated 15.03.2010, this Court directed the Commissioner of Schools to decide the appeal within eight weeks and if it was not decided in the stipulated period of time, an application was directed to be filed. The petitioner contends that in spite of the above order of this Court, the appeal has not been decided till date. It is the case of the petitioner that under the garb of this order, to which respondent No. 2 Board was not party, the petitioners School was informed telephonically, that a hearing was kept regarding the cancellation of the registration, on 06.05.2010, before the Secretary of the second respondent Board. This has been done in spite of the fact that the appeal against the recommendation of the fourth respondent for cancellation of the School is still pending. The petitioner requested for time to submit documents showing that a new building had been constructed with proper infrastructure. However, without considering this aspect, the second respondent Board passed the impugned order dated 15.07.2010, cancelling the registration of the School run by the petitioner Trust. In the appeal filed by the petitioner against the above-mentioned order before the first respondent, a specific ground was raised to the effect that, while passing the impugned order, the second respondent Board had not followed the procedure laid down in Regulation 9A of the Gujarat Secondary Education Regulations, 1974 (the Regulations for short). The said appeal was not decided by the first respondent for a considerable period of time. Once again, the petitioner had to approach this Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 1280 of 2011. By an order dated 15.02.2011, this Court directed the first respondent State Government to decide the appeal on, or before, 28.03.2011. The appeal has been rejected by the order dated 17.03.2011. Aggrieved by the impugned orders passed by the second respondent Board and the first respondent, respectively, the petitioner is before this Court.

4. Mr. R.R. Vakil, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that for the purpose of the cancellation of the registration of a School, a specific procedure has been laid down in Regulation 9A of the Regulations, which is required to be followed by the respondent Board. However, no such procedure has been followed. No Show-cause Notice was issued to the petitioner. Further, no charge-sheet containing the statement of the alleged defaults committed by it, as envisaged under Clause (2) of Regulation 9A, was issued to the petitioner Trust. Neither has any evidence in support of the alleged defaults been supplied. In fact, no inquiry, as contemplated under Regulation 9A(1), has been conducted by the Board. Instead, the respondent Board has called the petitioner telephonically to give an explanation. It is submitted that in the absence of a proper Show-cause notice and a charge-sheet being served, the petitioner was at a disadvantage to know on what grounds the Board was proceeding against it. Only when the petitioner received the impugned order, it came to know the grounds on which the registration has been cancelled. Had a proper charge-sheet as envisaged by Regulation 9A(2) been served, the petitioner could have raised a proper defence. Moreover, had an inquiry been conducted as per Regulation 9A, there would have been a spot inspection which would have revealed that the petitioner has constructed a new building with proper infrastructure. Under the circumstances, the principles of natural justice have been violated as the petitioner has not been granted an opportunity as contemplated by Regulation 9A.

5. It is emphatically submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that when the statute provides that a particular thing is to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in the manner provided. As the procedure prescribed in Regulation 9A has not been followed, the impugned order is vitiated and deserves to be quashed and set aside.

6. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed upon a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of J and K Housing Board and Another v. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul and others, reported in (2011) 10 SCC 714 [LQ/SC/2011/1435] .

7. It is further submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in the memorandum of the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of the respondent Board, a specific ground regarding the breach of the procedure prescribed under Regulation 9A has been taken, which has been totally ignored and not dealt with by the first respondent in its impugned order. Moreover, the documents indicating the fact that a new building has been constructed with proper facilities, have not been considered or even mentioned.

8. On the above grounds, learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed that the impugned orders passed by the respondent Board and the respondent State Government be quashed and set aside.

9. Mr. A.D. Oza, learned advocate, has appeared for the second respondent Board and has submitted that the fourth respondent DEO has conducted an inquiry as contemplated in Regulation 9A and on the basis of such inquiry, has recommended the closure of the school run by the petitioner Trust, by the order dated 01.12.2009. Another inquiry was conducted by the Commissioner of Schools (the third respondent herein) and the report is filed in January, 2010. It cannot, therefore, be contended that the respondent Board has passed the order cancelling the registration, without conducting any inquiry.

10. It is further submitted that the order of the DEO recommending the cancellation of the registration shows that the school had no proper building, infrastructure or students. Under the circumstances, the respondent Board is justified in passing the order.

11. Mr. Oza further submits that the requirement of Regulation 9A is to provide an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Even assuming that the procedure prescribed by the said Regulation has not been strictly followed, however, the petitioner has been granted two opportunities of hearing before the Executive Committee of the Board. Ample time of twenty days was also granted for the production of documents. It is contended that the Building Use Certificate and Stability Certificate produced by the petitioner are from private Engineers. It is submitted that the Board has followed the principles of natural justice which are contemplated by Regulation 9A, therefore, the petition deserves to be rejected.

12. Ms. Snusha Joshi, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 4 has adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. A.D. Oza, learned advocate for the respondent Board and has urged that the impugned order passed by the State Government, being just and proper, be upheld and the petition be rejected.

13. This Court has heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length, perused the averments made in the petition, the pleadings of parties and the documents on record.

