Thomas William Richardson, J.

1. The petitioner was an inspecting Pundit of Pathshalas orprimary schools under the Burdwan Municipality. He brought the suit to recoverhis pay for twenty-one months at Rs. 15 a month for the period from September1916 to May 1918, the pay for the whole period amounting to Rs. 315. He alsoclaimed a sum of Rs. 84-5 0 which, he alleged, was in deposit on his account inthe Provident Fund. The defence set up by the defendant was that thepetitioners pay had been stopped because he had not worked for the period forwhich the pay was claimed. I am informed that no separate defence was made inrespect of the sum in the Provident Fund, but the written statement has notbeen placed before me. The suit was tried by a Subordinate Judge exercisingSmall Cause Court powers. The learned Subordinate Judge, dealing somewhatbriefly with the merits on which he found that the plaintiff had done no workfor the period to which the claim related, dismissed the suit. This Rule wasissued on the defendant--the Chairman of the Municipality--to show cause whythe decree should not be set aside.

2. Now, the principal ground on which the learnedSubordinate Judge proceeded was the ground of limitation. He held that the suitwas barred by limitation under the provisions of Section 363 of the BengalMunicipal Act (III of 1884). That section lays down, in reference to thepresent purpose, that no suit shall be brought against the Commissioners of anyMunicipality or any of their officers "for anything done under thisAct" until the expiration of one month nest after notice in writing hasbeen delivered or left at the office of such Commissioners, It further laysdown that every such action--meaning every suit brought against theCommissioners for anything done under the Act--shall be commenced within threemonths next after the accrual of the cause of action and not afterwards. In thecase of Chunder Sikhur Bundopadhya v. Obhoy Churn Bagchi 6 C. 8 (F.B.); 3 IndDec. (N.S.) 6 it was held by a Full Bench of this Court that Section 87 ofBengal Act III of 1864--the provisions of which were similar to those of theAct of 1864-was applicable only in those cases where the plaintiff claimeddamages or compensation for some wrongful act committed by the Commissioners ortheir officers in the exercise or honestly supposed exercise of their statutorypowers. In that case, the suit was a suit for the recovery of land; but theprinciple laid down is applicable to the present case. Then there is the caseof Shudhangshu Bhusan Roy Chowdhury v. Beioy Kali Roy Chowdhury 3 C.L.J. 376.That was a case under the present Act, in which the plaintiff sued for adeclaration that a tax imposed upon him had been improperly assessed. Thelearned Judges followed--though apparently with some reluctance--theconstruction put upon the section by the Full Bench. A similar view of asimilar provision was taken by the Madras High Court in the case of Mayandi v.Mc Quhae 2 M 124 : 3 Ind. Jur. 309 : 1 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 358, where it was heldthat a suit for breach of contract was not a suit for a thing done under theAct. [See also Municipality of Parola v. Lakshmandas Supadhubhai 25 B. 142, 2Bom. L.R. 857.

3. In England the Public Authorities Protection Act of 1893applies to any action, prosecution or other proceeding against any person forany act done in pursuance, or execution, or intended execution of any Act ofParliament, or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any allegedneglect or default in the execution of any such act, duty, or authority andprovides that the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or beinstituted unless it is commenced within six months next after the act,neglect, or default complained of, It has been held that that provision doesnot apply to such actions as an action for wrongful dismissal founded on breachof contract of service (Lightwoods Time Limit on actions, page 389).

4. In my opinion it is clear that the present is not a caseto which Section 363 of the Bengal Municipal Act has any application. The suitis for breach of contract and not for anything done under the Act The learnedSubordinate Judge was, therefore, in error in holding that the suit was barredby limitation. As to the merits the learned Subordinate Judge, in view, no doubt,of the opinion which he held on the question of limitation, did not deal withthem as completely as he might have done. That being so, the decree complainedof must be set aside and the suit must be remanded to the Court below to bere-tried with reference to the observations made in this judgment. Costs ofthis Rule--the hearing fee being assessed at four gold mohurs--will abide theresult.

.

Panchanan Chatterjeevs. Babu Santosh Kumar Bose (07.02.1921- CALHC)