14. The main contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that, while passing the impugned order cancelling the registration of the school run by the petitioner Trust, the second respondent Board has not followed the specific procedure laid down in Regulation 9A for this purpose. This has vitiated the order and deprived the petitioner of a proper opportunity as contemplated by Regulation 9A, thereby amounting to a violation of the principles of natural justice.

15. As a corollary to the above contention, it has been submitted that the respondent State Government has not dealt with the specific ground raised by the petitioner in the memorandum of appeal in this regard, as is clear from the impugned order.

16. To fully understand the context of the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner, it would be necessary to refer extensively to Regulation 9A, which is reproduced herein below :

"9-A : (1) If it appears to the Board that a person in-charge of the management of the registered school (hereinafter referred to in this regulation as "the Manager") has committed defaults in carrying out any obligation imposed on him under the Act, or the regulations or any instructions issued to him by the Board and there is a prima-facie case for holding the enquiry in such matter under sub-section (9) of Section 31, the Board may direct the Secretary of the Board or any other officer of the Board not below the rank of Secretary of the Board to conduct inquiry.

(2) The Inquiry Officer shall serve on the Manager a charge-sheet containing the statement of alleged defaults committed by the management and the evidence in support of such defaults and call upon the Manager to give his explanation in respect of each of the allegations stated in the charge-sheet within ten days from the date of receipt of such charge-sheet.

(3) The Inquiry Officer after considering the reply of the Manager and after making such further inquiry as he deems fit, call upon the Manager to supply such further information as may be necessary within such period as may be specified in the notice. The Inquiry Officer, may, also call upon by such notice the Manager to state whether the Manager desires to be heard in person. Such notice shall state the place, date and time on which the Manager shall be heard in person by the Inquiry Officer. After hearing the Manager in person or if the Manager does not remain present on the date and the time fixed for hearing and after considering the further information, if any, supplied by the Manager, the Inquiry Officer shall prepare the report of the Inquiry conducted by him. Such report shall definitely state the defaults committed by the Manager and it shall also be accompanied by cogent reasons for his conclusions. The Inquiry Officer shall also make in such report definite recommendations regarding the action to be taken against the Manager.

(4) The Inquiry Officer shall submit such report to the Executive Committee of the Board. The Executive Committee shall examine and consider the report and the relevant records of the Inquiry Officer and make such further inquiry as it may deem fit. Thereafter if the Committee arrives at tentatively to the decision that the Manager has committed defaults, the Committee, may serve a notice upon the Manager calling upon him to state and explain within such period as may be specified in the notice, why the name of the school should not be removed from the register. Such notice shall state the reasons as to why the Committee agrees or disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and also the evidence and other materials on the basis of which it is proposed to remove the name of the school from the register. On receipt of the explanation of the Manager, Committee shall examine and consider whether the explanation submitted by the Management is satisfactory or not. After examining and considering the explanation of the Manager, if the Executive Committee decides that the Manager has committed defaults in carrying out the obligations imposed the Manager under the Act, Regulations or any instructions issued to the Board, Board may direct the name of the school to be removed from the register for such period as may be specified in the direction or direct that the name of the school may be removed from the register permanently."

17. The above regulation has been framed delineating, in detail, the manner in which an inquiry is to be conducted by the Board and the procedure to be followed at every stage, before the Board makes an order for the removal of the name of the concerned school from the register of Secondary Schools. In other words, in respect of the cancellation of the registration of a school, Regulation 9A is a Code by itself. It minutely lays down the procedure to be followed by the Board. The stage for the application of Regulation 9A would arise after the DEO has recommended the closure of the School. This aspect is not disputed by any party before this Court. It, therefore, necessarily follows that before removing the name of the School from the register of Secondary Schools, the Board was obliged to follow the procedure under Regulation 9A, at every stage.

18. Clause (1) of Regulation 9A contemplates the holding of an enquiry by the Board by its Secretary or any other officer not below the rank of Secretary of the Board. It may be noted that as per the regulation, the enquiry is required to be conducted by an officer of the Board of the prescribed rank, and not by an officer of the State Government. Mr. A.D. Oza, learned counsel for the respondent Board, has sought to argue that an inquiry was conducted by the fourth respondent DEO, before passing the order regarding closure of the School. Another inquiry was conducted by the third respondent Commissioner of Schools. However, Mr. Oza was at a loss to show whether an officer of the Board, itself, had conducted the enquiry. It is an admitted fact that against the order of the DEO directing the closure of the School, an appeal is still pending, in spite of the directions of this Court to decide it in a time-bound manner. Any enquiry conducted by the DEO before passing the order for the closure of the school would be at a stage before the provisions of Regulation 9A come into play. The Board steps in after the order of the DEO has been passed. Once the Board is seized of the matter, it is required to act strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Regulation 9A.

19. There is a clear breach of Regulation 9A(1) on the part of the Board in not appointing an Inquiry Officer of the rank of Secretary or equivalent rank of the Board. Even if the Inquiry Report of the Commissioner of Schools dated -01.2010 is perused, it clearly recommends that the Board should consider the fact that the petitioner Trust has constructed a new building in which there are proper facilities, so that the future of the students is not jeopardised. Assuming that this report is based upon an inquiry directed by the Board, it was incumbent upon the Board to have given reasons for disagreement with the findings in the said report, as per the provisions of Regulation 9A(4). This has obviously not been done.

20. Another glaring breach in the prescribed procedure by the respondent Board is that no charge-sheet, as contemplated by Regulation 9A(2), has been issued or served to the petitioner, containing a statement of the alleged defaults committed by the management of the school. Further, no evidence in the shape of documents in support of the alleged defaults has been supplied to the petitioner. As a result, the petitioner has been deprived of its right to even know about the specific allegations against it. Without knowing the allegations that ought to have been contained in a properly framed charge-sheet, the petitioner would definitely be placed at a disadvantage in tendering an explanation and producing relevant documents in its defence. Such glaring lacunae cannot be termed as mere technicalities but would amount to a deprivation of a proper opportunity of hearing, which would go to the very root of the matter as it would amount to a violation of the principles of natural justice.

21. When the Board has not deputed its officer of the prescribed rank to be the Inquiry Officer, it follows that there is no report of the Inquiry Officer. It has come on record that the Board has telephonically called the petitioner to appear before it without even issuing a charge-sheet, has recorded statements and then, straightaway, has proceeded to pass the impugned order. This course of action adopted by the Board is contrary to the provisions of Regulation 9A. Such a deliberate deviation from the prescribed procedure is unacceptable.

22. It may be true that in the process, the Board has heard the petitioner Trust twice. However, such a hearing, without any definite charges being framed or communicated, cannot be considered to be effective as the petitioner would be oblivious of the specific allegations against it. The manner and method followed by the Board is absolutely de hors the procedure laid down in Regulation 9A. The Board is bound by the Regulations and has to compulsorily follow them strictly. The submission advanced by learned counsel for the Board that the regulations contemplate an opportunity of hearing which has been granted, cannot be accepted. The Board cannot be permitted to take liberties with the Regulations as it pleases. It cannot be permitted to devise its own procedure contrary to the regulations, on its own whims and fancies. The deregistration of a school is a serious matter having far-reaching consequences. When the implications are serious in nature, it is all the more necessary to follow the prescribed procedure strictly, stage by stage, as laid down in Regulation 9A.

23. When it is clear that the Board has acted in flagrant breach of the procedure prescribed in Regulation 9A, it is immaterial whether it has called the petitioner twice for a hearing or granted twenty days to produce documents. This Court is unable to agree with the submissions advanced by learned advocate for the Board that the Board has granted full opportunity to the petitioner and satisfied the principles of natural justice. Opportunity has to be granted as prescribed in Regulation 9A and not as the Board deems fit. The Board cannot supersede the Regulations as it pleases. When no Inquiry Officer has been appointed, no charge-sheet issued, no evidence in support of the allegations supplied, it is evident that at every stage the procedure under Regulation 9A has been flouted by the Board. Due to the flagrant disregard of the provisions of Regulation 9A, the petitioner has been placed in a disadvantageous position and the principles of natural justice, as contemplated by Regulation 9A, have been violated.

24. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of J and K Housing Board and Another v. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul and others (supra), to buttress his submission that when a statute prescribes the manner of doing a thing, it must be done accordingly. The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced herein below :

"32. It is settled law that when any statutory provision provides a particular manner for doing a particular act, the said thing or act must be done in accordance with the manner prescribed therefor in the Act. Merely because the parties concerned were aware of the acquisition proceedings or served with individual notices does not make the position alter when the statute makes it very clear that all the procedures/modes have to be strictly complied with in the manner provided therein. Merely because the landowners failed to submit their objections within 15 days after the publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the State Act, the authorities cannot be permitted to claim that it need not be strictly resorted to."

This judgment fortifies the view taken by this Court. The respondent Board cannot devise its own method contrary to the Regulations.

25. Insofar as the first respondent State Government is concerned, it has failed to examine the specific ground taken by the petitioner in the appeal, regarding the breach of Regulation 9A by the Board. Without doing so, it has mechanically upheld the order of the Board.

26. Both the first and second respondents have sought to rely upon the order dated 01.12.2009, passed by the third respondent regarding the closure of the school. In the view of this Court, the reliance upon the said order is thoroughly misplaced, as an appeal is pending against the said order. Moreover, the said order has been passed prior to the stage envisaged by Regulation 9A and cannot be made applicable to the proceedings under this Regulation.

27. Taking into consideration all the above aspects cumulatively, this Court is of the firm view that both the impugned orders cannot be sustained.

28. For the afore stated reasons, the following order is passed :

(1) The impugned order dated 15.07.2010, passed by the second respondent, the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board, is quashed and set aside.

(2) The impugned order dated 17.03.2011, passed by the first respondent, State Government, is quashed and set aside.

(3) It is open to the second respondent to proceed strictly in accordance with the procedure envisaged in Regulation 9A.

29. It is clarified that this Court has dealt with the aspect of the breach of Regulation 9A but has not expressed any opinion regarding any other aspect of the matter.

30. The petition is allowed, in the above terms. Rule is made absolute, accordingly. There shall be no orders as to costs.